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ABSTRACT
Maureen Helen Fordham
Choice and constraint in flood hazard mitigation:
the environmental attitudes of floodplain residents and engineers.
This research examines the importance of environmental factors in the choice, promotion and
implementation of flood defence schemes in England and Wales. It focuses on the attitudes
of National Rivers Authority (NRA) engineers and floodplain residents to low-frequency flood
events and investigates the role of NRA engineers in influencing, the choices of floodplain
residents.
The theoretical focus includes an examination of the appropriateness of the dominant (North
American) hazards research paradigm as an explanatory model in the British context and the
development of a conceptual model applicable to this socio-political and cultural milieu. The
research extends existing, primarily quantitative, research designs to include more qualitative
approaches which provide descriptive richness and context beyond that afforded by
quantitative data alone.
The quantitative and qualitative studies of floodplain residents show environmental factors to
be an important influence on their attitudes to proposals for flood hazard mitigation and to
existing flood defence schemes. This is conceptualised as a 'risk-environment trade-off. The
case studies of floodplain residents further identify an unmet information need concerning
both flood risk and flood defence.
The qualitative study of NRA engineers highlights the differences in perception and attitude
between engineers and residents to flood risk, flood defence, public consultation and
environmental factors. It underlines the complexity of the interactions which occur between
individual, institutional and societal levels.
The research concludes that the dominant paradigm model is inappropriately focused at the
individual level and does not take sufficient account of institutional and structural influences.
Furthermore, the concentration on choice rather than constraint ignores the social conflict and
self-interest of actors in the decision-making environment. The research suggests that a
systems approach is inadequate for dealing with the complexities of flood hazard mitigation.
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PART ONE
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background to the study
Floodplain management raises issues of both academic and public policy interest. The present
study arises from a real world problem and thus is not solely of academic value but aims to
bridge theory and application. In Britain major floods have an infrequent and largely
unpredictable occurrence. After such events there can be an outcry from the public who
generally want to know the cause of the event (and possibly where to apportion blame) and
swift action to prevent a recurrence. However, preventative action can take many years to
come to fruition, during which time much of the anger, distress and fear that generated the
call for action, has subsided and many of the original residents who experienced the event
have moved away. When a proposal for a structural flood defence scheme is filially presented
to the public there can be considerable opposition, often on the grounds of unacceptable
environmental impact.
It was the need by the National Rivers Authority (NRA) 1 , one of whose responsibilities is
flood defence, to understand and forestall such opposition that was the original impetus for
this research. The Thames Region of the NRA is producing a hydraulic master plan of the
whole of the River Thames (The River Thames Flood Defence Strategic Initiative), which
aims to provide an engineering, planning and environmental overview of the Thames
floodplain with the objective of finding a 'solution' to the flood problem (Thames Water,
1988). Part of the NRA Thames Region's framework for assessment asserts a commitment
to the concept of public consultation (Thames Water, 1988:68). An element of this
consultation process, as seen by the NRA Thames Region, was a survey of public attitudes
to the flood risk and flood defence proposals. It is this research which forms the empirical
basis of much of this study.
In the later part of the 1980s, NRA Thames Region had experienced some difficulty in
promoting a major flood relief scheme (The Maidenhead Flood Alleviation Scheme) in a part
of the Thames floodplain which had not experienced major flooding for forty years. The
proposals for the scheme had met with considerable opposition despite the fact that the
scheme had been designed to be environmentally sensitive. Thus, for the NRA, an important
'Prior to privatisation and the splitting of the water management functions in 1989, the
ten regions of the NRA were part of the respective Regional Water Authorities.
1
objective of the research was the facilitation of scheme implementation.
The research design aimed to provide the NRA with information to aid future scheme
promotion - in particular, the next stage of the flood defence studies for the River Thames -
and to further existing models of floodplain decision-making. Although the research was
jointly funded, the empirical research was closely tied to NRA needs and the NRA made
detailed comment on the targeting of survey populations and the content of questionnaires.
As research design advanced beyond the most general level, it became clear that the NRA
was anxious to protect its public image and was not prepared to disclose publicly certain of
the information that it held. Despite the perceived need by the NRA to combat the low flood
hazard perception in the floodplain, there was much concern at the questionnaire design stage
not to alarm residents by informing them too strongly that they were at risk. Similarly with
the proposals for flood defence, there was concern that there should be no leak of a possible
scheme or route that might arouse residents to oppositional action.
After some months of collaborative work, the initial design for this thesis - which had been
strongly influenced by the (NRA) engineering culture - was extended to include an
examination of this culture and the interaction of NRA engineers with the floodplain decision-
making environment. This was felt to be necessary to understand how far the engineers
influenced the nature of the information reaching the public and to place in context the
empirical data being collected from the public'.
Joint funding created the opportunity to expand the areas of research interest away from those
solely of concern to the NRA and provided an element of independence. Thus, while a study
of NRA engineers was not perceived to be of immediate value to the NRA, arguments
justifying its academic value were accepted. In addition to a series of interviews with
engineers, observation and, to a lesser extent, participant observation were also employed to
examine the engineering culture and working environment. While never being a complete
participant in the sense of doing the same work as the engineers being studied, the author's
role as consultant afforded a degree of acceptance by the organization but also an expectation
of support for its aims and needs. However, an element of tension developed over time for
the author as it became increasingly difficult to adhere to the role of participant when a
'critical observer' role became more dominant. For the author it began to appear duplicitous
2 A major element in this research, as in many earlier studies, was to be an examination
of the flood hazard perception of the floodplain resident; however, in areas of very infrequent
flooding it was hypothesized that much of their perception would be based on information
from NRA engineers.
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at times.
Teamwork has been the dominant mode of working throughout the life of the Project although
certain of the research modules were designed and managed independently by the author. All
data was analyzed or reanalysed by the author for the completion of this thesis. The author's
personal input to each of the research modules is as follows':
1. Thames Perception and Attitude Survey, 1989 (DWSC/89): Baseline Study:
Major input to the design of the survey. Daily administration of the survey and its
team of interviewers. Data entry and supervision of data entry. Data analysis and
contribution to the (at time of writing) draft final report (Tunstall et al, 1990).
Extensive analysis undertaken subsequently.
2. 'The River Environment and You' Postal Survey, 1990 (DWSC/90):
Major input to the design of the survey. Project administration, later delegated. Some
analysis and contribution to the (at time of writing) draft final report (Tapsell et al,
1991). Extensive analysis undertaken subsequently.
3. The River Thames Maidenhead Flooding Survey, 1990 (Maidenhead 1990):
Major input to the design of the 'public perception' section of the survey. Project
administration, later delegated. Extensive analysis undertaken subsequent to
completion of the (at time of writing) draft final report (Sangster et al, 1990).
4. The Lower Stour Flood Alleviation Scheme: Christchurch, 1990:
Complete responsibility for the design, administration and execution of the study and
for the analysis and report writing (Fordham, 1991a).
5. The Bridport Flood Alleviation Scheme: West Bay, 1990:
Complete responsibility for the design, administration and execution of the study and
for the analysis and report writing (Fordham, 1991b).
6. Interviews with NRA flood defence engineers:
The examination of engineers' attitudes did not form a part of the NRA's information
needs but was specifically related to the academic and theoretical needs of the thesis.
These interviews were carried out as a separate research module subsequent to the
main data collection period; the design and implementation of this module were
entirely under the control of the author.
3 The author was also involved in interviewing, data analysis and contribution to the final
report (Tunstall et al, 1989) for the 1988 Eton Wick Survey (which was a pilot study for the
Public Perception of Rivers and Flood Defence Project, but which is not discussed in detail
in this thesis.
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Throughout this document the term 'the study' refers to the thesis: including its theoretical
underpinnings, all forms of its data collection, and the written document itself. The 'Project'
or 'the research project' refer to the jointly funded 'Public Perception of Rivers and Flood
Defence' research project. 'Modules' refer to the separate research enterprises undertaken for
the study: i.e. case study surveys and interviews, and the interviews with engineers.
1.1.1 Theoretical roots of the study
The study follows a now well-trodden academic path which began with the 'Chicago School'
of geographers who, since the 1960s, have produced a considerable body of empirical
research into floodplain occupance, management and decision-making. Their research
hypotheses and methodology have, at times, been imported virtually unchanged into the
markedly different British cultural and political milieu. One reason the North American model
could be transposed so easily was its focus on the 'natural' hazard event and the response of
the individual, and its apparent disregard of the socio-political environment within which such
responses are made.
Thus, with minor changes to accommodate differences in geomorphology, and therefore in
the spatial and temporal behaviour of rivers in flood, the model of perception and response
by individual floodplain managers' formed the basis of a similar body of empirical research
in the quite different socio-political and cultural environment of Britain. It became apparent,
however, that this model was less than satisfactory in representing British floodplain
management decision-making.
The research discussed below aimed to widen the focus to that most appropriate to the British
situation, by including both the individual and the organizational levels of investigation
(neither being solely satisfactory by themselves) while remaining substantially bound by the
behavioural research paradigm. More specifically it aimed to investigate the previously under-
researched role of environmental factors in floodplain decision-making, and to concentrate
more closely on attitudes to possible adjustments rather than the flood hazard. Thus the
conceptual model around which the survey research was designed and the survey instruments
themselves were based closely on earlier hazards research.
4 Floodplain managers are defined in the literature (Kates, 1962:30) as individual owners
or tenants of residential properties, or managers or tenants of commercial businesses or public
establishments. This would seem an inappropriate aggregation of the residential and the
commercial populations who one might expect to have different objectives and resources at
their disposal. In the present study the term is avoided when it might result in ambiguity.
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However, a later re-examination of the place of hazard-response theory in the context of a
wider body of geographical theory, supported by the findings of both the empirical
investigations and immersion in the decision-making environment, led to the ultimate
conclusion that both individual and organizational units of analysis lack conclusive
explanatory power, because both are fundamentally controlled at higher socio-political levels.
Nevertheless, this should not preclude further examination at either the individual or
organizational levels (as dogmatic adherence to opposing epistemological theories might
suggest) but rather that caution should be exercised in the assessment of the degree of
explanation provided by these units of analysis.
1.1.2 Research focus
The research proceeded through an examination of two key decision-making groups in
floodplain management: floodplain residents and NRA engineers. These two groups were
chosen to illustrate the importance of interactions in the decision-making environment which
constrain individual choice, and the inadequacy of concentrating primarily on the flood hazard
perception of individual floodplain residents in explanations of floodplain occupancy and
management.
While it is recognized that there exist a number of other key decision-makers in the floodplain
decision-making environment (such as representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries
and Food (MAFF), local authority planning officers, land drainage/flood defence committee
members, interest group representatives, commercial and industrial floodplain occupants,
property developers, etc.), in such a complex research area, focus was imperative if the study
was not to become too diffuse and superficial; the choice was restricted to two groups in
order to create a manageable research study. This research strategy represented, therefore,
a compromise between possible levels of analysis: individual, organizational and societal. The
concentration on the individual unit of analysis should not be interpreted as meaning other
scales of analysis have been either ignored or regarded as unworthy of further study.
The justification for the choice of these two groups lies in their more direct association with
the physical consequences of floodplain management policy decisions: NRA engineers design
and build the physical structures of flood defence with which the residents have to live. In
addition, they are the two groups most closely in contact, and sometimes in conflict,
regarding these structures.
While the need to communicate risk and act in mitigation of hazards is accepted, some of
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what follows might appear to be in opposition to this position. This is not the intention but
rather to show how limited opportunities for public participation, mishandling of public
consultation, and - at its extreme - an abuse of institutional power, militate against effective
and efficient risk communication and response. The stated position adopted by this study5
is critical of existing decision-making structures in flood defence and it is this factor, perhaps,
that makes this research different from much previous work which has tended to start from
an unstated position of congruence with the engineering perspective'.
1.2 Boundaries of the study
This study should be viewed in the context of certain prescribed boundaries. It does not set
out to examine flood hazard per se but rather to focus on attitudes to flood defence, and
largely on a particular level of infrequent flooding, in England and Wales. These boundaries
are discussed below.
1.2.1 Floodplain Occupance
The study is located within the field of disaster or hazards research which is now a substantial
research area covering natural and anthropogenic hazards and, what might more accurately
be termed, quasi-natural hazards, because of the frequent blurring of these distinctions. Much
of this work, particularly in the earlier years of its development, has concentrated on the
occupance and management of floodplains.
The density of population in Britain has encouraged substantial development in floodplain
environments. This has necessarily caused problems when, as part of the natural behaviour
of rivers, periodic flooding of surrounding land occurs and when the socio-political processes
of land use have had an impact on the hydrological regime of river catchments.
Flooding will continue to occur despite efforts to mitigate the risk because the highest levels
of adjustment can always be exceeded by an extreme environmental event (Mileti, 1980:329)
albeit, possibly some decades or centuries into the future.
5 It is argued below that all research is value-laden and subjective to a degree, and thus
it is incumbent upon a researcher to state their position, vis a vis the study problem, to avoid
misleading the reader.
Indeed, this research started from this very position by asking why it was that floodplain
residents persisted in living in a hazardous environment, why do they - irrationally - refuse
flood defence, how best can they be persuaded to change their attitudes.
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1.2.2 England and Wales
This study addresses itself solely to floodplain management in England and Wales. Scotland
has a different institutional and legal framework within which floodplain management
decisions are made (although, historically, all have been dominated by landowning and
agricultural interests (Parker & Penning-Rowsell, 1980:203)) and which have influenced the
development of policies and institutions.
In England and Wales two central government departments are involved in floodplain
management: MAFF and the Department of the Environment (DoE). The ten regions of the
NRA have chief responsibility for floodplain management on coastal floodplains and main
rivers' although there are also significant overlaps with local (planning) authorities who have
responsibility for managing non-main rivers. There are further, more minor, overlaps with
local authority engineering and drainage departments. While the role of county and local
authority planning departments is arguably a significant factor in the management of flood
hazard, it is only comparatively recently that detailed attention has been given to the way the
institutional liaison procedures have operated and to methods for the development of joint
strategic planning opportunities.
This lack of engagement between land use planning bodies has similarly been reflected in
much of the academic research literature which has often failed to address the constraints
placed on floodplain management by what are essentially political bodies. While
acknowledging the fundamental importance of these links, this research study has not made
an empirical investigation of them but does, through its development and critique of
'traditional' forms of hazard research, highlight both earlier omissions and future needs.
1.2.3 Urban river floodplains
There has been a significant policy shift in recent years with regard to the relative importance
of agricultural land drainage and urban flood defence initiatives. As mentioned above, the
landowning and agricultural dominance of land drainage/flood defence committees ensured
for many years the support of land drainage in the interests of greater agricultural production.
However, two related factors have combined to reduce the power and influence of this lobby:
firstly the recognition of agricultural overproduction in Europe and, secondly, more
7 Main and non-main rivers are so designated by MAFF on statutory maps. The NRA is
principally concerned with main rivers but it has a general supervisory responsibility over all
land drainage and flood defence matters in its respective regions.
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generalised public concern over the environmental impact of agribusinesses.
The fact that the Ministry with responsibility for flood defence is also the Ministry with
responsibility for agriculture led to the continued support of the land drainage function until,
in the national interest, a more rational policy on public expenditure (and arguably a need for
NRA personnel to protect their jobs) led to a shift from rural to urban protection (Penning-
Rowse11 et al, 1986).
Thus, in latter years, the majority of flood defence funding has been placed in urban and
coastal flood defence initiatives; making it a more fruitful area for study. The wider range
of interest groups in the urban environment creates a more diverse research field in terms of
the conflict that is sometimes generated.
For many urban floodplains the most frequent flooding problems have been alleviated to some
degree and this study focuses on the more infrequent flood events which lie in the area of
greatest decision-making uncertainty (Kates, 1962). NRA flood defence personnel base their
decision-making on historical records and statistical analysis of flood frequency which lead
them to prepare for the (inevitable, as they see it) repeat of a rare event. However, the
general public depend to a major degree on experience: both personal and secondary (i.e. that
of relatives, neighbours or other members of the community). In the urban environment
personal and community experience may be limited due to more frequent relocation by
residents. Thus, the urban floodplain resident must make decisions in situations of relative
ignorance and extreme uncertainty.
1.2.4 Residential and institutional (NRA) attitudes towards structural flood defence
measures
During the process of flood hazard management, NRA officers appraise the flood problem
in their area and, in consultation with a range of individuals and organizations, design and
implement a solution to the problem. The majority of NRA flood defence personnel (in senior
decision-making positions) are engineers and this concentration of engineering expertise leads
to an emphasis on structural solutions. This structural bias also arises from the limited powers
of the NRA to influence wider land use management decisions which may influence the
hydrology of the floodplain.
In addition, the nature of the majority of floodplains and hydrological regimes in Britain has
meant that structural solutions have been generally successful, in contrast to the markedly
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different situations in North America and Australia, for instance, where considerably more
powerful rivers and vast floodplains can lead more frequently to truly catastrophic events
when structural works are breached or overtopped (Parker and Penning-Rowsell, 1983;
Penning-Rowsell et al, 1986).
The study of individual engineers' attitudes complements the study of residential attitudes and
provides evidence of how the policies of the institution operate on both the individual
floodplain resident or engineer and also within the social environment of the floodplain.
During the following discussion, the terms 'organization' and 'institution' are used
interchangeably as indicative of a level of analysis greater (no value judgement implied) than
the individual but less than the societal. In following the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary
definitions of the terms, an organization is understood to be a purposive arrangement and is
incorporated within the definition of institution which, importantly, is more specifically
associated with the promotion of some object for public utility.
1.2.5 Attitudes examined at different points on a scheme-development continuum
Two recurring themes emerged from personal discussions with NRA engineers and from a
study of the academic literature: firstly, that the most important factor in flood hazard
management decisions is flood experience and, secondly, early opposition to flood defence
scheme proposals will fade soon after the scheme has been constructed. While the importance
of flood hazard perception is acknowledged, the primary focus of this study, and where it
diverges from earlier work, is on attitudes to structural flood defence works and not, flood
hazard perception. However, their inevitable interaction, through what is later termed a 'risk-
environment trade-off', is not denied.
The study is structured to examine attitudes at different stages of scheme development in
order to investigate the validity of the latter theme but has adopted a form of case study
approach which allows for an examination of scheme attitudes and flood hazard perception
in tandem. The stages that have been examined are:
the pre-scheme design, baseline study stage (sometimes known as the feasibility
stage);
the post-scheme design, option generating, baseline study stage;
and the post-scheme construction, project appraisal stage.
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1.3 Aims and objectives of the research
The research aimed to examine the following broad questions:
what are the important factors in flood hazard management decision-making?
how important are environmental factors in making decisions about flood hazard
management?
do floodplain residents and professional flood defence managers make a risk-
environment trade-off?
in what way do NRA engineers influence flood hazard management?
1.3.1 Theory
The research aimed also to examine the appropriateness of the dominant hazards research
paradigm as an explanatory model in the British context. A common criticism of much
hazards research has been that it is atheoretical (Watts, 1983). This study aimed to make a
more overt and conscious use of theory than previous research had done. However, theory
was used as a practical aid to interpretation and understanding rather than as a restraining
dogma. Thus, no single, clearly definable theoretical position is recognizable but an amalgam
of theoretical strands have been incorporated where they have been deemed useful.
1.3.2 Application
The research has had a strongly applied element from its inception. The NRA, as joint
funding body, had specific information needs that were to be addressed in the separate
research modules, with the objectives of providing an input to the NRA's consultation
programmes and to gather data to explore opportunities for policy change. Early findings of
the research have already found application in floodplain management' and it is expected that
there will be a continued input to institutional decision-making as the research project
progresses.
8 For example, the recognition by some flood defence engineers that early public
consultation can identify sensitive areas and issues of which the professionals were unaware
has led to moves to instigate consultation programmes at an earlier stage of scheme
promotion.
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1.3.3 Conceptual model
The development of existing conceptual models of flood hazard mitigation and adjustment was
one of the earliest objectives of the research. The research design was based on a variant of
generally accepted North American models of flood hazard perception and mitigating
adjustment (Kates, 1971; O'Riordan, 1971a; Mileti, 1980; Penning-Rowsell et al, 1986).
However, as the research progressed, the utility and appropriateness of such deterministic
models - even when adapted to British floodplain management - was questioned. This is
discussed in greater detail below.
1.3.4 Methodological tools for research
The design and testing of data collection instruments were early objectives of the research
project and to this end a range of techniques - both quantitative and qualitative - have been
used. These have included long, structured questionnaires administered by interviewers; self-
completion postal questionnaires; long, loosely structured interviews - taped and untaped; a
brief ethnography; content analysis; observation and, in a limited form, participant
observation. The need of the project to test the effectiveness of different survey instruments
has had both positive and negative affects: it is recognized in the literature (Denzin, 1970)
that the use of a range of techniques (i.e. triangulation, see below for discussion and full
references) can strengthen validity and thus have a positive value in research. Nevertheless,
the use of several techniques makes comparability across studies more difficult because it can
become impossible to gauge whether differences are 'real' or simply a methodological
artifact.
1.4 Structure of the thesis
The thesis is organized in two parts. Part One comprises the introduction to the study,
including surveys of relevant literature, discussion of underlying theory and fmdings relating
to hazards research, and a general methods section.
Part Two comprises the empirical studies of floodplain residents and engineers, a revision of
the initial conceptual model and concluding discussion and recommendations.
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2. THE DOMINANT PARADIGM IN HAZARDS RESEARCH
This chapter defines and discusses the dominant paradigm in hazards research and provides
an outline of its theoretical antecedence. It discusses certain, key, elements within hazards
research (the measurement of perception, attitude and behaviour, environmental perception
studies, and risk analysis) and the 'dominant view' represented by the 'flood hazard school'
and Kates' (1971) systems model of human adjustment to natural hazard. Finally it addresses
the appropriateness of the application of the dominant paradigm to the conditions which
obtain in England and Wales.
Broadly defined, the concerns of hazards research (also known as hazard and natural hazards
research) are "the totality of factors which generate, sustain, exacerbate, or mitigate those
characteristics of natural and man-made environments that threaten human safety, emotional
security, and material well-being" (Mitchell, 1984).
Although the term hazards research has been adopted throughout this thesis, a more
commonly used term has been 'natural' hazards research. Burton and Kates (1964:413) have
defined natural hazards as elements in the physical environment harmful to man and "caused
by forces extraneous to him" [my emphasis] which highlights the separation of man and
environment which is such a feature of the dominant paradigm. It is also, perhaps, a
'commonsense' view of hazards/disaster as implying a negative cost but the beneficial aspects
of hazards/disaster have also been noted (White, 1945; Kates, 1962; Mileti et al, 1975;
Sorensen and White, 1980; Penning-Rowsell et al, 1986; Namafe, 1989).
In White's first published work (White, 1935) natural hazards (in this case droughts) were
seen as 'acts of God' while the losses arising from them were seen as largely 'acts of man'.
Thus White had already conceptually separated the non-manageable (act of God) from the
manageable (act of man) in the hazard event. However, in the case of urban floods in
particular, such are the interactions with and impacts upon 'natural' geophysical systems (to
adopt the dominant paradigm concepts) that it has become increasingly inappropriate to use
the word 'natural' for either the precipitating event or the resulting loss. Flooding must be
seen as, at best, a quasi-natural hazard in most circumstances. Some have suggested that, so-
called, 'natural hazards' should be regarded, more realistically, as "acts of men rather than
acts of God" (Smith, 1979:7).
The term 'natural' becomes even less appropriate when attached to disasters - the sometimes
catastrophic outcome of hazards. In less developed countries in particular, disasters are more
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often associated with vulnerability, dependence and marginalisation and arise largely as a
consequence of socio-economic rather than natural factors (Winchester, 1992; Susman et al,
1983; O'Keefe et al, 1976; Ball, 1975; Tiranti, 1977). This is not merely a question of
semantics, for the perceived cause of 'natural' hazards/disasters will have an impact on
perceptions of appropriate adjustment. Use of the word 'natural' can suggest an event for
which nobody is to blame and whose solution is for everyone to 'pull together'. This, it has
been suggested (Burgess, 1978), is an ideologically-based argument in favour of consensus
and denies conflicts in the community arising from socially constructed inequalities of power
and control.
Within what has been variously called the "dominant view" (Hewitt, 1983:4), and "a modest
but universal research paradigm" (Kates and Burton, 1986:324), a flood hazard 'school' has
been recognised (Waddell, 1977), closely associated with the work emanating from the
Universities of Chicago, Toronto, Clark and, later, Colorado and dominated by the early
work of the geographers White (1945; 1974), Kates (1962; 1971) and Burton (1961; Burton
and Kates, 1964; Burton et al, 1978) - the "Kates-White-Burton paradigm" (Watts,
1983:240).
This work has examined the aetiology and perception of hazard events and the processes of
adoption of hazard-reducing adjustments. A closely related area of study is disaster research
which relates the impact of extreme geophysical events to patterns of human vulnerability and
which is similarly concerned with the role of hazard perception as a factor limiting the
mitigation of risk (Alexander, 1991). Although related, disaster research and hazards research
have been distinguished by their differing emphases on response to disaster impacts, and
adjustment to the risk of future disaster, respectively (Mileti, 1980; Burton et al, 1978; White
and Haas, 1975).
2.1 General theoretical antecedence
The theoretical underpinnings of the dominant paradigm in hazards research lie with
behavioural geography. More fundamentally they lie with positivism' and, subsequently,
humanism. Arguably, the "positivist orthodoxy" (Hughes, 1990) is so ingrained in hazards
research that it is rarely questioned or even noticed by those working within it: it has
assumed a role akin to the Kuhnian concept of "normal science" (Kuhn, 1970): that is, the
orthodoxy against which new theories are measured.
9 As did (and to a considerable extent still does) much social science, in its attempt to
gain academic respectability through the adoption of a natural science model.
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Research workers in the hazards field have tended not to challenge or extend the fundamental
theoretical base, but rather to make incremental changes within the paradigm. Quantitative
measurement techniques have favoured the concentration of explanatory power at the
individual unit of analysis, to the neglect of the political-economic context (similarly,
concentration on the individual unit of analysis has favoured quantitative measurement
techniques). This has led to accusations of banality and triviality (Watts, 1983; Waddell,
1977) which are not totally unjustified.
The theoretical discussion which follows examines some of these criticisms. It does not aim
to provide a comprehensive discussion and analysis of the development of geographical
theory: this can be found elsewhere (see, for example, Jackson and Smith, 1984). Its more
modest aim is to highlight those theoretical areas of significance to the development and
practice of hazards research and to suggest how the adherence to a particular (or, more
accurately, composite), dominant, theoretical base has restricted the range of hazards theory.
2.1.1 Positivism/humanism/behavioural geography
Positivism can be characterised by the following elements: it stresses the primacy of sensory
experience for an objective explanation of external reality; it claims the natural science model
as an appropriate method for the examination of social reality; it supports a fundamental
distinction between fact and value; it argues that it is by the systematic accumulation of facts
that general theories and laws are produced (Hughes, 1990; Jackson and Smith, 1984).
Despite its initial development out of a reaction to certain positivist assumptions, the
behavioural geography that emerged in the mid-1960s "was destined to become a typical
product of its quantitative, positivist era" (Jackson and Smith, 1984:46). Behavioural
geography developed an early interest in humanist concerns with meaning but was most
strongly influenced by those who wished to make social science more scientific.
Behavioural geographers, working initially in the field of locational analysis, had sought a
more realistic substitute for the rational, economic model of man the optimiser (discussed
further below) which they found in Simon's `satisficer' model (Simon, 1957) in which people
adopt more modest goals and seek to avoid major risks (Jackson and Smith, 1984:48). This
resulted in qualifications of, but little radical change to, the existing theoretical framework;
however, it did stimulate considerable methodological variety and originality. The emerging
geography included, inter alia, studies of human adaptation to natural hazards and
environmental perception, with both positivist and humanist orientations. The latter, by
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acknowledging the central and active role of human beings, places itself in opposition to both
a positivist spatial science and to structural marxism (Jackson and Smith, 1984:8).
A major criticism of behavioural geography has been its over-emphasis on the individual
actor and its neglect of the role of societal constraints. Rieser (1973) applies an epithet of
Baran (1969) to accuse it of `psychologism% that is, a reduction of "complex social and
historical trends to individual psychological processes" (Rieser, 1973:54). Rieser's research
experience in housing led him to the conclusion that the concrete problems of the real world
are not commensurable with the abstract orientations of the academic. He found that "the
objective constraints were so great that the elucidation of constraints in subjective knowledge
of the environment became meaningless" (Rieser, 1973:53). In Rieser's analysis, behavioural
geography is not passive and value-free but, in its predication on the belief that all society's
problems are solvable through a gradual reforming process, provides active support for the
status quo. It obfuscates and mystifies objective reality and its methods hold the potential to
be a tool of social control. This analysis suggests that the employment of survey research by
NRA engineers to facilitate the development of a structural flood defence scheme could be
construed as a form of social control through manipulation of public attitudes.
A further point made by Rieser and other analysts is that behavioural geography concentrates
on choice when, in light of power relations in society, a more realistic focus should be on
constraint; although, even this approach, he argues, maintains an inappropriate emphasis on
the individual (Rieser, 1973:55). This position is best summed up by Marx (1972:10)10,
which encapsulates the central problems of the correct unit of analysis and the power of the
individual to choose:
"Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not
make it under circumstances chosen by themselves."
Gray (1975) also addresses the issue of the individual and the failure of behavioural
geography to deal with constraints on preference and choice. Indeed, Gray identifies
preference and choice, in addition to aspiration, decision, perception and behaviour, as key
words in the literature of behavioural geography, denoting the dominant explanatory referent,
i.e. "that people exercise individual preferences made within a choice framework" (Gray,
1975:228-9). This he believes to be - as does Rieser (1973) - a "mythical and mystical"
notion which has buttressed the status quo in society and proved a hindrance to "a true
1° From "The eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte", and quoted in Leach, 1978:35,
Rieser, 1973:55 and Watts, 1983:244.
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understanding of reality" (Gray, 1975:234).
Gray believes the key to understanding urban processes to be a political economy approach
incorporating the study of institutions (as reflections of capitalist society) rather than
individuals. The concentration of research on the individual unit has arisen, he believes,
partly as a result of "the heritage of the discipline"; partly as a result of the inter-relation
between the types of data used (often questionnaire surveys and census data) and the direction
of the research; and partly because of a value judgement concerning the appropriateness of
the individual household as the unit of analysis. These he links with an acceptance of
'establishment' modes of analysis found in much of geography's academic environment and
its "intellectual weakness" (1975:232). Thus, an explanatory framework should stress the
structural features of society. The North American heritage of hazards research has provided
an emphasis on the role of the individual as a research focus appropriate to the North
American cultural milieu but perhaps less so (despite a decade of individualistic `Thatcherism'
(Hall and Jacques, 1983) in Britain.
Relph (1976) has claimed from a phenomenological perspective that many positivist analytical
models of behaviour are mechanical and abstract and ignore the subtleties of everyday
experience. Furthermore, echoing Rieser (1973), such "simplified structures" are then used
as the basis of "more efficient" modes of environmental design and manipulation (Relph,
1976:preface). However, the phenomenological approach can be criticized on the grounds that
it too fails to address society beyond the individual and is unable to convey the "brutal
objectivity of much everyday experience" (Smith, 1979:367).
Burgess (1978) sums up the debate so far and touches on criticisms pertinent to hazards
research, i.e. that it has eliminated historical elements or that it has been guilty of historical
specificity (Watts, 1983; Waddell, 1977):
"The phenomenal and behavioural approaches in geography lead to a radical
elimination of historical and social elements from the study of man's relationship to
the environment and build an individualistic psychology into an explanatory
mechanism for interpreting meanings, values and actions" (Burgess, 1978:9).
Although the above describes much theoretical divergence and opposition, Jackson and Smith
(1984) remark on a more recent tendency towards convergence and compromise in
behavioural geography (1984:50-64) and social geography generally (1984:185-6). To
illustrate the point, their theoretical model is a structural-conflict model, of Weberian rather
than Marxist influence but also influenced by Park and the Chicago School in respect for
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experience. They argue that there is a need to reject the determination of the cultural by the
politico-economic but also to recognize that cultural expressions may be structured by the
political (1984:176-8). Theirs is a model of society as an ongoing process of social interaction
involving both conflict and consensus in uneasy balance (1984:188).
Such a view acknowledges the contribution of subjectivist perspectives, while not
neglecting the importance of historical context or existence of multiple constraints on
social action" (Jackson and Smith, 1984:189).
They are not alone in suggesting the possibility of (and even the need for) theoretical and
methodological plurality (Hughes, 1990; Silverman, 1985; Harvey 1990; Bryman, 1988). It
is this research perspective that underpins this thesis and which is necessary, it is argued, to
extend the horizons of hazards research.
2.1.2 Perception, attitude, values and behaviour
Perception studies, including environmental and hazard perception, have been a prominent
sub-field of behavioural geography at least since the 1960s and the publication of an
influential and seminal paper by Lowenthal (1961) which put forward a tentative geographical
epistemology on the basis of experience and imagination and provided the impetus for many
subsequent empirical perception studies; although the philosophical issues it raised received
less attention (Jackson and Smith, 1984). Behavioural research has made considerable use of
social surveys and structured questionnaires as research instruments and yet they focus,
apparently paradoxically, on the study of attitudes rather than behaviour. This section outlines
the definitions of perception and attitudes and their relationship to behaviour.
The problems of definition of terms have been noted by researchers (Saarinen, 1969; Goodey,
1973; Whyte, 1977) - particularly those who have crossed disciplinary boundaries - although
Goodey (1973) notes also the usefulness of a certain lack of definition in the early stages of
understanding.
Perception is the process by which an organism detects and interprets information from the
external world by means of the sensory receptors. In psychology the concept is a narrow one
of direct sensory perception; a broader definition in general usage is more closely related to
'cognition' in psychology (Whyte, 1977). At its simplest and broadest, perception is a process
of being aware (Goodey, 1973) and is a function of past history and present situational
conditions (Schiff, 1970).
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An attitude is "a disposition to respond favourably or unfavourably to an object, person,
institution, or event" (Ajzen, 1988:4). Attitude is a multidimensional concept comprising an
affective, a cognitive and a conative, or behavioural, component. These can be defined
respectively as comprising an individual's feelings of liking or dislike for an object; an
individual's beliefs about an object; and an individual's behavioural intentions towards an
object. The affective and cognitive components are organized systematically, producing a
predisposition to respond in a way consistent with the system. Thus, an attitude is a collection
of feelings (affects) and beliefs (cognitions) which predispose an individual to respond in a
particular way to the object (Schiff, 1970).
Underpinning attitudes are values. Social groups have shared value systems which act as a
frame of reference for the evaluation of attitude and behaviour. Rokeach (1968:ix) also takes
a systemic view and argues that if beliefs, attitudes and values are elements in a functionally
integrated cognitive system then, it follows, that a change in one part will effect change in
other parts of the system and will culminate in a change in behaviour. Beliefs vary in
importance: the more important the belief, the more resistant to change it will be and the
greater will be the disturbance to the rest of the belief system in the event of such a change.
Importance is defined by the functional connectedness with other beliefs: the more central the
belief, the greater will be the implications and consequences for other beliefs (Rokeach,
1968:5; Lauer, 1971:248).
As hypothetical constructs, attitudes cannot be measured directly but must be inferred from
responses - such as a number of attitude statement items in a structured questionnaire, for
example. While a single item is unlikely to prove reliable in capturing such dispositions,
aggregating responses over a number of items has been found to be a more reliable measure.
An underlying assumption in the use of this research method is that understanding attitudes
will enable us to understand, if not predict, behaviour. While the extent to which people act
in accordance with their attitudes is variable - particularly with respect to specific behaviours
- intuitively we can accept that people act in ways that are consistent with underlying relevant
dispositions.
Ajzen (1988) acknowledges the role of experience ("past events") - central to much
environmental and hazard perception research - which leaves an enduring mark on a person.
"By assessing attitudes and personality traits we attempt to unveil the hidden factors
that, as a result of past events, have come to predispose the individual to act in
certain ways" (1988:146).
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Ajzen does not promote a single method of measurement but believes the appropriateness of
a given method is dependent on circumstances: different methods may all be used as valid
measures of underlying dispositions. He stresses the importance of definition and
measurement of dispositions at different levels of generality or specificity for reliability and
predictive validity. Measures can only be considered indicators of a given disposition if they
correspond in level of generality: broad response dispositions tend to be poor predictors of
specific behaviours (Ajzen, 1988:148).
A lack of correspondence between what people say and what they do has been attributed, in
part, to problems of measurement validity (Lauer, 1971). The possible presence of biases in
the verbal response situation (such as a tendency to acquiesce or to respond in a socially
desirable manner, for example) have received more attention than possible biases in observed
behaviour which may also be influenced by social desirability or conflict avoidance, for
example. However, Ajzen claims that few situations provide an incentive for a strong bias
and that these should be overcome by the application of suitable measurement techniques.
Ajzen favours the concept of intention as the most useful predictive measure of specific action
(1988:150). He states that "barring unforeseen events, people tend to carry out their
behavioral plans." Further, that they are generally consistent in their behaviour patterns and
are not controlled by external forces.
Ajzen's theory of planned behavior (1988:132), an extension of the earlier theory of reasoned
behavior (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980), has as a central factor the individual's intention to
perform a given behaviour. The theory postulates three conceptually independent determinants
of behaviour: attitude towards the behaviour, subjective norm and perceived behavioural
control. The last determinant is stressed: thus if resources or opportunities to perform a given
behaviour are absent then strong behavioural intentions will not be formed even in the
presence of favourable attitudes towards the behaviour and the approval of significant others.
Lauer (1971:249), discussing the second of these behavioural determinants, presents a concept
of attitude as an ecological variable: individuals function within the context of an attitudinal
ecology. In order to understand behaviour it is necessary to establish how the behavioural
situation is defined, the self-concept of the individual, and the individual's reference group.
O'Riordan (1983a) also acknowledges the importance of 'social milieu' in behaviour but has
expressed doubts concerning the relationship between attitudes and behaviour (1983a, 1973).
He has suggested that conflicting attitudes and inconsistent behaviour are quite probable given
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the variety of meanings and situations for action inherent in many environmental issues, for
example, and that measurement should be directed at behaviour rather than attitudes (1973).
He points out that too often, attitude surveys attempt to elicit a response to likely behaviour
far removed from the interview situation or concerning 'cosmic' questions for which a
number of behaviours may be appropriate depending on the situation (1973:18). In effect, he
suggests investigating behaviour to discover attitude (and other psychological, social and
structural factors which promote or inhibit action).
As a response to O'Riordan's contribution to the 'attitude-action dichotomy', Svart (1974)
suggests that, paradoxically, behaviour may be less significant than attitudes in understanding
actions. Svart claims that O'Riordan's analysis fails to acknowledge the constraints placed
upon behaviour by existing social systems and that investigations of actual behaviour that
preclude potential behaviour can produce "ideologically-biased information about the
desirability of alternative social policies" (1974:303).
While agreeing with the latter assertion, Massey (1975) argues that the focus of the debate
is incorrect and that it is empiricism itself which is at fault and not just its application to
behavioural studies. That the proper focus for geographical research is the systemic structure
that produces the behaviour (1975:202). This argument takes the discussion to another
fundamental problem of geographical research, that of finding a means to mediate between
the individual and society.
An alternative model of the relationship between attitude and behaviour has also been posited
(Bern, 1970), which suggests behaviour influences attitude. By observing his/her own
behaviour, an individual will adjust his/her beliefs and feelings. However, O'Riordan (1983a)
contends that perhaps neither model is satisfactory because they do not acknowledge the
social and political forces, influencing attitudes and constraining behaviour (1983a:226).
2.1.3 Environmental perception/attitudes
Environmental perception research has been eclectic in its disciplinary contributions, sharing
however a common orientation and philosophy relating to the centrality of human
understanding, choices and behaviour as forces shaping the environment (Whyte, 1977).
Psychological techniques and approaches for the analysis of interactions between environment
and human behaviour, which stress the individuality of perceptions of the environment and
the irreducible uniqueness of private world views (Lowenthal, 1961:257) have been
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prominent in geography and influential in hazards research. Environmental perception can be
set within the wider context of social perception which, at its simplest, is concerned with the
effects of social and cultural factors on the individual's cognitive structuring of the physical
and social environment (Saarinen, 1969). Thus perception is dependent on more than just
sensory data but is related to past experience, psychological set' (Saarinen, 1969), context,
role and personality of the individual, and the operation of cultural forces (Craik, 1986). The
importance of placing the 'cultural filter' within a political, economic and historical context
has also been stressed (Pepper, 1989).
Research has examined variations in orientations or dispositions to the environment
(McKechnie, 1977) which suggest that variations in `worldviews' (Craik, 1986) or underlying
value systems (Cotgrove, 1982) are important for understanding complex reality (Pahl,
1967:218-242). The simplest 'split' between differing orientations is Craik's dual
conceptualisation between "Contemporary Worldview 'A": favouring a highly technological,
high-growth, free enterprise, materialistic society with rational, quantified decision-making
processes and "Contemporary Worldview `B": favouring a low-growth, low-technology,
socially and environmentally concerned, decentralised, non-materialistic society with
participatory decision-making processes (Craik, 1986:54).
A similar but more detailed construction is that of Cotgrove (1982) (see Table 2.1) which
contrasts the dominant social paradigm with an alternative environmentalist paradigm.
Considerable variation has been found in attitudes and beliefs between industrialists (the
dominant social paradigm) and environmentalists and also between (Cotgrove 1982) and
within (O'Riordan, 1977; Pepper, 1989) different environmental groups themselves.
Environmentalism can encompass widely divergent social views. On the one hand it can be
seen as radical in its approach to problems of resource management, on the other it can
attract those with deeply conservative, hierarchically structured and authoritarian value
systems. Environmental concern can be a manifestation of dismay at the loss of a certain
social order and traditional authority structure (Lowe and Warboys, 1978). Far from being
a homogeneous group, environmentalists can be categorised along a continuum of
environmental concern from 'deep environmentalists' at the extreme of ecocentrism, to
`cornucopians' at the extreme of technocentrism (O'Riordan, 1983; Cotgrove, 1982).
Arguably, it is the latter which more closely approximates the values expressed within the
dominant paradigm, despite the widespread concern for environmental issues that has
11 Saarinen (1969) defines 'set' as "attitude acting through values, needs, memories,
moods, social circumstances, and expectations" (1969:5).
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ECONOMY
POLITY
SOCIETY
NATURE
Table 2.1: Dominant and alternative environmental social paradigms
DOMINANT PARADIGM	 ALTERNATIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL
PARADIGM
CORE
VALUES
Material
Natural env. valued
as a resource
Domination over nature
Market forces
Risk and reward
Rewards for achievement
Differentials
Individual self-help
Non-material
Natural env. valued
intrinsically
Harmony with nature
Public interest
Safety
Incomes related to need
Egalitarian*
Collective/social
provision
Authoritative structures:
(experts influential)
Hierarchical
Law and order
Centralized
Large-scale
Associational
Ordered
Ample reserves
Nature hostile/neutral
Environment controllable
KNOWLEDGE	 Confidence in science and
technology
Rationality of means
Separation of fact/value,
thought/feeling
Participative structures:
citizen involvement
Non-hierarchical*
Liberation*
Decentralized
Small-scale
Communal
Flexible*
Limited natural resources
Nature benign
Nature delicately
balanced
Limits to science
Rationality of ends
Integration of fact/value,
thought/feeling
* Some environmentalists favour hierarchical, differentiated, stable, traditionally ordered
communities/societies.
(After Cotgrove, 1982:27)
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developed in recent years (see Chapter 3).
2.1.4 Risk perception/analysis
There is frequently some conflation of the two terms 'hazard' and 'risk' in the literature. A
simple definition of the two terms is given as: "hazards are threats to people and what they
value and risks are measures of hazards" (Kates and Kasperson, 1983:7027, quoted in Short,
1984:711). This definition emphasises the negative dimension but risk can be both more
neutral (e.g. the probability of an event) or positive (e.g. voluntary risks associated with
dangerous (hazardous) sports) (Short, 1984; White and Haas, 1975). Douglas (1986) has
noted that risks are selected and that risk perception cannot ignore the social concerns that
influence selective attention (1986:39).
Torry (1979a) has noted that Burton, et al (1978) confer three distinct meanings on the term
'hazard': the agent which produces the impact; risk of exposure to the agent; and the losses
resulting from impact; this, he suggests, is a "muddling of core concepts" (Torry,
1979a:371). Notwithstanding this criticism, the present study uses both the first and second
meanings.
Risk is commonly defined as the probability of an adverse event and its magnitude (Rayner
and Cantor, 1987). However, while this definition may be adequate at the level of
engineering calculations, it does not adequately define the issues of risk management in the
wider social arena (Rayner and Cantor, 1987). There can be no single 'correct' perception
of risk; risks are selected from a universe of risks and the selection is the result of social
influences (Douglas 1986; Kasperson et al, 1988). This suggests that underlying value
systems are likely to be as influential in risk perception as the physical properties of hazard
events:
"The important issues of risk perception can never be analyzed with an inventory of
the physical features of events, their scale of damage, suddenness or duration"
(Douglas, 1986:28).
While technical assessments of risk may be necessary, they are not sufficient as the basis of
societal choices regarding risk management; "the technical concept of risk is too narrow and
ambiguous to serve as the crucial yardstick for policy making" (Kasperson et al, 1988:178).
It has been acknowledged (White, 1966a, 1966b; Burton et al, 1978; Otway and Wynne,
1989) that there can be fundamental differences in professional and public perceptions of risk:
23
the former tend to view risk probabilistically; the latter tend to view it causally (Tunstall et
al, 1990). Flood defence engineers (as professionals) estimate flood risk in terms of the
statistical probability of a repeat event of a given magnitude and design control structures to
meet these levels (plus a little more, termed `freeboard'). It has been suggested (Green et al,
1991) that the engineering culture, which emphasises the design of safe structures, results in
a conservative bias towards estimation in the interests of failure limitation (Gardiner,
1991:10/9). However, the resulting structure may conflict with public preferences of
acceptable levels of 'failure'; that is, the result of a trade-off between standards of protection
and levels of perceived environmental damage (Fordham and Tunstall, 1990).
While the engineer views floods as largely natural events, the public tend to view them as
largely the result of human agency; they look for someone to blame for mismanagement
(Fordham, 1991a). As an extension of this dichotomy of approach, the two groups are also
divided in the degree of attention they give to values and ethics in their definitions of risk
(Handmer and Penning-Rowsell, 1990; Kasperson et al, 1988). In fact, the
professional/engineer is more likely to eschew such considerations as being beyond his/her
(professional) brief and capabilities; while the member of the public is more likely to
concentrate on just these factors to the virtual exclusion of the technical - and for the same
reasons. Thus, in addressing questions of acceptable risk, the two groups will essentially be
speaking different languages (Handmer and Penning-Rowsell, 1990). The differences in
perception are marked between those (engineers) for whom the concept (the risk of a rare
flood) is an abstraction and those (residents) for whom it has personal meaning.
Earlier research (Burton et a1,1978) found that different time horizons seem to exist between
the average floodplain resident (with a short-term time horizon) and the scientist/engineer/city
planner etc. (with a long-term time horizon). On the basis of differences in livelihood
expectations and other factors, a given hazard event will not constitute the same hazard to
everyone (1978:97). For those who expect to occupy the floodplain for a short time period
only, a flood risk of 1 in 50 appears remote and improbable. The flood defence engineer with
a professional time horizon of 50 or 100 years regards the probability of such an event with
a greater degree of certainty. Older persons are particularly prone to the former view because
they do not project beyond their (limited) life expectancy.
The infrequency of extreme events means that few people will have sufficient experience to
accurately assess future risk. This applies to both the public and the professional (Saarinen,
1990). To predict future flooding with any degree of accuracy requires many years of record
which are not usually available. Thus the basis of the apparent factual nature of the
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professional assessment of risk probability - which gains respectability through the use of
numbers - is actually very uncertain.
The public, who are unlikely to have access to statistical data, judge risk in terms of their
own experience and what they have heard or seen. This method is also prone to uncertainty.
It is likely, in the case of the estimation of flood risk, that they will extrapolate on the basis
of a very small sample. It has also been noted that people tend to focus on (and overestimate
the probability of) events that are easiest to recall - the so-called 'availability bias' (Saarinen,
1990; Slovic et al, 1979) - such as those that are frequent or dramatic. This is allied to the
'image of damage' (Mileti, 1980; Marks, 1990) that is perceived will result from extreme
events and which is likely to influence attitudes to mitigation.
The importance of risk communication has been stressed in the identification of new risks,
the determination of acceptable risks and the minimisation of unacceptable risks (Handmer
and Penning-Rowsell, 1990). However, risk information cannot be regarded as value-free but
is culturally defined (Douglas, 1986) and an effective tool in the hands of the powerful
(Handmer and Penning-Rowsell, 1990). A problem for the understanding and communication
of risk is that the provision of information will not necessarily (or even probably) alter
existing perceptions of risk; rather information is likely to be selected if it reinforces an
existing position and rejected if it does not. While this is an accusation made most often
against the layperson it applies also to the professional/expert.
2.1.5 Acceptable risk
Risk perception-communication paradigms have largely ignored the social context in which
perception and communication take place (Otway and Wynne 1989) and have contained
inherent assumptions about the direction of risk communication (i.e. unidirectional from the
professional/authority to the layperson), and about relationships to authority (i.e. that
authority figures are acting wholly in the public interest). Thus, if viewed in a wider social
context, techniques for risk communication could be either benign or manipulative. This
social relationship is of obvious importance where the decision to be made is one of the
acceptability of risk: whether a level of acceptability is self-determined or imposed externally
may significantly effect responses to it.
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Rayner and Cantor (1987) suggest risk managers and policymakers' are addressing the
wrong question when they ask "how safe is safe enough?"; they should rather be asking "how
fair is safe enough?". The authors suggest at least three factors are of importance to the
public ("policymakers' constituencies"):
1. Is the procedure by which collective consent is obtained for a course of action
acceptable to those who must bear its consequences?
2. Is the principle that will be used to apportion liabilities for an undesired
consequence acceptable to those affected?
3. Are the institutions that make the decisions that manage and regulate the
technology [risk] worthy of fiduciary trust? (Rayner and Cantor, 1987:4).
When these three factors are answered satisfactorily, the risk-bearing population will hardly
even regard as risks the low-probability/high consequence events that concern risk analysts
and professional risk managers. Thus, there is a difference in the conceptualization of risk
management between the managers and the managed and between different constituencies
of the managed which suggests risk should be seen as a complex of interactions between
different people and not only, as with typical engineering calculations, between people and
'nature' (Rayner and Cantor, 1987).
The connection between the theoretical and applied aspects of risk analysis (used as an
inclusive cover term) has been close. A major aim of examining risk perception and
communication, for example, is to understand how improvements in the latter can cause
improvements in desired response. It has been noted (Otway and Wynne 1989) that there are
difficulties in combining a critical, independent, researcher role with one of "enthusiastic
advocacy" (1989:142); thus engendering suspicions of manipulative intent - whether or not
they are justified. The production of research must be seen as part of the wider social
relations of production with all the implications that holds for the social legitimation of
research agendas and uses.
It has been noted (Short, 1984) that risk analysts have given insufficient attention to the
positive aspects of risks and to social values other than economic and human (physical) health
costs and benefits: social science research has not examined how people live with risks and
interactive effects on perception and behaviour (Short, 1984:712). Douglas (1986) has
discussed further the systematic neglect of cultural influences on the acceptability of risks and
12 Rayner and Cantor's paper, and the research findings on which it was based, address
specifically questions of societal technological risk but many of their findings and the
underlying theories of risk analysis are easily transferable to the issues surrounding flood
defence decisions; that is, what is more often (usually erroneously) called 'natural' risk.
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the centrality they should occupy:
"The question of acceptable standards of risk is part of the question of acceptable
standards of living and acceptable standards of morality and decency, and there is no
way of talking seriously about the risk aspect while evading the task of analyzing the
cultural system in which the other standards are formed." (Douglas, 1986:82).
The next section focuses more closely on the place of the 'flood hazard school' in this wider
view of societal risk management.
2.2 The flood hazard school
2.2.1 Disciplinary background
Hazards research has borrowed from, and been adopted by, a number of disciplines including
geography, economics, psychology, anthropology and sociology (White, 1973). Despite such
disciplinary interactions, the flood hazard school has been criticised (Torry, 1979a:375) for
a lack of sociological sensitivity which has prevented it from adequately addressing the social
processes which underpin hazard aetiology'. The geographical approach has been both
formative - early examples of which were the work of Harland Barrows (Barrows, 1923) in
the 1920s on human ecological adaptation to environment and White's seminal monograph
on flood perception (White, 1945) - and dominant. Social science methods have been used
extensively, emphasising the spatial and temporal distribution of risk, impacts and
vulnerability (Palm, 1990; Alexander, 1991).
While for some (White, 1973; Kates and Burton, 1986) the links forged with other disciplines
were regarded as a positive benefit through the cross-fertilization of ideas, others have
claimed that hazards research has been oblivious to discoveries made by hazard researchers
in other disciplines (Tarry, 1979a:375) and has become fragmented through specialization'
and that a fully interdisciplinary, ecocentric approach is now required within the framework
'3 In the late 1970s and early 1980s the 'dominant view' was challenged by a number of
researchers in geography and other disciplines (Hewitt, 1983). At its most positive this
critical response suggested the potential for new directions to hazards research; at its most
negative it showed a tendency to stray into the personal and vitriolic (Waddell, 1977; Torry,
1979a, 1979c).
14 Alexander  (1991) identifies 6 discernible specializations of approach: a geographical
approach, an anthropological approach, a sociological approach, a development studies
approach, disaster medicine and epidemiology and a technical approach prevailing among
natural and physical scientists (Alexander, 1991:211-212).
27
of human-ecology (Alexander, 1991).
This orientation within an ecological conceptual framework is not new: under the broad,
umbrella term of environmental research, hazards research has been aligned with human-
cultural ecology (Watts, 1983:235) or human-ecology (Kates, 1971). The tradition of human
ecology can be traced back to the work of the Chicago school of sociologists and ecologists,
dominated by the work of Park (Jackson and Smith, 1984). Mileti (1980) however, has
argued that hazards research is different from human ecology in that the former has sought
to understand human adjustment to environmental extremes and has emphasised individual
adjustment, while the latter has sought explanations for human adjustment to the
environmentally routine and has focused on larger collective social units (1980:328).
Despite associations with human ecology, Torry (1979a) has remarked on the ("curious")
absence of an ecological perspective (1979a:377) in natural hazards research, a criticism he
bases on the absence of the essential organizational component in hazard response systems.
There has been a noticeable lack of any in-depth studies of the role of environmental factors
(the importance of concern for nature conservation and landscape) in floodplain decision-
making.
An ecological perspective has been used or claimed by many researchers to indicate that their
work (or others') is (or should be) holistic in nature; taking in the broadest possible area of
inquiry by integrating physical and human social systems (Burton, Kates and White, 1968;
Kates, 1971; Smith and Tobin, 1979). Yet, even in later works, and notwithstanding the point
that 'ecological' does not equal 'environmental', the constraints imposed by environmental
attitudes, values and imperatives are noticeably lacking (Smith and Tobin, 1979). Where
environmental factors are addressed they are given cursory attention. Kates' (1971) somewhat
vague "ecological setting" refers to "whether the hazard is intrinsic to the use characteristics
or locational advantage of the site" (Kates, 1971:440). James (1974) lists environmental
concern as a factor affecting response to structural measures but the recommended
measurement measures (1974:37) are severely limited.
Waddell (1977) believes the dominant hazards methodology to be ahistorical (1977:75) and
a product of, and relevant to, a particular type of society:
"...a Western, urban-industrial, capitalist state characterized by a resolutely
antienvironmentalist ideology, a population that both is massively mobile and has lost
most of its sensitivity to the natural world, and a central government whose
responsibility for managing environmental problems is ill-defined" (1977:73).
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While the acerbic tone of his criticism has a tendency to alienate the reader, nevertheless,
many of Waddell's observations are penetrating and apposite; having relevance also for a
British analysis. The ahistorical approach adopted (not necessarily consciously) by the hazards
school does not address the underlying social and political processes of hazardous phenomena
and this factor may have been instrumental in (apparently) facilitating the transfer of
methodology across national and cultural boundaries.
2.2.2 Underlying theories
Although social geography can be characterised as essentially eclectic (Jackson and Smith,
1984), nevertheless, positivism (albeit in a modified rather than a crude form) has held a
dominant position in geography, and social science generally, with methodological
implications. The belief that knowledge is derived from empirical evidence is pre-eminent in
positivism (Hughes, 1990) and it is perhaps Britain's "unparalleled attachment to an
empiricist tradition" (Jackson and Smith, 1984:130) (dating back to the philosophers Hume
and Locke) that eased the transposition of the dominant paradigm across spatial and cultural
boundaries.
It has been suggested above that a positivist-behavioural-humanist analysis (in which much
hazard research can be placed) focuses overmuch on the individual and neglects wider
cultural and socio-political constraints. Torry (1979a) has claimed that geographers have
concentrated on the physical properties of land and weather that make societies hazard-prone,
but "without the benefit of a coherent social systems frame of analysis" (Torry, 1979a:377).
While hazards studies have been made of larger social units, such as organizations (Haas and
Mileti, 1976) and societies (Sorenson and White, 1980; White, 1974), arguably these have
been aggregations of individual actions and beliefs (Kates, 1971; Burton, Kates and White,
1978; Mileti, 1980) and have never been successfully integrated within the analysis but rather
have been used as a backdrop against which the focal study of the individual takes place.
Whilst remaining strongly associated with the dominant paradigm, Penning-Rowsell et al,
(1986) adapted and extended it to a more appropriate research focus for the British situation,
where the individual unit of analysis is less than adequate. Their aim was to advance hazard-
response theory to include institutional and political forces and to provide an analysis with
practical relevance to floodplain managers - a goal suggested earlier by Lewis (1976). They
conclude that, while the debate on the relative importance of focusing on the role of the
individual or the state cannot be settled with empirical analysis (because "both individualistic
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and 'structural' explanations of policies and events can be vindicated by the same data"),
more progress will be achieved through further policy analysis from a "holistic perspective"
rather than individual perception and response (1986:177).
On the basis of the now extensive empirical studies, hazards research has developed several
'laws' (Alexander, 1991). For example, that high magnitude geophysical events tend to have
a low frequency distribution and vice versa; that the distributive effects of hazards are such
that as the magnitude of individual impacts decreases, so the size of the population affected
increases (Burton et al, 1978); that there is a tendency to overestimate the impacts of large
scale hazard events and to underestimate the minor and more frequent hazards; that the more
frequent and well-known the hazard, the greater will be its integration within community
culture and the less variation there will be in reaction to it; that, generally, the greater the
physical or emotional distance from the hazard, the less the psychological impact (Alexander,
1991:213-214). The search for such 'laws' and "a general theory of response to flood hazard"
(James et al, 1971) is indicative of an early, crude, empiricist approach that has been
modified subsequently to some extent.
Nevertheless, underlying much hazards research there remains an assumption that there exists
an objective reality which is capable of being perceived more or less realistically - although
rarely achievable. This position is allied perhaps to the pragmatism of Park (Jackson and
Smith, 1984:71) which is a hybrid between empiricism and humanism. This duality is
reflected in White's (1966a) early recognition that "there can be no thoroughly objective
perception of the environment, only degrees of distortion which are minimized in rigorous
scientific description" (White, 1966a, quoted in Kates and Burton, 1986:225), which
suggests, paradoxically, both the unlikely attainment of a truly objective perception and the
mechanism (rigorous science) by which it might be possible.
2.2.3 The rationality question: bounded rationality
The early hazards research was strongly influenced by the tenets of economics, one of which
suggests the existence of the 'rational, economic man'. Thus it was formulated that the
floodplain manager's choices were based on individual economic optimization, as a result of
relatively complete knowledge of the (flood) hazard and possible adjustments. This initial,
'optimizer' model was modified to one of subjective expected utility where optimization was
sought but on the basis of limited knowledge. However, even this modified model failed to
explain many research findings and thus a model of bounded rationality (Simon, 1957) was
adopted and developed by Kates in his study of LaFollette (Kates, 1962) and later in his
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general systems model of human adjustment to natural hazards (Kates, 1971).
Burton et al, (1978) later acknowledged that rarely do individuals have access to full
information regarding natural hazards or choice of adjustment and that even if they were to
have such information, it is unlikely that they would be able to process it adequately or select
optimal adjustments (Burton et al, 1978:52).
The early research into floodplain adjustment tended to regard as irrational floodplain
managers who failed to perceive the flood hazard or failed to adjust optimally (White,
1966b). Later work found that when attitudes or behaviour were placed in perceptional
context then much could be seen to be rational within these bounds (Parker, 1976).
Nevertheless, despite such modifications to a crudely empiricist approach, the attainment of
rationality in decision-making remains a dominant theme.
The policy implications of such an analysis are that if existing (boundedly rational)
attitudes/behaviours have been formed on the basis of inadequate knowledge, they can more
closely approximate objectively rational attitudes/behaviours through education. This is the
model on which the NRA operates: it assumes that, given an adequate amount of information
on the flood hazard, the floodplain resident will act rationally by accepting floodplain
management proposals put forward by professional flood defence managers. However, there
is incomplete understanding of the relationship between knowledge and action and much of
the literature points to a lack of causal relationship (Sims and Baumann, 1983). Furthermore,
in a complex society, rationality is culturally bounded, dependent upon the differing
experiences of different social groups and institutions (Douglas, 1978; Rayner and Cantor,
1987).
2.2.4 The standard survey instrument
The relationship between theory and method is complex and, arguably, its nature has yet to
be determined definitively (see Chapter 5 for further discussion). Kates and Burton (1986),
who have described natural hazards research as a "modest but universal research paradigm",
claim that it is the problem, and not the discipline or available methodology, which dictates
the research (1986:324). Conversely, Waddell claims, in a review article of White's 1974
volume ("Natural Hazards: Local, National, Global"), that the "configuration of the problem
is dictated by the constraints of the methodology" (Waddell, 1977:76).
A standard survey instrument (White, 1974; Natural Hazards Research Working Paper
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No.16, 1970) was developed for the collaborative research programme sponsored (from 1969)
by the Commission on Man and the Environment of the International Geographical Union (a
selection of whose results were published in White, 1974) based on early empirical work in
North America (Burton et al, 1968; Kates, 1971).
The basic research design entailed an examination of the extent of occupance of hazard-prone
areas, hazard perception and the adjustment choice process, the range of possible adjustments
to hazard events and the effects on response of varying public policy (White, 1974). It has
had an enduring influence on much hazards research, even up to the present day (the case
studies discussed below owe much of their basic conceptual structure to the standard survey
instrument).
While criticisms of this standard questionnaire have been extensive (Waddell, 1977),
including some from those taking part in the original collaborative research programme
(Rowntree, 1974; Kirkby, 1974, Saarinen, 1974), nevertheless it has been an undeniably
productive research instrument, although it is sometimes argued that the subsequent research
findings have been lacking in substance (Waddell, 1977): producing quantity but not quality.
Lewis (1976), in a review essay on White's "Natural Hazards: Local, National and Global",
advocates an intermediate stage of research to investigate implementation of findings and to
involve a management study to aid assimilation of the research results by those practitioners
for whom they would be most useful. He also identifies a need for a methodology, to parallel
the standard survey instrument, for the analysis of the socio-economic patterning within a
given location (Lewis, 1976:232). Arguably, this remains an unmet need despite analysis of
the institutional and political levels by later researchers (Penning-Rowsell et al, 1986).
The many criticisms of the standard survey instrument initiated improvements to existing
techniques and searches for alternative methods. Some later work has used less structured,
more in-depth studies, owing more to anthropological methods (Whyte, 1986; Lave and Lave,
1991). Schiff (1977) suggests three 'new' methodological approaches to aid understanding -
specifically of the relationship between personality variables and coping behaviour.
Firstly to "abandon" structured interviews with large samples and to concentrate on in-depth
interviews with fewer people. Secondly, to shift the emphasis from the independent variable
suggested by theory to relate to adjustment adoption, to individuals known to vary on the
dependent variable and look for the factors which differentiate between them. This is a model
of research based on the deviant case which is a common focus in qualitative methods but in
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quantitative methods may be excluded from analysis as an 'outlier'. Thirdly, to examine the
adjustment process using the household rather than the individual as the unit of analysis. This
third point acknowledges the limitations of decision-making at the individual level although
the subsequent suggestions for analysis places it firmly back in a positivistic mode
(1977:252).
Generally, however, questionnaire surveys modelled on the standard instrument have endured
largely because their core structure has proved to be sufficiently reliable and valid (if not very
innovative) to further the basic core theory; they are appropriate to a pre-structured research
design which makes them more amenable to the construction of detailed research proposals;
and the descriptive statistics produced are of a form to satisfy research sponsors.
2.2.5 Earlier research findings
This section discusses the broader research findings of hazards research, rather than
individual results and significant variables: such reviews can be found elsewhere (White and
Haas, 1975; Parker and Penning-Rowsell, 1983; Mitchell, 1984).
Early hazards research by geographers questioned why people occupied hazardous floodplains
and examined the land use and economic effects of public action to reduce flood losses. The
major finding to come out of this work was that increasing large-scale federal investment in
flood control had resulted in an increase in total national losses (White et al. 1958). This was
the so-called 'levee effect' (Burton et al, 1968:15) whereby the development of flood control
structures induced floodplain encroachment which put greater numbers at risk of any future
floods greater than the design flood (i.e. the level of flood which the control structure was
designed to protect against).
Subsequent research examined the effects of non-structural adjustments to flood hazard and
this was followed in the late 1960s by a collaborative research programme between the
Universities of Chicago - later Colorado (i.e. White), Clark (i.e. Kates) and Toronto (i.e.
Burton), which extended the flood studies to other geophysical events and to other countries
(White, 1974).
As noted above, the amassing of empirical research results has generated several basic 'laws'
but also, central to hazards research are a core of findings and hypotheses generally accepted
within the paradigm. Firstly, there is the hypothesis that the apparently irrational behaviour
of persistent floodplain occupance can be seen to be rational when the 'poor' perceptions of
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the occupants are examined. This early contention by White formed the springboard for the
ensuing perception research.
Secondly, the paradigm posits that variations in hazard perception can largely be explained
by: physical hazard characteristics; recency and severity of flood experience; situational
characteristics of the adjustment decision; and personality traits. The primacy of experience
has been at the core of hazards research and was conceptualised as a 'prison' of experience
(Kates, 1962:140).
Thirdly, there is the hypothesis that choice of adjustment is a function of: hazard perception;
perception of available choices; and hazard experience (White, 1973, 1974; Burton et al,
1978). The latter has been modelled by Kates (1962) as a 'certainty-uncertainty scale', where
it is on the basis of perceived frequency of flood events that adjustments are adopted. Thus
few adjustments will be adopted in areas of low flood frequency and low flood hazard
perception and vice versa.
It was recognized that extreme events in nature can produce both benefits (resources) and
costs (hazards) (White, 1945; Kates, 1971; Burton et al, 1978); likewise, risks are sometimes
tolerated because they too can entail benefits for the risk taker (James, 1974; Fordham,
1991a; Fordham and Tunstall, 1990; Green et al, 1991). The latter is a somewhat less
researched area, most research having concentrated on the more desirable (in terms of the
dominant paradigm) result of risk avoidance and adjustment choice.
Early research explained persistent floodplain occupance largely on the basis of faulty or
inadequate information about the risk (Kates, 1962): i.e. subjective expected utility later
modified to bounded rationality. This analysis suggested that adequate information would
increase awareness of risk and this would lead inevitably (rationally) to the adoption of
protective measures. However, this causal chain is unproven (Sims and Baumann, 1983)
although intuitively attractive still. Later research found that many floodplain residents were
aware of the flood risk and tolerated it to varying degrees because of the perceived locational
benefits (James et al, 1971'; Moline, 1974; Fordham and Tunstall, 1990).
A recurring theme in hazards research is the threat denial response: when asked to estimate
the probability of recurrence of flooding, common responses are "we have no floods here,
only high water" or "it can't happen here" (Burton et al, 1978; Burton et al, 1968). A
15 James et al (1971) found 7 factors influencing residential choice: access, space, low
price, facilities for children, seclusion, attractiveness and nice neighbours.
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theoretical explanation for this response was proposed by Kates (1962) and Burton (1972),
based on cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957). This explanation suggests that the
knowledge that one's environment is hazardous is inconsistent with the continuation to live
there and creates dissonance that is removed by denying the threat.
Geographic proximity to the hazard is hypothesized to influence response to the hazard.
Allied to this is the threat enhancement hypothesis which suggests that those living further
from the source of hazard tend to enhance the threat posed by the hazard (by the circulation
of fear-arousing rumours) to justify the fear they feel in the absence of visible hazard
damage; thus they eliminate the dissonant state (Festinger, 1957). Shippee et al (1980)
examined this concept and incorporated distance from the hazard source as an independent
variable. They found enhanced hazard perception in those individuals who perceived
themselves to live on and beyond the hazard area (defined by researchers) but no threat denial
response was found in those living in close proximity to the hazard (Shippee et al, 1980).
Psychological explanations for attitudes and behaviour have also included personality traits
related to whether a respondent feels in control of their destiny (internal locus of control) or
whether they feel other forces - such as God or fate - are in control (external locus of control)
(White, 1974; Sims and Baumann, 1983). There have been considerable measurement
problems in the examination of this concept (Schiff, 1977) and it proved to be particularly
susceptible to the claim of cultural and historical specificity (Waddell, 1977; Torry, 1979c).
An important theme in White's work has been the study of the perceptions of laypersons
*
which, he noted, can conflict with those of 'experts' (White, 1966b). Although the
perceptions of laypersons can be accepted as being boundedly rational, yet in much hazards
research, the expert/technical perception is seen to be more closely allied to 'reality'.
Respondents are classified as 'optimistic', 'pessimistic' or 'neutral', depending upon whether
their future flood expectation, respectively, underestimates, overestimates or coincides with
the scientific expectancy (Roder, 1961). This position is perhaps explained by the influence
of White's humanism, which gives greater emphasis to meanings and values, and diverges
from more assiduously positivist modes of explanation which tend towards quantification and
are more closely allied to the expert/technical.
Apart from prior flood experience (which one would intuitively expect), associations of
significant variables have been inconsistent across individual surveys (see Appendix A-2.1)
and even the flood experience variable has not been entirely consistent (McKay, 1984). For
this reason it is not proposed to discuss further findings here but they will be referred to
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below wherever relevant.
Early hazards research recognized the issue of salience of hazards (Burton, 1962) but
subsequently it has been "buried" as a research issue (Whyte, 1986:256). Furthermore,
Whyte (1986) claims that "salience cannot be deduced from measures of perception and
response" and that "by putting questions on hazard probabilities and future behavioural
adjustments together in the same interview, the researcher can generate [.. I spurious
relationships" (1986:257).
Burton and Kates (1964) acknowledge the cultural influences in the occupance of hazardous
coastal areas, in particular the recreational potential and attractions of the outlook, but rarely
extend recognition (and examination) of these benefits to riverine floodplains in their
comparison of locational advantages. They make the interesting observation that in river
floodplain environments, the introduction of structural flood protection may encourage further
development by increasing perceived safety behind it, while in coastal regions the reverse is
likely, if such protective devices obliterate the view and thus reduce the amenity value of the
site. They suggest that, in this situation, the removal of such protection, and thus the
extension of a sea view and concomitant amenity value, is more likely to increase
development (1964:380). This study has found that similar cultural influences are apparent
in both coastal and riverine floodplains in Britain.
Burton and Kates found that managers of coastal properties, even those whose residence was
seasonal, had a greater hazard awareness than city dwellers on river floodplains; "The city
floodplain dweller with no knowledge of flood hazard is common. The coast dweller without
a little knowledge of storm potential has not been found" (1964:384). However, they state
that coastal dwellers also tend to be somewhat "optimistic" in assessment of frequency,
likelihood, probability and severity of storm damage (1964:385). An urban-rural split
(mirroring the riverine-coastal dichotomy above) in awareness and adjustment has also been
noted in Britain (Penning-Rowsell, 1976).
2.3 Models of flood hazard perception and mitigating adjustment - general introduction
A fundamental feature of models is that they involve in their construction a highly selective
attitude to information (Chorley and Haggett, 1967:23). The selection process creates a
structure based on the connections between (perceived) significant aspects of reality.
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"A model is simply an ordered set of assumptions about a complex system. It is an
attempt to understand some aspect of the infinitely varied world by selecting from
perceptions and past experience a set of general observations applicable to the
problem in hand" (Meadows et al, 1974:20).
A prerequisite of a geographical model is its reapplicability to the real world and a major
function is its ability to bridge observation and theory (Chorley and Haggett, 1967:24).
Although the environment, as experienced, "is a seamless web", with the social and the
physical interacting, yet there has been a common distinction - across a range of disciplines -
between social and physical milieus (Lowenthal, 1972:334-5). Even when both are system
components, integration is often lacking. Anderson (1973) notes, from the perspective of
social and cultural anthropology, that there is a need to integrate 'environment' within the
total system rather than viewing it as an external 'given' of the system. In many models (and
this is applicable to the hazards research models) ecology-environment (the terms are often
used interchangeably) is seen as an exogenous factor, a backdrop against which the primary
components are placed. Environment - when used as an explanatory variable - is an external
factor influencing the socio-cultural system under study but not actually a part of it; however,
the treatment of culture and environment as independent is a move away from an ecological
perspective (Anderson, 1973:207).
Anderson (1973) argues in favour of a systems approach, which he believes could be a
primary tool of synthesis and integration. His belief, however, is predicated upon the
existence of an "actual objective environment" and the possibility of freedom of ideological
bias (1973:213), two theoretically related concepts, both of which have been challenged
(Jackson and Smith, 1984; Pahl, 1970; Harvey, 1974). Harvey has said that the claim of
science to be ideology free is itself an ideological claim (Harvey, 1974:23).
The basic model in hazards research of the mitigation adjustment process is that
conceptualised by Kates (1971) and discussed in detail below. Later modifications to this
basic model by Mileti (1980) are discussed below in Chapter 4.
2.3.1 Kates' general systems model of human adjustment to natural hazards
Kates' (1971) general systems model of human adjustment to natural hazards (see Figure 2.1)
is the dominant conceptual model within hazards research. It is described in some detail
because of its fundamental importance in the research field and because it was the initial
model which directed the design of this study. Despite many justifiable criticisms (see below),
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Figure 2.1: Kates' (1971) General systems model of human adjustment to natural
hazards
the model simplified (or over-simplified as some would argue) the complexity of the problem
area and was a bold, initial step which served at least to create a focus for a critical response.
The origination and initial development of the concept of human adjustment belongs to the
work of Harlan H. Barrows (Barrows, 1923). In hazards research 'adjustments' are courses
of action available to floodplain managers for coping with the hazard (Slovic et al, 1974) such
as loss bearing, structural works, flood warnings, land use change or control etc. Adjustment
is a short-term response, said to be purposefully or incidentally adopted (Kates, 1978).
Various typologies of adjustments have been constructed (White, 1961b; Burton et al, 1968,
1978; Mileti et al, 1975; 1980).
Kates lists four critical features of natural hazards which influence choice of adjustment. The
frequency, magnitude and suddenness of onset of the natural event and, fourthly, the
'ecological setting' (see above). Although Kates refers to decision-maker differences, he
presents them as essentially minor and finds no fundamental discrepancy between individual
and collective choice (1971:440). While acknowledging that earlier individual or collective
action may have constrained future choice, nevertheless, the emphasis throughout is on choice
rather than constraint.
Hazard perception is defined as expectation of future occurrence and personal vulnerability
and Kates claimed it to be independent of socio-economic indicators. The most significant
characteristics of the hazard event were hypothesized to be magnitude, duration, frequency
and temporal spacing; of personal experience: recency, frequency and intensity; of
personality: fate control, differential views of nature and tolerance of dissonance-creating
information. Risk-taking propensity was found to be inconsistent, arising perhaps from the
difficulties found in measurement.
Awareness of adjustments is viewed in a passive manner and seen to be mainly a function of
"casual access to communication networks" (1971:441) and differences in awareness "might
be" due to factors controlling access to information. Motivation for increased knowledge is
seen to be possibly related to personal experience encouraged by "positive views of fate
control and the efficacy of action" (1971:441). Political power or effectiveness is absent from
this exposition. Kates' floodplain actors appear passive individuals for whom freedom of
choice is constrained merely by their own information and personality traits (which is
commensurate, perhaps, with a geographer schooled in the behavioural science tradition
working in a North American environment of 'free enterprise').
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In Kates' model the interaction of a human use system ("locations, livelihoods, and social
organization" (Burton et al, 1978:20)) and a natural events system ("the array of wind, water
and earth processes" (Burton et al, 1978:20)) poses a natural hazard. Arguably, this should
be, at most, a quasi-natural hazard. Such human use interactions seriously compromise the
'naturalness' of any event.
Human use is described in terms of "managerial units"; from the smallest, which comprises
a household, through industrial and governmental units to an aggregate which is the nation-
state. Although Kates admits that "one cannot simple aggregate the smaller units to arrive at
the higher levels of hierarchy" (1971:444), there is an assumption in the work that this is
indeed what happens in the absence of any differentiation of behaviour between the individual
and the collective anywhere in the model.
The adjustment process control sub-model (Figure 2.1) describes a threshold of hazard
perception below which adjustments are neither sought nor evaluated. The threshold is a
function of the manager's perception of natural events, personal hazard experience, and
specific personality characteristics. Crossing the hazard perception threshold triggers a search
and evaluation of known adjustments and, based on the evaluation, a decision is made
whether or not to adopt an adjustment. The major influence on adjustment adoption is hazard
frequency with high variation of adoption in areas of intermediate frequency; the so-called
certainty-uncertainty model (Kates, 1962).
Forms of adjustment are modifications of the natural events system, modifications of the
human use system and post-event emergency adjustments. Although the model is of individual
adjustment, few of the suggested available adjustments are open to individual action. Weather
modification in the form of cloud seeding, water storage and retardation structures for
example are beyond the financial and legal means of most individual managers and yet
collective, institutional or governmental policy and behaviour and its role in constraint or
availability of choice is not modelled.
Kates acknowledges the limitations of the model to deal with external determinants of
behaviour, giving as examples the effects on policy of the economic depression of the 1930s
and their likely impact on behaviour during droughts and floods at the time, and the influence
of colonialism in East Africa through its 'encouragement' of cash cropping and controls on
movement. But, again, these are not seen as structural, or systemic, constraints on availability
of choice but as "events" (1971:450); neither do his examples reflect the omnipresence of
"external" determinants of behaviour. The continuing process of fragmentation and reduction
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inherent in the model obscures the wider, major issues by its focus on the particular and the
minor.
The model presents a picture of free and (theoretically) unlimited individual choice. Rational
economic man is only moderately bounded; and then bounded only by an inability, or an
almost perverse refusal, to perceive the choices available. Contained within the model is the
potential failure of the individual to adequately respond to the rational demands of the system,
rather than in any sense the explication of a political system and its constraints. Individuals
are said to "fail to perceive" environmental risks (Burton et al, 1978:88).
It has been suggested (Whyte, 1986:252) that, since it is acknowledged that only a subset of
possible factors have been included in hazard perception models, discussion should focus not
on whether models include all relevant factors but on whether they include the most
important. The Kates model approximates to a closed system where problems are analyzed
only with reference to its internal structure and not its external environment. The external
environment is a 'given'; an essentially unchanging and unchangeable system of conditions
within which the model operates towards a condition of homeostasis. While there may be
academic justifications for this (that it is impossible to study the full complexity of reality,
thus the model is an abstraction of one manageable component; that the study of the external
environment exceeds the bounds of an academic discipline, for example) the effect of
applying this model to the 'real world' is the maintenance of the status quo. Thus engineers
can continue to operate solely within their engineering paradigm and fail to address the wider
socio-political issues of, for example, land use planning because these are external to their
modelled decision-making structure.
A major problem of past analyses has arisen from the virtually exclusive viewing of flood
hazard adjustment through the single optic of flood hazard perception. However, flood hazard
adjustment decisions are intimately bound up with other factors of land use, environmental
concern, the power of the individual to choose, the degree to which the decisions of
institutions are representative of given constituencies, the influence of underlying and
competing value systems and ideologies reflecting political, economic and social structures,
etc. Flood hazard perception is just one of many factors bearing on the decision.
2.4 Application of the dominant paradigm to the British situation
The non-applicability of the hazard school research methodology to other parts of the world
and the call for an anthropological input to counteract its cultural specificity were frequent
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criticisms of White's much reviewed and discussed 1974 volume (Lewis, 1976) although the
critics most often referred to its inappropriateness for the less developed world rather than
Britain. Nevertheless, despite the many political and cultural differences, the hazard school
model was imported almost unchanged into the British geographical research discipline
(Porter, 1970; Penning-Rowsell, 1972; Penning-Rowsell and Underwood, 1972; Parker and
Penning-Rowsell, 1972; Harding and Parker, 1974; 1976; Parker, 1976).
The inappropriateness to Britain of the dominant hazard research paradigm has been related
to differences in land use control, floodplain size (Parker and Penning-Rowsell, 1983),
construction methods and materials (Smith and Tobin, 1979), and floodplain management
institutions (Penning-Rowsell et al, 1986). Arguably, these criticisms were all satisfied by
minor adaptations of the model.
Thus, the model evolved slightly by, for example, investigating the economic benefits of
flood alleviation (Penning-Rowsell and Chatterton, 1977) and the intangible costs of flooding
(Green et al, 1983; Green and Penning-Rowsell, 1985) and by adopting a planning focus
(Penning-Rowsell and Parker, 1973; 1974; Neal and Parker, 1988). Perception studies
similarly followed the North American model with closely approximate results (Harding and
Parker, 1974; Parker, 1976; Penning-Rowsell, 1976; Smith and Tobin, 1979). Arguably, with
the same research model it was inevitable that the findings would be closely related.
The difference between societies based on free enterprise (North America) and a welfare state
(Britain) is another factor in the inappropriateness of the transfer between the two but this
factor was not amenable to understanding by a minor transformation of the model and thus
has remained under-researched.
In the British situation, crossing of the hazard perception threshold is frequently induced
artificially by institutional forces which, likewise, influence the adjustment search. Although
it is possible for individuals to make their own adjustments by floodproofing properties or
various adaptive or coping strategies, most flood hazard adjustment is performed and
governed at a higher level. The insurance situation in Britain is also different to that operating
in north America. In Britain, the majority of insured households (there is variability in uptake
of insurance irrespective of flood risk) have flood cover as standard in their insurance
policies: thus, premiums are spread throughout the population with those in flood-prone areas
being subsidised by those who are not. In areas subject to frequent and/or serious flooding,
however, premiums or level of 'excess' may be raised considerably. Insurance has been seen
as an effective response to flood hazard by spreading the cost through space and time (Anie11
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et al, 1984).
An example of the application to Britain of the dominant model was the research done by
Smith and Tobin (1979) in Cumbria. They followed closely the 'dominant paradigm',
concluding, optimistically, that a predictive model of floodplain behaviour could be possible
in the future based on hydrological data and social traits. This they based on findings such
as, for example, that older residents had the most accurate perceptions of the flood hazard
and were most likely to adjust 'effectively'. Thus, the degree of hazard adjustment on
particular floodplains could be gauged from an assessment of census data and, following on
from this, suitable educative action could be taken to improve the existing level of response
(1979:117).
Their general model of individual hazard perception and response (1979:117) has as its goal
the seeking of a peaceful coexistence with the floodplain environment, with degree of fear
as the crucial catalyst for response. This models a small part of the total decision space by
concentrating on the point of perception and ending with "a response". Perception of the
flood ha7ard is associated with the physical characteristics of flooding, "structural factors"
(which they list as proximity to hazard source, house type (cellar) and areal location) and
social characteristics. Forms of response are limited to taking individual action or pressurising
authorities to take action. Although it does acknowledge the decision choice of "accept some
flooding".
Between perception of flood hazard and response is "degree of fear". Thus, if no degree of
fear is experienced, presumably there will be no response. This again is an inappropriate
focus on the individual: even if an individual does not perceive there to be any hazard, if the
NRA perceives there to be (a sufficient) one then an adjustment will be made. The NRA has
permissive powers that enable it to override objections and to develop a flood defence scheme
'in the wider public interest' (although they would be unlikely to override significant
numbers of objections).
Smith and Tobin's concluding list of five practical, "prospective advances" (1979:116-117)
in flood loss reduction begins with the need for "general education", comprising a local
authority leaflet outlining suitable action in a flood emergency and regular publicity for any
existing warning schemes. The primacy of the educational role is perhaps over optimistic
given that the causal connection between education and behaviour has very rarely been
demonstrated to have occurred (Sims and Baumann, 1983; Mileti et al, 1975).
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Third in the list, following the setting up of a flood warden scheme, is "development
controls" which, arguably, should come first if the wider socio-political causes of flooding
are acknowledged and if future escalation of damages through inappropriate floodplain
development is to be halted. Smith and Tobin see this as a prospective advance in the long
term, which is perhaps why they placed it lower down in their list of practical aids. However,
while the necessary legislation to enforce development control may take some time, sensitivity
to the importance of its role in floodplain management can begin much sooner, hence delay
should be avoided. The major barrier to this kind of advance is an institutional one;
floodplain management has never been integrated successfully within the wider land use
planning structure and existing institutional structures are dominated by engineers, not
planners.
White (1974) recognized that to cope effectively with environmental hazards modern societies
cannot rely solely on technological solutions:
"A crucial aspect of any long-term accommodation to the human environment is the
skilful, sensitive use of a range of adjustments, including engineering devices, land
management, and social regulation. To depend upon only one sort of public action is
to court social disaster, environmental deterioration, and enlarged public obligations"
(White, 1974:13).
This, in terms of White's (1974) typology, is a post-industrial response. Arguably, this long-
term accommodation has yet to fully materialize in British floodplain management which still
favours engineering devices - a 'technological fix' - over land management and social
regulation (despite the fact that land use planning and social regulation procedures do exist),
although economic and environmental pressures may now be forcing a shift in this direction.
A later, British, conception of decision making in community hazard reduction (Penning-
Rowsell et al, 1986) focuses less on individuals and more on macroeconomic and institutional
factors and the wider structural forces at work in society. This modelling of decision making
at the "community' or political level" (1986:15) attempts a more close approximation to the
complexity actually found in (British) society by a generalised typology of decision making
influences, not specifically anchored to flood hazards. However, the "structural influences"
remain atomistically separate from other "inputs and influences" and from the "catalysts" to
action. Thus, this model appears insufficiently grounded in fundamental socio-political forces.
It is possible that it is the over-mechanistic, reductionist form of conceptualisation (in other
words, the model itself) that is at fault. A good model simplifies to aid clarity of
conceptualisation but over-simplification can itself be an obfuscation.
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Hazards research, like any other, does not operate in an academic vacuum but within the
wider social relations of production. As such, the orientation of research production is
ultimately structured by the dictates of political economy: 'fashionable' areas of research that
attract funding are closely related to current states of national economy and government
policies (Silverman, 1989:5). Much research is initiated and fmanced by agencies involved
in hazard management and with their own "mission" (White and Haas, 1975:6). Parker and
Penning-Rowsell (1983) have noted that, in the 1960s and 1970s, interaction between
geographers and engineers ensured close links between policy and practice and influenced
research initiatives (1983:186) but this, essentially positive, reading of the situation disguises
the fact that the very nature of the links ensured little alteration to the status quo'. The
engineering profession, as too the research profession, operates in such a way as to secure
its own future, thus small scale incremental change is the most likely form of advance to arise
from the geographer/engineer relationship.
This section has examined the theoretical underpinnings of hazards research with particular
reference to its North American origins. The next section examines more specifically the
floodplain management environment of England and Wales.
16 See Harvey, (1974) for a discussion of this area.
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3. FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT - ENGLAND AND WALES
3.1 The institutional context of flood defence
Detailed description and analysis of floodplain management institutions can be found
elsewhere (Penning-Rowsell et al, 1986; Parker and Sewell, 1988; Parker and Penning-
Rowse11, 1980); this section serves to orientate and place in context the discussion of research
fmdings below.
Land drainage is a cover term which includes both the drainage of agricultural land and urban
flood defence. These are linked both hydrologically and institutionally although it is the
agricultural drainage interests that have dominated policy setting and implementation
(Penning-Rowsell et al, 1986). In England and Wales responsibility for the determination of
national water-related objectives and ensuring the implementation of legislation lies with the
Ministry for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF), the Department of the Environment
(DoE) and the Welsh Office.
However, the day-to-day policy-making and executive functions are devolved to the regional
level in which lies the responsibility for meeting demands for water, sewerage, land drainage
and recreation (Parker and Penning-Rowsell, 1983; Penning-Rowsell et al, 1986). At this
level, Regional Flood Defence Committees (RFDCs) formally approve expenditure for new
structural flood defence works (Penning-Rowsell et al, 1986). Regional and local land
drainage committees performed this function prior to the 1989 Water Act and the change of
name underlines the shift of emphasis from agricultural to urban, although the committee
structure remains largely unchanged. This institutional anomaly reflects the lobbying power
of landowning and agricultural interests who have maintained their control over local land
drainage spending throughout several institutional restructurings (Penning-Rowsell, 1981).
It has been suggested (Parker and Penning-Rowsell, 1983) that the formation of the ten
regional Water Authorities, which occurred as a result of legislation in 1973, was to the
detriment of public accountability because policy and decision-making was then situated at
neither the national, parliamentary level nor the local government level. This worked to the
benefit of the (engineering) professionals for whom the political dimensions of decision-
making were seen to be a poor substitute for technical judgements.
It has also been suggested (Patterson, 1987) that the transfer (as a result of local government
legislation 1974) of water management from a local government level to regional level also
46
served to emphasise the role of water as a commodity and a resource for industry while
devaluing it as a service concept; regional level organisations, by their scale of operation and
relative lack of elected representatives, are more accessible to powerful capitalist interest
groups (who also tend to be organised at a regional level) and less accessible to non-
dominant, local consumer-based pressure groups (who tend to operate at the local level). This
process, and the market economy ideology upon which it is based, is closely related to the
later water industry privatization process (see below).
River management generally has undergone numerous institutional changes but has been
organised largely within river catchment boundaries since the 1930 Land Drainage Act which
invested 46 Catchment Boards with responsibility for land drainage. Subsequent legislation
(i.e. the 1948 River Board Act, the 1963 Water Resources Act, the 1973 Water Act and the
1989 Water Act) reduced the numbers of authorities to ten, while still maintaining natural
land drainage catchment boundaries (Gardiner, 1991:1116).
Water management organised within a river catchment or basin structure can have technical
and economic benefits by, for example, avoiding the export of costs ('externalities') beyond
management boundaries, as can occur when upstream, river management operations cause
downstream effects (Green, 1990a). It can be difficult however to maintain consistent inter-
organizational liaison practices where hydrological and (local) political boundaries diverge.
Integrated river basin management (IRBM) - the management by one body of the whole water
cycle from rainfall collection to water supply and treatment of waste water - created as a
result of the 1973 legislation, has been widely regarded as a favoured operational structure
(particularly in continental Europe where it is effectively precluded by the crossing of national
boundaries by major rivers) but had an inherent weakness in that one organisation had both
utility and regulatory functions.
This integrated system was broken by the water industry's latest (1989) institutional
restructuring - privatization of the water supply and sewage treatment functions (see below)
and the retention of the regulatory function in public hands (the NRA). Arguably, this latest
development is not to be understood primarily as the attempt to increase institutional
operational efficiency but rather as a result of the ideological position of the current and
former conservative governments.
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3.1.1 The flood defence function
It has been estimated that approximately a quarter of a million people (0.6 percent of the
population) are at risk of flooding likely to occur on average, once in 100 years (Penning-
Rowse11 and Handmer, 1988; National Water Council, 1983). Just over half of these people
are in areas covered by a flood warning system. Up to a further 200,000 people may be at
risk of flooding from the sea (Handmer, 1987).
Flood defence in Britain is regarded as a social welfare product (Penning-Rowsell et al,
1986): flooding is generally perceived as 'an act of God' (albeit exacerbated by individual
and/or collective human action) and it is both difficult and often economically inefficient to
provide flood defence for individual utility, thus it has long been seen as a responsibility of
the state. However, the maintenance of the rights and responsibilities of the individual
riparian owner is a key aspect of land drainage law. Another key element is the permissive,
rather than mandatory, nature of much land drainage law.
As a result of legislation in 1973, the then Water Authorities were required to carry out
surveys of their areas in relation to their drainage - including flood protection - functions
(Water Act 1973, Section 24(5)) to identify all the major land drainage and flooding problems
in each area and to include a plan or programme for their solution. This, later reinforced by
Circular 17/82 (DoE et al, 1982a), also entailed consultation with local authorities and a duty
to "have regard to" their structure and local plans towards a co-ordinated planning response.
3.1.2 NRA Thames Region
The Thames Region of the NRA, with which this analysis is principally concerned, is the
highest spending region of the ten regions (the following based on 1989/90 figures) and is
responsible for approximately a fifth of the total NRA expenditure. Out of a total Thames
Region expenditure of 56 million pounds, flood defence expenditure accounted for 42 million.
The Region covers an area of 5,000 square miles, having a population of some 11 million.
It contains a floodplain area of 211,000 hectares and 3,230 miles of main river (Gardiner,
1991).
3.1.3 Privatisation of Water Authorities/NRA
In February 1986 the Government published a White Paper containing proposals to privatize
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the water industry': in the following July it announced it was shelving such plans for the
current term of office. This was largely as a result of widespread concerns about a private
water supply company being able to police itself - although this had been the case with public
ownership. Privatization plans reappeared in the Conservative Party manifesto the following
May, in which the regulatory functions were to be invested in a National Rivers Authority.
The water authorities protested strongly at the disintegration of IRBM - the "holy cow of the
water authorities" (Mitchison, 1987). Roy Watts - then Chairman of Thames Water Authority
and regarded as the 'inventor' of the water privatization idea (Sunday Times, 1987) - soon
became its most sternest critic when proposals for the splitting up of the industry were
announced. The proposals for the remit of the NRA were subsequently revised and a
slimmed-down organization was proposed. Within a year - between February 1986 and July
1987 - the proposals for a water industry watchdog were said to have come full circle "from
in-house lap dog, to expensive fanged hound, and ... back to a litter of toothless puppies"
(Mitchison, 1987:21).
It has been stated that the government and the Water Authorities "stumbled into" privatization
without clearly understanding its implications (Khmersley, 1988:127). Policies have been
ideologically-driven with the intention of changing social structures in favour of a reduction
in public expenditure and the role of the state and an increase in 'popular capitalism'.
Certainly, anomalies remain. The flood defence function entails a major development role:
this reproduces the conflict of interest inherent in the dual poacher/gamekeeper role that, it
was claimed, would be abolished through privatisation and the separation from the water
supply functions. The regulating of the flood defence development role lies ostensibly with
MAFF via economic appraisal techniques designed to identify the potential costs and benefits
of a proposed (structural flood defence) development: this technique is cost-benefit analysis
(discussed below). A major limitation of cost-benefit analysis is its inability to deal adequately
with environmental factors and yet environmental protection has always been seen to be a
major part of the NRA brief. Publicity material of the NRA presents the Authority as the
"guardians of the water environment" and lays claim to being "the strongest environmental
protection agency in Europe" (NRA Thames Region, 1989a). The following section outlines
some of the environmental legislation that has influenced floodplain management in recent
years.
" The early (1986) White Paper never proposed to privatize land drainage and flood
protection, for these special arrangements were to have been made.
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3.2 The (environmental) legislative context of floodplain management
The growth of environmental concern has been institutionalised in the legislature which has,
in turn, affected institutions. Of particular relevance for this discussion are the Wildlife and
Countryside Act (1981), the Water Acts of 1973 and 1989 and Statutory Instrument 1217,
The Land Drainage Improvement Works (Assessment of Environmental Effects) Regulations.
The 1973 Water Act stated that Water Authorities should "have regard to the desirability of
preserving natural beauty, flora and fauna". The 1981 Wildlife and Countryside Act charged
Water Authorities with the duty to "further the conservation and enhancement of natural
beauty and the conservation of flora, fauna and geological and physiographical features of
special interest" in the carrying out of their functions (Newbold et al, 1983). The 1989 Water
Act extended these aspects to the promotion of conservation and enhancement for its own
sake (Gardiner, 1991).
Thus there has been a progressive broadening of the powers of environmental protection in
the legislation although careful wording has created a number of opt-out possibilities. For
example, the duties to preserve, conserve, enhance and promote are all followed by such
caveats as: as far as is consistent with other duties; as far as the NRA considers desirable;
to have regard to the desirability of carrying out this duty; as far as is reasonably practicable
and consistent with other duties (HMSO, 1989).
The European Community has had a significant effect on this legislative development and of
particular relevance for flood defence was the introduction of Statutory Instrument 1217
(MAFF and Welsh Office, 1988). SI 1217 implements, in respect of proposals for land
drainage improvement works, the European Community Directive 85/337/EEC on the
assessment of effects of certain public and private projects on the environment and provide
a procedure for the provision of an environmental statement where the works are likely to
have a significant effect on the environment.
The drainage body is required to give notice of proposed works in two local papers and state
whether or not they propose to prepare an environmental statement. If the drainage body
proposes not to prepare a statement, and subsequently representations are made concerning
the likely environmental effects, then the proposals must be referred to MAFF (or, if in
relation to Wales, the Secretary of State for Wales) which may direct that an environmental
statement must be prepared.
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When a statement is prepared, this must be announced in two local newspapers and copies
must be supplied to interested parties. If no objections are forthcoming then the drainage body
may proceed with the works; if an objection is made and not withdrawn then the decision
must be referred to the appropriate Minister for a decision (MAFF and Welsh Office, 1988).
It has been argued (Gardiner, 1991) that in order to judge whether an Environmental
Statement is necessary, an Environmental Assessment is a necessary precursor and so some
form of assessment procedure is assured whatever the outcome.
The 1981 Wildlife and Countryside Act was a factor in motivating land drainage engineers
in the integration of environmental interests with operational activities (Archer, 1986).
However, although Severn Trent Water Authority has long employed a landscape architect
(later a team) - many of whom combine aesthetic with nature conservation requirements - it
was not until some time after the formation (in 1989) of the NRA that all ten regions created
at least one permanent staffing position to deal with environmental aspects of the Authority's
work; generally this was a Conservation Officer(s) post (Gardiner, 1991).
In July 1991 the Government announced proposals for the setting up of an Environment
Agency comprising all or parts of three existing organisations: the NRA, Her Majesty's
Inspectorate of Pollution and the Drinking Water Inspectorate. This could once again divide
and disrupt the NRA, coming only two years after the last major change resulting from
privatisation, although the likely effects on the flood defence function are unknown.
Having outlined the institutional and legislative background to flood defence, the next section
addresses issues in the availability of choice of possible adjustments.
3.3 Choice in the adoption of adjustments
The theoretical range of choice of adjustments to flood hazard outlined in the literature
(White, 1945; Sewell, 1969; Burton et al, 1978; Penning-Rowsell et al, 1986) would appear
to be quite large (see Table 3.1). However, while much of the hazards literature has
concentrated on the individual's
perception of hazard and choice of adjustments, the possibilities for individual adjustment
are limited and may, in certain circumstances, be counterproductive when viewed within the
wider context.
For example, if an individual property owner decided to protect themselves by constructing
a floodwall around their property, the NRA might formally object to the works because of
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Table 3.1: Options for flood hazard mitigation
UNIVERSE OF OPTIONS
GOVERNMENT LEVEL STRUCTURAL OPTIONS NON-STRUCTURAL
OPTIONS
* land use planning
* building design &
construction codes
* provision of
disaster relief
* emergency planning
* build control	 * issue flood warnings
structures	 * public education
(dams, reservoirs,	 * property acquisition
relief channels,
banks, walls etc)
* river management
* adapt individual
buildings
* prevent access of water 	 * evacuate
(e.g. sandbagging)	 * change location
* bear the loss
* insurance
their potential to obstruct flood flows and increase the level of flooding elsewhere in the
floodplain. In this hypothetical case, individual action in response to the flood hazard,
although highly 'rational' at the individual level and conforming to the desired outcome in
terms of the dominant paradigm model (perceive flood hazard - make adjustment), would be
overruled at the institutional level as an unacceptable response. Thus, it is accepted that flood
control is the responsibility of the wider community and occurs (generally) above the level
of the individual.
Although White (White, 1961; 1964) early recognized that the full range of alternative
adjustments are never available to the resource/hazard manager, little research effort has been
expended on why this is so: it is possible that the concentration on examining flood hazard
perception as the means to understanding mitigation choices, rather than concentrating on
mitigation itself has been a contributory factor. The actual (as opposed to theoretical) range
of choice of flood hazard mitigation options available to the individual member of the public
is constrained by government level policies, institutional level preferences, individual social,
economic and political factors, and perception of the flood hazard (which may itself be
moderated at the institutional level through control of information dissemination).
At the level of the individual floodplain resident, choice of adjustment can be so severely
limited that it becomes more appropriate to replace the term 'choice' with 'constraint'. Far
from choosing between a range of structural and non-structural options, the resident rarely
has a choice even between alternative structural options but is most likely to be presented
with a single preferred structural option. The 'do nothing' option is rarely offered as a
choice, as such, but can sometimes be present in the form of a veiled threat (i.e. 'you must
accept this or nothing').
Choice of the 'do nothing' or 'bearing the loss' options (where they are options and not
impositions) are related to coping strategies. 'Hazard' has been recognized as "the interaction
between a 'natural' event and the character of human settlements and economics beyond the
point where adaptive capacity to cope can avoid serious damage or death" [my emphasis]
(O'Riordan, 1990:293; Burton et al, 1978). However, 'adaptive capacity to cope' is variable;
it will be different at different levels of analysis and - at the individual level - for different
individuals. The implication of scheme promotion (by an external body) is that floodplain
residents cannot (or have not) adapt or cope and that some form of external intervention is
necessary. While this may well be the case, there has been little opportunity made to test
adaptive capability.
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The process of adjustment choice at the institutional level begins with a range of feasibility
studies which may include one or more of the following: legal-administrative-ownership
constraints, physical-technological, political, financial, economic, social (Smith and Tobin,
1979; James and Lee, 1971; O'Riordan and More, 1969) and environmental (Penning-
Rowse11 et al, 1986; Gardiner, 1991:2/6) feasibility. MAFF provide grant aid for flood
protection/land drainage schemes under the Land Drainage Act 1976 and formal application
procedures are required. Following consultation and agreement on expenditure by the
Regional Flood Defence Committee, an application is made for Approval in Principle. MAFF
has produced guidelines (MAFF, 1985) to ensure standardisation of approach to the
evaluation of costs and benefits.
The (five year) capital programme is the framework within which schemes are prioritised.
It can be the case that near the end of the financial year project managers find they have
underspent on the capital programme and have to search for suitable work on which to spend
the money (because of severe limitations on the amounts which can be carried over to the
following year). Once schemes have been slotted into the capital programme it then becomes
problematic to cancel them; thus, public opposition to proposed schemes, which (because of
the usual timing for consultation) tends to occur some time after detailed plans have been
started, can be very disruptive to the capital programme. Hence, project managers have a
particular incentive to take a scheme to completion.
Smith and Tobin (1979) argue that human adjustment has been ineffective because of a
dependence on partial solutions dominated by a technical approach. A major factor in the
failure to adopt an integrated floodplain management strategy is the "general lack of
understanding of the practical importance of the social dimensions of the problem"
(1979:31) 18 . Floodplain management is a multidimensional problem which is ill-served by
a unidimensional, technical-engineering approach.
The concept of multiple adjustments to flooding is not new: in 1937 President Roosevelt
concluded in a speech that a number of measures have to be pursued simultaneously because
"they all tie in to a general picture" (quoted in Platt, 1986:43), and White (1945) discussed
this concept in some detail in 1945.
O'Riordan (1971a) has argued that the significant factor in resources decision-making is the
actor's perception of the degree of threat presented by the problem in relation to other
" However, their analysis of the social dimension remains severely limited and adds very
little to the earlier models emanating chiefly from the dominant paradigm in hazards research.
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stresses in the community (1971:115). However, when the major decision-makers are (NRA)
flood defence engineers, the flood hazard problem can become elevated to a primacy that
tends to override other stresses'.
3.4 Structural and non-structural adjustments
It has been noted that floods can be both hazards and resources: similarly, structural' flood
defence schemes can confer costs as well as benefits. Overtopping or failure of defences can
result in catastrophic flood events, far greater than would have occurred in the absence of
defences. Both quantity and velocity are increased when stored waters filially escape the
bounds imposed by the defence.
Acknowledgement of this apparent paradox is perhaps more advanced in the U.S.A. where,
in the last sixty years, vast amounts of federal funds have been spent on such engineering
structures. The prestige attached to the development of major engineering structures makes
them attractive to both engineers and vote-hunting politicians and ensures, at least, their initial
consideration if not their ultimate acceptance. Something of the grandeur pertaining to such
works is expressed by Platt:
"This national commitment to the taming of rivers and coastal waters ranks among
the foremost undertakings of mankind, equivalent to the pyramids of Egypt, the Great
Wall of China, and the moon program. It is now in the process of joining them as
past history" (Platt, 1986:29-31).
While Platt can claim for the U.S.A., in 1986, that "blind faith in structural protection is a
thing of the past" (1986:62), this is perhaps not yet the case in England and Wales, although
neither is there quite the same uncritical acceptance and scale of belief that the statement
suggests, nor, perhaps, the same scale of works. Furthermore, it has been noted (Parker and
Penning-Rowsell, 1983) that structural flood relief schemes have been relatively successful
in Britain.
The grant aid system which has operated in Britain has been biased towards structural,
19 In the Thames Perception and Attitude Survey (see DWSC/89 Case Study) some
respondents mentioned, as a greater personal concern, aircraft crashing, as they lived beneath
a flight path into Heathrow; another respondent volunteered that a more serious personal
concern was reservoir failure, as they lived in the vicinity of a major reservoir and at the
time of interviewing there was some media coverage of this latter danger.
20 4 structur / ,ai in this discussion implies a physical structure; something constructed.
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centrally organized, management options with - in the past - little or no aid being available
for non-structural floodplain management options (Parker, 1988). While the establishment of
flood forecasting and warning systems attract central government grant aid, they are not yet
operative throughout England and Wales and riverine flood warning services, while being
continually extended, have been found to have a variable performance level (Neal and Parker,
1988)21.
It is possible that as the capital costs of structural schemes increase, benefit-cost ratios decline
and difficulties arise from escalating concern about the potential for environmental impact,
there might be a growing shift of emphasis from the structural to the non-structural.
When engineers promote their schemes to the public, they do not make available sufficient
information to enable the public to make a truly informed decision: they do not tell them, for
example, that a factor in the choice of the level of structural defence offered is the likely
frequency and seriousness of overtopping. Engineers prefer a standard of protection that
avoids such a risk occurring too often as this can have a detrimental effect on their
professional reputation (see Chapter 13 for further discussion of this point).
The process of extending the standard of protection and not publicising the risks attached to
differing levels of protection or the existence of post-scheme residual flooding, is a factor in
the development in the public of the belief that engineering structures offer complete
protection. Although engineers recognize this erroneous belief by the public, arguably, they
do not attempt strenuously enough to re-educate them, because of the risk that this might
jeopardise their projects. Thus, the inherent dangers of engineering solutions are not part of
scheme promotion.
Structural flood alleviation schemes can 'invite' further development behind the protection
they initially provide - the so-called 'levee effect' - but any subsequent development
compromises their level of protection to the extent that further flood alleviation schemes are
required to maintain the initial scheme's design standard. It has long been recognized (White,
1945) that a circular process of protection-development-protection is thus created (Smith and
Tobin, 1979). It has been argued (Neal and Parker, 1988) that the major reason for the
perpetuation of existing flood hazards and the creation of new ones may well lie with the
increased use of floodplains for property development. The circular process of protection-
development-protection is a self-perpetuating system with potentially severe environmental
21 A coastal stormtide warning service, aimed at preventing loss of life, is available for
most of the coastline (Parker and Sewell, 1988).
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consequences if structural solutions are the chosen option.
3.5 The wider land use planning context
A general land use and development control system, designed primarily to control the spread
of urban development into the countryside, has been in operation in England and Wales since
1947. While not enacted specifically for floodplain control, it is believed to have been largely
successful in controlling extensive floodplain development in areas of high risk (Penning-
Rowsell et al, 1986:3). However, while it offered some control over future development, this
legislation did not remove the existing flood problem which arose from historic development
adjacent to the natural lines of communication and other benefits that rivers provided.
Neither, despite a planning liaison system between the NRA and local planning authorities,
did it sufficiently control developments in areas with (relatively) remote (1:25 - 1:100) risks
of flooding.
The problem does not lie simply with large scale development: small-scale, incremental
change can ultimately have a profound effect on the hydrological regime and can lead to a
substantially increased flood risk and flood damage potential. Such developments may
increase surface water flows by transforming permeable into impermeable surfaces, increase
discharges to storm sewers (Hollis, 1975), obstruct flood flows, and/or create additional flood
damage potential.
The planning liaison system which exists between the NRA and local planning authorities
aims to control development applications which could exacerbate the flood risk (DoE et al,
1982a). The NRA, however, have an advisory role only and acceptance of its
recommendations is discretionary.
It has been suggested (Gardiner, 1991:12/4) that the predecessors of the NRA "felt obliged"
to facilitate floodplain development and that this was encouraged to some degree by the
available guidance notes, Circular 17/82 (DoE et al, 1982). However, as a result of its
mandatory duty under Section 8 of the Water Act (1989) to conserve and enhance the
environment in the implementation of its functions, the NRA could now object to
development proposals on environmental as well as drainage grounds (Gardiner, 1991:12/5).
Estimates of the degree and impact of floodplain encroachment in Britain are variable (Smith
and Tobin, 1979; Parker and Penning-Rowsell, 1983; Neal and Parker, 1988) but in southeast
England (the Maidenhead area is a good example) past development and current development
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pressures have been substantial and the planning liaison system has not protected many areas
from inappropriate development. However an argument has been put forward (Penning-
Rowse11 et al, 1986; Neal and Parker, 1988) for the selective development of floodplains as
a necessary resource in such a densely populated country as Britain.
The next section returns to structural flood defences and the technique for evaluating their
(economic) viability.
3.6 Cost-benefit constraints
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA), also referred to as benefit-cost analysis (BCA), is a tool which
aims to guide choices towards a social optimum (Mishan, 1972) via Paretian welfare theory
(Dasgupta and Pearce, 1972). The rationale of benefit-cost criteria is ultimately that of a
potential Pareto improvement: defined as a change in economic circumstance such that one
or more members of society gain without others incurring a loss; while a potential Pareto
improvement (essentially the simple Pareto rule modified by the Kaldor-Hicks compensation
principle) is a change which can make everyone better off such that gainers can compensate
losers and yet themselves remain better off; although the theory does not require that
everyone is actually made better off or nobody made worse off (Mishan, 1972; Dasgupta and
Pearce, 1972).
Maximisation of net social benefit, frequently defined in terms of national economic welfare,
ignores many other legitimate political objectives such as regional economic welfare or
income distribution. Even an ideally constructed CBA cannot guarantee a prescription for
society: "a project that is adjudged feasible by reference to a cost-benefit analysis [...] is quite
consistent with an economic arrangement that makes the rich richer and the poor poorer"
(Mishan, 1972:13). While acknowledging its limitations, it has been suggested (Donaldson,
1978:212) that a virtue of CBA is that it forces decision-makers to make explicit, relative
social values.
The advent of CBA can be traced to the United States of America, in the mid-Nineteenth
Century - when the notion of measuring the net advantages of a capital project in terms of
the net utility gains to society was first addressed - and subsequently in 1936, in the United
States Flood Control Act; but it was not until the 1950s, and its use in water resource
decision-making (again in the USA), that formal procedures for valuing costs and benefits
were attempted (Dasgupta and Pearce, 1972). Its first application in Britain was to the first
motorway, and transport has continued to be a major application.
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Flood alleviation, often requiring considerable public expenditure, is a typical example of a
social welfare product for which CBA has been used to gauge the economic returns to the
nation over and above the costs incurred. Since 1977 a manual of techniques and a computer
model have been available to systematize the procedures (Penning-Rowsell and Chatterton,
1977; Chatterton and Penning-Rowsell, 1978, 1981). An important aspect of benefit-cost
accounting is that, under Treasury rules, analyses must be carried out at the national level;
this is justified on the grounds that it is the nation - not the region or the local community -
that bears the largest proportion of costs of flood defence (Parker et al, 1987).
As part of the economic evaluation of flood defence, benefits are discounted over the life of
the scheme. The discount rate is set by the Treasury and its aim is to allow comparison of
the investment in flood defence with other investments (Penning-Rowsell et al, 1986). The
benefit-cost ratio can be considerably affected by only small changes in the discount rate
(O'Riordan, 1983a) which can decide the viability of a scheme. Thus the measure of social
utility to be gained from investment in flood defence is somewhat arbitrarily constructed,
relative to this rate.
Cost-benefit analysis, like any other technique, is open to manipulation. The illusion of value-
free objectivity masks the reality of its use to confer respectability and spurious rigour on
preferred objectives. Benefits are not found but sought to increase the benefit-cost ratio and
make it more robust in order to ensure scheme approval and grant-aid from MAFF. While
the latter procedure is designed to protect the public purse at the national level, it ignores the
investment by engineers of a great deal of individual/personal resources into the promotion
of a scheme. If the benefits are not sufficient, they will go back and look for more. The
potential for abuse of the technique was remarked by White (1971):
"One effect of benefit-cost analysis is to give any respectable engineer or economist
a means for justifying almost any kind of project the national government wants to
justify. (You tell me the project you want, and I'll give you a favourable benefit-cost
analysis). It's thrown a cloud of respectability over sets of analysis which have
ignored whole sectors of impacts and have misread other aspects, all in the most
earnest, conscientious form. [...] Exclusive reliance on benefit-cost analysis has been
one of the greatest threats to wise decisions in water development. I wouldn't
eliminate it: but I would try to see it in proper perspective in terms of other sorts of
guidelines."
n During the engineers' interviews (see Chapter 13) one engineer discussed the trade-off
point at which it was no longer worth expending officer time on squeezing a few more
benefits.
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The limitations of CBA in relation to urban flood protection have been discussed in some
detail elsewhere (Parker et al, 1987); some of these limitations include: its over-simplification
of issues to either benefits or costs; that it is predicated upon a social consensus model and
cannot overcome values-based conflicts; it can alienate the public and impede public
participation in decision-making by its use of technical language which can obscure inherent
assumptions; and its omission of impacts which cannot be quantified in economic efficiency
terms (Parker et al, 1987:28) (the latter point is discussed in the next sub-section).
CBA itself can be a constraint on floodplain management, in that national economic efficiency
can sometimes be an inappropriate measure for the relief of local flood problems. It can also
lead to the promotion of schemes entailing considerable environmental impact, as the standard
of protection is forced up to give a ratio greater than unity and the potential for environmental
impact increased. Cost-benefit analysis is a poor tool for assessing environmental impact
because, in cost-benefit terms, 'the environment' has no value: in its broadest sense, it cannot
- at present - be measured but is set aside as an 'intangible'.
In the light of recent advances in economic modelling some (Pearce et al, 1989) might argue
with the latter assertion and claim that increasingly sophisticated economic models can indeed
place quantitative values on human desires and preferences, including those pertaining to the
environment. However, these measures have yet to gain widespread validation and
acceptance; most particularly from government agencies such as the Treasury and MAFF.
3.6.1 Intangible costs (of flooding/of scheme)
CBA is perhaps as well known for what it does not measure as much as for what it does. The
intangible damages from flooding comprise those to which a monetary value cannot be
assigned and include anxiety caused by flooding and the anxiety aroused by the prospect of
future flooding, physical ill-health as a result of flooding, and inconvenience arising from the
breaking of communication links and commercial disruption (Parker and Penning-Rowsell,
1980). When compiling a benefit-cost report it is common practice to include a summary of
intangible damages, to draw their existence to the notice of the decision-maker.
While the intangible costs of flooding have been recognized to exist and attempts made to
evaluate them (Green and Penning-Rowsell, 1985), the intangible costs of schemes have
hardly been acknowledged in any technical way; rather they have been regarded (if at all) by
many practising engineers as, perhaps unfortunate, but inevitable, costs accruing to a minority
for the greater good.
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The use of Environmental Impact Analyses (EIAs) or Environmental Assessments (EAs) in
flood defence scheme appraisal is a first step in acknowledging the sometimes major
environmental impact of flood defence schemes; but EAs suffer similar limitations as CBA:
e.g. the problem of assigning meaningful and comparable values to non-market goods. It has
been suggested (Sewell, 1981; Bowers, 1990) that ETA is perhaps better recognized as a
framework for public participation rather than an analytical tool.
While there is a degree of optimism on the part of some economists (Pearce et al, 1989) and
policy analysts (Green, 1990b) concerning the potential for (and the desirability of)
'extending' cost-benefit analysis to determine 'objective' values for environmental and
aesthetic factors, the focus has tended to be at the 'high value' end of the scale. Thus, while
the impact of a proposed scheme on a Site of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI) or an Area of
Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB) may be scalable to some extent (although, I would
suggest, this is arguable methodologically, and the desirability of doing so must ultimately
rest on a value judgement), less amenable to measurement is the (relatively minor) impact of
a scheme on, for example, the view from residential property or on ease of access to a local
recreation or amenity area.
The end result of this kind of valuation could tend towards the maintenance of a few,
scattered sites of national or regional importance containing certain rarities known to experts,
and the destruction of most locally important sites containing common species familiar to, and
valued by, the majority of the ('ordinary') public. The importance of the commonplace
(Mabey, 1980) is underestimated by many (expert) decision-makers.
However, the highly disputable measures of environmental value are tangential to and, to an
extent, an obfuscation of, an understanding of a more fundamental failing of CB, whick ties
in the operation of monopoly power relations. The latter is the dominant factor in institutional
decision-making and it is this, rather than in a failure to appropriately value environmental
factors per se, that will significantly affect the outcome of any decision. At a theoretical level
CBA relies on the independence of the decision-maker (Bowers, 1988; 1990), and is thus a
typical product of (supposedly) value-free, positive economics. However, this condition is
invariably violated: decision-makers frequently have some considerable interest in the
outcome of the decision-making process and are often in positions of sufficient power to
enable them to manipulate the analysis to their own advantage (Bowers, 1990).
61
3.6.2 Equity and distributional issues
Flood hazard mitigation invariably presents decision-makers with problems of equity. Costs
and benefits rarely exhibit equal spatial, temporal or social distribution. Even when the
benefits (of a flood defence scheme for instance) outweigh the costs, there is an argument that
the minority who bear the costs must not be disregarded (Platt, 1986:42). In attempting to
deal with such externalities it is common to aggregate individuals into 'the public' (see Kates,
1971); but, by ignoring specific individuals or minority groups, it is possible to overlook the
potentially severe distress and disruption caused to them (O'Riordan, 1983a).
There are conflicting arguments over whether, or to what extent, CBA should be, or is, a
means of redistributing income (Parker et al, 1987). Some would argue that it is not
appropriate to deal with society's distributional problems at the level of flood protection:
others would suggest that redistribution already occurs to some extent when Treasury funds -
gained from all taxpaying members of society - are used to benefit the minority at risk of
flooding: whether this redistribution is itself equitable is yet another issue.
Identification of costs and benefits invariably implies a degree of public consultation, albeit
at the level of representatives rather than at the general public level. Similarly, legislative
requirements (in particular, SI 1217) demand public exposure of flood defence proposals.
These factors combined have been instrumental in increasing the amount of public
consultation that flood defence institutions have to conduct. The next section examines the
issues surrounding public consultation and participation in flood defence.
3.7 Public consultation and participation
The terms 'participation' and 'consultation' are frequently used interchangeably but they are
in fact discrete. Participation invariably implies consultation at some stage but the converse
is not necessarily the case. Consultation can occur without any real participation in the
decision-making process: views can be sought but disregarded. Involvement through
consultation may not effectively influence the outcome. However, if participation (in some
form) is held to be the ideal end point and, to some extent, the purpose of consultation then
the occasional conflation of terms below can be accepted.
Public participation is widely held to be "a good thing" - the egalitarian result of an
evolutionary process of social change; although a revolutionary and subversive potential is
also acknowledged (Sewell and O'Riordan, 1976). That consultation procedures have
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'evolved' over recent years is also the perception of NRA engineers; not only have
consultation procedures evolved they have also expanded enormously.
However, it has been noted that resource managers (NRA engineers in this case) rarely have
the communication or group problem solving skills necessary for effective participation
(Sewell and O'Riordan, 1976:19-20). NRA engineers report (see Engineers section) a growth
in consultative aspects of their work and a lack of any formal training at any point in their
engineering career'.
A classic, if radical, analysis of participation is presented in the form of Sherry Arnstein's
'Ladder of Citizen Participation' (Arnstein, 1969) (see Table 3.2). The eight rungs of the
ladder represent varying levels of citizen control. According to this typology, consultation can
be mere tokenism which simply reinforces the status quo and provides a means for informed
consent rather than an expansion of democratic choice (Nelkin, 1984:36). Just how far up the
ladder it is possible to go, and how far any decision-maker would want to go (given the
largely voluntary nature of much consultation in the area of land drainage) is debatable.
The NRA are statutorily obliged to consult certain organizations when proposing flood
defence schemes with a likely significant impact on the environment. However, statutory
requirements for consultation in land drainage are minimal and voluntary consultation
procedures are required if the public is to influence decisions (Penning-Rowsell et al,
1986:171). In practice, those involved in flood defence scheme promotion invariably go
beyond the statutory consultees and consult with a wide range of interested individuals and
groups such as individual landowners, local wildlife groups, parish councils and others: the
list of consultees can be lengthy (Gardiner, 1991). Consultation with the general public is
generally undertaken at a late stage of scheme development and it is at this stage that the
differentiation between consultation and participation becomes important and the consultation
process can be regarded both internally and by some members of the public as little more
than a public relations exercise (see Lower Stour Case Study for accusations of this nature
and Chapter 7).
23 During interviews, one engineer described the current situation and past evolution as
follows: "[Consultation work accounts for] the vast bulk of the time spent on a scheme. It
outweighs the amount of time spent on design by a great amount. Design is a relatively
insignificant part of scheme promotion these days.. .it's [consultation] sort of evolved over
the years. Most of the people here have been in the field for quite a long time now.. .and the
consultation process itself has evolved over the years with the people involved."
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Table 3.2: Arnstein's 'Ladder of Citizen Participation' (source: Arnstein, 1969).
RUNGS ON THE
LADDER OF CITIZEN
PARTICIPATION
NATURE OF
INVOLVEMENT
DEGREE OF POWER
SHARING
8. citizen control }
7. delegated power citizens are given
management power for
selected or all parts of
programmes
1	 degrees of
1	 citizen
1	 power
}
6. partnership trade-offs are negotiated }
5. placation advice is received from
citizens but not acted upon
}
}	 degrees of
4. consultation citizens are heard but not
necessarily heeded
1	 tokenism
}
3. informing citizens' rights and options
are identified
1
}
2. therapy powerholders educate or
cure citizens
}
1	 non-participatory
1. manipulation rubber-stamp committees 1
It has been argued (Sewell and O'Riordan, 1976) that the ultimate aim of participation is
"community participatory design", through an integration of the latent planning potential of
the public and the expertise of the elite; this being most possible at the small scale,
community level where interest is high. However, decision-making issues are rarely
containable at the community scale and may have regional or national level inputs and the
question of who should participate or be consulted becomes quite complex.
Wengert (1971) touches on this problem in relation to water supply issues (on the
Susquehanna river). He points out that it should not be assumed that those most concerned
with development decisions are necessarily only those that happen to live in the watershed.
In the Susquehanna example, he also points to the needs and concerns of several cities
regarding the iecreational potential of the basin and the national interest in its economic
development (1971:31).
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Wengert has noted the complexity of concepts of public participation and the difficulty of
their implementation in water resources planning (Wengert, 1971). He suggests that many of
those who have written on the subject have not carried out empirical investigations or
analyses to support their assertions; rather that "ideological concepts of public involvement"
may be overruling more traditional values of representation and majority rule and
participation is often a euphemism for pressure tactics and manipulation (1971:27).
Sewell and O'Riordan (1976) also note that participation may lead to greater alienation by
exacerbating social divisions and favouring those who can exploit the political culture
(1976:19). Within a community there will be a variety of, often competing, interests with
differing opinions and value-sets (Long, 1975:126). Representativeness becomes important
when groups are used as a proxy for public opinion - particularly in environmental matters.
Success or failure in an environmental dispute can have distributional consequences for the
rest of the community with costs and benefits being unevenly distributed (Lowe and (ioyder,
1983:98-105). However, particularly in the case of social risk assessment, even when
benefits accrue to the majority, due attention must also be given to the minority who bear the
costs (ICrimsky 1984:54; Platt 1986:42).
The consequences of participation may be increased tension and polarization, making
imperative the setting up of parallel agencies or departments for conflict resolution. Neither
does greater public participation necessarily make planning easier or decisions more rational
(Wengert 1971).
Wengert (1971) makes the point that water planning agencies invariably do not have legal
authority or institutional structures for involving the wider general public in decision making
(1971:30) and even if they did, it is unlikely that they would know which public they should
be concerned with. He quotes Dorfman (1969) who says "information about the nature of
beneficiaries, as distinct from the nature of benefits, is not emphasized" (1969:30). In issues
of flood defence there can be a blanket identification of all floodplain occupants as
beneficiaries of a flood defence project. This may obscure significant impacts arising from
a flood defence scheme on groups and individuals in the floodplaie.
Non-participation should not be construed as implying consent or lack of concern but may
' It may also obscure other, more oblique, beneficiaries such as property developers,
whose formerly flood-prone developments have thus been protected out of the public purse
and whose identification might be in the general public interest.
65
reflect any of the following: incomprehension; apathy; ignorance of what is happening;
distrust of the intentions behind participation; powerlessness and feelings of impotence to
influence the outcome (Lowe, 1976; Otway and Wynne, 1989). However, the very fact of
non-participation generally makes it impossible to explain the reasons or the attitudes.
Evidence supports the view that participation should occur early on before major choices have
been made and options foreclosed (Kasperson 1986:276; Bruton 1980:440). However, many
arguments against early participation have also been advanced; such as that information
collection (possibly of a technical or scientific nature) may not yet be complete and the
opportunity exists therefore for confusion when further assessment is carried out at a later
date; that there is likely to be a profusion of interested and possibly competing parties
requiring information; and that early consultation can increase the opportunities for opposition
(Kasperson 1986:277). However, once the problem area is defined, inertia on the part of
decision-makers can make a fundamental re-examination of policy issues extremely difficult:
technical and policy issues are rarely clearly delineated (ICrimsky, 1984:50).
An aim of consultation and participation in floodplain decision-making is the achievement of
consensus (NRA Thames Region, 1989b), however, in nonhomogeneous communities
increased participation is likely to highlight differences and increase conflict. Thus it is
important to examine whether a condition for consensus exists. If so, participation may
further its realization: if not, (if a condition of diversity exists) then participation is likely to
contribute little to conflict resolution and may increase conflict by creating conditions for
confrontation and polarization (Wengert 1976:27).
A fundamental division exists between perceptions of society as either conflict- or consensus-
based. Is society basically a cooperative and integrated collection of groups, most of whom
subscribe to the same kinds of values or is society more accurately understood on the basis
of conflict theory and characterised by social conflict and alienation: the struggle for the
acquisition of scarce resources, political power and ideological conflict? (Simmie 1974:42).
It would appear that the corporate view within the NRA favours the former model, and on
this basis maintains a self-image as a provider of services for the public good. Minority
opposition to these services merely indicates an information/education gap that need only be
filled to achieve a broad consensus.
The perceived need for consultation/participation can be different depending on whether one
is communicating (NRA engineer) or receiving (floodplain resident) information. A
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differentiation can be made between the public official's perception of the role of public
participation - as a means to accomplish ends (characterised by such goals as: correcting
misperception; educating the public; reducing conflict; easing implementation; and increasing
legitimacy) and the public's approach to public participation which tends to concentrate on
ends rather than means and is characterised by conflicts over fundamental ethical issues such
as appropriate or tolerable levels of risk and who is to decide such levels and - in terms of
scheme or project development - should it go ahead at all and for the benefit of whom?
(Kasperson, 1986).
The potential for conflict is particularly great where structural flood defence schemes are
perceived likely to have a detrimental environmental impact. As more of the countryside and
open space has come under development pressure so environmental concern has grown and
the construction of schemes has become problematic. The next section discusses the growth
in environmental concern that has been an influential factor in the agricultural land drainage
debate but has only recently become an issue in urban flood defence.
3.8 The growth of environmental awareness/concern
There can be many interpretations of the term 'environmentalism'; some include "a social
movement, a set of ideas based upon ecology, a tack-to-nature' philosophy, or just a greater
interest in environmental affairs" (Sandbach, 1980:21), and a politicising and reformist
movement (O'Riordan, 1983a:300). This variability in defmition reflects the diverse nature
of, what can broadly be called, environmental concern within which many competing
ideologies are to be found. Despite a widespread tendency to ascribe homogeneity to
environmentalists, ecocentrism is politically ambiguous (O'Riordan, 1983a; Pepper, 1989).
A marked increase in concern for environmental issues was apparent in Britain throughout
the 1980s but particularly so at the latter end when Margaret Thatcher, then Prime Minister,
made a speech to the Royal Society which appeared to give a new legitimacy to
environmental matters (albeit of a markedly non-revolutionary kind which linked the health
of the environment with the health of the economy). Although the speech was regarded by
many as a cynical vote-catching strategy - the Government's environmental words were not
commensurate with their environmental deeds - it nevertheless initiated a great deal of
speculation and discussion in the communications media (Marsh, 1988; Financial Times,
30.9.88; The Guardian, 29.9.88; Phillips, 1988; Nature, 6.10.88; New Scientist, 8.10.88)
which began to carry environmental stories, or gave stories an environmental slant, on most
days thereafter.
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Environmental issues have remained prominent in the media, fuelled by pressures from the
European Community and the passing of the 1990 Environmental Protection Act, although,
arguably, they have declined somewhat from their peak levels in 1989 and 1990. In
September 1990 an opinion poll (Phillips, 1990) placed the environment as second only to
the poll tax as a major cause of concern in Britain. Nevertheless, environmental issues have
settled at a level higher than that existing before September 1988.
The apparent periodicity of environmental concern has been noted by many authors
(Sandbach, 1980; O'Riordan, 1983a) and was conceptualised by Downs (1972) as conforming
to an 'issue-attention cycle', related to a systemic cycle of heightened public interest,
followed by increasing boredom.
The cycle comprises five stages: firstly, a "pre-problem stage", when a social problem exists
but has not been recognized as such in the public issue domain, although it may have
generated concern in some interest groups or experts.
The second stage is one of "alarmed discovery and euphoric enthusiasm", when, as the
result of a dramatic series of events, the public become aware and alarmed and are
enthusiastic about the possibility of finding a solution to the problem.
This is followed by the realization of the costs of significant progress. In this stage, certain
sections of the public recognize the relationship between the benefits of problem solution and
the costs - the former accruing to others while the latter accrue to themselves.
Fourthly, and closely related to the previous stage, there is a gradual decline of intense
public interest, as the difficulties and necessary sacrifices of problem solution are more fully
appreciated. One or more of three reactions can then develop: people become discouraged,
or they feel threatened by thinking about the problem and so suppress the thoughts, or they
become bored. At this stage another issue is likely to be entering stage two.
Finally there is the post-problem stage where an issue loses its central position and occupies
a position of "prolonged limbo", punctuated by recurrent spasms of interest. However, the
issue does not return to the pre-problem level of attention because during its progression
through the five stages, new policies and institutions may have been initiated which will
continue to make some degree of impact and thus a new equilibrium level of attention will
have been created.
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In response to Downs' conception, which largely ignores the role of the media and other
social institutions in maintaining the existing social and economic order, Sandbach (1980) has
put forward a 'conflict-accommodation model' as one more appropriate to a materialist
understanding of the environmental movement (1980:35), in which conflicts of interest and
the confinement of issues to areas safe for capital and the maintenance of vested interests are
the key explanatory factors. This is a model of accommodation (see also O'Riordan,
1983a:376) which maintains the status quo.
There has been some divergence in research findings of the characteristics of the typical
environmentally concerned individual although a majority opinion favours environmentalism
as a largely middle class pursuit. Some earlier North American research (Tognacci et al,
1972) suggested that the environmental movement was unlikely to be a unifying social force
because its members were predominantly the highly educated, of high socio-economic status,
younger and with liberal political views; i.e. the same constituency as those traditionally
active in civic and political institutions.
This research suggested that expressions of environmental concern might be a reflection of
increasing commitment by this subgroup rather than by the public generally. However, a later
American survey (Council on Environmental Quality, 1980) found support for the
environmental movement was not limited to the affluent, the well educated or the young but
was noticeable across the social categories. Research in Britain (Jowell et al, 1990) has shown
increasing levels of concern generally through the late 1980s about pollution and threats to
the countryside but the most concerned tend to be younger, better educated and from higher
social classes.
What is unknown as yet is whether the apparent growth in envirenntenta/ concern represents
the beginning of a 'paradigm shift' (Kuhn, 1970) which will precipitate a reordering of the
social framework of meaning within which experience is interpreted or whether it will result
merely in a minor accommodation (see Chapter 4, Section 4.5 and O'Riordan's 'pattern of
environmental ideologies' (1983a:376)) by the dominant paradigm to resource constraints.
A recent survey of industry and the environment (The Economist, 1990) suggests that the
latter is certainly possible and even probable if capitalist economies are to survive in the
medium (if not the long) term. This survey exemplifies the incorporation of environmental
'concerns' within the dominant social paradigm. The adoption of green technologies and
green strategies are seen as leading to a potentially positive economic advantage. It reflects
the values of 'technogreen' determinism, using language such as: "officious
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environmentalists" (p .22); "ingenious technology" (p.6);6); " smart entrepreneurs" (p .22); "good
green companies" (p.30); and "the paradox of technology: the industrial economy causes
environmental damage, but also offers the main way to repair that damage" (p.29).
It must be acknowledged that such 'opinion polls' have been criticised on the grounds that
they are a poor guide to understanding the strength of commitment to policy objectives
(Sandbach, 1980) and that they "rarely solicit deeply-held views" but reflect socially
acceptable opinions, of matters rarely considered before, that are influenced by media
coverage and social communication (O'Riordan, 1983a:216-7)25.
With hindsight, minority opinion can be seen to have been in the vanguard of more
widespread environmental attitude change in relation to flood defence as follows: demands
by articulate minority groups (local nature conservation groups, etc.) for consultation and
participation were met initially by counter claims that the groups were unrepresentative of the
general public and therefore, in the light of wider public interest, their demands were
unreasonable. In a process which perhaps can be likened to Kuhn's (1970) theory of scientific
progress, as more evidence built up to support their validity, attitudes towards these same
minority group demands eventually underwent a 'gestalt switch' and became institutionalised
and (to varying degrees) accommodated. The growth in institutional acceptance of the
importance of nature conservation issues in flood defence can be seen as an example of this
accommodation process. It is possible that the increasing importance of the (even more)
subjective aesthetic issues may be at the beginning of a similar path.
These issues are central to the focus of this study. The next chapter discusses these focal
issues, including reasons for locating in floodplains and differences between lay and
professional attitudes. It looks in more detail at the hypotheses conceptualised as underlying
the central theoretical proposition that floodplain managers (residents and engineers) make
a risk-environment trade-off.
25 Criticisms of opinion polling are not always confined to the limitations of commercial
market research techniques but are sometimes part of a more fundamental criticism of
(academic) behavioural research.
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4. FOCAL THEORY
4.1 "Why do they live there?" (Kates, 1962)
At a superficial level this question can be answered with the very simple statement that for
most people who specifically chose to live there, and for most of the time, the floodplain
environment is a very pleasant place to be. It is unlikely that the outsider - whether they are
merely travelling through or with a professional interest in the area such as engineers or
geographers perhaps - will be able to appreciate fully the benefits of a given location. Natives
and non-natives acquire and assimilate information about a place differently (Lowenthal,
1961:260).
Kates (1962) put forward 5 reasons for the persistence of people in areas subject to flood
hazard:
1. They do not know about the flood hazard and are therefore not unduly
concerned.
2. They know about the flood hazard, but personally do not expect a future
flood, and therefore are not unduly concerned.
3. They expect a future flood, but do not expect to bear a loss, and are therefore
not unduly concerned.
4. They expect to bear a loss, but not a serious one, and are therefore not
unduly concerned.
5. They expect to bear a serious loss and they are concerned. Therefore, they
have undertaken or are planning to undertake some action to reduce the losses
(Kates, 1962:135).
While individually these reasons may be valid (most research projects have identified one or
more of these reasons), together they do not encompass the range of possible determinants
of persistent floodplain occupance. The assumption behind this list is that only reason 5 is the
correct analysis and response: (flooding is a serious hazard; this hazard has been perceived;
ergo mitigation will be undertaken). It assumes that the other four reasons are deficient in
some manner. However, at least two more reasons could be added to this list:
6. They expect to bear a loss but accept this outcome as an acceptable cost of
enjoying the locational (environmental) benefits.
7. They had little or no choice in location and/or have little or no choice but to
stay.
Reason 6 was recognized by James et al (1971) who acknowledged that Kates' explanation
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of floodplain occupance on the basis of faulty information was "not the whole story"
(1971:footnote 44). James questioned the correctness of a policy that sought to prohibit
floodplain residence by those who had willingly chosen to "endure floods every few years"
in order to enjoy the benefits of the location. This was particularly the case in areas subject
to shallow flooding where he believed there would be only a minor threat to properly
constructed properties, or to life and health (1971:vii). However, James' analysis is limited
by its strong focus at the individual level; individual goals and choices are aggregated to
determine floodplain policy or effect environmental change. Government is assigned a
reactive, policing role - "regulating individual excesses" - rather than any essentially pro-
active, ideologically-based, structural or values- and attitude-forming function as this thesis
would suggestm.
In response to reason number 4 above, it is likely that, in Britain generally and in the areas
of flood risk to which this thesis directs itself, most people's experience of floods will be of
the less serious kind, i.e. they will experience indirect disruption from flooded roads or
railways or perhaps their gardens only will be flooded. Fewer, and a (relative) minority, will
suffer household flooding of a serious nature.
It is of some interest, therefore, to ask what is a flood? (Gately, 1973); clearly it is not an
absolute term. Related to this, it is unrealistic to extract those who say the event was/will be
very serious and assign to them the exhibition of the rational response against which other
responses will be measured: some people will find the event very stressful and very serious
but possibly the majority will not. Within the often somewhat large 'flood envelopes'
denoting the spatial extent of a given level of risk/protection (such as a 1:50 to 1:100 level
common to many flood defence schemes) it is unlikely that the majority will experience a
serious level of flooding.
Reason 7 (they had little or no choice in location and/or have little or no choice but to stay)
is a necessary counterbalance to the dominant model's emphasis on voluntary, individual
choice. Hazards have been classified as 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' (Starr, 1972). Examples
of the former, it has been suggested (White and Haas, 1975), are smoking or riding
motorcycles and are consciously assumed; examples of the latter are the uses of electricity
and motor vehicles which are said to be borne without conscious choice. Within this
26 The pre-eminent role of the individual in the free enterprise, North American society
is recognized, nevertheless it must be acknowledged that major flood defence projects have
been and continue to be constructed by a government agency (the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers) and thus organizational and societal level analyses are appropriate.
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classification, White and Haas claim natural hazards "have a strong component of the
voluntary" (1975:88) resulting from interactions between human activity and destructive
events.
Further, that aggregated individual preferences towards risk set the threshold acceptable to
the nation (White and Haas, 1975:89). The foregoing strongly suggests a consensus in the
nation and overlooks the extreme variation in choice availability and (sub-)cultural
imperatives among different social groups. The implication is that the individual need only
act to change both his/her - and ultimately, through aggregation, the nation's - level of risk.
Issues related to the conceptual appropriateness of choice or constraint have been discussed
in greater detail above.
The following subsection returns to the sixth reason and describes more fully the concept of
a risk-environment trade-off and its role in answering the question "why do they live there?".
4.2 The risk-environment trade-off
The term 'risk-environment trade-off encompasses a range of conceptual dimensions and so
could be said to contravene Shively's (1980) rule for social scientists to use unidimensional
language. His prescription is supported by the following three reasons:
1. The meaning of a theory is not unambiguously clear if it is couched in
multidimensional words
2. Variables cannot be measured unambiguously if they have been defined in a
multidimensional way
3. Inclusion of multidimensional words in a theory confuses that theory with
additional theories which are implied by the existence of the multidimensional
words themselves (Shively, 1980:36).
However, while insisting on the necessity of thinking and working with unidimensional
concepts, he acknowledges the validity of joining separate dimensions together in explicit
multidimensional combinations (1980:37). These can add clarity when juxtaposing several
concepts and can be useful for describing general processes. There can be some value also
in retaining a looseness of definition in the early stages of investigation to avoid a too limited
perspective (Goodey, 1973:2).
Initially, in this study, 'environment' was defined narrowly to focus on its ecological or
nature conservation aspects. However, it soon transpired, as research continued, that this
focus was too narrow and too technical and would result in limited and mostly negative
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responses from the general public who, while concerned to varying degrees about such issues,
tend to focus more on the more visual landscape and aesthetic issues. Thus, while a structural
flood defence scheme might be recognized as possibly leading to disruption of wildlife',
this would be a somewhat broadly defined concern to most members of the general public and
probably secondary to the way the scheme would impact on the view from a house, or change
the appearance of a familiar area for example.
The research programme aimed to examine to what extent, when structural solutions are
suggested to flood hazard, people make trade-offs between flood risk and environmental
values. Why do some make the trade-off in one direction - i.e. in favour of protection of
environmental value or integrity, with an attendant increased risk from the flood hazard - and
others make it in the other direction - i.e. in favour of protection from the flood hazard, with
an attendant sacrifice of environmental value or integrity.
In the risk-environment trade-off, 'environment' comprises all those environmental concerns
including inter alia pollution, nature conservation and landscape issues, but is focused
specifically on the impact on visual amenity and ecology that may arise from a proposed or
actual flood defence structure. More fundamentally it is related to an underlying value
system, of which environmental factors form a part.
The following subsection outlines the hypotheses from which a model of flood hazard
mitigating adjustment was constructed.
4.3 Hypotheses
The research design was based on a familiar model (Kates, 1971; White, 1974; Mileti, 1980)
but with the express aim of including an environmental dimension. The main hypothesis to
be tested in the research was that there exists some relationship between hazard perception
and environmental perception that influences the decisions of floodplain residents/managers -
whether individuals, groups or institutions (such as the NRA). The hypothesis suggests that
trade-offs' are made between tolerable levels of risk and the willingness to accept
environmental change resulting from structural flood defence schemes.
Thus, the research project aimed to extend Kates' hypothesis to examine whether, or to what
extent, the threshold of response (adjustment search, evaluation and adoption/rejection) is
" Flood defence schemes can also enhance wildlife value to varying degrees but this
aspect is invariably compensatory for a similar or greater degree of disruption elsewhere.
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influenced, not only by flood experience, as he and others had found, but by environmental
factors, to avoid or prevent the initiation of structural adjustments which are perceived as
environmentally damaging.
Kates (1971), building on work by White (1961b), has hypothesized that there exists a
threshold of hazard perception below which the floodplain manager does not seek or evaluate
adjustments. When the threshold is reached the adjustment search begins and adjustments are
evaluated. It was hypothesized here that the perception threshold, and nature of the search
and evaluation processes, were likely to be different in individual and institutional floodplain
managers. Thus, it was intended to investigate possible differences in perception and attitude
between experts and laypeople (focusing on NRA engineers and the general public
respectively); the factors affecting those attitudes and the way in which the attitudes (and
subsequent behaviours) of the 'experts' influence public choice and its availability. This is
discussed in greater detail below.
An additional strand in the research, which assumed greater importance as the work
progressed, was that of public participation and the consultation process as it relates to river
management and flood defence in particular. In a model of society as one of competing
interest groups, decisions have distributional consequences that can be controlled to varying
degrees by those in positions of power: control of information is an important tool of power
groups. It was hypothesized that access to information is a key factor in influencing attitudes
to flooding and flood defence and that social 'gatekeepers' (NRA officers, estate agents,
solicitors, etc.) might be controlling this access.
These hypotheses underlie the conceptual model described in the next sub-section. The
conceptual propositions, constructed from the hypotheses underlying the model are listed in
Appendix A-4.1.
4.4 Initial thesis model of flood hazard mitigating adjustment
Flooding is an inevitably recurring event wherever people have developed communities in
floodplains. Choice - when choice is available - of mitigating adjustments to manage the flood
hazard will be determined not only by both geophysical and socio-economic factors but also
by attitudinal factors as conceptualised below.
The conceptual model (see Figure 4.1.) described here is a development of a basic model of
flood hazard perception and flood mitigating adjustment taken from Kates (1971) and later
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Figure 4.1: Initial model of flood hazard perception and mitigating adjustment
extended by Mileti (1980) and was the theoretical model which guided the research design
for the studies discussed below. The description that follows is based on this early conception
and does not incorporate the findings of the subsequent research. Thus, it may appear to
conflict with some of the foregoing and concluding discussions.
In this model the human community and its use system, linked to a physical system (e.g. a
floodplain environment) define a level of flood hazard that can be seen as, essentially,
objective. This level of hazard is dependent upon the chosen land use practices of the
community and the geophysical characteristics of the particular environment. The model
describes a dynamic system in which the level of (objective) hazard can be altered by changes
in both the human use system and the physical system. There is, therefore, a circulating
feedback mechanism between these first three elements.
However, it is the (subjective) perception of flood hazard which is hypothesized to determine
the degree and form of hazard mitigating adjustment. It is hypothesized that the perception
of hazard is dependent upon the social characteristics of the social unit, included in which is
previous flood experience, both personal and secondary experience through relatives and
acquaintances. Whatever the actual level of hazard (a truly objective determination of hazard
being problematical) if it is not perceived to exist then, to all intents and purposes, it does
not exist and hazard mitigating adjustment will not be considered.
Once the hazard perception threshold is reached, an adjustment search is initiated and the
consequences of the possible adjustments are evaluated. This evaluation procedure is
influenced by the social characteristics of the social unit and by various external influences
such as macro Government policy issues, institutional factors such as the nature of the flood
defence authority (e.g. NRA) and its policies, access to information and (possibly conflicting)
interest group goals. These factors will influence the degree and form of hazard mitigating
adjustment chosen.
The degree and form of hazard mitigating adjustment can change both the physical system
and the human use system. Thus creating a further feedback mechanism which, in turn, alters
the level of hazard - both objective and subjective.
These are the elements of the basic model to which this research adds certain environmental
factors. In this parallel, but closely related, environmental system, the human use system and
the physical system define a level of environmental value which can be seen as objective (in
the sense of recognized designations such as Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB)
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or Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI)). This objective level of environmental value is
similarly linked into a feedback mechanism whereby the value can be altered (enhanced or
degraded) by changes in the human use system and the physical system.
It is hypothesized that perception of environmental value is influenced by the social
characteristics of the social unit and both are an influence upon attitudes to the local
environment, to use of the local environment and to attitudes to environmental change (e.g.
arising from structural flood defences). It is further hypothesized that evaluation of the
consequences of possible hazard mitigating adjustments will be dependent upon these
environmental attitudes. Attitudes to proposed flood relief schemes will be determined not
only by perception of the flood hazard but also by the environmental attitudes of the social
unit and by attitudes to the NRA, in terms of confidence in its technical abilities and its
environmental sensitivity.
The perceived levels of hazard and environmental value are dependent upon the
characteristics of the social unit. The perceptions are likely to be different at the individual
and at the institutional level. Likewise, the probability is that perceptions of the consequences
of selected adjustments also differ between the individual and the institution. This is discussed
further in the following sub-section.
4.5 Perceptual and attitudinal differences of flood defence engineers and floodplain
residents
Differences in perception between professionals in various fields and the public have been
noted (White, 1966a, 1966b; Craik, 1970; Sewell, 1971, 1974; Sewell and Little, 1973;
Coppock, 1974; Cotgrove, 1982). In the following discussion, flood defence engineers are
typically associated with a professional or expert response while floodplain residents are
associated with the 'layperson' or public response. The differences between the two groups
in relation to risk perception have already been discussed (see Section 2.1.4) this section
discusses decision-making and environmental attitudes.
Sewell (1974) provides an introductory framework of some of the key issues. He notes the
reliance on expert opinion (notably engineers among others) in decisions relating to
environmental quality which, he suggests, results from the complexity of the problems
involved, from the uncertainty of individual decision-makers in the adequacy of their
judgements and ,
 also partly from the promotional abilities of the professionals themselves.
78
A consequence of this has been the development of a technical elite which has assumed
responsibility for the identification of problems and their solutions and whose advisory role
has been institutionalised within administrative structures. A further consequence (noted by
Sewell with reference to North America but now perhaps equally applicable in the UK) has
been "the alienation of the public in the policy-making process" (1974:111). Engineers, for
example, not only defme the problem to be solved, they also determine the options for a
solution and frequently select the strategy to be adopted. This process inevitably gives
expression to their views of what society wants (1974:112) or needs.
Sewell found the perceptions and attitudes of the engineers he studied to have the
characteristics of a closed system. The views of the engineers appeared to be highly
conditioned by training, they adhered to the standards and practices of their profession and
showed allegiance to the goals or mission of their agency or firm. They believed themselves
to be highly qualified to do their job and to be acting in the public interest (1974:120). Sewell
found scepticism on the part of professionals (particularly in the sciences) about the
involvement of the public in policy making because the latter were perceived as not
sufficiently well informed and liable to produce a profusion of opinions which would make
policy maldng impossible. However, while the presenting to the public of a few discrete
alternatives has the advantage of simplifying the process of choice, unless the values of the
public - rather than those of the professionals - are reflected in the alternatives, they may all
be rejected (1974:129).
Sewell concluded that "experts are not in favour of institutional change, especially if it means
that their own role will be altered" (1974:129). This is characteristic of social systems
generally and can be conceptualised as a state of 'dynamic vowel-statism' or a tesdescy ta
fight to remain the same (Schon, 1971). In the case of institutional structures for flood
defence, environmental factors have already forced a degree of institutional change to
accommodate them (i.e. in the provision of conservation and landscape officer posts and the
imperatives of environmental legislation).
Environmentalism, and environmental attitudes generally, cannot be examined in isolation
from other social and political values of which they are merely a part. Of central importance
is whether, and if so to what extent, the values of environmentalism are in opposition to
dominant social values and thus to what extent it will be necessary to overcome the inertia
of the status quo. Cotgrove (1982) found' in a series of social surveys, a high level of
28 Cotgrove's research was carried out between 1977 and 1980.
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environmental awareness and concern in the public with a majority supporting, for example,
higher taxation to control pollution although the balance of opinion favoured the protection
of jobs over the protection of the environment (1982:17).
However, Cotgrove argues that surveys tend to aggregate the opinions of quite different
social groups and if they are disaggregated then a marked polarization of perceptions of the
environment emerges. Cotgrove (1982) made a useful early distinction between different
kinds of environmentalist: traditional and radical. The traditionalists are exemplified by values
relating to small scale, decentralized communities and the restoration of order; the radicals
are attracted to possibilities for escape from hierarchical and bureaucratic structures; they are
anti-power and anti-authority. It is argued here that it is in the former section that many
'environmentally sensitive' engineers could be placed; the radicals - by definition - are bound
to comprise a minority group in society.
I have used Cotgrove's (1982:27) model of the dominant social paradigm as appropriate for
the socio-political framework as applied to Britain (see Chapter 2, Table 2.1). This is the
paradigm held by the most powerful social groups - and to which, arguably, the majority
aspire - and which provides legitimation for the institutions and processes of a market
economy. His model contrasts industrialists (the dominant paradigm) with environmentalists.
For this analysis the hypothesis is that there is a congruity between the attitudes of engineers
and the dominant paradigm and that this is contrasted with the alternative environmental
paradigm; particularly - in the light of the specific focus of this analysis - in terms of values
concerning nature and knowledge.
In this simplified, dichotomous structure, engineers are hypothesized to value the
contributions of science and technology in the production of knowledge, and the separation
of fact and value, while the environmentalists recognize limits to the power of science and
technology and tend to integrate fact and value. The engineers are also hypothesized to regard
nature as hostile (inherent in the terminology of flood hazard) or neutral and to perceive the
control of the environment as both possible - within technological limits - and desirable, while
the environmentalists recognize a balance in nature that can be upset by, and should not be
subject to, human control.
The above conceptual differentiation suggests how it is that engineers can claim to be
environmentalists and yet find themselves in conflict with environmentalists (see Chapter 7
for further discussion). O'Riordan's formulation (1983a; see also Sylvan, 1985 and Redclift,
1988) extends this dichotomous structure to include four "stopping points" Ccornucopians',
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`accomrnodators', 'self-reliance soft technologists' and 'deep environmentalists') on a
continuum of environmental ideologies (1983:376). In this conceptualisation, it could be
argued that an environmentally concerned engineer might be characterised as an
`accommodator'; closer to Cotgrove's `cornucopians' but still some way from the 'deep
environmentalists'.
The above discussion has outlined the specific foci of this study. Before discussing the case
studies in which these issues were examined, it is necessary to address certain general
methodological issues which are central to our understanding of the information that has been
collected and to assumptions concerning its validity.
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5. METHODS
5.1 General introduction to theory and literature
While hazards research has traditionally used predominantly quantitative methods of inquiry,
this study has had as one of its aims the extension of the methodological field to include
other, qualitative approaches. Social science has been concerned, for at least the last few
decades, with the debate between what are seen as, not only, opposing methodologies but also
opposing epistemologies and even ideologies.
The importance of this debate is not merely theoretical but has practical implications for the
choice of research method. If differing theoretical perspectives are representative of differing
ways of seeing and acting upon society, this presupposes that methodologies (which must be
theoretically based) cannot be neutral but must define the way in which the researcher acts
on and represents their environment (Denzin, 1970).
Lofland (1971) provides a simple framework within which to view the fundamental
differences between qualitative and quantitative methods of analysis. At its simplest level,
social inquiry or analysis can be seen as an attempt to answer one or more of three questions:
1. What are the characteristics of a social phenomenon, the forms it assumes, the
variations it displays?
2. What are the causes of a social phenomenon, the forms it assumes, the
variations it displays?
3. What are the consequences of a social phenomenon, the forms it assumes, the
variations it displays? (Lofland, 1971:13).
Within this simple framework, qualitative analysis is generally seen as the attempt to answer,
primarily, the first question and quantitative analysis as the attempt to answer, primarily, the
second and third questions. Thus qualitative research would appear to be ideally suited to
providing rich descriptions of social settings, and quantitative research appropriate to the
search for causes and consequences.
This is, necessarily, a simplification and cases will arise where all questions come under
examination. However, Lofland's argument is that while conjecture, hypothesis and theory
may be addressed to varying degrees in qualitative research, they are rarely tested to the same
extent as they are in quantitative research and the research reports that come out of the
research do not "stand or fall" on these causal accounts but rather on the variations and
patterns of the findings (Lofland, 1971:62-3). Other researchers do not ascribe this somewhat
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narrow theoretical role to qualitative research and make a case for a stronger theory
generation and testing function (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Mitchell, 1983; Strauss, 1987).
The discussion below is structured to examine separately each of these two methods of
research analysis and then to examine the potential for combining both.
5.2 Quantitative methods
Quantitative research is predicated upon a natural science model. Research set within the
scientific paradigm proceeds along a well defined path: problem, hypothesis, research design,
measurement, data collection, data analysis and generalization (Nachmias and Nachmias,
1989). Much of the more positivistic (see Chapter 2), quantitative survey research has
adopted this paradigm although it is widely recognised that the actual research process is
somewhat different to this idealised type (Silverman, 1985; Cornwell, 1986) and that a strict
adherence to the initial hypotheses defined within this scientific paradigm will almost
inevitably require a degree of post hoc rationalisation. Further, that this model of research
can distort meanings (Silverman, 1985; Barrett, 1976).
Certain preoccupations are prominent in quantitative research. One of these is the
establishment of causality: in which the causal process is deemed to be unidirectional - the
action of the cause comes first in time (Hage and Meeker, 1988) - and is operationalized in
terms of dependent and independent variables. Survey researchers have been concerned with
establishing cause and effect relationships despite there being a general belief that survey
research is appropriate at the level of simple associations and correlations and that
'correlation does not imply cause' (Bryman, 1988).
Another preoccupation is with the generalization of findings to a wider population and this
is manifested in issues of sampling design and the representativeness of samples. The use of
computers and probability theory have extended the scientific respectability of this aspect of
the research process. Related to this is the issue of replication. The replication of findings is
a test of their `generalizability' to other contexts. The difficulty of replication is a key
criticism of qualitative research in which the idiosyncrasies of the researcher may be a
significant component of the research and thus impossible to replicate.
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Quantitative research has been dominated by a focus on the individual unit of analysis".
This is related to the dominant technique of enquiry, the survey questionnaire, which is
administered to individuals and the results aggregated. This necessarily results in a view of
society as an 'aggregation of disparate individuals' (Blumer, 1948:546 quoted in Bryman,
1988:39). There has been extensive debate concerning the appropriate level of analysis:
whether social processes can be explained by reference to individuals and the meanings of
situations or by reference to social structures. After some years of polarised positions on this
question (still not entirely resolved), researchers began to bridge the two (micro and macro)
levels or chose (irrespective of personal ideological position) the level most appropriate for
answering a particular research question while making reference, during analysis and
interpretation, to the influence of the other level (Silverman, 1985): this eclectic approach has
been criticised however (Eyles and Lee, 1982).
The main techniques adopted by quantitative research are surveys and, in psychology, the
experimental method: others also used include the analysis of previously collected data,
content analysis and structured observation (Bryman, 1988). Of pre-eminence, however, is
the social survey.
Surveys themselves do not have to be synonymous with particular techniques (Marsh 1982)
although they are most commonly associated with structured questionnaires and are normally
characterised structurally by a variable by case matrix (de Vaus, 1986) which is fundamental
to their method of analysis. Neither, it has been argued (Marsh, 1988:102), do they have to
be inherently positivistic. However, the most frequently used survey instrument - the
structured questionnaire - is based largely on the possibility of asking unbiased questions and
the measurement of atheoretical and value-free perceptions which makes this latter claim
problematic. Detailed discussion of the survey method can be found elsewhere (Marsh, 1982).
5.3 Qualitative methods
Hammersley (1990) notes that ethnography is something of a blanket term which can be
synonymous with 'qualitative method', 'participant observation', 'case study' and a number
of other, primarily non-quantitative, methodologies. In this thesis no distinction is made
between ethnography and other qualitative methods: the distinction that is used is a broad one
between quantitative and non-quantitative approaches.
29 But not, paradoxically, the individual her- or himself; it is qualitative research that
more appropriately studies the individual person while quantitative methods are concerned
with aggregations of individuals.
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A particular strength of qualitative methodology lies in its potential to uncover the
interviewees' own language and issue selection -(within the bounds of the interviewer's ability
to uncover issues of importance without overly directing and leading the interviewee); a
method of seeing through the subject's own eyes (Bryman, 1988:70). Spradley makes a useful
distinction (in the context of the ethnographic interview) between the respondent in the social
survey and the informant in the ethnographic interview (Spradley, 1979:25-39). In the social
survey, the respondent responds to questions formulated previously in the survey researcher's
own language; in the ethnographic interview, the informant informs the researcher of the
questions s/he should ask. The former searches for answers while the latter searches for
questions. (Arguably, the choice of use of these two terms also represents a shift from a
confirmatory to an exploratory mode respectively.)
Spradley claims that ethnography "always implies a theory of culture" (Spradley, 1979:5).
However, 'culture' is probably one of the most complicated words in the English language
(Williams, 1983:87). Spradley uses the term to mean "the acquired knowledge that people
use to interpret experience and generate social behavior" (Spradley, 1979:5).
The core of ethnography is a concern with the meanings of actions and events to the people
the ethnographer is seeking to understand (in contrast to a concern with the meanings to
the ethnographer of the people s/he is trying to understand). It represents a radically
different approach to the proposed study group. The ethnographer sets out in relative
ignorance (but see the discussion of case study research below) to learn from the study group
what is meaningful to the study group. In contrast, the survey researcher sets out with greater
knowledge (or assumptions) to test pre-formed hypotheses about restricted areas of interest
to the researcher.
This concept is reflected in the language used: the ethnographic interview can be
distinguished from social survey research by the use of the terms informant and respondent
respectively (Spradley 1979). At a simple level, in social surveys, the respondent responds
to questions that have been formulated in the social scientist's language, out of the social
science culture. In the ethnographic interview, the informant informs the ethnographer of the
questions s/he should ask. Thus, the flow is reversed: social surveys begin with questions
rather than with the search for questions (Spradley, 1979:31).
The method contains flexibility and often an initial lack of structure. This should not suggest
that the method.
 is unsystematic but rather that there is a rejection of (detailed) concept and
theory formulation in advance of fieldwork (Bryman, 1988) and the categories used for
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interpreting what people say and do are not pre-given or fixed (Hammersley, 1990).
Data may be gathered from a range of sources, but observation and/or relatively informal
conversations/interviews are the most frequent forms (Hammersley, 1990). Data analysis
focuses on description and the interpretation of meanings and functions of social behaviour
and relies very little on quantification and statistical methods which may be singularly
inappropriate because of the small numbers often involved. In some cases the focus may be
on a single individual but more usually it is a particular setting or group. The questionable
general utility of findings taken from a very small, non-random sample is regarded by some
as a potential weakness of the method.
However, although the qualitative approach concentrates on the (un-aggregated) individual
to a greater degree than quantitative methods, ultimately the focus of analysis is on the
patterns and themes that emerge from interviews (Hakim, 1987:26) and these may be found
to have a wider relevance. Hakim notes further in defence of the qualitative method that its
dismissal in favour of surveys is based on the overlooking of the latter's own validity
problems (Hakim, 1987:27-8). In a structured, quantitative interview, unique or deviant
responses are handled statistically and might be eliminated from the later stages of analysis.
In unstandardized, qualitative research, such deviant responses can have a significant effect
on interpretation and lead to a revision of earlier hypotheses (Whyte, 1977:38).
Hammersley (1990) underlines the importance of context, and the motivation for the message
built into the context, to understand meaning. He also observes, with perhaps a hint of
caution, that context is "almost endlessly extendable" and at its extreme can extend to the
wider society in which the communication occurs and even to the history of that society
(1990:ix). Nevertheless, qualitative research conveys a strong message that the situating of
events in their wider social and historical context is imperative for understanding (Bryman,
1988:65).
Qualitative research shows a concern with process: social life is viewed in processual rather
than static terms. In policy research this manifests itself in a concern with the process of
implementation rather than a focus on outputs: emphasis is placed on the responses of both
those who implement and those who are affected, how each responds to the other's views,
how policies are interpreted, and how perspectives change (Bryman, 1988; Finch, 1986).
The place of theory in research is often a distinguishing element of the research method. The
simple quantitative research model tends to start with theories and hypotheses to be tested and
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verified by the investigation while the simple qualitative research model rejects an initial
statement of theory as likely to be unrepresentative of the subjects' own views and develops
hypotheses through the investigation: theory emerging at the end. There has now developed
some blurring of these distinctions. 'Grounded theory' (Strauss, 1987; Glaser and Strauss,
1967), associated strongly but not exclusively with qualitative methods, emphasises the early
and continuing development of theory throughout the investigation while quantitative
investigations can have exploratory or unpredictable elements (see Bryman (1988) for further
discussion and examples). The place of theory is discussed further in the case study section
below.
5.4 Quantitative and qualitative methods in combination
The notion of combining qualitative and quantitative research methods is not new but has
tended to occur in a specific sequence: qualitative methods have traditionally been used as
explorative precursors to the main research stage which is quantitative. Thus qualitative
methods are frequently viewed as 'second rate' (Bryman, 1988:94) generators of hypotheses
which can be tested more vigorously by quantitative means. Proponents of qualitative
research, and those more open to the possibilities of combination, tend to see the relationship
more as one of equals.
In a discussion of how far positivist, humanistic and structuralist approaches (to geography)
conflict with or complement each other, Johnston has noted (1980) that a strong case can be
made for combining positivist/behavioural and structural approaches. However, against this,
Eyles and Lee (1982) argue that:
"There appears to be an assumption.. .that these 'approaches' are in some way
alternatives; that we can select this concept from one approach, that method from
another, and the perspective from yet another. Unfortunately, this desire for
eclecticism rests on the false assumption that these approaches are above all
techniques for analysis rather than epistemologies" (1982:117).
Harvey (1990) argues against this and says that methodologies are not inherently positivist,
phenomenological, etc. Bryman (1988) believes the tendency to view quantitative and
qualitative research as arising from different epistemological positions, and the resultant
depiction of them as mutually exclusive models of research, has exaggerated the differences
between them (Bryman, 1988:105).
Quantitative research methods began to decline in popularity in the sociological field after the
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mid 1960s, although they were (and are) still held to be valuable in other disciplines
(Silverman, 1985). After a period of conflict, sometimes characterised by intolerance and
bigotry (Bulmer, 1984) between the proponents of the two opposing methodologies, there has
developed a blurring of the distinctions and a move towards research designs calling for the
use of whichever method is most appropriate or combining elements of both (Fielding and
Fielding, 1986; Bryman, 1989, 1988). There has been a reaction against the dogmatic
approach and a call for a sense of balance in qualitative research that allows for a degree of
quantification where necessary to maintain intellectual breadth and rigour (Silverman,
1985:17).
Johnston (1980) suggests that empirical results can be used in a number of ways (1980:155)
and not necessarily employing a positivist approach. His discussion of work by Cox and
McCarthy (1982) is apposite. They carried out a questionnaire survey and analyzed the data
using multivariate statistical analysis. However, their goal was not to establish that the same
empirical results hold elsewhere but to examine underlying forces. They "used the empirical
material both to suggest structural interpretations of observed relationships and to illustrate
the empirical outcome of structural mechanisms - in given circumstances" (Johnston,
1980:154).
5.4.1 Triangulation
The combination of techniques and strategies known as triangulation (Campbell and Fiske,
1959; Webb et al, 1966 referenced in Bulmer, 1984) is recommended in the research
literature (Denzin, 1970; Smith, 1975; Marshall and Rossman, 1989:146; Patton, 1980:108-9;
Bryman, 1988:131-4) to strengthen the validity of empirical inquiry. A number of different
types of triangulation are possible: triangulation of theory (by using multiple theoretical
perspectives in relation to the same object or set of objects); of data (in time, space, level of
analysis); of investigator (by using multiple observers of the same object or set of objects);
and of method (either between methods or within methods) (Denzin, 1970:301).
Triangulation has been used throughout this research project by the use of different research
methods - quantitative and qualitative; using different data sources (including written
documents, personal interviews and newspaper articles); and incorporating questions from
other quantitative studies in order to make comparisons. While triangulation can increase
confidence in the validity of separate research studies through comparisons of core themes
and questions, the importance of context in any research 'event' must not be underestimated:
each must be evaluated in its own terms. This can make the fmal integration of triangulated
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data problematic (Silverman, 1985:21). It is also possible that the use of a multi-method
technique may result in an increase in error if the relevant bias-checking procedures have not
been adopted (Fielding and Fielding, 1986:31).
In Kuhnian terms (Kuhn, 1970), paradigms are "incommensurable" and thus, if quantitative
and qualitative research comprise individual research paradigms then, it is not possible to
integrate different research methodologies if they are founded on conflicting epistemologies.
There appears to be no simple answer to the epistemological debate that avoids dogmatic or
fetishistic adoption of a single world view and accompanying methodology. Clearly, research
methods are not neutral or atheoretical representations of the 'real' world; rather they act as
filters through which the world is selectively experienced (Smith, 1975:273). However, while
each method may result in a degree of bias or distortion, a combination of methods, based
on suitability to the problem or problem element under investigation, incorporating adequate
recognition of their inherent biases, should more accurately represent the research
environment. This is the position adopted by this research.
5.4.2 Case study research
A simple dichotomous characterisation of the differences between quantitative and qualitative
research is that the former is nomothetic and the latter ideographic; that is, the former seeks
to establish general laws, applicable irrespective of time and place, while the latter is located
in a specific time and milieu (Bryman, 1988). The case study, which may be a single person,
group or event, is typically ideographic.
A criticism levelled at qualitative research generally and case studies in particular, is the
limited degree to which findings can be generalized to other or larger populations. This
criticism is based on a false notion of the form of inference undertaken. Sampling theory in
survey research has gained a pre-eminence which can obscure the possibilities of other
analytical routes to understanding meaning. The apparent problem of generalizability is one
of a confusion between statistical inference and logical (Mitchell, 1983) or analytical (Yin,
1984) inference; the former relies on a representative sample having been drawn initially,
from which the analyst can extrapolate to a larger population. There is a misconception that
views case study research as if it were a sample of one drawn from a universe of similar
cases (Bryman, 1988:90). Logical inference is based on the unassailability of the subsequent
analysis (Mitchell, 1983:200); it is not theory-less but arises from an a priori familiarity with
underlying theory. Thus case studies can be selected, not for their 'typicality' but for their
explanatory power:
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"For general purposes any set of events will serve the purpose of the analyst if the
theoretical base is sufficiently well developed to enable the analyst to identify within
these events the operation of the general principles incorporated in the theory. [...]
So in the social sciences an illuminating case may make theoretical connections
apparent which were formerly obscure" (Mitchell, 1983:204).
This method acknowledges the uniqueness of any event and the possibility of examining the
exceptions to generalization which can deepen understanding of social processes. It calls for
a generalization, not to other case studies, but to theoretical propositions (Yin, 1984:44).
It should be noted that quantitative research does not always adhere to its own rules for
representativeness: surveys do not always use random samples (Bryman, 1988) and often
refer to spatially or temporally restricted populations. Thus the simple nomothetic/ideographic
dichotomy is rarely applicable.
While this thesis adopts the term 'case study' it may not conform to strict definitions of the
term (Yin, 1984) but rather uses it as a unifying link between quantitative surveys and sets
of qualitative interviews (which might more usually be termed case studies) based on certain
underlying theoretical propositions. The individual research designs for each case study and
for the interviews with NRA engineers are under the appropriate individual Case Studies
below.
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PART TWO
6. INTRODUCTION TO CASE STUDIES OF FLOODPLAIN RESIDENTS
The research findings are based on three quantitative data sets and two qualitative studies:
The Quantitative Studies:
1. The Thames Attitude and Perception Survey, 1989 (DWSC/89) (part of The Datchet,
Wraysbury, Staines and Chertsey Baseline Study);
2. 'The River Environment and You' Postal Survey, 1990 (DWSC/90) (also part of The
Datchet, Wraysbury, Staines and Chertsey Baseline Study);
3. The River Thames Maidenhead Flooding Survey, 1990 (Maidenhead 1990) (part of
The Maidenhead, Windsor and Eton Flood Study).
The Qualitative Studies:
4. The Lower Stour Flood Alleviation Scheme: Christchurch, 1990;
5. The Bridport Flood Alleviation Scheme: West Bay, 1990.
Detailed examination is focused on two quantitative studies (DWSC/89 and Maidenhead) and
one of the qualitative studies (The Lower Stour). Anecdotal information collected over the
three year study period from all ten NRA regions also informed the research as did
attendance at both public and internal NRA meetings, seminars and conferences, following
which notes were made.
Table 6.1 shows the status of the case studies: whether or not there has been recent flooding,
the stage of flood defence scheme development and an estimate of the proximity of those
interviewed to any possible scheme impact (there is an assumption that all schemes will have
some impact on the local environment but no value judgement is made concerning the nature
of the impact).
During the research period between 1988 and 1991 the author was involved, to varying
degrees, in a number of individual research modules. With so much empirical data it was
necessary to strike a balance between breadth and depth. The choice of case studies to be
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Table 6.1: Stages on a scheme-development continuum
CASE STUDY RECENT
FLOODING
SCHEME
DEVELOPMENT
SITUATION
PROXIMITY OF
SCHEME
IMPACT ON
MAJORITY
INTERVIEWED
DWSC/89 NO NOT PROPOSED* LIKELY TO
VARY
DWSC/90 NO** NOT PROPOSED* LIKELY TO
VARY
MAIDENHEAD YES PROPOSED DISTANT
LOWER STOUR NO COMPLETED NEAR
WEST BAY YES REJECTED*** NEAR
*	 i.e not publicly proposed although certain
**	 very little flooding in the immediate
Maidenhead (1990).
***	 N.B. rejected by the interviewees.
options have been examined.
area although flooding occurred nearby in
discussed here was justified on the grounds that they covered a range on the scheme-
development continuum from the baseline situation, before a flood event or scheme proposals
(DWSC/89), to the post-scheme development stage (Lower Stour).
Two other studies which could have been included and on which analysis was undertaken (the
Eton Wick survey of residents' perceptions of flood risk and flood alleviation schemes and
the River Severn Flooding Survey) were excluded from the case study section for three
reasons: firstly because little or no direct input was made to their design; secondly because
they contained insufficient comparable data; and thirdly to limit the size of the total study.
However, because Eton Wick lies within the main study area for this research, occasional
references are made to the community and to some of the research findings which are
reported in full elsewhere (Tunstall et al, 1989).
The major quantitative analysis exercise involved the Thames Perception and Attitude Survey
(DWSC/89) but cross referencing to the other data sets (including those not discussed in
detail here) was undertaken for selected analytical variables. The findings from each of the
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surveys have been reported in separate research reports (see under separate Case Studies) but
the following discussion is based on a re-analysis of the data sets.
Where there was missing data for a variable, a decision was made generally to exclude these
cases from the analysis; thus, for any table or chart, the number of valid cases may differ
from the total sample number but is generally noted.
Key tables and figures appear in the main text but a number of supplementary tables and
figures have been placed in appendices.
6.1 The Thames floodplain studies: general introduction
Discussion of the Datchet, Wraysbury, Staines and Chertsey Flood Study which comprised
the Thames Perception and Attitude Survey (DWSC/89) and follow-up postal survey 'The
River Environment and You' (DWSC/90) must be preceded by an outline of the Maidenhead
Windsor and Eton (MWE) Flood Study, out of which it grew. The MWE Flood Study had
been initiated partly as a result of Thames Water Authority's Section 24 (5) surveys to
identify the major land drainage and flooding problems in the region. A study carried out by
Middlesex Polytechnic Flood Hazard Research Centre (Thames Water, 1987) identified a
number of towns along the River Thames as being at risk of flooding. Maidenhead was
selected initially for further examination partly because of the existence of extensive flood
records for the area. The early stages of the design process for this major scheme were
notable for the number of disciplines involved in detailed discussion regarding the optimum
design and route, taking into account a range of environmental factors (Gardiner, 1988).
Subsequently, ten options for flood defence in the Maidenhead area (later extended to include
Windsor and Eton) were identified and, from these, one preferred option was chosen: an east
bank flood relief channel - of approximately the same width as the Thames - combined with
improvement works to the Thames and embankments in certain areas. A programme of public
consultation was initiated (see below) as a part of which, Middlesex Polytechnic Flood
Hazard Research Centre undertook a survey of residents' attitudes (Tunstall et al, 1989) to
the proposed scheme in Eton Wick, a small village to the southeast of Maidenhead and close
to which the proposed route lay.
As a result of continued (technical) studies and public consultation, the final proposed design
93
and route was modified and subsequently extended to provide flood relief to Windsor and
Eton also (see Figure 6.1). This resulted in a proposal for an 11 kilometre long channel and
associated works which would protect against flooding with a return period of approximately
1 in 60 years. The outcome of planning applications for this scheme is as yet unknown.
The extension of studies to the 27 kilometres downstream to Walton Bridge was part of the
River Thames Flood Defence Strategic Initiative (Thames Water 1988). Although a particular
scheme had not been specified, studies were initiated to test the engineering, environmental
and public feasibility of a continuation of the MWE scheme channel. The 1989 Thames
Perception and Attitude Survey (Tunstall et al, 1989) formed part of these early studies of
public attitudes and was seen by the NRA Thames Region to be part of an early public
consultation initiative.
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Figure 6.1: Map of Maidenhead, Windsor and Eton Flood Alleviation Scheme route (as
at January 1991)
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NO RECENT MAJOR FLOODING
NO SCHEME YET PROPOSED PUBLICLY
SCHEME IMPACT - VARIABLE
STUDY STATUS
7. THE THAMES PERCEPTION AND ATTITUDE SURVEY (DWSC/89): BASELINE
STUDY
7.1 Introduction
This study area (Figure 7.1) extends from Datchet downstream to Walton Bridge (Thames
Water 1988) and is an extension of the Maidenhead, Windsor and Eton Flood Study area
discussed above. Proximity to London and the many attractive and historically important
features in the landscape make it a favoured residential environment. It is predominantly
contained within the Metropolitan Green Belt and contains a number of Sites of Special
Scientific Interest and other ecologically valuable areas. The area has been affected by
mineral workings and associated land restoration works; however, certain areas remain
relatively unchanged and are valued for that reason.
7.1.1 Consultation and participation: procedures followed
The NRA Thames Region proposed a baseline public perception survey (DWSC/89) to
investigate attitudes to the flood risk and possible future schemes prior to any firm scheme
proposals or designs having been made. In this way they hoped to identify problem areas or
issues ahead of the design stage so that costly amendments could be avoided. There was some
hesitation, however, on the part of NRA personnel to alert floodplain residents to both the
flood risk, in case this alarmed them, and the possibility of a future scheme, in case this
created `nirnby-type' opposition groups. Thus, the NRA set the most unfavourable conditions
for an information-gathering exercise in an area without recent flooding and little or no
experience of flood defence.
7.2 Research design
The survey population was defined as householders living within the 100 year floodplaie
between Datchet and Walton Bridge. All the streets within the flood envelope were listed and
3° The floodplain definition was based on the latest maps supplied by the consulting
engineers on the flood study (Halcrow Water) but has been redefined subsequently.
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Figure 7.1: Map of the Thames Perception and Attitude Survey (DWSC/89) study area
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electoral registers used to estimate the number of addresses. Seven separate samples were
drawn with varying sampling intervals in order to produce samples of sufficient size for
separate analyses if required.
The interview period extended through the summer and autumn of 1989, providing 494
questionnaires (see Appendix B-1) for analysis. The interviews were lengthy (the average
interview took just over an hour) and prospective interviewees were warned beforehand of
the probable amount of time they would have to commit. This may have been a contributory
factor in the high refusal and non-contact rate of over 50 percent m . However a major cause
of the low response rate appears to be the considerable apathy of the floodplain residents with
regard to the flood risk. Interviewers reported many instances of residents expressing the
belief that there was no flood risk and thus the survey was irrelevant to them.
It is possible that the high non-response has led to an element of bias and that the results are
not representative of the population as a whole. It is possible that those who responded were
more than usually interested or concerned with environmental or flooding issues. However,
for the purposes of the NRA, it is often precisely these people who are of most interest as
they are the ones most likely to become actively involved in any public debates about
proposed schemes and thus the NRA should be aware of their attitudes and concerns.
The sampling error at a 95% confidence level for a random sample' of this size is 4.5%
(de Vaus, 1987:63). The selection of analytical sub-groups will, of course, affect this level
of error.
7.3 Flood history and present level of risk
The last major flood in the area, estimated at the time of the survey to have a return period
of 56 years, was in 1947 although high water levels, which would have caused localised
flooding of gardens and possibly a few riverside properties, occurred in 1968, 1974, 1979
and 1988. Records of flooding in the study area are scarce (Griffiths, 1979).
Since 1947 there has been considerable development in the floodplain, including major
infrastructure developments such as motorway and reservoir construction, which have
m Because of the failure of certain interviewers to complete interview response forms it
is not possible to give a completely accurate response rate.
32 This was not strictly a random sample but rather a stratified random sample.
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influenced the pattern of flooding (Thames Water, 1988). Estimates, derived by NRA
consultants from mathematical models and other specialised software, of the number of
properties to be at risk of flooding suggest that up to ten thousand properties throughout the
study area are at risk from a flood of similar magnitude to that which occurred in 1947.
7.4 Social characteristics
A breakdown of social characteristics across all three quantitative data sets (DWSC/89,
DWSC/90, Maidenhead) is given in Table 7.1.
The majority of the study sample is in the middle or older age group, and is relatively
affluent and well educated. The mean length of residence is 19 years but almost a quarter
have been resident for less than 5 years. Only 11 percent of respondents have been resident
long enough to have witnessed the 1947 flood but over a third long enough for the 1968
floods.
Forty-three percent of the sample live within 250 metres of a river, with 11 percent of these
in riverside properties. Just over a quarter of the sample live over 500 metres from the river.
The latter is an indication of the geographical extent of the floodplain and a probable factor
in the general lack of concern of the respondents about the flood risk (many respondents
expressed a belief that they live too far from the river to be at any risk).
Membership or regular support of various organizations (Question 41) were hypothesized to
be indicative of the strength of respondents' environmental and community concern, their
access to alternative channels of information, and an increased disposition to act on issues of
concern. Of the organizations listed in the questionnaire, those with the largest support were
sports clubs (28 percent), the National Trust (23 percent) and the World Wide Fund for
Nature (20 percent). These were closely followed by the Royal Society for the Protection for
Birds and civic or community associations (both with 19 percent) and other environmental
groups such as Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace (16 percent).
A scale was constructed, based on the number of community actions taken (see Appendix C-
7.1). The categories were suggested by the British Social Attitudes Survey Research (Jowell
et al, 1987) but the corresponding question wording (Question 9) was altered from a
specifically environmental activism to general activism because of a concern that too few
numbers would be achieved for analysis from such a relatively narrow interest area and that
the propensity to act on any issue would be sufficiently informative.
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Table 7.1: Social characteristics across 3 datasets
Thames Attitude Survey (1989)	 (DWS C/89)
'The River Environment and You', Postal Survey (1990) (DWSC/90)
Maidenhead Flooding Survey (1990) 	 (M'head)
SEX	 % male
% female
cases
DWSC/89
50
50
(489)
DWSC/90
59
41
(589)
M'IlEAD
46
54
(197)
AGE	 % 18-34 21 20 10
35-49 N/A 31 35
50-64 N/A 25 79
65+ N/A 24 21
*DWSC/89
35-54 39 40 N/A
55+ 40 42 N/A
EDUCATION (age when completed)
%	 <15 years 31 33 15
16-17	 " 40 47 32
>17	 " 29 20 53
cases (478) (559) (189)
HOME OWNERSHIP
%	 yes 86 85 95
cases (483) (585) (198)
INSURANCE COVER FOR FLOODS
%	 yes	 63	 63	 83
no	 6	 7	 6
don't know	 29	 27	 9
don't have*	 2	 3	 3
cases	 (491)	 (583)	 (198)
* Maidenhead wording: 'No: others/landlord responsible'.
LENGTH OF RESIDENCE
mean years
	 19.3	 20.0	 12.2
median "	 14	 14.5	 8
cases	 (492)	 (602)	 (198)
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Table 7.1 continued
DWSC/89 DWSC/90 M'HEAD
DISTANCE FROM RIVER*
%	 riverside	 11	 16	 28
250m	 32	 19	 54
250-500m	 31	 19	 17
>500m	 26	 40	 2
cases	 (463)	 (603)	 (198)
* DWSC/89 distances were measured by researchers; in other surveys, distances were
assessed by respondent.
FLOOD EXPERIENCE
%	 yes
cases
24
(493)
24
- (604)
91
(199)
GROUP SUPPORT/MEMBERSHIP
National Trust
% 23 29 N/A
cases (491) (405)
WWF
% 20 22 N/A
cases (491) (405)
Political Party
% 11 17 N/A
cases (490) (405)
Naturalists' Trust
% 4 3 N/A
cases (490) (405)
RSPB
% 19 16 N/A
cases (489) (405)
Sports Club
% 28 39 N/A
cases (489) (404)
Civic Assoc.
% 19 18 N/A
cases (481) (405)
Other env. group
% 16 22 N/A
cases (478) (406)
•
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The high scorers (defined as those who have taken 6 to 8 actions) on this scale were more
likely to be middle-aged (35-54) males with higher levels of education, home ownership and
income. Thus, while activism may appear to have become more widespread in recent years,
the data support the traditional view that it is largely the middle classes' who engage in
such community activity.
Responses to scheme statements (Question 24) were examined to discover whether or not
those most in opposition to scheme proposals were also likely to be more active in the
community, as this would be problematic for the NRA. The responses were variable and
inconclusive: out of 15 scheme statements, 7 attracted more positive responses and 8 attracted
more negative responses towards hypothetical schemes although the differences between high
and low scorers were marginal. Attitudes to the NRA (Question 31) were examined in a
similar way and were generally more positive although, once again, differences between high
and low scorers were marginal.
7.5 Environmental perception and attitudes
How people perceive the environment was hypothesized to affect their attitudes to proposed
structural flood defence schemes in their area. An important indicator of such attitudes is
likely to be the relative importance of environmental values within a respondent's total value
system; this survey, however, concentrated on the environmental component.
7.5.1 General environmental orientation
A pilot survey (April 1989) tested two sets of attitude statements (compiled by several FHRC
researchers) related to nature conservation, and environment and society, comprising 23 and
22 statements respectively. There was considerable agreement with the majority of the
statements suggesting widespread environmental awareness and concern. After, inter alia,
factor and reliability analyses, the two sets were amalgamated into one section of general
environmental orientation. This was necessary to reduce the overall interview time.
For the main survey (Autumn 1989) a set of 25 statements were used, some of which were
based on, or influenced by previous published work (Cotgrove, 1982; McKechnie, 1977;
Jowell et al, 1988).
33 Class was not examined specifically but an assumption is made here on the basis of
higher levels of education, income and home ownership.
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Analysis again showed positive environmental awareness and concern, although certain
statements showed a more divergent response when respondents had to choose between
industrial growth and environmental preservation. Factor analysis (Kim and Mueller, 1982,
1983) showed that a number of dimensions were contained within the overall concept of
environmental values; eight factors were found which were difficult to interpret. However,
cluster analysis (Norusis 1988, 1990) revealed a basic two cluster pattern of 15 and 10
statements each. From these two clusters two separate but related scales were formed, termed
'environmental values' and 'optimistic utilitarianism'', comprising 13 and 7 items
respectively (see Appendix C-7.2 and C-7.3).
The two scales broadly conform to the values represented by the dominant and alternative
social paradigms (Cotgrove, 1982) discussed above (see Table 2.1: in particular, the core
values and those concerning nature and knowledge). Higher scores on the optimistic
utilitarianism scale are related to the values of the dominant paradigm (materialism, the
natural environment as a resource, confidence in science and technology, controllability of
the environment etc.) and high scores on the environmental values scale are related to the
alternative paradigm (intrinsic value of the natural environment, balance of nature).
While neither scale showed substantial differences in response, the optimistic utilitarianism
scale was more discriminating than the environmental values scale. This suggested that, in
the sample studied, while environmental concern is widespread at a superficial level, the
discriminating factors appear to be related to the primacy of economic and individualistic
versus other - particularly environmental - values. The role of science and technology in
society and willingness to accept a degree of personal sacrifice in order to protect the
environment were important underlying factors.
Those people giving the lowest scores on the optimistic utilitarianism scale (and by
implication the most environmentally committed) are most likely to be young to middle-aged
females, with higher levels of education beyond the statutory minimum and to be home
owners with higher incomes (see Appendix C-7.4).
The majority of the sample rate highly the area in which they live (Question 3). Those
scoring highly on the optimistic utilitarianism scale (and thus the least environmentally
34 Parallel research and analysis on a larger set of attitude statements was undertaken
by another researcher (Green and Tunstall, 1990) and these two terms coined although
the identification of the concepts and dimensions had been arrived at jointly with the
author.
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committed) rate it very slightly higher, which suggests that although the environmental factors
are significant, other factors (possibly related to attitudes to property and other, non-
environmental, values) not measured by the questionnaire are also important.
Membership or support for various organizations and mean scores on the scales were not
always easily interpretable (see Figure 7.2). Members of 'other environmental groups' (such
as Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace) were the highest scorers on the environmental values
scale and the lowest scorers on the optimistic utilitarianism scale, which was broadly as
expected; as was the lowest score on the environmental values scale for the sports club
members. Members/supporters of County Naturalists Trusts were the highest scorers on the
Optimistic Utilitarianism scale which was surprising although somewhat in line with
Cotgrove's (1982) findings (see Chapter 4, section 4.5) which contrasted 'environmentalists'
and 'nature conservationists': the former allied to a more radical social paradigm; the latter
more allied to the traditional, hierarchical values which underlie the optimistic utilitarianism
scale. Unusually the responses of the National Trust and Sports Clubs members and
supporters seemed to be related and they proved to be low scorers on both scales. However,
the low frequencies of organization membership throw some doubt on the reliability of these
findings.
Table 7.2 shows the mean scores on environmental values, optimistic utilitarianism and
community activism scales according to the number of environmental groups supported.
Although the differences between the categories are small, they conform to the expected
pattern, i.e. the members/supporters of the greater number of groups have the lowest
optimistic utilitarianism scale scores and the highest environmental values and community
activism scale scores.
7.5.2 Attitudes to the local environment
Respondents were asked (Question 2) to rate a number of items as advantages and
disadvantages of their local area as a place to live (see Figure 7.3). This showed that the
nearby countryside and nearness of the river were rated as considerable advantages while the
risk of river flooding was a marginal disadvantage only (for some, the risk of flooding is so
far from being a disadvantage that they rated it positively). Other advantages of the area
included housing, access to work and leisure and recreational facilities. Being near the river
was rated an advantage by 79 percent of respondents while the risk of river flooding was
rated a disadvantage by only 34 percent. Thus the many advantages of the local area outweigh
the perceived risk of flooding (similar findings emerged in all the surveys discussed).
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Table 7.2: Mean scores on environmental values, optimistic utilitarianism and
community activism scales according to membership/support of environmental groups
(DWSC/89)
ENV'MENTAL
VALUES SCALE
OPTIMISTIC
UTILITARIANISM
SCALE
COMMUNITY
ACTIVISM
SCALE
Member/supporter
no environmental
group
46.6 21.0 3.1
Member/supporter
1 environmental
group
47.4 20.6 4.4
Member/supporter
2 or more
environmental
groups
49.1 19.8 5.0
All cases 47.4 20.7 3.8
Environmental groups = National Trust,
County/Local Naturalists' Trust, RSPB, Other
the Earth/Greenpeace)
World Wide Fund for
environmental group
Nature,
(e.g. Friends of
Attitudes to the local environment were also examined in three questions (Questions 7, 7a and
8) based on questions in the British Social Attitudes Surveys (BSAS) of 1985, 1986 and 1987
(Jowell and Witherspoon, 1985; Jowell et al, 1986; 1987). The wording was changed slightly
to make them more appropriate to the needs of the survey and the study area. For example,
while the BSAS survey questions were widely focused on the countryside generally, the
DWSC 1989 survey aimed to examine attitudes to the particular local area. It was thought
possible that not all respondents would regard their local open spaces as 'countryside', and
so the wording was changed from "do you think the countryside generally is much the same
as it was twenty years ago, or do you think it has changed?" to "I would like to ask you
whether you think the local countryside and open spaces have changed in the last 20 years".
Thus, while the results are not directly comparable, they serve to place the local Thames
survey results against a wider, national, background. The Thames survey data suggest (see
Appendix C-7.5) that in 1989 more change is perceived to have occurred locally compared
to nationally in earlier years and that just under two fifths of respondents regard the changes
as being for the worse. However, just over two fifths regard the changes as having both
106
Countryside
Near river
Housing
Environment
Open spaces
Wildlife
Work
Shopping
Clean town
Leisure
Rates
Transport
Flood risk
Figure 7.3: Advantages and disadvantages
of living locally (DWSC 1989).
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0
	 1
mean rating
Scale: -5 major disadvantage
to 5 major advantage
107
positive and negative aspects. A question (Question 8) was included to measure levels of
concern for the local environment. The categories were expanded and the wording changed
slightly for the DWSC/89 survey which generally shows (see Appendix C-7.6) a higher level
of concern for the local environment than is apparent in the more widely focused, national
sample. Only 4 percent of respondents admitted to being "not particularly concerned".
Another measure of environmental concern at the time of the Survey was the European
Election results in June 1989 when the Thames Valley (Berkshire East, Reading East,
Reading West, Slough, Spelthorne, Windsor and Maidenhead, Wokingham) gave the Green
Party 21.5 percent of the vote (nationally the Green Party took 14.9 percent of the vote; other
results were: Conservative 52.7 percent; Labour 27.2 percent; Social and Liberal Democrats
8.5 percent).
Thus, the respondents in the Thames Valley study area show a high level of concern for their
local environment which they feel has undergone considerable change, much of it for the
worse.
7.6 Flood experience
A quarter of respondents have experienced flooding in their house or garden. Of these,
almost half have experienced flooding at their present address and the majority of the
remainder of those with flood experience were flooded in some other part of the study area.
A third of those with flood experience had floodwater inside their homes while the remainder
had floodwater in the garden only. The majority of those with flood experience have been
flooded on one occasion only, although some have experienced more frequent flooding.
Respondents were asked (Question 10g) the date of the most serious flood they had
experienced. Only 13 percent (3 percent of the total sample) had experienced their most
serious flood within the last ten years. Thirty-one percent (6 percent of the total sample) gave
1947 as the date of the most serious flood experienced.
7.7 Perception of, and attitudes to, flood hazard
Awareness of past flooding in the area was high (80 percent aware) with over 40 percent
aware of the 1947 flood specifically. Awareness of flooding at other times was not common;
the next largest percentage recalled 1968 as a year of flooding.
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Just over half of the respondents were aware of the flood risk when they moved to the area.
In response to the question: "could you tell me your reasons for moving here even though
you knew about the possibility of flooding?" (Question 19d.), they gave answers such as they
liked the area, it was convenient, the flood risk was low or non-existent, it was a better
property or that they wanted to live by the river (see Appendix C-7.7). Other research
(James, 1971 et al,; James, 1974) has also shown high levels of awareness of flood risk when
moving to an area.
A number of attitude statements were used with the intention of constructing Likert scales of
flood hazard perception to indicate levels of awareness of the causation and likelihood of
flooding, and the nature of flooding and living in flood-prone areas. The expected pattern was
that those with high flood hazard perception would agree with the more negative aspects of
flooding suggested by the statements and would be more likely to expect flooding to recur.
It was hypothesized that those with flood experience would be likely to show higher flood
hazard perception, and thus a higher score, than those without.
In practice, the experience of these floodplain residents appeared to conflict with the expected
pattern in certain aspects, giving negative correlations where positive correlations were
expected (although the correlations were weak, most being less than 0.3). Appendix C-7.8
and Appendix C-7.9 show the means, medians and standard deviations for the statements
according to flood experience. The validity and reliability of the scales were deemed
unacceptable and the statements were used as individual indicators only.
The majority of respondents asserted that there are no problems getting insurance in the area
perhaps because there was also a majority belief - irrespective of flood experience - that there
are no "real floods" in the area. In general, respondents disagreed that in areas liable to
flooding you could not get insurance but about a quarter were uncertain (neither agreeing nor
disagreeing) - irrespective of flood experience. In fact 63 percent of respondents said they had
insurance that provides flood cover; 6 percent said their insurance did not provide flood
cover; 2 percent do not have any insurance and 29 percent did not know whether their
insurance policy provided flood cover. The last suggests an apparent lack of concern about
the flood risk.
The vast majority agreed that it takes a long time to get back to normal after a flood but they
were split over whether you can get fun out of the flooding situation: more of those with
flood experience agreed that you can. Agreement with the latter item was hypothesized to
point towards trivialisation and underestimation of the serious nature of flooding and was
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expected to be supported by those without flood experience, thus it was surprising to find
those with flood experience agreeing with it.
While the majority agreed that nobody wants to buy a flooded house, about a quarter
disagreed, irrespective of flood experience. Respondents were split over whether "If you live
in flood prone areas, flooding is at the back of your mind all the time", however, those with
flood experience showed greater disagreement; which is the reverse of what was expected.
Although the majority agreed with the statement "the worst thing about floods is not the
monetary costs but the loss of personal possessions like letters and photographs", the
responses of those with flood experience were more dispersed across the attitude range. It
seems probable that for a minority who do lose such possessions of importance, it can be the
worst part of a flood event but for those who do not, other factors predominate.
Those without flood experience were uncertain whether "flooding brings out the best in
people" but those with flood experience expressed stronger agreement. Those without flood
experience believed more strongly that "a flood affects people's mental and physical health
long after the event" than did those who have experienced flooding. This, again, was the
reverse of what was expected.
There was considerable uncertainty about flooding, its effects and likelihood in this sample
of whom only a quarter have experienced flooding. The responses to the statements suggested
that frequently it was the non-flooded who responded as would be expected from a
hypothesized model of those with high flood hazard perception, i.e. with a negative image
of flooding as distressing and disruptive. In this sample, those with flood experience revealed
more positive aspects of flooding, and were frequently in opposition to this hypothesized
model. The expected pattern was confounded in 6 out of 10 statements. It is possible that the
seriousness of the experienced flood would have an influence on these responses. However,
no objective assessment of event seriousness is available, only the respondents' subjective
rating of seriousness.
Eight statements were used to examine the causation and likelihood of flooding (Appendix
C-7.9). It was hypothesized that flood experience would be likely to increase knowledge and
awareness of flooding. More of those with flood experience disagreed that the Thames
Barrier had removed the risk of flooding in the area but a quarter believed it had.
•
Poor operation and maintenance of locks and weirs was believed to be the cause of flooding
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in the area by both those with and those without flood experience although more of those with
flood experience believed building roads and houses in the area makes flooding worse. Those
with flood experience were more likely to believe that "past flooding was a freak event,
unlikely to happen again".
There was more disagreement from those with flood experience with the statement that "the
likelihood of flooding in the area is increasing all the time because of changes in climate and
other things" but there was little difference in responses between those with and those without
flood experience to the statement that "a flood could happen again any year".
Although a majority disagreed that "a flood won't happen again because the Water Authority
(NRA) can now control flooding through river management", the responses from those with
flood experience were more dispersed. There was considerable uncertainty regarding the
statement "we are now due for another flood" with similar responses irrespective of flood
experience.
7.8 Perception of, and attitudes to, future flood risk
Awareness of the possibility of future flooding was also high (75 percent aware) although this
suggests that a quarter of respondents had not considered this risk before the interview. Of
those who were aware of the flood risk, the majority became aware through personal
observation of the river. Other major sources of information were neighbours and solicitors
and estate agents when buying their property.
Respondents were asked whether they would be prepared to live in the same area if there
were varying levels of risk (Question 18). A majority would be prepared to live with risks
between 1 in 200 and 1 in 50 but only a minority were prepared to live with risks between
1 in 25 and 1 in 5. However, more than a fifth of respondents were prepared to live with the
most frequent flood risk. Those with flood experience (see Figure 7.4) were more prepared
(or as prepared) than those without to live with all but the most remote level of risk.
Preparedness to live with varying risks followed a decay function with distance from the
river; those living nearest being more prepared to live with all levels of risk (see Figure 7.5).
Appendix C-7.10 shows the ratings for perceived seriousness of an experienced flood and
worry about future flooding across the 3 data sets. This shows little difference in the
seriousness ratings but a rise in the level of worry about future flooding from the recently
flooded samples from Maidenhead compared to the DWSC/89 survey. Generally, the latter
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respondents suffered less recent and less serious flooding than the former survey sample
which supports the 'classic' survey findings of Kates and others that recency and magnitude
are important and influential factors in flood hazard perception although the above discussion
suggests that this is not a simple relationship.
7.9 Attitudes to adjustment (proposed/implemented)
At the time of the survey there were no specific plans for flood defence in the study area and
so responses were to hypothetical works only. Interviewees were asked to respond to a set
of general and area-specific scheme attitude statements (Question 24; see Appendix C-7.11).
Generally respondents had a positive attitude towards flood relief schemes although responses
were qualified and large numbers showed uncertainty by giving a "neither agree nor disagree"
response. A third believed that there is no need for a scheme because the risk is too low and
over a quarter were uncertain.
Distance from the river proved to be a useful explanatory variable with regard to attitudes
to proposed schemes. Those living closest to the river and those with flood experience were
generally more prepared to live with the flood risk and were often less in agreement with
scheme development proposals. As those who live nearest to the river also have the greatest
flood experience it was necessary to examine preparedness to live with risks and attitudes to
flood scheme proposals and to control for flood experience. Many of the examples of those
with flood experience are based on low frequencies (the numbers are below 50 in many cases)
and may be less reliable in statistical terms.
Appendix C-7.12 shows responses to selected scheme statements according to flood
experience and distance from the river.
Distance from the river was not a consistent explanatory variable which suggests this is not
a simple bivariate relationship but other factors, perhaps related to underlying value systems,
are also in operation. In order to examine this hypothesis a comparison was made of
responses to 6 scheme statements (Questions 24 a, d, e, g, k and o) according to flood
experience, distance from the river, environmental values scale score and optimistic
utilitarianism scale score (see Appendix C-7.13a to C-7.130.
The statement "Anything designed to reduce flooding is desirable" (Appendix C-7.13a)
attracted general agreement, as had been found elsewhere (see discussion of this statement
in the Lower Stour case study Chapter 10, Section 10.9), with little difference between the
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responses according to distance from the river, flood experience or environmental values
scale score. However, there was much stronger agreement from the high scorers on the
optimistic utilitarianism scale. This finding accords well with what would be expected from
those espousing the values of the dominant social paradigm, particularly control of nature and
materialism.
Conversely, the statement "I would rather put up with flooding than spoil the open spaces
here with flood relief channels" (Appendix C-7. 13b) attracted general disagreement - possibly
because respondents found an image of damage easier to construct for flooding than for flood
relief channels. Neither of the environmental scales discriminated between responses but
distance from the river and flood experience did, which suggests that the interviewees were
responding to the first part of the statement - related to flooding - rather than the second -
related to environmental damage from mitigation works. Those living closest to the river and
those with flood experience (two strongly related categories) showed greater agreement with
the statement.
There was general disagreement with the statement "It is a waste of money to spend it on
flood relief channels: nature will always win in the end" (Appendix C-7.13c), with none of
the explanatory categories discriminating well. This statement also contained two parts and
it is uncertain whether responses were directed to one or other or both parts. The more
strongly worded and area-specific statement "A flood relief scheme should be carried out in
this area regardless of cost" (Appendix C-7.13d) attracted a slightly more dispersed response
with a higher frequency of 'neither agree nor disagree' responses. Interestingly the high
scorers on both environmental scales showed greater agreement with the statement, perhaps
because there were no obvious environmental triggers in the wording and responses were
directed at the cost aspect. The fact that the high scorers on the environmental values scale
tended towards greater support for this statement indicates the complexity within a broadly
environmental values system, aspects of which can straddle both the dominant and the
alternative social paradigms.
Respondents were uncertain about the statement "There is no need for a flood relief scheme
in this area because the flood risk is too low" (Appendix C-7.13e), with large numbers opting
for the 'neither agree nor disagree' category. Perhaps surprisingly, there was little difference
in response according to flood experience. The two scales, although showing only moderate
variation, appeared to accord with expectations (see 'economy' category in Table 2.1): the
high scorers on the environmental values scale opting for safety and the high scorers on the
optimistic utilitarianism scale leaning towards risk. Most of the variation was found in the
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distance from the river variable, with those living closest to the river showing greater
agreement with the statement.
Although there was general agreement with the statement "I would rather have any scheme
than be flooded" (Appendix C-7.130, there were marked differences in responses depending
on distance from the river and score on the optimistic utilitarianism scale. Those living closest
to the river showed stronger disagreement with acceptance of any scheme and, conversely,
those with the higher score on the optimistic utilitarianism scale showed (as hypothesized)
greater support.
7.10 Consultation and participation
The DWSC/89 Survey was considered by the NRA Thames Region to be part of its
consultation process and the questionnaire included a number of questions specifically
concerning attitudes to consultation and participation in relation to flood defence.
7.10.1 Residents' attitudes
While the Thames Perception and Attitude Survey may have been regarded internally as an
early public consultation exercise (see discussion above), in terms of the public's power to
influence decision-making it was more closely allied - in Arnstein's (1969) conceptualisation
(see Table 3.2) - to non-participatory 'tokenism' than to 'citizen power'. There was some
scepticism and much uncertainty among the respondents regarding the completeness and
fairness of the NRA's consultation procedures (see Appendix C-7.14). Almost two thirds of
respondents believed "some people affected by a flood relief scheme have more influence on
the decisions of the Water Authority/NRA than others" and two-fifths believed "The Water
Authority/NRA doesn't take the public's views into account when deciding on a flood relief
scheme". However, over half agreed that "The Water Authority/NRA consults the people
affected fully when developing plans for a flood relief scheme".
Respondents were asked their preferences regarding the timing, the target groups and the
nature of consultation on any possible flood relief schemes for the area (Questions 32, 33 and
34). The majority preferred to be consulted at the stage when a number of possible options
had been selected for them to choose between or even earlier (see Table 7.3. This lends
support to the recommendations arising from the Eton Wick Survey (Tunstall et al, 1989:37)
where dissatisfaction with the late @referred option) stage of consultation was reported.
115
% Number
29 (144)
59 (290)
8 (41)
2 (10)
% Number
13 (62)
16 (76)
70 (342)
Table 7.3: Preferences for consultation: when, who and how? (DWSC/89)
Preferences for consultation: when
Question 32: "If the National Rivers Authority Unit of Thames Water were to propose a flood relief
scheme for this area, how soon do you think it should consult the public?"
a) Before it selects any options for the design or route
b) When it has selected a number of possible options for the design
and route so that the public can choose between them?
c) When it has chosen a preferred option for the design and route for
people to comment upon?
d) Or do you think it shouldn't consult at all but should go ahead
with whatever it thinks best?
Cases: 489
Preferences for consultation (DWSC/89): who?
Question 33: "In your view, should the NRA Unit of Thames Water..."
a) Only consult the general public directly?
b) Only consult through representatives such as parish councils,
residents' committees, wildlife and amenity groups etc?
c) Consult both the public directly and through representatives?
Cases: 491
Preferences for consultation (DWSC/89): how?
Question 34: "How would you prefer to be consulted about any flood risk or flood relief proposals for
this area?"
a) Public meetings
b) Walk-round exhibitions
c) Video presentations
d) Regular newsletters
e) Other
YES
% Number
NO
% Number
59 (282) 41 (195)
66 (313) 34 (159)
46 (212) 54 (253)
82 (393) 18 (86)
29 (63) N/A N/A
(e.g.: local free press, use of local shopping centres, "Water Authority personnel should come and
visit people in their homes and talk about it.")
Cases: 465-479
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Respondents expressed a preference for consultation with both the public and representatives
(such as parish councils, residents' committees, wildlife and amenity groups etc.). Arguably,
this, combined with an early start to the consultation process, could mitigate against a
repetition of the situation which arose in Eton Wick, where a late discovery of sites of
importance to the public conflicted with the sites chosen for the preferred flood defence
option (Fordham et al, 1991): this was the rationale behind the decision to survey the Datchet
to Walton Bridge area prior to the development of detailed plans.
Respondents were asked whether or not they would prefer to be consulted by public meetings,
walk-round exhibitions, video presentations or regular newsletters or to specify other means.
There was a majority in favour of all but video presentations, with newsletters gaining the
strongest support. It is possible that more respondents expressed a preference for this means
because it entails the least effort on their part but another factor may be that the regularity
suggests continuity of consultation rather than the 'one-off nature suggested by the other
means. Whether or not respondents had experienced flooding did not affect their attitudes
towards consultation but greater numbers of those living closest to the river preferred to be
consulted at the earliest stages of the process. This lends support to the notion (discussed
below) of differentiation between consultees. Those most impacted by both flooding and
proposed schemes should perhaps receive higher levels of contact and opportunities for
participation (as opposed to mere consultation) than those less impacted (usually those further
away from the river).
7.11 The risk-environment trade-off
In the determination of a negative flood hazard mitigation attitude (as partly indicative of a
risk-environment trade-off), distance from the river was the most useful explanatory variable
(in terms of the number of statements where it showed a variance in response), followed by
the optimistic utilitarianism scale score, flood experience and then the environmental values
scale score.
To examine this further, those with a negative attitude towards scheme proposals were
selected from the responses to a set of scheme response statements (Question 24, statements:
a, b, d, g, j, k, 1 and o). These statements were selected as showing a strongly negative
attitude to a flood relief scheme in their area and to be indicative of those making a risk-
environment trade-off (see Table 7.4). Each statement was examined in turn and the findings
amalgamated to give an average response across the set.
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Table 7.4: A risk-environment trade-off: percentage giving responses to selected scheme
statements indicative of a negative scheme attitude (DWSC/89)
(Question 24)	 Percentage
showing negative scheme
- frequency
response
Anything designed to reduce flooding is [not]
desirable
23% (113)
A flood relief scheme should [not] be carried out in
this area regardless of cost
43% (215)
I would rather put up with flooding than spoil the
open space here with a flood relief channel
16% (81)
I would [not] rather have any scheme than be
flooded
32% (157)
I would rather rely on flood warnings and risk being
flooded than have any flood relief scheme in this
area
20% (97)
There is no need for a flood relief scheme in this
area because the flood risk is too low
36% (171)
More of these respondents lived closer to the river and had generally been in residence
longer. The majority rated the attractive environment and being near the river as a greater
advantage and the risk of flooding as less of a disadvantage. They were more aware of
past flooding and had more personal flood experience but they rated the seriousness of the
experience lower than the average. They believed the likelihood and seriousness of future
flooding to be less than average and were less worried and more prepared to live with the
complete range of risks. They were more often males with higher levels of education and
income and higher levels of community activism.
The fact that they rated their flood experiences as lower than average might be construed
as typical of those prepared to tolerate flooding: the argument (most particularly from
flood defence engineers discussed below) being that were they to experience serious
flooding they would change their attitudes and accept virtually any flood defence scheme.
However, the other case studies discussed here do not always support this view and the
engineers themselves provided evidence to contradict this position (see Chapter 13).
Furthermore, the flood experience seriousness rating (Question 10e) is a subjective one: it
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does not indicate the objective level or duration of any flood event but rather how it was
perceived by the respondent. It is possible that an 'objectively' serious flood may be given
a low 'subjective' seriousness rating although an approximate relationship must be
assumed (the Maidenhead data (below) broadly support the relationship between depth of
flooding and event seriousness rating).
7.12 Summary and conclusions
This survey showed a general level of support for flood defence in principle but not at the
expense of the environment: thus floodplain residents were indeed making the
hypothesized risk-environment trade-off. The survey found widespread environmental
awareness and concern although this could be said often to be at a superficial level. The
discriminating factors appeared to be related to the primacy of economic and
individualistic versus other, particularly environmental, values.
The majority rated highly the area in which they live. The nearness of the river and
countryside were rated as considerable advantages while the risk of river flooding was a
marginal disadvantage only.
Over two thirds of respondents were aware of the flood risk when they moved to the area
but there was considerable uncertainty about flooding (its effects and likelihood) in this
sample, of whom only a quarter had had flood experience. Those with flood experience
tended to respond differently, revealing more positive aspects of flooding and opposite to
the expected response pattern.
A majority would be prepared to "live with" risks between 1 in 200 and 1 in 50 (which
covers the 56-year return period for the last major flood in 1947) but only a minority
were prepared to live with a more frequent risk. However, more than a fifth of
respondents were prepared to live with the latter, most frequent, risk.
Greater numbers than expected of those living closest to the river and those with flood
experience were prepared to live with the flood risk and were often less in agreement with
scheme development proposals.
The majority of respondents preferred to be consulted about flood defence at least at the
stage when a number of possible options had been selected for them to choose between or
at an earlier stage. This was particularly the case for those living nearest to the river.
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While this survey itself represented a form of public consultation at an early stage, it
nevertheless remained passive in form and provided little opportunity for direct public
participation in decision-making.
In terms of the relationships hypothesized in the model which guided the basic research
design, the findings have supported the importance of environmental factors in flood
hazard mitigation but they have also suggested an underlying complexity that the model
does not convey. Appendix C-7.15 contains a more detailed discussion of some of the
significant relationships found when testing the model.
This survey has examined a sample of floodplain residents, the majority of whom have yet
to experience either a flood or a flood defence scheme thus their decision-making
environment is one of great uncertainty and their responses must be regarded as tentative
indications only of their responses to an actual scheme. The following case study discusses
a follow-up study in the same area, which was carried out after flooding occurred
nationally and in areas nearby.
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RECENT, MOSTLY DISTANT FLOODING
NO SCHEME YET PROPOSED PUBLICLY
SCHEME IMPACT - VARIABLE
STUDY STATUS
8. DATCHET, WRAYSBURY, STAINES AND CHERTSEY STUDY: POSTAL
SURVEY: 'THE RIVER ENVIRONMENT AND YOU' (1990)
8.1 Introduction
Localised flooding in February 1990 of parts of the Thames Valley provided the opportunity
to examine the same study area as in 1989 before and after flood events were addressed by
the media and perhaps experienced by respondents. This Case Study provides a brief
discussion of the survey findings, which have been reported at greater length elsewhere
(Tapsell et al, 1991).
8.1.1 Consultation and participation: procedures followed
No formal consultation programme had been initiated at the time of the 1990 survey (no
scheme having yet been decided) although, as with the DWSC/89 survey, the postal survey
itself was considered to be part of an early information-gathering, consultation process. An
unknown number of respondents would have been contacted by letter and by interviewer
during the first survey and this may have raised awareness levels (while it is known how
many households took part in both surveys, the number of households which were contacted
and refused or were unattainable has not been computed).
8.2 Research design
The same sample and the same or similar questions were used for both the 1989 and 1990
surveys but the second survey used a self-completion postal questionnaire (see Appendix B-
2). This was chosen as a means of examining different survey instruments and perhaps
overcome the poor response rate in 1989. Attention was paid to the presentation of the
questionnaire and a glossy cover was used to encourage people not to throw it away. Some
of the feedback from the respondents suggested that most of them liked the presentation but
some were concerned that the materials should have been less extravagant and recycled ones
used instead.
The response rate for the 1990 postal survey, allowing for the removal of incomplete returned
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questionnaires, was 54 percent which was better than the previous survey but still low. It is
likely that, despite recent flooding in nearby communities and the country nationally, there
was still a high level of unconcern about the possibility of future flooding. It is possible (even
probable) that those who did return the questionnaires showed a more than average level of
concern for either or both the local environment or the risk of flooding. Twenty-three percent
(261) of the 1990 questionnaire returns were from households that had been interviewed for
the 1989 survey.
The two surveys are not directly comparable because differences may be attributable purely
to the difference in survey instrument rather than a change in respondent attitude to the
measured item. However, it must be accepted that any survey is a unique record of attitudes
at the time of survey and dependent upon many extraneous (unmeasured) factors that can be
hypothesized to influence attitude change or stability. Furthermore, the survey questionnaire
can itself change attitudes, by raising awareness for example, and thus the administration of
the same survey instrument may result in changed attitudes (Lowenthal, 1966).
A further argument against their direct comparability is that the same individual may not have
answered both sets of questions. The 1990 postal survey used the same list of households as
in 1989 but no indication was given about which individual in the household could fill in the
questionnaire and no specific question was addressed to this.
Bearing in mind the above, it is felt, nevertheless, that the two surveys under discussion are
sufficiently similar in both content and in the sample from which they were drawn, to be
broadly comparable.
The sampling error at a 95 percent confidence level for a random sample' s of this size (614)
is between 4 and 4.5. The selection of analytical sub-groups will, of course, affect this level
of error.
8.3 Flood history and present level of risk
Flooding occurred in February 1990 in many parts of England and Wales. There was little
flooding in the study area although a red alert (flood warning) had been issued (and featured
in the national news media) and the River Thames flowed out of bank on some stretches. The
nearest major flooding occurred upstream in Maidenhead and was covered extensively in both
35 As with the preceding survey, this was not a simple random sample but a stratified
random sample.
122
local and national news media; this was hypothesized to be a possible influence on attitudes.
8.4 Social characteristics
The social characteristics of the postal sample closely resembled those of the first (see
Chapter 7, Table 7.1) except that a higher number of males responded to the Postal survey
than in the 1989 survey (59 percent compared to 50 percent previously) and there were
differences in the distance from the river at which they lived.
In the DWSC/89 survey the distance was measured by researchers while in the DWSC/90
survey the respondents were asked to estimate the distance themselves. The 1989 survey used
'riverside' as the nearest zone of property, meaning those roads/properties closest to the river
without intervening properties or developments. The 1990 survey asked respondents if their
property 'overlooked' the river which could include properties at some distance and even with
intervening properties/developments that still allowed a river view. This may have increased
the numbers in the 1990 survey giving the nearest zone, and decreased the numbers in the
next (up to 250 metres from the river).
There was a considerable increase in the numbers of respondents giving 'over 500 metres
from the river' as the distance they lived from the river. This suggests that those living over
250 metres from the river may perceive themselves to be further away than they are. This
factor may influence attitudes to both the river's environmental benefits and its risks.
Membership and support for various organizations were broadly similar to the 1989 survey.
8.5 Environmental perception
8.5.1 General environmental orientation
A set of environmental attitude statements was used in both surveys. The main differences
between the 1989 and 1990 responses (see Appendix D-8.1) were that less respondents
believed that "people are more important than the environment"; more people agreed that "the
most important problems today are the threats to the environment"; less people agreed that
"it's right to use animals for medical research"; and less people agreed with the statement that
"these days, morality and trying to do what's right don't seem to matter". The findings
suggest a slight enhancement of environmental concern between the two surveys. However,
this could be accounted for by the fact that those who were more environmentally concerned
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would be more likely to return the questionnaire.
8.5.2 Attitudes to the local environment
Although a similar question was asked in both surveys regarding the advantages and
disadvantages of living in the area, a different rating scale was used (the use of a `-5 to +5'
scale was considered to be too complicated for some possible respondents in a postal survey
without the aid of an interviewer). It showed (see Figure 8.1) that the mean response to the
risk of flooding placed it as marginally more disadvantageous than "new building
developments" and marginally less disadvantageous than "aircraft noise" (the latter was site
specific however). The "attractive countryside" and "being near the river" were rated highly
as advantages, as was "access to work". The mean general rating of the area was similarly
high (after recalculation) in both surveys.
The responses of those with flood experience (see Figure 8.2) closely resembled those
without. The largest difference was for the item: "being near the river", which showed those
with experience giving it a higher rating. As with the 1989 survey, the advantages of the
location appear to outweigh any apparent disadvantages related to the flood risk.
8.6 Flood experience
It had been hoped, for comparative purposes, that the postal survey would show higher levels
of flood experience than had been found in the 1989 survey; however, levels of flood
experience were similar, with three quarters having no experience of flooding. Of the quarter
who had experienced flooding the majority had experienced garden flooding only and at their
present address.
Only four respondents reported flooding in the house in 1990 and 35 (6 percent) reported
flooding in the garden.
8.7 Perception of, and attitudes to, flood hazard
Compared to the 1989 survey, slightly higher percentages of the 1990 survey respondents
were aware of the possibility of future flooding (Question 13) and were aware when they
_
moved to the area (Question 13a) (see Table 8.1). Over 80 percent of respondents were aware
that there was a risk of flooding in the area and three quarters of these (over half of the total
sample) were aware of the risk when they moved. Of those who were unaware of the flood
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Figure 8.2: Advantages and disadvantages
of living locally, according to
flood experience (DWSC/90).
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to 5 major advantage
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Table 8.1: Perception of flood hazard: past and future flood risks (DWSC/90)
'The River Environment and You' (DWSC/90: Questions 7, 13 and 13a)
and 'Thames Attitude Survey' (DWSC/89: Questions 13, 19 and 19b).
DWSC/90 DWSC/89
Aware of past flooding in area* 62% 80%
Aware of possibility of future flooding 81% 75%
Aware of flood risk when moved 58% 52%
* DWSC/90 Survey question wording: "Are you aware of the flooding that
occurred in February 1990.. .in this area?"
DWSC/89 Survey question wording: "Are you aware of [this local area] having
been flooded in the last 50 years?"
Cases: DWSC/90: 479 - 616
DWSC/89: 383 - 494
risk, three quarters (almost half of the total sample) stated they would still have moved there
had they known (Question 13d).
Responses to a set of statements used in the 1989 survey indicated a general increase in the
perception of flood hazard (see Appendix D-8.2) with fewer respondents agreeing that "past
flooding was a freak event" and that "we don't have real floods here". There was also less
agreement with the (erroneous) statement that "the Thames Barrier [...] has removed the risk
of flooding in this area", although it is not possible to point to the cause of the latter finding.
Respondents were asked whether the Thames floods of February 1990 had changed their
attitude to the flood risk in the area. The majority said it had not. Thirty percent said it had
not and they were still unconcerned; 30 percent said it had not and they were still concerned.
Of the 26 percent who said the flooding had changed their attitude, 23 percent were more
concerned. Fifteen percent said they did not know about the flooding.
8.8 Perception of, and attitudes to, future flood risk
Like the 1989 respondents, fifty percent or more of the 1990 respondents were prepared to
live with risk levels of 1:50 to 1:200 (see Figure 8.3). Unlike the 1989 respondents,
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Figure 8.3: Preparedness to live with
varying flood risks (DWSC/89 and
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Figure 8.4: Preparedness to live with
varying flood risks according to
distance from the river (DWSC 1990).
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however, those living nearest to the river (see Figure 8.4) were not more prepared than those
living further away to live with all levels of risk. They were less prepared to live with the
low probability/high impact flood risks of 1:50 to 1:200 but they were more prepared to live
with risks between 1:5 to 1:25. It is not possible to interpret this reliably: assuming a
sophisticated understanding of flood risk (which it is not always possible to do) then it could
be that those living closest to the river were more prepared to live with more frequent/low
impact floods than rare floods of a more serious nature. The variability may be related to the
fact that respondents themselves had gauged distance from the river and some of their
estimates may not be reliable.
The 1990 respondents were less prepared to live with the complete range of flood risks (see
Figure 8.3) perhaps because they believed flooding to be more likely (see Figure 8.5 and
Figure 8.6) and were more worried than the 1989 respondents (see Appendix D-8.3).
Interestingly, the 1989 respondents gave a slightly higher seriousness rating to their worst
flood and yet were less worried about the possibility of future flooding; this confounds the
expected pattern which suggests past, serious, flood experience would heighten future
concern. Both sets of respondents rate similarly highly the effects of a future Thames flood.
8.9 Attitudes to adjustment (proposed/implemented)
At the time of the survey there were still no publicised plans for a flood relief scheme in the
study area; thus, responses were to a hypothetical scheme.
Several of the 1989 survey scheme response statements were included in the 1990 survey and
many of the responses were similar (see Table 8.2). The second survey differed however in
showing less agreement with the statement "there is no need for a flood relief scheme in this
area because the flood risk is too low", suggesting that their perception of the flood risk had
increased. Nevertheless, this did not ensure unconditional support for a scheme, as
respondents in the second survey were also less in agreement with the statements: "I would
rather have any scheme than be flooded" and "anything designed to reduce flooding is
desirable". Despite this slightly cautious attitude, they were not prepared to risk flooding and
showed a similar, negative, response to the 1989 respondents to the more strongly worded
statement: "I would rather put up with flooding than spoil the open space with flood relief
channels".
The reduced support for the statement "anything designed to reduce flooding is desirable"
may stem from the different position it occupied in the list of statements (Schwarz, 1991 and
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Table 8.2. Agreement with scheme statements (DWSC/90 and DWSC/89)
DWSC/90: Question 15 and DWSC/89: Question 24.
-	
% AGREE MEAN SURVEY
A flood relief scheme should be 37 2.9 DWS C/90
carried out in this area regardless
of cost
33 3.1 DWS C /89
I would rather put up with 18 3.4 DWS C/90
flooding than spoil the open
space here with flood relief
channels
16 3.6 DWS C/89
I would rather have any scheme 40 2.9 DWS C/90
than be flooded 53 2.7 DWS C/89
There is no need for a flood 27 3.1 DWS C/90
relief scheme in this area because
the flood risk is too low
36 3.0 DWS C/89
I would rather rely on flood 20 3.4 DWS C/90
warnings and risk being flooded
than have any flood relief scheme
in this area
20 3.5 DWSC/89
Anything designed to reduce 48 2.8 DWSC/90
flooding is desirable 67 2.5 DWSC/89
Flood relief schemes will only 32 2.9 DWS C/90
bring more development into the
area
34 3.0 DWS C/89
Cases: DWSC/90: 569 - 580
DWSC/89: 479 - 493
see discussion of this point in the Lower Stour Case Study (Chapter 10, Section 6.5).
Respondents were asked whether they were aware of the scheme proposed for Maidenhead,
Windsor and Eton (discussed in Chapters 6 and 9) and whether they thought a similar flood
defence channel would be the best option in their area. Only 16 percent were aware of the
scheme and three quarters said they did not have enough information to decide whether this
would be the best option.
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8.10 Consultation and participation
8.10.1 Residents' attitudes
A similar set of questions was asked in both surveys to ascertain preferences for public
consultation. The majority of respondents preferred to be consulted at the stage where there
were a number of possible options to choose between or even sooner (see Table 8.3). It has
already been remarked (see Chapter 8, Section 8.10), and will be remarked upon further, that
these early stages are the most preferred by the public and yet the least used and preferred
by the NRA (see Chapter 13). As with the 1989 survey, few preferred to be consulted at the
preferred option stage.
8.11 The risk-environment trade-off
In a similar process to that used in the 1989 survey, those with a negative attitude to flood
defence schemes were selected from a set of scheme response statements (Question 15) to
partly indicate a risk-environment trade-off (see Table 8.4).
This group were more aware of past floods and had more flood experience but rated it as less
serious. They were less worried about the possibility of flooding and more prepared to live
with all flood risks. This was perhaps because, as with the 1989 survey group, they thought
it less likely.
More lived nearer to the river and rated its advantages, and the general area rating, slightly
higher. The flood risk was also rated slightly higher. The group comprised more males who
had a slightly longer period in education, slightly higher home ownetship and. mote. %coup
membership. Slightly more had taken precautions against flooding including having insurance.
Thus, awareness and experience of flooding is not sufficient to assure acquiescence to scheme
proposals and environmental factors are of importance to those with a negative attitude to
(hypothetical) flood defence schemes.
8.12 Summary and conclusions
The 1990 survey generally confirmed the findings of the 1989 survey but suggested that
levels of flood hazard perception had increased. It has not been possible, however, to separate
the influences of the recent flooding in the area and the repeated contact and information from
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Table 8.3: Preferences for public consultation: when? ((DWSC/90 and DWSC/89)
DWSC/90: Question 19; DWSC/89: Question 32.
"If the National Rivers Authority Thames Region were to propose a flood
defence scheme for this area, how soon do you think it should consult the
public?"
DWSC/89 DWSC/90
Before it starts any studies of a flood problem?* 20% N/A
Before it selects any options for the design or route? 15% 29%
When it has selected a number of possible options
for the design or route so that people can choose
between them?
52% 59%
When it has chosen a preferred option for the design
or route for people to comment upon?
10% 8%
Or do you think it shouldn't consult at all but should
go ahead with whatever it thinks best?
2% 2%
* Not asked in 1989
Cases: DWSC/90: 589
DWSC/89: 489
Table 8.4: A risk-environment trade-off: percentage giving responses to selected scheme
statements indicative of a negative scheme attitude (DWSC/90)
(Question 15)
	
Percentage - frequency
showing negative scheme response
Anything designed to reduce flooding is [not]
desirable
28% (164)
A flood relief scheme should [not] be carried out in
this area regardless of cost
34% (196)
I would rather put up with flooding than spoil the
open space here with a flood relief channel
19% (106)
I would [not] rather have any scheme than be
flooded
34% (200)
I would rather rely on flood warnings and risk being
flooded than have any flood relief scheme in this
area
20% (114)
There is no need for a flood relief scheme in this
area because the flood risk is too low
27% (157)
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the surveys themselves.
As with the earlier survey, the perceived advantages of the location outweighed the possible
disadvantages of flooding to a sample of whom only a quarter had experienced flooding.
Awareness of the flood risk was high; three quarters were aware when they moved and
although the 1990 respondents were less prepared to live with flood risks than were the 1989
respondents, half or more were still prepared to live with risks of 1:50 to 1:200 (i.e. the level
of risk which a scheme would be likely to protect against).
Attitudes to hypothetical flood defence scheme proposals were generally positive in the
totalsample although environmental factors presented an important possible constraint:
particularly so for those with a negative response to schemes. However, these responses
might change were an actual proposal to be promoted.
James (1974), in a comparison of interview and postal questionnaire surveys (with identical
questions), found a bias in the latter towards those especially concerned about flood
problems. He concluded that the postal questionnaire was a good instrument for obtaining
information from those with flood problems but one that would tend to overestimate the
magnitude of the problem (1974:66), because it would be the most concerned who were more
likely to respond voluntarily in a postal survey but an interview survey can persuade the more
reluctant to participate.
The Thames floodplain surveys support this finding: the DWSC/90 postal survey showed a
higher level of concern with and expectation of flooding than did the DWSC/89 interview
survey. It is likely that the DWSC/89 survey is more representative of floodplain attitudes
generally (and the situation most commonly faced by NRA engineers during scheme
promotion) and the DWSC/90 postal survey is representative of the more 'sensitized'
floodplain resident, after the occurrence of a flood event or the intervention of some other
sensitizing factor (such as a repeated questionnaire survey, for example).
In contrast to the two case studies discussed above, the next case study examines a
predominantly flooded sample and a proposed flood defence scheme.
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FLOODING - 1990
SCHEME PROPOSED
SCHEME IMPACT - MOSTLY DISTANT
STUDY STATUS
9. THE MAIDENHEAD FLOODING SURVEY (1990)
9.1 Introduction
Maidenhead (see Figure 9.1) is located in the Thames Valley, approximately 55 kilometres
west of London and is upstream of, and contiguous with, the DWSC study area. Several
lengths of the river are of outstanding beauty, notably Cliveden Reach, and the river is
spanned by two bridges which are listed structures, the Maidenhead Bridge and the Brunel
Railway Bridge (Thames Water, 1986).
Proximity to London, allied to considerable environmental attractions, has made the area
important in both recreational and residential terms. The housing stock is generally of high
quality and property values are correspondingly high, with riverside properties at a premium.
The original town of Maidenhead was located on high ground, some 1.5 kilometres west of
the Thames. However, continued expansion has occurred leading to development of land
between the original town centre and the river and elsewhere in the floodplain (Neal and
Parker, 1988).
Major floods have occurred in November 1894, January 1915, December 1929 and March
1947. The last flood, used most often for comparative purposes, was caused by heavy rainfall
on a frozen catchment which was then accompanied by snow melt, leading to very high run-
off rates: it has an estimated return period of 1 in 56 years. Other less serious floods have
occurred in December 1954, January 1959, December 1960 and November 1974. Prior to
the February 1990 flooding, which initiated the survey discussed here, the last major flood
to cause damage to property in Maidenhead was in March/April 1979 which, although a
relatively minor flood, was exacerbated by the setting loose of a barge by vandals and which
collided with, and then sank in front of, Boulters Weir in Maidenhead.
The December 1954 flooding of Maidenhead came from overland flow from Cooldiam Beach
which swelled the Maidenhead Ditch. Following this event the Thames Conservancy (which
had responsibility for flood defence at that time) undertook a scheme to restrict the water
entering the town from the north and comprised enlarging and streamlining of existing
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Figure 9.1: Map showing Maidenhead and Datchet, Wraysbury, Staines and Chertsey
(DWSC) study areas
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watercourses. These works were designed to prevent a recurrence of the 1954 flood but did
not provide a solution to the overall flood problem in the area: this was to be addressed by
the Maidenhead, Windsor and Eton Flood Study outlined above. The areas affected by
flooding in February 1990 extended from Bourne End and Cookham, north of Maidenhead,
to Eton and Windsor in the south east. This flood event initiated the survey discussed below.
9.1.1 Consultation and participation: procedures followed
In 1988 the NRA Thames Region (then Thames Water) undertook a public consultation
programme on the basis of the preferred option at that time (an east bank flood relief channel
combined with improvement works to the Thames and embankments in certain areas) which
had become a contentious local issue (Tunstall et al, 1989). The Flood Hazard Research
Centre was asked by the NRA Thames Region to undertake a survey of residents' attitudes
to the proposed flood defence scheme and Eton Wick was chosen as the focus of study as it
was the largest residential development to be directly affected by the proposed flood relief
channel. At that time the possible extension of the proposed channel to provide flood defence
for Eton and Windsor was being addressed. However, the study was still known as the
Maidenhead Flood Study and did not become known as the Maidenhead, Windsor and Eton
Flood Study until some time later. This fact caused annoyance to some residents outside
Maidenhead who were being asked to accept a flood defence scheme which appeared to be
solely for Maidenhead's benefit and to be necessary, many believed, solely because of
Maidenhead's mismanagement of floodplain development control (Tunstall et al, 1989).
Public consultation proceeded through the normal route of statutory consultees followed by
many public meetings (incorporating slideshows and exhibitions) in local areas to be affected
by the scheme. The size of the scheme justified to the NRA the opesimg of. 2, separate, oftte,
in Maidenhead to deal with this major engineering project. From this office invitations were
sent to flooded residents after the February 1990 flood, inviting them to one of two receptions
where details of the scheme were exhibited. The residents were shown a promotional video
and a number of NRA personnel gave tqlks on various aspects of the flood; the meetings
were then opened to discussion.
These receptions had a dual purpose. Firstly they were to project the best possible image of
the N'RA to the public, by showing the lengths to which they had gone to design an
environmentally sensitive scheme, ahead of the major flood for which it was designed. Allied
to this, the meetings were aimed at defending the NRA should they incur any blame for the
February flood. Secondly it was a promotional exercise to gain support for the scheme from
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those who, the NRA believed, would be most likely to lend support.
9.2 Research design
The 1990 survey (Sangster et al, 1990) concentrated on those properties flooded in the house,
garden, outbuildings or in the road immediately outside. Information leading to the
identification of this population was obtained from consulting engineers to the NRA Thames
Region who identified 40 properties thought to have been flooded within the house out of a
total flooded population of 520 households. A sample of 200 was drawn from this population
and included all 40 households thought to have been flooded within the property. The
remainder were selected by random sample from each identified location. A 75 percent
response rate was recorded.
The research brief from the NRA Thames Region was quite extensive and aimed to gather
data on the following:
1. Details of the flood event: areas affected, depth, duration;
2. Description of direct flood damages;
3. Description of indirect damages and intangible effects;
4. Performance of the flood warning system;
5. Perception of flood risk and the local environment and knowledge of and attitudes to
the flood defence proposals.
Only the last, which comprised the same and related questions as those for the other case
study surveys, will be discussed below (see Appendix B-3 for relevant sections of the
questionnaire).
A major analytical variable was flood experience. As the majority of the Maidenhead
respondents had experienced flooding to some extent, the responses were broken down into
those whose houses were flooded inside ('flooded') and those who experienced either garden
flooding or no property flooding ('not flooded'). In certain specified circumstances the flood
experience variable was divided into three (flooded in house; flooded in garden; not flooded).
Thus the definition of 'flooded' and 'not flooded' differs between the Maidenhead survey and
other surveys. The amount of flood experience in the Datchet, Wraysbury, Staines and
Chertsey surveys was too small to allow such a breakdown of the data.
The survey of the flooded area was undertaken, in part, to further the promotion of the
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scheme by gathering information on support in the community and also to gain more accurate
information on the damages likely to ensue from any major flood in the future. As discussed
elsewhere, the benefit-cost ratio must be greater than unity for MAFF to grant-aid and
support a scheme. In a scheme of this size considerable benefits must be found to offset
scheme costs and any data likely to increase the benefits would be of value to the NRA. Due
to the high property values in the area it was believed that a 'Maidenhead factor' was in
operation which would raise the probable benefits and therefore make the benefit-cost ratio
for the scheme more robust.
The sampling error at the 95 percent confidence level for a random sample' of this size
(199) is between 7 and 7.5 percent (de Vaus, 1987:63). The selection of analytical sub-groups
will, of course, affect this level of error.
9.3 Flood history and present level of risk
(See above, Section 9.1). The flooding which occurred in February 1990 was estimated to
have a return period of approximately 1 in 6 years. Thus it was considerably less serious than
the level of flooding against which the proposed flood defence scheme is designed to protect
(approximately 1 in 60 years). Nevertheless, flooding occurred over a period of
approximately 12 days (this varied with location) and there was considerable disruption to
certain groups and individuals.
9.4 Social characteristics
(See Table 7.1. for comparative data across all the quantitative surveys). Compared to the
total population of Windsor and Maidenhead (Berkshire County Council: 1989) the sample
comprised fewer respondents in the youngest age bracket and more in the older age brackets,
particularly the 50 to 64 years age range.
The Maidenhead respondents had higher levels of education and home ownership than any
of the other survey respondents but the average length of residence was much lower. Levels
of affluence were high but a quarter of respondents refused to answer this question. When
the total percentage was recalculated, omitting those who refused to answer, two fifths of the
36 This was not strictly a random sample but rather a stratified random sample. The
households 'flooded within the house represented almost a population: it had been intended
to survey all those who had been flooded within the house but during the interview process
other properties were identified but not interviewed.
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respondents had an annual income greater than £40,000 and a quarter of these had an income
greater than £60,000.
More than a quarter of Maidenhead respondents overlooked the river compared to 11 percent
in the DWSC/89 survey. A further 50 percent lived within 250 metres of the river. Only 2
percent of respondents lived over 500 metres from the river, compared to a quarter of the
DWSC/89 respondents. In comparing these data sets it must be emphasised that distance from
the river in the DWSC/89 survey was measured from maps by researchers while in the other
surveys, including Maidenhead, it was by respondents' own estimation. It is possible that
some under- or over-estimation may have occurred through these different measurement
techniques.
9.5 Environmental perception and attitudes
9.5.1 General environmental orientation
A scale was constructed from seven environmental attitude statements (see Appendix E-9.1.)
used previously in the DWSC/89 survey' and the social and other characteristics of the
lowest and highest scorers were examined.
High scorers on this environmental values scale were more likely to be males, whereas in the
DWSC/89 survey they were females. The lowest scorers had the highest levels of education
and qualifications except for professional qualifications, more of which had been obtained by
the high scorers. This suggests that length of education is not necessarily associated with
positive environmental attitudes but possibly of more significance is the type of education and
later career path (these being related to underlying value systems). The lowest scale scorers
also had the highest income levels (approximately a third were in the greater than sixty
thousand pounds per annum bracket). As might be expected, the high scorers gave higher
ratings to certain environmental advantages of the area, such as being near the river and the
attractive environment and rating the area generally: more of these lived overlooking the
river.
Those with the highest environmental values scale score were least aware of the flood risk
when they moved to the area but more would have moved there anyway had they known
(although the latter group had too few cases to be reliable). More of those with the lowest
37 This survey used only a selection of the attitude statements used in the DWSC/89
survey and in this instance a single scale was constructed.
139
score were flooded in the house and more of those with the highest score were flooded in the
basement during the 1990 flood but flooding in other locations did not present any clear
pattern. Those with the lowest scale score rated the seriousness of the event higher and those
with the lowest scale score were least worried.
The highest scale scorers were least likely to think the proposed scheme is the best option and
more likely to think there is a better alternative, while the lowest scorers were most likely
to say they did not have enough information (almost a third).
Responses to many of the individual environmental attitude statements did not vary greatly
between the Maidenhead and DWSC/89 Surveys. Of those that did, more of the Maidenhead
respondents agreed with the statement "people are more important than the environment", and
disagreed with the statement "the most important problems today are the threats to the
environment".
9.5.2 Attitudes to the local environment
The general rating of the local area was very high and the attractive environment, quality of
the housing and being near the river were regarded as considerable advantages. The risk of
flooding was regarded as a disadvantage but not a major one (see Figure 9.3). Compared to
the DWSC/89 Survey, being near the river, the attractive environment and the general rating
of the area were all given higher ratings, while the risk of river flooding was regarded as
more of a disadvantage (Figure 9.4).
Those living overlooking the river regarded being near the river and the attractive
environment as more of an advantage and gave the area generally a higher rating. The risk
of flooding was regarded similarly whatever the distance from the river although there was
a slight tendency for those living furthest from the river to regard it as more of a
disadvantage than those overlooking (reliability is doubtful because of the low numbers living
at a distance from the river).
9.6 Flood experience
Respondents were asked how often in the last 5 years or, if resident less than five years,
since living in their present property, they had been flooded. Seventeen percent reported that
they had n9t been flooded before. Almost half had been flooded once and over a third had
been flooded more than once. Almost a half had had their gardens or outbuildings flooded
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once and almost a quarter had been flooded within their property once.
For the February 1990 flood, the mean depth and duration of flooding within properties (i.e.
ground floor/under floor/basement) was 40 centimetres and 8 days. The mean depth and
duration of flooding outside properties was 59 centimetres and 11 days. Thirty-one percent
of the respondents had their ground floor, under floor or basement flooded; 60 percent were
flooded in their gardens or outbuildings; and 9 percent were not flooded at all.
9.7 Perception of, and attitudes to, flood hazard
As with the other surveys, the majority (77 percent) of the respondents were aware of the
flood risk when they moved to the area. Of those that were unaware, over half would still
have moved to the area had they known. Two thirds of respondents became aware of the
flood risk through their own personal observation and experience of the river. A third heard
from their solicitor and almost another third heard from neighbours.
The Maidenhead responses were compared with the DWSC/89 and DWSC/90 responses for
the same attitude statements dealing with the flood risk (Appendix E-9.2 and see also Figure
9.5). It can be seen that there is a substantial difference between the DWSC/89 responses and
those of the other two surveys. Generally the DWSC/90 responses fall between the two but
nearer to the Maidenhead respondents.
Only 4 percent of Maidenhead respondents (compared to 29 percent in the DWSC/89 survey
and 9 percent in 1990) agreed that the Thames Barrier has removed the risk of flooding in
their area. Only 12 percent, compared to 61 percent in the 1989 survey and 31 percent in the
1990 survey, agreed with the statement "we don't have real floods here".
Thus, compared to the lower levels of flood experience further downstream between Datchet
to Walton Bridge, the recently flooded sample in Maidenhead showed a higher level of flood
hazard perception as measured by this set of attitude statements. It is hard to avoid the
interpretation that the increase in perception of flood hazard is related to the degree to which
the samples were exposed to recent flood events (this interpretation holds when just the
flooded samples of DWSC/89 and DWSC/90 are compared to the Maidenhead sample).
9.8 Perception of, and attitudes to, future flood risk
The perception of the likelihood of future flooding was higher here than that found further
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downstream in the DWSC/89 and DWSC/90 surveys but was still not perceived to be great
in the short term (see Figure 9.6). A decay function was apparent according also to the
degree of flooding experienced (whether in the house, the garden or not flooded at all) with
those experiencing the most serious flooding perceiving future flooding to be more likely (see
Figure 9.7). Thus, earlier research findings relating flood experience to heightened perception
of flood risk were substantiated.
No easily interpretable pattern of response was apparent with varying distance from the river
(see Appendix E-9.3). Those living closer to the river believed flooding to be more likely in
the 5 to 50 year period but for periods of 100 and 200 years hence, it was those living further
away, between 250-500 metres and over 500 metres from the river (the median values were
better indicators for the highly skewed responses to this question).
A majority of respondents were prepared to live with flood risks between 1 in 50 to 1 in 200
but only just over a third were prepared to live with a 1 in 25 risk. This was close to the
result for the DWSC/89 and DWSC/90 surveys although the DWSC/90 respondents were the
least prepared to live with any level of risk (see Figure 9.8). However, those in Maidenhead
with the most serious (house) flood experience were generally more prepared than those
without to live with all risks except the most frequent, 1:5 risk (see Figure 9.9).
Distance from the river showed no simple trend. Those living closer to the river appeared
more prepared to live with the less serious and more frequent risks between 1:25 and 1:5,
than did those living further away (despite believing flooding to be marginally more likely
in that period). However, they were less prepared to live with the less frequent and more
serious risks between 1:200 and 1:50 than those further away (despite believing flooding to
be marginally less likely in that period). Thus, the first example suggests that greater
expectation of risk does not necessarily lead to greater avoidance of risk.
9.9 Attitudes to adjustment (proposed/implemented)
Respondents were asked a series of questions about the proposed scheme (see Table 9.1). A
substantial majority were aware of the proposed MWE flood relief scheme, just over half of
whom had heard of it through newspaper reports and approximately two fifths had heard
about it from an NRA leaflet.
The majority were aware of the location of the proposed channel but there was considerable
uncertainty as to its size and nature. Approximately two fifths (flooded and non-flooded) were
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Table 9.1: Awareness of proposed Maidenhead, Windsor and Eton Flood Alleviation
Scheme (Maidenhead 1990)
Question 75: "Are you aware of the flood alleviation scheme (which includes a major
flood relief channel) that has been proposed by the NRA for the Maidenhead, Windsor
and Eton area?"
Frequency
Yes 82% (159)
No 19% (36)
Cases: 195
Question 75a: "If yes, where did you hear this?" Frequency
Newspaper 55% (108)
Television 3% (5)
Public meeting 25% (50)
NRA leaflet 39% (77)
NRA video 7% (14)
Neighbours 15% (29)
Cases: 198
Question 76d: "Do you think that the proposed scheme is the best option for alleviating
flooding in this area?"	 Frequency
Yes, this is the best option 	 54%	 (90)
No, there is a better alternative	 5%	 (8)
No, for other reasons
	 2%	 (3)
Don't have enough information to decide 	 27%	 (44)
Don't know	 13%	 (21)
Cases: 166
Questions 76a to 76c:	 Frequency
Aware of the location of the proposed channel 	 72%	 (142)
Aware of design elements of the proposed channel 	 40%	 (77)
Aware of the width of the proposed channel	 41%	 (41)
Cases: 86 - 166
correct in their belief that the channel would have mainly natural banks but a further two
fifths did not know.
A third (a quarter of those flooded in the house) did not know, when presented with three
options, how wide the channel would be. Almost a half of those who had been flooded within
the property and who had received extra information, believed the width to be half that which
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was proposed. Thus, in the group which had received more information, more of them
thought they knew the correct answer but more of them were wrong.
It is possible that even the slender majority (see below) of this flooded sample in favour of
the channel might be further eroded by the knowledge that the channel will be twice the size
they had thought. It was not possible to differentiate between those who had, and those who
had not, attended NRA receptions and thus had received more detailed information.
Surprisingly, considering the efforts the NRA had made in contacting and informing many
of the respondents, there was not a clear majority in support of the scheme. Forty-six percent
of the total sample and a bare majority of 54 percent of those who had experienced flooding
within the property, agreed that the proposed scheme was the best option. Approximately a
third (of both the total sample and the flooded sample) felt they did not know or did not have
enough information to decide.
Perhaps not surprisingly, a comparison of those that believed the proposed scheme to be the
best option with those who felt they did not have enough information to decide, found that
the former regarded the effects of both the past flood and a future flood to be more serious;
were more worried about future flooding; believed it to be more likely and were less
prepared to live with all levels of risk.
Few respondents (10 percent) agreed with the statement that they would rather put up with
flooding than spoil their open space with channels - even those (16 percent) with the highest
scores on the environmental values scale. Those with the highest levels of education were
least likely to agree.
As might be expected, those rating the risk of flooding as more disadvantageous were more
likely to express positive attitudes to scheme proposals and have a higher score on the scheme
scale. They were more likely to agree that "anything to reduce flooding is desirable" and less
likely to prefer flood warnings to a scheme or putting up with flooding rather than spoil the
open space with channels.
However, those living nearest the river, and thus, at greatest risk from flooding, were more
likely to disagree that anything to reduce flooding is desirable or that they would rather have
any scheme than be flooded.
The responses from the DWSC/89 and Maidenhead surveys were compared for the same
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scheme attitude statements (Appendix E-9.4. The responses were similar for the statement
"anything to reduce flooding is desirable", with both sets of respondents showing majority
agreement (but see later discussion of this statement in the Lower Stour Case Study).
However, the later statement "I would rather have any scheme than be flooded" gained
stronger agreement from the DWSC/89 respondents, who did not have an image of a scheme
on which to base their response, than from the Maidenhead respondents who did - despite the
greater flood experience of the latter. However, the Maidenhead respondents did not agree
that "there is no need for a flood relief scheme in this area because the flood risk is too low".
This suggests that opposition was not to a flood defence scheme per se but to a particular
design or route of scheme. This kind of attitude is discussed in greater depth in the Lower
Stour Case Study.
9.10 Consultation and participation
9.10.1 Residents' attitudes
Respondents were asked several questions about their preferences for consultation that were
the same or similar to those asked in the DWSC/89 and DWSC/90 surveys. When asked how
soon should the NRA consult the public about flood relief schemes (see Table 9.2), the
majority of respondents chose consultation when a number of options for the design and route
were available to choose between or earlier, as the NRA starts studying the problem. Few
respondents preferred to be consulted at the stage when a preferred option has been chosen.
Thus there was little support for the procedure actually adopted by the NRA.
As with the DWSC/89 survey, the majority preferred consultation to be carried out with both
representatives and directly with the public. Newsletters and public meetings were preferred
methods of consultation. Those who were flooded in the house (many of whom attended the
NRA receptions) showed a higher preference for those methods which were used at the
receptions: public meetings, exhibitions and video presentations. However the majority of
respondents (both those flooded within their property and those not) heard about the proposed
scheme via the newspaper and regarded this as the best source of information.
9.11 The risk-environment trade-off
As with the two previous surveys, those respondents with a negative attitude to scheme
proposals were selected from the responses to several scheme statements (Questions 70 (1),
(2), (4), (6), (7) and (8)) and their characteristics examined as indicators of those making a
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Table 9.2: Preferences for consultation: when, who and how? (Maidenhead 1990)
Preferences for consultation: when?
Question 72: "When proposing flood relief schemes, how soon do you think the NRA should
consult the public? Should it consult them..."
% Number
a) As it starts studying the flood problem 31 (61)
b) Before it selects any options for the
design or route
c) When it has selected a number of possible
options for the design and route so that the
public can choose between them?
d) When it has chosen a preferred option for the
design and route for people to comment upon?
e) Or do you think it shouldn't consult at all but
should go ahead with whatever it thinks best?
11
45
10
4
(22)
(89)
(19)
(7)
Cases: 198
Preferences for consultation: who?
Question 73: "In your view, should the NRA..."
% Number
a) Only consult the general public directly? 17 (34)
b) Only consult through representatives such as
parish councils, residents' committees,
wildlife and amenity groups etc?
c) Consult both the public directly and
through representatives?
18
65
(35)
(128)
Cases: 198
Preferences for consultation: how?
Question 74: "How would you prefer to be consulted about any flood risk or flood relief
proposals for this area?"
YES	 NO
% Number	 % Number
a) Public meetings	 47	 (92)
	
3	 (5)
b) Walk-round exhibitions	 38	 (75)	 2	 (4)
c) Video presentations	 24	 (47)	 4	 (7)
d) Regular newsletters 	 75	 (148)	 3	 (6)
Cases: 54 - 154
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risk-environment trade-off (see Table 9.3). While the numbers prepared to make the trade-off
were generally somewhat less than the DWSC/89 survey, the characteristics of this group
were broadly comparable. Compared to the total Maidenhead sample, very slightly less lived
overlooking the river (an average difference of only 1 percent, however, and so well within
the margin of error for this sample size) and more lived in the sector up to 250 metres away.
They had been resident longer; regarded being near the river as a greater advantage and the
risk of flooding as less of a disadvantage; and rated the area generally as slightly higher.
Fewer of them had experienced flooding inside the house, more had experienced flooding in
the garden and they rated the seriousness of the event as lower than the average. More of
them were aware of the flood risk when they moved to the area but they were less worried
and regarded the likelihood of flooding as less likely. They were more prepared to live with
all levels of risk from 1:5 to 1:200. They had similar levels of education to the average but
more of them owned their property.
As stated above, those with the highest environmental values scale score were least likely to
think the proposed scheme is the best option and more likely to think there is a better
alternative. This strongly suggests, in this predominantly flooded sample, that flood
experience can be less important than environmental factors in influencing attitudes to
structural flood defence schemes.
9.12 Summary and conclusions
This recently flooded sample showed a higher level of flood hazard perception, as measured
by a set of attitude statements, and a higher perception of the likelihood of future flooding
than those further downstream in the DWSC/89 survey, although the risk of future flooding
was still not perceived to be great in the short term.
This would seem to support the model's hypothesized relationship between flood experience
and greater flood hazard perception; however, those with house flood experience believed
flooding to be more likely and yet were more prepared than those without to live with all
levels of flood risk except the most frequent (1:5). Thus, greater expectation of risk does not
necessarily lead to greater avoidance of risk. This undermines the assumption (as
hypothesized) that greater hazard perception will necessarily lead to hazard mitigation (or
acceptance of hazard mitigation).
The majority of respondents were aware of the location of the proposed channel but showed
considerable uncertainty as to its size and nature, despite many of them having been exposed
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Table 9.3: A risk-environment trade-off: percentage giving responses indicative of a
negative scheme attitude (Maidenhead 1990)
(Question 70)	 Percentage - frequency
showing negative scheme response
:
Anything designed to reduce flooding is [not]
desirable
27% (52)
A flood relief scheme should [not] be carried out in
this area regardless of cost
32% (63)
I would rather put up with flooding than spoil the
open space here with a flood relief channel
10% (20)
I would [not] rather have any scheme than be
flooded
11% (22)
I would rather rely on flood warnings and risk being
flooded than have any flood relief scheme in this
area
_
11% (22)
There is no need for a flood relief scheme in this
area because the flood risk is too low
-
6% (10)
to greater information levels.
Despite recent flooding there was not majority support for the proposed scheme but a third
felt they had insufficient information to decide. Higher numbers of those living nearest the
river disagreed that anything to reduce flooding is desirable, and that they would rather have
any scheme than be flooded. Few respondents preferred to be consulted at the stage chosen
by the NRA (when a preferred option has been chosen); most preferred to be consulted
earlier.
This third case study represented a progression from the DWSC/89 survey situation by
examining attitudes to a proposed scheme after a recent flood. It did however, examine
attitudes to proposals only: the fourth case study (Lower Stour) examined attitudes to a
scheme which had recently been constructed.
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FLOODING - 1979
SCHEME CONSTRUCTED
SCHEME IMPACT - NEAR
STUDY STATUS
10. THE LOWER STOUR FLOOD ALLEVIATION SCHEME: CHRISTCHURCH,
DORSET (1990)
10.1 Introduction
In 1985, as part of its programme of consultation, the National Rivers Authority Wessex
Region invited residents in Christchurch (see Figure 10.1) to respond to proposals for a major
flood defence scheme to be constructed in an area of significant ecological and amenity value.
The proposed scheme works included dredging of the river, excavating tipped land and the
construction of flood banks and walls up to three metres high. The comments that were made
in the comments book provided (see Appendix F-10.1) reflected a range of attitudes, from
the most positive to the most negative (see Appendix F-10.2 for an extended list and
examples of themes taken from those reported in the comments book). This case study is
based on interviews which were undertaken with thirteen of those residents to investigate
whether their attitudes have changed since the section of the scheme nearest to their
properties has been largely completed.
The case study area, Christchurch in Dorset, is between five and six kilometres from the sea
and comprises mainly residential properties and recreational land and relies for its main
source of income on the holiday trade. The area contains a number of caravan parks and a
holiday camp. A large proportion of the population is retired. Much of the floodplain land
is Council-owned and managed as public open space for formal and informal recreation.
The following discussion is a revised version of an earlier research report (Fordham, 1991a).
10.1.1 Consultation and participation: procedures followed
In addition to contacting the statutory consultees, the NRA Wessex Region arranged several
public meetings and exhibitions, one of which provided the Comments Book reported on
here. The NRA felt that the exhibition and comments book had been inconclusive and so all
those householders likely to be affected by a 1 in 100 year flood were balloted to ascertain
their preference for one of three options: the full scheme, a modified scheme to a lower
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Figure 10.1: Map of the Lower Stour study area
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standard, or no scheme (see discussion below.
10.2 Research design
A qualitative approach was adopted for the Lower Stour Flood Alleviation Scheme Case
Study to complement the largely quantitative work carried out elsewhere in the research. The
chief method employed was a long (taped) interview technique that most closely resembles
the `nonschedule-structured interview' as categorised by Nachmias and Nachmias (1989:189-
192).
An outline interview schedule was prepared prior to the interviews (see Appendix F-10.3).
This listed a number of topics under six headings - flooding, local environment, flood defence
scheme, consultation, NRA and insurance - which it was hoped each interview would cover.
It also contained, for comparative purposes, certain specific questions that have been used in
the other surveys discussed here.
An open and relatively unstructured research strategy was adopted and it was proposed that
the interviews should be as free from interviewer direction as possible in order that those
matters of importance to the interviewee could be revealed. However, the interview schedule
provided a checklist of topics identified as important to the interviewer for comparison with
the other surveys undertaken.
Prior to the interviews, some content analysis (Weber, 1990; Nachmias and Nachmias, 1989)
was undertaken in the examination of the copy of the comments book that had prompted the
case study. This provided insight into the broad areas of concern aroused by the scheme and
represented the baseline of attitudes against which the interview material would be compared.
It also provided the address list from which the sample was drawn.
The study was designed as an initial exploratory examination" of both the study area and
the use of a qualitative method. Hence the number of interviews was small and the sample
was particularly closely focused. The population comprised all those who made comments
in the comments book provided during the flood alleviation scheme consultation programme
in 1985. There was a total of 181 contributions in the comments book.
The sample was what Hakim terms a 'focused' sample (Hakim, 1987:141-143), that is, one
" The study formed part of the assessment for the Postgraduate Diploma in Research
Methods in the Social Sciences.
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that selects particular persons, groups, processes or relationships etc. to offer particularly
illuminating examples or tests of propositions. The available sample was broken down
according to overall positive or negative attitude to the proposed flood alleviation scheme.
Comments were categorised, somewhat crudely, as follows:
(+)
	
Positive and for the scheme;
(-)
	
Negative and against the scheme;
(+/-)	 Critical but generally for rather than against;
(-/+)
	 Critical but generally against rather than for;
(N/C)	 Not committed either way or uncategorizable from the available comments.
As an important focus of interest was the risk-environment trade-off, the sample was
concentrated primarily on those whose comments appeared to express this trade-off most
forcefully. As a first step in identifying these respondents the focus was placed on those
addresses partly or wholly within the 1979 flood outline. The rationale for this was that such
addresses, being nearest to the river, were most likely to have experienced flooding, were
most likely to be at risk of future flooding and most likely to have significant environmental
benefits associated with their location and, thus, any trade-offs made would be meaningful.
The area of search was narrowed down further to all addresses partly or wholly within the
1979 flood outline (flood maps were supplied by the NRA).
The area of search was again narrowed to concentrate mainly on 'front line' properties. It
was felt that people in these properties would have both the most to gain and the most to lose
from the flood defence scheme and also would have been closely associated with, and affected
by, its construction.
Introductions and requests for interview were undertaken by telephone. Only one person
refused to be interviewed but she agreed to talk over the telephone. She was generally
satisfied with the scheme. Another would not be available at the time the interviews were
undertaken but also agreed to speak on the telephone. She had some criticisms of the scheme.
One interviewee refused to have the interview taped.
Some interviews were with one informant but others were with couples (see Appendix F-
10.4). While interviews with couples might be thought to result in ambiguous findings, they
can reveal elements of the decision-making process that are normally hidden. Individual
attitudes/behavioural intentions measured by (quantitative) questionnaires will be constrained
in actuality; people do not act as isolated individuals in society - all actions are subject to the
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physical or moral constraints of the social group. Individual choice is constrained through the
assumption of different roles - as partner, family member, group member, etc. - which
influence their final decision. Decisions affecting common assets (such as the possible impact
on jointly owned property of flooding or a flood defence scheme) are likely to be subject to
a degree of debate and subsequent refinement. Thus, preparedness to live with a range of
flood risks (discussed below) may vary between partners and the subsequent decision will
reflect this.
Excerpts from the interview transcripts are prefixed by the interview number in square
brackets and, if both partners of a couple contribute in the extract, the gender is denoted by
'MR' for the male and 'MRS' for the female. Gender is not specified elsewhere.
10.3 Flood history and present level of risk
A severe flood in December 1979 which flooded over 250 properties and disrupted traffic for
a number of hours on the main 'A' road through the area was the impetus for the design and
provision of a flood alleviation scheme. The 1979 flood has been assessed as having a likely
return period of 60 years (Wessex Water Authority, 1986:3). Wessex Water Authority (the
body responsible for flood defence prior to privatisation in 1989), also reported flooding to
have occurred prior to this in 1954, 1960 and 1966.
The flood risk in the area has been exacerbated by a lack of development control that has
allowed urban development of the floodplain (Wessex Water Authority, 1986:3). In addition,
domestic refuse tips in several floodplain locations have raised ground levels thereby lowering
the capacity of the floodplain to store flood waters. A number of obstructions in the
floodplain have also increased the flood risk.
10.4 Social characteristics
The social characteristics of those interviewed were varied. Although this is an area with
moderately high property values, a number of the residents are retired with low disposable
income. Those interviewed comprised a number of retired persons but also professionals in
the middle age range (40 to 60). Both sexes were represented. Levels of education varied
from manual workers through to professionals. Income was not assessed. The majority of
those interviewed lived overlooking the river and/or the flood relief scheme but three of the
ten interviews were undertaken with informants living further away.
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10.5 Environmental perception and attitudes
10.5.1 General environmental orientation
A general environmental awareness and concern underlay much of the interview content
although most focused on particular local environmental concerns and issues. A love of the
landscape, and pain at the damage perceived to have been caused to it, were expressed during
interviews. One informant spoke of herself and her husband as "great conservationists"
(INT5), to the extent that they did not kill garden pests in case of inadvertently killing bees
and other beneficial insects. Other interviewees spoke of concern for wildlife but related to
the specific local area. Appendix F-10.5 contains a selection of themes, with examples, taken
from the interview transcripts.
10.5.2 Attitudes to the local environment
Informants showed considerable concern for the local environment and gained much pleasure
from it. The site of the flood defence scheme was well used for walking and informal
recreation and remained so by most of the informants although one claimed he does not visit
the area any more because he felt the NRA had spoilt it. Informants expressed awareness of
and concern for wildlife and for the impact of the scheme on the landscape. It is likely that
the group of residents who were selected for interview had a particularly strong concern for
scheme-related environmental issues because they were personally so strongly impacted.
Why people moved to the area was an important factor in their attitude to the scheme. This
was a fmding of the quantitative surveys also but was explored in more depth in the
qualitative studies. In five interviews the view across the meadow, or golf course, and the
river was mentioned specifically as a major factor in location choice. Many of those who
were antagonistic to the scheme, moved to that location specifically for the environmental
benefits it had to offer and because of that, to varying degrees, accepted the flood risk.
[INT5] "We've retired here, dear.. .we know about the flood. We retired here
knowing about it. We bought the house here, we could have had one round the
corner, actually the surveyor said to me "you can get a better house, you know, less
money, what do you want that one for?" I said to him "that's why I want it [points
to garden and view] I don't want to look in somebody's kitchen". You see, I said,
"it's so private here, look, I mean, it's so private! and beautiful"."
[INT7] "We bought this house because of the view...it was a beautiful view; it's a
beautiful view now from upstairs but not from here."
158
In these and similar cases, the view seemed to be regarded as integral to the property and so
the construction of floodbanks and walls represented a direct assault on what was probably
perceived as their most valuable asset.
10.6 Flood experience
A factor of expected importance in attitudes to flood defence schemes was flood experience.
Only two out of the nine taped interviews were with residents who had been present and
personally experienced the 1979 flood. Coincidentally, the four untaped interviews were all
with residents who had been present during the flood; three had personally experienced
flooding, two of whom had floodwater in the house. The record of their experiences,
however, was minimal compared to the tape transcripts. Thus, the flood experience variable
cannot be examined as thoroughly as it might have been had transcripts been available for all
those with flood experience.
The interviews served to elucidate the complexity which underlies decisions about flood
hazard mitigation. No simple relationship was found between flood experience and scheme
attitude. Negative scheme attitudes were found in both those with and those without flood
experience and vice versa.
10.7 Perception of, and attitudes to, flood hazard
The perceived cause of flooding can be expected to have an influence on attitudes to solutions
to the flood risk. Those who believe, for example, the cause of flooding to be lack of
maintenance of existing drainage channels are unlikely to accept the need for major structural
works in addition to dredging and clearing of obstructions. In all the surveys discussed, an
element of this reasoning was found. In the DWSC/89 survey, 59 percent of respondents
believed that "flooding is only likely in the area if rivers, streams, locks and weirs are not
properly maintained or operated". A similar finding obtained in Maidenhead where flooded
residents complained about obstructions in local drainage channels during the flood event.
NRA engineers have argued that these factors had little or no effect on flood levels in
Maidenhead or Christchurch but many residents remained unconvinced. Residents adopted
a 'commonsense' approach to the problem: commonsense told them that if drainage channels
had not been dredged or sufficiently managed then this would exacerbate flood levels:
[INT5] "We told them that a lot of the trouble was that the river wanted cleaning
out. it
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[INT5] "But, you see, all the channels were blocked so the water couldn't get
away.. .if you look over that bridge you'll fmd all the archways underneath.. .they
were totally blocked."
A major problem lies in the level of protection preferred by the NRA engineers which, in
most cases, is considerably greater than any flood experienced by the residents and thus
seems excessive to them.
A connection was made by many interviewees between development in the floodplain and
increased flood risk:
[INT4] "...with all these huge housing estates they've built.., as well as hospitals,
supermarkets, all the rain comes off very, very rapidly into the river. And all the way
up the Stour."
Some of those interviewed in Christchurch had a fairly sophisticated understanding of the
nature of the flood risk:
[INT4] "A lot of the flooding down here has increased over the years possibly
because of the drainage and the government grant scheme for farmers.. An order to
drain the land all the way round the Stour here... so its a political problem, its not an
engineering one really."
Several of those interviewed mentioned a rumour that the 1979 flood was caused, or at least
exacerbated by, a failure on the part of NRA operatives to either open or close (nobody was
sure which) a valve or a floodgate upstream. As the flood occurred over the Christmas
period, the rumour claimed that the operatives were the worse for drink and had not
performed their duties correctly. Others suggested that earlier straightening of the river
channel by the NRA had worsened the flood risk by speeding the flow.
Much engineering effort now goes into trying to avoid or reduce to a minimum the
exacerbation of flood risk downstream from upstream river engineering". The Maidenhead,
Windsor and Eton scheme is estimated to increase downstream flood levels by approximately
100 millimetres, a level which the engineers regard as minimal but which causes concern to
certain of the downstream residents. A Lower Stour interviewee also felt that the works
would make the flooding worse downstream ([INT3] "...but I don't think there's any doubt
that what they've done here is going to push the flooding further down"); and this factor was
" Some engineers who were interviewed refuted this accusation: some had carried out
tests in response to this claim and found no downstream changes from river works.
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an element in her critical, but ultimately not oppositional, stance to the scheme.
The social characteristics of the informants were varied and no pattern was apparent in
linking particular characteristics with type of response. Age was identified by the informants
at the ninth interview (INT9) as being a contributory factor in their response to the flood risk
and the scheme. The female informant believed that now, at the age of 60, she would not
tolerate a flood again but if she were 20, 30 or 40 she might (this informant was 50 when the
previous flood occurred). She also identified health factors (both mental and physical) as
being influential in determining tolerance levels. She regarded herself as a 'nervous' person
who worried too much to tolerate the risk. Her husband has heart problems which now would
not allow him to cope as he had done previously. She believed that younger people were
more prepared to cope with and tolerate a flood.
[INT9] "I suppose really at our time of life.. .youngsters don't care do they? I mean,
lets face it, you can take it better when you're younger. Well, I don't know, when
you're 30/40 you take.. .1 mean what were we? I was what 50? about 52 when we
were flooded."
However, other informants of the same age or older were against the scheme and prepared
to tolerate the risk. This was so for both those with and without direct personal experience
of the 1979 flood.
Two interviews in adjacent properties, with neighbours of approximately the same age, both
with floodwater inside their house in 1979, with previously similar views across the golf
course to the river and now with similar views of the scheme, had opposing attitudes to the
scheme. It is not possible to say why this is so; the informants who had a positive attitude
(INT9) regarded themselves as "an easy pair", that is, they were not the type of people to
make a fuss. They believed, however, that those who did complain "get thought better of'.
The neighbour who had a negative attitude (INT1U1) had lived in the area all his life and
felt, because of that, that he knew the area and its flood risk better than the NRA. He had
objected strongly to "the form and height" of the proposed defences and remained strongly
opposed. He had been particularly concerned at the time of the consultation with the impact
of the proposed scheme on privacy and the likely "desecration of the beauty of the area". He
felt that the comments he had made had been ignored. Thus, even though this informant's
house was flooded (he had had between 4 and 5 inches of water in the house and had lost
certain, irreplaceable items) he remained a staunch opposer. It is possible that a belief that
the flood will not return is one of the determinants of this informant's present attitude but the
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interview was too short to build sufficient rapport and to fully examine underlying
meanings'.
10.8 Perception of, and attitudes to, future flood risk
It was apparent from the interviews that expectation of future flooding was generally low. For
most of those interviewed the flood risk was remote and many felt a flood of similar
magnitude to that which occurred in 1979 would not happen again. A common recurring
theme was that the flooding was a 'freak event':
[INT5] "I always think floods are freak things. I do honestly."
[INT1] "I'd still have that attitude that it couldn't happen really."
[INT2] "I don't ever think its going to happen again personally, that's my view.
Yeah, I think it's [the scheme] all done for nothing [said bitterly]."
Just what constitutes a 'freak' flood is not easy to define. Arguably, a flood with an estimated
recurrence of 1:50 or 1:100 years comprises a relatively 'freak' occurrence. This case study
has confirmed earlier findings (Burton et a1,1978) that different time horizons seem to exist
between the average floodplain resident (short-term time horizon) and, for example, the
professional engineer (long-term time horizon). Burton et al have noted that a given hazard
event does not constitute the same hazard to everyone (1978:97). For those who expect to
occupy the floodplain for a short time period only, a flood risk of 1 in 50 appears remote and
improbable. The flood defence engineer, however, with a professional time horizon of 50 or
100 years regards the probability of such an event with a greater degree of certainty. Older
persons are particularly prone to the former view because they tend not to project beyond
their (limited) life expectancy.
Clearly there are differences in perception between those (such as engineers) for whom the
concept (the risk of a rare flood) is an abstraction and those (such as many residents) for
whom it has personal meaning. Understanding of the statistical estimation of flood risk and
the justification for a scheme's design standard was not widespread among the informants:
" This informant had been suggested by his neighbour: contact was made by personal
visit and the interview was conducted at that time. Thus, the informant had not had time, as
others had, to evaluate the researcher and research purpose beforehand. He remained
somewhat suspicious and refused to have the interview recorded.
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[INT5] "You get these freak floods. It doesn't mean they're going to come
every.. .unless you build 12 foot walls. It's a lot of nonsense..."
[INT2] "We were told by the engineers of Wessex Rivers that it would never be
flooded for another hundred years."
[INT7] "We'd have been insured anyway, and the word was, once in a hundred
years. In a hundred years we shan't be here anyway."
Although some had a better understanding:
[INT4] "Yes well they say it only happens once in a hundred years but I... suspect
those statistics like that because catastrophes can happen at any time really."
Interviewees' attitudes to the flood risk seemed to have been influenced by their insurance
companies and their solicitors when they bought the property. It is possible that such
professionals are acting as 'gatekeepers' (Pahl, 1975) and should be included specifically in
any flood hazard information dissemination that the NRA might carry out in the future.
[INT3] "I mean before we bought the place, we went to the insurance company and
said well, were they prepared to insure the property and, t', would they ask for an
additional premium, and this was what, 5 years after the event and they were quite
happy, they regard it as a freak incident"
[INT2] "Even when it was flooded you see none of the insurance policies went up at
all. II
[INT9] "But we never had anything said about flooding on our...papers...all they
done on our.. .the solicitors brought our attention to was the Route 10.. .but there was
nothing else that they drew our attention to."
These extracts indicate some of the other sources of information which were used by residents
to balance that provided by the NRA.
People responded differently to the high river levels of the winter of 1989/90. For some who
had a negative attitude to the scheme, the fact that even after a lengthy wet period there was
little water to be seen outside of the river banks, was confirmation that the scheme that had
been constructed was unnecessarily extreme:
[INT5] "Now the other thing was, about.. .oh just before Christmas, or some little
time before Christmas, we had the most terrible weather here when it rained for days
and days and days. The golf course got flooded; but for all that the river overflowed
and the golf course flooded, it was no higher than that [indicates 2 foot above the
ground]. So what do we want a 12 foot wall in front of our property for?"
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For others with a positive attitude to the scheme, the sight of high river levels reminded them
of the flood threat and caused them to be grateful for the presence of the scheme:
[INT9] "Yes well mind you, last winter [1989] when the weather was a wee bit
atrocious at times.., and we did have a lot of wet around Christchurch...I suppose we
felt happy."
Thus, people seemed to interpret the event in accordance with prior attitudes. Although the
event referred to was slight, this example does indicate how experience is not always a
sufficient causal factor in attitude change.
It was planned to ask interviewees several questions from other surveys undertaken for the
main research project so that a comparison could be made. However, it was found that the
loosely structured interview situation did not always lend itself to asking questions in the
same formal manner that obtained during earlier questionnaire surveys. It was decided,
therefore, after four or five interviews, to drop most of these. However, the following
question was asked at nine of the interviews (see below for a discussion of the use of selected
scheme attitude statements):
Would you be prepared to live in the same area if the risk of flooding were as follows:
a 1 in 200 risk each and every year that your house would be flooded;
a 1 in 100 risk each and every year that your house would be flooded;
a 1 in 50 risk each and every year that your house would be flooded;
a 1 in 25 risk each and every year that your house would be flooded;
a 1 in 10 risk each and every year that your house would be flooded;
a 1 in 5 risk each and every year that your house would be flooded?
The same, or a closely related, question formulation was used with nine out of the thirteen
interviewees' who showed a range of competence in dealing with risk estimation in this
form. The use of this question was one of the means of estimating a risk-environment trade-
off. It served here to reveal the interviewees' perception of flooding as a cyclical process and
proved useful in identifying the ways in which interviewees interpreted this question;
providing some confirmation of previous hypotheses about how survey respondents handled
41 Exactly the same wording was not used because it did not seem appropriate in some
of the interview situations so the findings here cannot be said to be strictly comparable to
findings using a different survey methodology.
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the issue of risk. That is, that they tend to think concretely about risk in terms of the
likelihood of an event over time (e.g. the 100 year flood) and not in terms of abstract
statistical measures of risk (e.g. a 1 in 100 risk). Also, while willing to respond to the range
of risk statements, underlying this is the belief by many that it won't happen to them or that,
in any case, they have no choice in the matter.
On first moving to the house, the first interviewee (INT1) and her invalid husband had
arranged flood plans for his evacuation to neighbours across the road. Thus they had to some
extent prepared for a flood and since making these plans she had stopped thinking about the
flood risk. When asked the standard question on preparedness to live with the flood risk, she
answered that she was prepared to tolerate all levels of risk and gave various reasons.
Firstly, she stated that she would adopt the specific tactic of getting sandbags to manage the
flood. Secondly, that she would "still have that attitude that it couldn't happen really", which
can be regarded as another tactic: denying the risk. Thirdly, and somewhat differently, she
felt she couldn't very well move anywhere else now, she wouldn't want to uproot her home
and so she would have to tolerate the flood risk, she did not perceive that she had any choice,
she was constrained to stay; which is somewhat different to a completely voluntary tolerance.
Based on new information about a general change in flood risk (global warming and sea level
rise) and by a process of 'getting used to' change arising from the scheme development, this
informant now felt able to accept the scheme even though her perception of the specific flood
risk with which she was faced had not undergone radical change, i.e. she still felt, based on
past experience, that it would not happen to her. This casts in a new light the common
finding: 'it won't happen to me'. This argument is more often allied with arguments against
acceptance of mitigation but here it is allied with acceptance of mitigation. It is included here
to indicate that seemingly irrational and illogical reasoning can be used by both opponents and
supporters of flood hazard mitigation.
The majority of those interviewed, irrespective of their attitude to the scheme, were prepared
to live with risks of between 1 in 200 and 1 in 25, and a third were willing to live with all
risk frequencies (see Table 10.1) for the responses of the Christchurch interviewees to this
question). Thus, the Lower Stour informants were more prepared to live with frequent levels
of risk than those in the other case studies.
An expected pattern might be that whose house was flooded would have had a positive
attitude to the scheme and vice versa. This simple pattern was not found in all cases. For
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Table 10.1: Preparedness to live in the same area with varying flood risks (Lower
Stour)
Interview
number and
scheme
attitude
- flood risks -
1:200 1:100 1:50 1:25 1:10 1:5
INT1+ YES YES YES YES YES YES
INT1UT- YES YES YES YES YES YES
INT5- YES YES YES YES YES YES
INT4-/+ YES YES YES YES NO NO
INT6- YES YES YES YES NO NO
INT2- YES YES RE: YES depends** no no
SHE: NO no no no
YES YES YES possibly no no
INT9+ HE: YES YES NO no no no
SHE: NO no no no no no
INT3+/- YES NO NO no no no
Signs (+ -) following the interview number indicate positive (+) or negative (-) attitudes to
the scheme
** 'depends on insurance'
UT = untaped (interview)
Uppercase NO = recorded response
Lower scae no = response assumed from previous responses
example, Interviewee 1 was not flooded and yet had a positive attitude to the scheme while
Untaped Interviewee 1 was flooded and yet had a negative attitude to the scheme. The
inclusion of whether the interviewee overlooked the scheme (and thus was more obviously
impacted by the scheme) again did not conform to the pattern as expected in the ideal type
(see Table 10.2). Interviewee 4 did experience flooding, did not overlook the scheme (and
so was not immediately impacted by it), and yet had a fairly strongly negative attitude to the
scheme. This is discussed further in the following section.
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Table 10.2: Flood experience, whether scheme overlooked and scheme attitude
(Lower Stour)
INT. No. HOUSE GARDEN INT'VIEWEE OVERLOOK ATTITUDE
ORIGINAL FLOODED ONLY PRESENT SCHEME? NOW
ATTITUDE FLOODED DURING
FLOOD
INT 1- NO YES NO YES +
TNT 2- YES NO YES -
INT 3- YES NO NO +1-
TNT 4- YES YES NO -/+
INT 5- ?YES NO YES
INT 6- YES NO YES -
TNT 7-1+ YES NO YES -
TNT 8- NO YES NO YES +1-
TNT 9- YES YES YES +
NT lUT*- YES YES YES
NT 2UT- YES YES NO -/+
INT 3UT+ NO YES YES YES +
TNT 4UT+ NO ?YES YES YES +
* UT = Untaped interview
= positive attitude to scheme
= negative attitude to scheme
+/-	 = critical attitude but mostly positive
-/+	 = critical attitude but mostly negative
10.9 Attitudes to adjustment (proposed/implemented)
The scheme that was proposed aimed to give "protection against all floods with a return
period of less than 100 years" (Wessex Authority, 1986:2). The scheme works were to be
phased over a period of six years and the estimated capital cost (in 1986) was £2.3 million.
167
The main components of the scheme were the construction of floodbanks and walls (up to
three metres high), the dredging of the river bed, clearance of blocked flood arches and
excavation of tipped land (see Figure 10.1 for location of works).
The most controversial part of the scheme was, and remains, the flood embankment (up to
three metres high in places) which was of a new design that had not been used before for
floodbanks (it had been used by the Ministry of Defence for blast banks on weapons ranges).
The side of the embankment that faced residential property had a steep (1:2) gradient, the
purpose of which was to reduce landtake. The opposite, golf course, side of the embankment
had a gradient of about 1:3. The turf was an integral part of the bank construction and not
a post-construction landscaping element (see Appendix F-10.6 for photographs of the
scheme).
The main objections in 1985 to the scheme proposals were focused on the embankments and
walls which many felt were too high and feared would result in a loss of view, reduction in
property value and loss of privacy caused by children playing and people walking along the
tops and looking into windows. Other objections were based on the infrequency of flooding
which, it was felt, did not warrant such a large scale and expensive scheme. Many people
agreed with certain scheme elements, such as dredging the river and unblocking flood arches,
but disagreed with the full scheme (for an extended list of themes arising from the comments
book see Appendix F-10.2).
Loss of privacy, caused by people walking along the bank and wall, was mentioned by most
interviewees as a problem to some degree; this was the case whether or not they were
generally happy about the scheme.
[INT2] "You get cars come up here at night time, police have had to patrol
it.. .there's people walking along the bank and look over into people's gardens, there's
a hell of a high risk for burglars."
[INT5] "Now, this wall, is being used for children on bicycles and they're up and
down..."
[INT7] "A lot of people along the wall, adults mainly, using extremely bad language
when they've been asked to move."
[INT8] "We frequently get people walking up and down, having a look in to see
what's happening because they've got a good view."
More positively, some interviewees had 'adopted' the bank as part of their garden:
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[INT1] "I planted all the flowers up there [on floodbank] and they came up and
they're quite nice."
Others had watered the bank during drought periods when the turf was having difficulty
getting established.
The embankment had proved more of a problem than the wall. The new technique tried in
its construction has not been wholly successful due in large part it is thought to lengthy
periods of drought during its construction and early stages of turf growth. Damage caused
by the contractor while mowing, further reduced its aesthetic appeal by requiring remedial
measures that relied on patching in of black plastic netting, fixed with bright blue plastic
twine. Many interviewees contrasted the promises of green, grassy, landscaped banks to the
dry, brown, mound patched with black polythene and blue twine that they could see from
their windows (see Appendix F-10.6c).
[INT6] "Now listen.. .listen to this [reads from NRA document], "by careful
landscaping, selection of materials and planting of suitable trees, shrubs and flowers,
we hope to make the works as pleasant as possible". Now have a look at that! Take
a look at that! Do you know what was on the side there, its all been burnt off now,
polythene! Black polythene!"
For many of those who bought their property for the view it afforded, the scheme was a
major disappointment. The (excessive) height of the embankments and walls was a continuing
theme:
[INT7] "But to go to this extent, to build a Berlin Wall to keep the river water
back..."
[INT2] "Get a machine here and we'll knock a metre of it off [laughs], quite easy to
do, mind [laughs]."
[INT5] "You see...everybody along here, we're all in agreeance ...let's have a little
flood barrier but not 12 foot high."
This last comment reveals an important component in scheme attitudes: those who opposed
the scheme, opposed the height of the defences and therefore the standard of protection
offered. They were not totally opposed to flood defence in principle. It suggests that, if the
NRA believe high levels of protection to be justified, more resources should be expended on
explaining the justification for this standard and the implications of choosing a different level.
However, floodplain residents do not necessarily act as passive and positive recipients of
information from the NRA; they receive information from elsewhere in the community and
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it is possible that this latter source may reinforce their initial beliefs and outweigh information
from the relatively unknown NRA.
Another theme that was raised in the comments book and resurfaced during interviews was
the perceived impact of the scheme on property value:
[INT7] "There's no talk of compensation or anything like that for loss of
view.. .Devaluation of the house because of the wall, I suppose they would say the
house would be of more value because it would never get flooded again [laughs] but
the once in a hundred [flood] won't make up for the other 99 times you can look out
over the meadow, an unrestricted view."
It was felt by many who opposed the scheme that there had indeed been an impact on
property values from the scheme. This was expressed most often as the loss of a 'selling
point'; that is, the scheme had obstructed the view, which formerly had been a selling point.
[INT7] "Who wants to live behind a wall? Not a selling point. Before we had a view;
that was a selling point. It's not now."
It could be argued that the protection from flooding offered by the scheme would improve
property values, however, the presence of a flood risk does not seem to have influenced
property values here in the past although one informant remarked that they had tried without
success to sell their property after the 1979 flood. Thus, property values may suffer in the
immediate aftermath of a flood but recover again after a flood-free period. Similar fmdings
have been reported by Montz (1992) whose study of the impact of hazard disclosure on
property values in three New Zealand communities found that disclosure of hazard had little
effect and that hazardousness did not appear to be an important consideration in house buying
decisions; any impact of an actual event on property prices was temporary (see also above
comments relating to insurance company and solicitors' attitudes to the flood risk in the area).
For some of those who feel strongly against the scheme, it was impossible to find anything
positive to say about it. Others were pleased with the sense of security it offered. Some
remarked that the scheme afforded them more privacy than they had enjoyed previously. A
number of residents gained extra land between their former garden boundary and the bank
or wall; this was not always regarded as a benefit by the older residents who had difficulty
managing their gardens.
Negative aspects were necessarily more numerous, given the sample that was chosen, and
were mostly concerned with the perceived visual blight and threat to privacy mentioned
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elsewhere. The ramps and pathways constructed for access across the defences were also felt
to be a negative aspect; not only because of the impact on privacy but also because the stark
white of the original paths was thought to be out of character with the area.
Three key variables in scheme attitude were: height of the defence, perception of scheme
impact on view, and flood experience. However, the variables did not co-vary in a simple
way and, clearly, the relationships were complex. Those whose attitude to the scheme was
generally positive, would not be so satisfied if the floodbank or wall were nearer or higher:
[1NT9] Q: "How would you feel if [the floodbank] was higher than that?
MRS: Oh gosh!
MR: Very upset! Very upset."
The first interviewee (1NT1) was originally "dead against [the scheme]...absolutely dead
against it." She elaborated on the reasons for her present, more positive attitude. Firstly, she
associated her change of attitude with "being human beings and human nature", a result of
which was adaptation: "you get used to it". 'Getting used to it', and more particularly,
'having to get used to it' and a somewhat fatalistic attitude, were mentioned by several
informants as having influenced their present attitude. To some extent the NRA engineers
who promote schemes depend on this process occurring (this will be discussed further in the
section dealing with the engineers' interviews) to overcome opposition in the long term.
Secondly, this informant was influenced as a result of interactions with others in the
community; by neighbours and other residents discussing the possibility of future flooding
and, probably more importantly, by hearing a talk by "one of the people from the Council"
on the 'greenhouse effect' and the threat this posed through rising water levels. The latter
(allied to wider media coverage) was an important component in attitude change for this and
for other informants. Thus, for this informant, scheme attitude was not dependent on
information from the NRA but from other social or cultural contacts; in this instance it served
to turn a negative scheme attitude to a positive one and thus worked in the NRA's favour.
Two conditions of her acceptance of the scheme were her belief that "when they've
landscaped it, it will be quite nice" and that "it hasn't spoilt my view". The latter is a very
important condition of acceptance of the scheme for this informant and for others. The
floodbank at her location was sufficiently low for her to have retained a distant view down
to the river and also the condition of the turf on this section was better than in other sections
where it had suffered drought and other damage. If these two factors were reversed then it
is probable that her attitude to the scheme would have been more critical.
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10.10 Consultation and participation
10.10.1 Residents' attitudes
There was a relatively clear division of attitudes to the NRA consultation programme.
Generally, those in favour of the scheme were satisfied; those against the scheme, were not.
For those with serious criticisms of the scheme, the consultation programme did not seem to
answer their needs. Many could not accept the need for such high defences to protect against
flooding that 'wouldn't happen for 100 years'. The use of the term '100 year flood' by NRA
officers, had merely acted as a reinforcement to the public perception of flooding as a freak
event with a likely recurrence 100 years hence.
A number of those interviewed felt that the drawings and plans did not adequately convey the
information they required; one believed this to be a deliberate tactic of the NRA to get
support for the scheme. Others felt that the consultation process did not go far enough in
allowing them an input into decision-making:
[INT2] "I think that we should have been asked in different ways how it would be
designed and we were only asked about the height."
Some informants expressed the attitude that the NRA weren't really interested in peoples'
opinions and that the consultation was more of a public relations exercise.
[INT2] "Alright, they had us up there and you write in a book but they didn't
really.. .they weren't really interested in it at all."
[INT3] "...I mean consultation is as much or as less as you want to put into it
really...I think its a very good public relations exercise, consultation, but whether or
not, from the public's side, you get what you want, I really don't know."
More positive attitudes were also expressed by some who felt the NRA had taken trouble to
organise the displays and exhibitions and had kept people informed by a form of newsletter.
The use of newsletters was a preferred method of consultation in the Thames Valley surveys
discussed above. More regular use of this means of communication might have avoided some
of the negative attitudes to the NRA which developed particularly when elements of scheme
design were changed after the exhibitions, leading some residents to suspect that there was
an element of 'trickery' involved.
The NRA survey of residents' preferences (see Table 10.3) was criticised by a number of
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Table 10.3: "Results of the [NRA] Public Consultation in the Iford Area, January 1986"
(Lower Stour)
Number of questionnaires delivered 860
Total returns by 11 February 503 58%
1st choice:	 Option 1 - Full scheme 276 55% }
Option 2 - Reduced scheme 163 33% } 100%
Option 3 - No scheme 62 12% }
Unidentified papers 2
503
Area upstream of Barrack Road
Total returns 383 60%
1st choice:	 Option 1 220 58%
Option 2 120 33%
Option 3 41 11%
Area downstream of Barrack Road
Total returns 120 54%
1st choice:	 Option 1 56 47%
Option 2 43 36%
Option 3 21 17%
Front row of properties	 Total 68
Total returns 56 82%
1st choice:	 Option 1 19 34%
Option 2 27 48%
Option 3 10 18%
Properties where occupier voted
for Option 3 - no scheme 62
Number of these in new ownership since 1979 19 31%
Source: NRA Wessex Region
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interviewees who felt that the area covered by the ballot had extended too far and had
included those who would not be impacted by the scheme:
[INT2] "They went a bit too far with their leaflets to get a lot of votes.. .those people
weren't concerned, see.., they weren't concerned about it were they, they weren't
worried, "oh yes, let's go for the higher scheme"."
[INT9] "If we lived back there, we would have done that naturally, in fairness to
yourself, if its 8 foot its going to be dead certain and 4 foot...if you're back there and
you don't even see it, you're naturally going to opt for the [higher scheme] I mean,
we would have done the same."
Informants did not appreciate that the ballot was of those likely to be affected by a 100 year
event; they thought it was only of those affected by the 1979 flood and perceived, therefore,
that the NRA had spread the net too wide - and, it was suggested by some, manipulated the
result - by including many who were not flooded in 1979. This created a considerable level
of distrust which could perhaps have been avoided by a more thorough explanation of the
criteria for inclusion in the survey.
It was felt by some interviewees that certain of the concerns expressed by them in the 1985
consultation and reported in the Comments Book, were not dealt with by the NRA during
final design and construction of the scheme. For example, the probable loss of privacy caused
by people walking along floodbanks and walls. Although this concern was expressed in 1985,
it did not seem to have been dealt with in the design. It had caused considerable annoyance
and distress since construction and appears to have necessitated the erection by the NRA of
chestnut paling fences as an ad hoc preventative measure:
[INT7] "One of the meetings I asked, if there was going to be a wall could it be made
pointed so people couldn't walk on it. I didn't get a satisfactory answer. The answer
is, it's 2 feet wide and it's like a footpath."
[INT5] "Oh and then on top of that they put that hideous fence, can you see it? You
know why that's there? To stop the kids cycling!...they're up there all the time."
The interviewee who requested a pointed top to the floodwall remarked that this suggestion
was now being considered but he was uncertain of how this would be achieved when the wall
was ostensibly complete.
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Some informants felt that none of the tactice 2
 they had used to convey their feelings about
the scheme had worked and in the fifth interview the informants were left with a feeling of
powerlessness which seemed to have a long-term consequence in that the experience had
persuaded them it was not worth objecting to anything in the future.
[INT5] "I would never object to anything in future because it's a lot of wasted energy
at our age, when we don't need to waste our energy, you know, we objected and we
went to the meetings, we did this, that and the other.. .it's all to no avail. Oh
absolutely not."
A number of informants - both those who opposed the scheme and those that did not -
believed that those in opposition were a 'minority' and as such had no chance of their
preferences prevailing against the majority. This was particularly evident in the widescale
ballot of opinion carried out by the NRA.
[INT5] "It doesn't matter about going to meetings 'cos one man, Residents'
Association, said "sit down".. .Because he wasn't interested, he was in favour of the
wall because he lives.. .miles away from the wall, you see, so they weren't interested
in your opinion anyway. And asked the opinions of people who don't live anywhere
near the wall."
These informants claimed to be 'staunch Conservatives' and had found themselves in the
unusual and, to them, distressing position of being regarded as rebels and in opposition to the
consensus view of the public meetings:
[INT5] "MR: ...after attending all these meetings and that.., you were pushed aside
because.. .they ask you for your opinion and when you gave your opinion, you were
looked at as if you were.. .were rebels you know ...you don't know what you're
talking about."
When asked whether the differences of opinion about the need for the flood defence scheme
had caused conflict in the community these informants said it had not, although their
reasoning was that this was because there were too few in the minority group to create a
significant level of conflict.
The minority/majority theme is conveyed here by the comparison of the informants'
(minority) side of the road with the other (majority) side. They suggest that it was "natural"
' This term was not an informant's term but its use here relates to analysis based on
'grounded theory' techniques (Strauss, 1987), the results of which are presented in Appendix
F-10.7)
175
for those living on the 'front line' to opt for the lower scheme and those living further back
to opt for the higher scheme:
[INT2] "MRS: Well obviously they're all for it the other side and we're all against
it this side which is only natural isn't it. MR: That's right. MRS: 'cos it only affects
us; doesn't affect the other side...MR:...They weren't bothered over the other side
of the road. MRS: Naturally. We wouldn't have been. MR: We wouldn't have been,
no, that's right."
Other interviews, however, suggested that this was not always the case; some living further
back also opposed the scheme. The NRA's questionnaire survey showed only 14 percent of
respondents were from the 'front line' and yet 45 percent of the total respondents chose the
lower or no scheme.
Another informant believed, unusually, that the majority comprised those who were flooded
in 1979 (he was aware that his property had been flooded to a depth of three feet but he was
not resident at the time) and the minority, those that overlooked the scheme but were not
flooded:
[INT7] "I mean, people such as us living alongside it, a nice view, were in a minority
I suppose. 'Cos all the people that got flooded in the past were living behind.., so they
were the majority and the minority people such as myself, I suppose if you followed
up round the back of the golf course, they all felt the same as I did, that they didn't
want it. .You've only to walk around the back streets.. .and all those roads that were
flooded, to know that the few people that were bordering on to the golf course and
on to the meadow here are definitely in a minority. The people across the road, they
don't care a damn about the view here would they? The back streets that were flooded
opted for the wall and the higher wall because they wanted to be covered against the
flood. We're just outnumbered that's all which I don't think will be considered in any
way at all."
Equity issues arise frequently in floodplain management and have yet to be addressed
adequately by decision-makers. Decisions are made on the basis of majority opinion which
can result in considerable distress to individuals and minorities. This will be dealt with further
in Chapter 13, Interviews with NRA Engineers.
10.11 The risk-environment trade-off
In this case study the risk-environment trade-off was more overt than in the previous case
studies as it formed the central research problem, the saliency of which had been determined
by the floodplain residents themselves in the comments they made during consultation, before
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the present research study began.
In the following discussion the risk-environment trade-off is illustrated by a simultaneous
examination of flood risk and mitigation through the use of two scheme attitude statements
taken from the earlier quantitative surveys. These statements were used in several of the
Lower Stour interviews and the responses included here illustrate the complexity involved in
the response process as well as the risk-environment trade-off itself. The two statements were
"I would rather have any scheme than be flooded" and "anything designed to reduce flooding
is desirable". The rating scale used was: 1 strongly agree, 2 agree, 3 neither agree nor
disagree, 4 disagree and 5 strongly disagree.
It will be seen that informants qualified their responses to the statements to some degree
before or after they answered; this process is not (usually) conveyed in quantitative surveys.
In the extract below the first informant (INT1) agreed with the first statement, explaining
further with the qualifying word "now". That is, she would not have agreed with the
statement before the scheme was built and before her attitude to the general flood risk had
changed (as discussed above). However when the first statement was followed by the second,
and an emphasis placed on the word "anything", a different response was given:
Q:	"...If I said to you "I would rather have any scheme than be flooded", how
would you respond to that statement, strongly agree to strongly disagree?
MRS: I would agree now. '2', agree.
Q:	 And what about "anything designed to reduce flooding is desirable"?
MRS: Yes, provided its a good design [laughs].
Q:	 But if I said "anything [emphasised] designed to reduce flooding is
desirable"?
MRS: No, it's got to be done in consultation with the people that are living here so
I wouldn't say anything.. .I'd say disagree."
This shows the qualifying process which would be hidden by the simple, unprompted
numerical results of 2 or 4 (agree and disagree). It also points to the importance of the
position of the statements in a series (Schwarz, 1991). It is possible that different responses
might be gained by altering the relative positions of statements as seemed to be the case with
the DWSC/90 survey where the statement ("anything designed to reduce flooding is
desirable") was placed later in the order, giving respondents more chance to think about
negative aspects of schemes before responding. The self-completion process in the postal
survey also allowed respondents to read and respond to statements in any order rather than
being directed by an interviewer.
In the second interview (INT2) the informants' initial response to the statement: "I would
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rather have any scheme than be flooded" was to strongly agree but when the words 'any
scheme' were emphasised the male informant '
 interjected a qualification: "as long as it...it
suits [said emphatically] the environment". Similarly with the second statement ("anything
designed to reduce flooding is desirable"), the initial response was strong agreement but when
it was suggested that the informants had in fact got 'anything' they showed considerable
discomfort. They recognised the contradiction in their previous position and tried to
rationalise their response by explaining that they were never against a scheme per se but only
against the design with which they had been presented: it was too high and inadequately
landscaped.
The informant in the seventh interview (INT7) responded similarly to the same statement,
first agreeing and then, on reflection, disagreeing when he realised the implications of
agreeing to 'anything' and qualifying his answer thus: "...not anything, not anything no. It
depends in which way they go about it."
This probing of responses indicates how simple reliance on the response frequencies in a
quantitative survey can be misleading. The frequency of agreement with the above statements
might conceal considerable dissatisfaction with and opposition to an actual scheme, were one
to be developed.
The juxtaposition of risk and environment inherent in the statements and responses strongly
supports the notion of a trade-off occurring.
10.12 Summary and conclusions
In this study area, which last experienced major flooding in 1979 and is now protected to a
100 year standard, experience of, and attitudes to, the environment and flooding were closely
intertwined. Although age, health, flood experience and distance from the river/scheme were
important variables for some informants, no consistent pattern was observable in this small
sample relating social characteristics with either flooding or scheme attitudes.
Expectation of future flooding was generally low and many regarded past flooding as a 'freak
event'. The majority of those interviewed, irrespective of their attitude to the scheme, were
prepared to live with risks of between 1 in 200 and 1 in 25 and a third were willing to live
with all risk frequencies (1 in 200 to 1 in 5) but underlying this was the belief for some that
the flood would not occur or that they had no choice but to tolerate the risk: moving home
not being a viable option.
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No simple relationship was found between flood experience and scheme attitude. Negative
scheme attitudes were found in both those with and those without flood experience and vice
versa.
Many of those who were antagonistic to the scheme, had moved to that location specifically
for the environmental benefits it had to offer and because of that, to varying degrees, had
accepted the flood risk as they perceived it. They comprised a subgroup (of the population
at risk) who had been differentially impacted by the scheme.
The level of protection chosen for the community by NRA engineers was greater than any
flood experienced by the residents and thus seemed excessive to them. Generally, informants
were not opposed to flood defence in principle.
For those with serious criticisms of the scheme, the consultation programme did not answer
their needs. It was argued that it did not go far enough in allowing them an input into
decision-making and was regarded by some merely as a public relations exercise.
Floodplain residents are not necessarily passive and positive recipients of information from
the NRA; they receive information from elsewhere in the community and it is possible that
this latter source may reinforce their initial beliefs and outweigh information from the
relatively unknown NRA.
Those that opposed the scheme regarded themselves as an aggrieved, powerless and beaten
minority. Majority decisions can result in considerable distress to individuals and minorities
and this suggests the need for an examination of the feasibility of differential levels of
consultation and participation.
The qualitative method has brought out the variability in response rather than, as with the
quantitative method, focusing on homogeneity. The long, loosely structured, interview
technique was successful in highlighting some of the complexity behind expressed attitudes,
although it would have been preferable to have carried out one or more follow-up interviews
to deepen the analysis. The informants' evaluation of the flood risk and possible (and actual)
adjustments to it were conditional upon a range of beliefs and circumstances and upon
interactions with others in the community. Some of these are summarised in Appendix F-
10.7, which presents the results of analysis based on grounded theory techniques (Strauss,
1987) and lists a range of conditions, consequences, interactions and strategies/tactics applied
to selected dimensions of the scheme and flood risk.
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This case study has examined the attitudes of a small sample of residents to a scheme that
was constructed despite considerable levels of opposition. It showed dissatisfaction to have
outlasted the construction phase albeit in the absence of any recent, serious flooding. The
following case study (West Bay) examined the attitudes of scheme opponents who 'won' their
argument and the proposed scheme was not constructed but who subsequently suffered serious
flooding.
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RECENT FLOODING
SCHEME PROPOSED & REJECTED
SCHEME IMPACT - NEAR
STUDY STATUS
11. WEST BAY, COASTAL FLOODING (1990) (BRIDPORT FLOOD ALLEVIATION
SCHEME: STAGE 1c)
11.1 Introduction
This very small case study differs from the others in that it concerned coastal rather than
riverine flooding. It examined the rejection of flood defence proposals by the residents of four
properties on Chesil Beach in Dorset (see Figure 11.1). Because the survey population was
so small, the maintenance of confidentiality was problematic and, while the informants did
not feel they had said anything during the interview that they would not wish a third party
to hear, nevertheless, assurances were requested and given that they would not be identified
individually by name. In this section and the report (Fordham, 1991b) on which much of the
following is based, the sex of the informant is also disguised by the use of the term 'they'
in place of 'he' or 'she' for example.
All four cottages were flooded on the weekend of December 16/17th 1989. Interviews were
conducted in April 1990 with three of those present during the flood.
West Bay is a small holiday resort on the Dorset coast. It lies downstream of Bridport at the
point where the River Brit enters the sea at West Bay Harbour. Development of the town has
been low-key and was felt to be responsible for a large part of its charm.
The focus of the study concerned a group of cottages which lie at the western end of the
29km long Chesil Beach (see Figure 11.1). Chesil Beach stretches from Portland Bill in the
southeast to West Bay Harbour in the northwest and is a Site of Special Scientific Interest
(SSSI).
The cottages are Grade 2 Listed dwellings. Originally, it was thought, they were built as coal
bunkers for a much larger four storey terrace lying at a right angle to the coastline. The
Grade 2 listing is a constraint on the type of individual floodproofing measures that could be
undertaken.
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Figure 11.1: Map of the West Bay area
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11.1.1 Consultation and participation: procedures followed
NRA engineers who have commented on this research and the accompanying report
(Fordham, 1991b) now acknowledge that the original consultation procedures were perhaps
less than adequate and report that "things are done differently now". At the time, the process
was of fairly standard form including consulting the statutory consultees, one of whom was
the NCC which objected to the original proposals which included concrete piling and would
have required importing material on to the beach. There is a divergence of opinion as to
whether or not individual residents were consulted prior to the commencement of works: the
NRA believe residents were contacted but the residents claim they were not.
11.2 Research design
Flooding of the properties occurred during December 16th and 17th 1989 and it was proposed
to interview the owners to ascertain whether their attitudes to flood defence had changed since
the flood event.
The names and addresses of the cottage owners concerned were obtained from the NRA
Wessex Region and contact made by letter and telephone in March 1990. Interviews were
carried out in April 1990 with a single owner from all the cottages and also one tenant. All
who were asked agreed to be interviewed although one interviewee was somewhat reluctant
and the ensuing interview was too short (approximately twenty minutes) to generate very
much information.
Four loosely structured interviews ranging between two hours and twenty minutes in length
were completed. One owner owns two of the cottages which are rented out while they live
elsewhere; one owner occupies their cottage permanently; and one owner uses theirs as a
holiday cottage but their father (the tenant and fourth interviewee) occupies it permanently.
Interviews were also conducted with two engineers involved with the scheme.
The loose structure of the interviews was designed to cover certain basic areas but to allow
the interviewees to express their own concerns freely. Several set questions taken from other
surveys were asked for comparative purposes. The interviews were not tape recorded but
notes were taken during the interview and expanded notes were included immediately
afterwards.
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11.3 Flood history and present level of risk
The particular flood problem to which this study relates is one of overtopping of the East
Beach (see Figure 11.1) by tidal influences. High wave action can cause overtopping of the
East Beach shingle bank at approximately two- or three-yearly intervals although property is
not normally flooded. If, however, this coincides with high spring tides, significant flooding
can occur in the village of West Bay and can include property flooding and road closure. The
last event of such severity occurred in December 1979 and was the impetus for the original
flood defence proposals which date from 1981.
The flood adjustment situation existing before the 1989 flood was that all three owners of the
cottages had refused to accept the proposals put forward by the NRA, which comprised the
raising and regrading of the existing beach profile to 7.5m AODN (Above Ordinance Datum
Newlyn) from the existing level of between 5.7m and 6.7m AODN to provide a 1 in 100 year
standard of protection. The proposals entailed a potential impact on visual amenity for the
owners of the cottages who have always enjoyed an uninterrupted view of the sea. The
subsequent refusal of the proposed works meant that the cottages themselves became the
defence.
Some adaptation to the flood risk was apparent: the ground floor circuitry in one cottage at
least was isolated from the rest of the house so that, in the event of a flood, heat and light
would be available in the rooms upstairs. One interviewee believed the cottage was built to
be flooded but not to have shingle in it. The basement had a `plughole' in the floor to drain
floodwaters.
11.4 Social characteristics
No information was sought systematically on the social characteristics of those interviewed.
Interviews were undertaken with both males and females whose ages ranged from the mid-
forties to one interviewee who was 85. Educational level was not examined specifically but
varied across the informants. One interviewee referred to their university education; another
referred to previous hotel ownership and management; another to working "in the building
trade".
The ownership and occupancy of the cottages was as outlined above. Length of ownership
and residence varied: one non-resident owner bought their property in 1955; the other in
1971. The resident owner-occupier bought their property in 1981 and the tenant had been in
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residence since 1982.
11.5 Environmental perception and attitudes
11.5.1 General environmental orientation
Little information is available on the general environmental orientation of the informants
although two mentioned the wider, more philosophical aspects of environmental concern
which underlay their attitudes to the locality and their opposition to the proposed scheme;
these are discussed in relation to scheme attitudes below.
11.5.2 Attitudes to the local environment
West Bay was regarded by one of the informants as "a bit of a slum; bit of a grotty joint"
(said in a way which suggested this was part of its charm). The town had been largely
bypassed by development. What little had occurred was "of an amateur, shabby kind", which
was regarded as part of its value: it had not been professionally developed. It was also said
that the town had "a sense of history".
Asked what was the particular attraction of the property or location, two informants
responded that it was the rarity of the position - the last house on Chesil Beach - and that it
was difficult to find a house that close to the sea.
One of the informants was an active member of the local preservation society and thus had
greater concern for, and involvement with, local planning decisions. The attitudes of another
informant to the locality were dependent upon the time of the year:
"it's nice in summer but in the winter it's different with the wind coming in through
the windows. Beautiful in summertime."
11.6 Flood experience
The cottages had experienced little or no flooding prior to 1989. Some percolation of water
occurs through the shingle and up into the basements which can get "quite damp". This had
occurred in one of the end cottages on one previous occasion when two inches of water
"seeped up through the gravel and then went away again". In 1958 there was minor flooding
in the other end cottage causing damage to one carpet. The owner of one of the middle
cottages reported that there appeared to be no record of flooding "by local memory for the
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last 100 years".
The 1989 flood brought approximately four feet of water and fifteen tons of gravel (by one
estimate) into the cottages on the evening tide. By eleven p.m. on the Saturday evening the
sea had broken through the windows - smashing the glass and frames - and flooded the
basements. By two or three a.m. the Fire Brigade had managed to pump out the water down
to a level of approximately one foot but the next day the water and gravel came back again.
Three of those interviewed were present during the flood that occurred over the weekend of
the 16th and 17th December 1989.
11.7 Perception of, and attitudes to, flood hazard and future flood risk
Those who experienced the flood were asked how they felt about it. None underestimated the
severity of the event but feelings were varied:
"it was a very frightening experience. The sea often comes up to the edge of the bank
[of shingle]; too close for me. Frightening"
"the worst thing was feeling so helpless. I never thought it [the flood] would happen.
I used to say, 'I don't mind if it does, if it is caused by the elements', but I minded
more than I expected"
"feeling numb, helpless. Not really frightened"
"I didn't think 'Oh, I must get out and sell the place'"
At one stage members of the Fire Brigade, roped together, attempted to negotiate the seaward
side of the cottages but were prevented by the strength of the waves ("they were afraid").
The interviewees mentioned a number of contributory causes of flooding. It was suggested
by one interviewee that the original course of the river Brit had been further to the east
(nearer to the East Cliffs) and that works carried out in the past by the NRA (the construction
of a shingle bank) had blocked off this flood route which would have funnelled the flood
waters up the original course of the river to the east and round the back of the cottages. A
similar flood causation factor emerged in the Lower Stour Case Study.
Another contributory cause of flooding that was mentioned was the over-extraction of gravel
from the beach. This, it was felt, had changed the beach profile and made it much steeper.
This was perceived to contribute to the cause of flooding by bringing the sea nearer. The
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"natural defence", the Chesil Beach, had "disappeared". It was said that it always used to
disappear but had always come back again; "but it hasn't come back".
When the flood defence proposals were rejected by the residents the NRA had raised the
shingle bank slightly and built a small wall next to one of the cottages as a compromise. This
wall was held by some interviewees to be a contributory factor in the flooding. Another
interviewee reported that the shingle bank was breached during the flood and floodwaters
washed down the Watch House Cafe on the beach.
Insurance factors were some influence on attitude to the flood risk. One informant reported
having insurance that covered all risks. This flood caused approximately £10,000-£20,000
damage and the informant was concerned about the response of the insurance company, i.e.
that they would raise the premium considerably or even refuse to insure. Another informant
had to pay the first £500 building excess and the first £500 contents excess. Asked if they
could put a ceiling on the cost of premium which would force them to leave, they said it was
impossible.
One of the non-resident owners, not in residence at the time of the flood, had offered
alternative accommodation to those who were but they had refused; preferring to stay despite
the disruption of the flooding'.
Some interviewees mentioned the fact that the cottages had withstood the elements for over
a hundred years and felt secure in the belief that they would continue to do so. The cottages
were felt to be structurally sound with walls two feet thick and, to a certain extent, designed
to be flooded.
11.8 Attitudes to adjustment (proposed/implemented)
In the immediate aftermath of the December 1989 flooding, the NRA raised the shingle bank
levels to approximately the levels first proposed. While gratitude was expressed for the help
provided and the raising of the shingle bank was acknowledged as being well meant, at the
time of interviewing, one at least of the interviewees was less than happy with the result and
referred to it as: "a gruesome little bank.. .this ghastly bank".
Two interviewees did not think the original flood defence scheme would have made any
43 These temporary tenants could not be contacted for interview.
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difference in the December 1989 flood event if it had been constructed.
Since the flooding of December 1989 the owners suggested a modified proposal for a new
wall between the properties and the shingle bank. This, it was felt, would deflect most of the
seawater and break the force of the waves. The height of the proposed wall had not been
decided but it was felt that it must retain the view, fit in with the surroundings and not rob
people (visitors) of access to, and the recreational value of, the beach. If it were unsightly
then one interviewee at least would prefer nothing. An NRA engineer who was asked about
this proposal expressed some reluctance to address the issue with any speed.
One interviewee felt that steel shutters on the windows would have prevented much of the
damage caused by the gravel which was washed into the basements with such force as to
break not only the window glass but the frames also. However, because these are listed
buildings, the owners are not allowed to erect such shutters.
Three of the four interviewees were asked to respond to the following attitude statements
from the other surveys in the research project: "I would rather have any scheme than be
flooded" and "Anything designed to reduce flooding is desirable". They were asked to rate
their response in the same way as those who had been interviewed with a structured
questionnaire, on a scale of 1, strongly agree to 5, strongly disagree. Two of the three
strongly disagreed with both statements, giving them both a rating of 5. Both these
interviewees chose the location specifically for the environmental benefits it had to offer and
were not prepared to tolerate any scheme, if it represented a significant detriment to the
environment. They acknowledged a difference in perception between the engineers and non-
engineers:
"You must be careful about engineers, they don't care about the look of the thing."
The third interviewee was given just one statement, "anything designed to reduce flooding
is desirable" and responded positively:
"would settle for anything. Would have to.. .at the moment there are no defences at
all; you're just open to the sea."
This interviewee, however, was the elderly tenant with limited abilities to cope with a flood
and who did not specifically choose the location for its environmental benefits.
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11.9 Consultation and participation
11.9.1 Residents' attitudes
A lack of consultation was mentioned by two interviewees as a matter of some annoyance.
It was said that they first became aware of the flood defence proposals when work began on
the beach and that no prior contact had been made: "the whole place was up in arms".
A further cause of annoyance was that they were not offered any alternatives to "a twelve
foot high" shingle bank. Thus, there were no possible areas for discussion or bargaining and
the residents had to 'take it or leave it'. They chose to leave it.
One informant believed that individual engineers with whom they had had dealings were
"very good" and:
"...possibly took [our] opinions seriously.. .didn't think [we] were lunatics... but
maybe they just sent down the charmers to keep [us] quiet."
However, this contact had come too late for the residents to affect the design of the proposed
flood defence.
11.10 The risk-environment trade-off
Three of the interviewees were asked the standard question from other surveys in the research
project on preparedness to live with varying levels of risk (see Question 18, Thames
Perception and Attitude Survey Questionnaire [Appendix B-11 and other case stDdie3). Twi>
interviewees were prepared to live with up to a 1 in 25 risk but not a 1 in 10 or more
frequent risk. Their reasons for tolerating the risk lay in the uniqueness of the situation - the
last cottages on Chesil Beach - and the nearness of the sea. One of these interviewees thought
this attraction to the sea was "a primeval thing": that they "couldn't see a threat to life and
limb at the moment" and that they "enjoy a gale - exciting experience".
Another felt that living there was their choice and that they must put up with flooding to
some extent:
"if you choose to live near water you have to put up with something.. .you cannot
damage the environment just for the sake of property... 'seriousness' means deaths,
not amount of damage."
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The third interviewee was prepared to live with a 1 in 100 risk but not a 1 in 50. This elderly
(over 80 years old) interviewee was very ill, and subsequently hospitalised just as the
flooding occurred. Unlike the others, this interviewee was a tenant, not an owner, and had
not specifically chosen the location.
Table 11.1 gives a simplified breakdown of whether or not the 1989 flood was experienced
by the interviewee, their present attitude to the flood defence scheme, and whether or not the
location was chosen specifically for its environmental benefits. From this table it can be seen
that the only interviewee to accept the need for a flood defence scheme as proposed by the
NRA, did not choose the location for its environmental benefits (this does not, of course,
preclude the importance of other factors in arriving at this decision).
Those that chose the location for its environmental value, in particular its proximity to the
sea, were prepared to make a trade-off (up to a 1 in 25 year risk) between the risk of
flooding and the maintenance of the existing environmental quality. This was so, despite
recent and serious flood experience.
One informant expressed the belief that one must expect danger from the elements, although
the wind was perceived to be more dangerous than the sea. And that "it comes back to the
sea. You cannot damage the natural environment just for the sake of property". Those
residents who wanted the shingle bank just so they could have their carpets saved were
dismissed in a partly scornful, partly despairing tone.
These expressions of the hypothesized risk-environment trade-off were the strongest that have
been found. They were made in the immediate aftermath of serious flooding and were strong,
personal expressions of the context in which preparedness to live with flood risks occurred
for them. They suggest that environmental assets are of greater value to them than property
assets. The first example above, which speaks of the primeval attraction of the sea, also hints
at a much deeper relationship between people and nature that has yet to be explored
sufficiently.
11.11 Summary and conclusions
Individual reasons for locating in the area seemed of more importance in this study than flood
experience in partly explaining attitudes to the flood defence scheme proposals.
Those that chose the location for its environmental value, particularly its proximity to the sea,
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Table 11.1: Personal flood experience, attitude to the flood defence scheme, and whether
or not the location was chosen specifically for its environmental benefits (West Bay)
Flood
experience
(1989)
Accept
proposed
flood scheme?
Chose location
for
environment?
1 non-resident owner NO* NO YES
1 occasionally resident owner YES NO YES
1 permanently resident owner YES NO YES
1 permanently resident non-owner YES YES NO
* This interviewee, though not personally
financial penalty and a degree of disruption.
present during the 1989 flood, sufferred a
were prepared to make a trade-off between the risk (1 in 200 to 1 in 25) of flooding and the
maintenance of the existing environmental quality. That was so despite recent and serious
flood experience.
The owners (but not the resident non-owner) of this group of cottages were prepared to
tolerate a degree of flood risk in order to maintain their view of the sea. The problem for the
NRA lies in its perceived obligation to protect other residents who may be at risk of flooding
and who may not be prepared to tolerate similar or greater levels of risk. This may be
because these residents do not enjoy similar environmental benefits which they perceive
would be damaged by the proposed protection.
The interviews suggested that greater consultation in the earlier stages and with a range of
options rather than one preferred scheme might have resulted in an acceptable compromise.
Although this fmal case study dealt with coastal rather than riverine flooding, many of the
same issues were apparent. This was surprising in view of the greater danger inherent in
close proximity to the sea compared to rivers. However, the interviews with engineers (see
Chapter 13) also identified risk-environment trade-offs in relation to coastal flooding; this
would appear to be a fruitful area for further study.
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12. CASE STUDY CONCLUSIONS
Early hazards research had not found socio-economic status to be associated with flood
hazard perception but these findings were contradicted subsequently (James, 1974; Burton et
al 1978:95). James (1974) concluded that "people of certain characteristics are more likely
to move onto the flood plain than are people of other characteristics, and those who live on
flood plains have their perceptions and attitudes changed by flood experience" (1974:72). His
research showed that "flood plains are disproportionately settled by people who overlook
flood problems as not relating to any residential choice considerations that they deem
important" (1974:73).
Although James acknowledges the considerable variation between locations in the perceptions
and attitudes of residents to flood problems and notes that the optimum solution for one
location may be inadequate for another (and thus "project-specific" information is required),
nevertheless his discussion assumes a degree of social homogeneity in floodplain residents
that is not supported by the Thames Valley and southern England case studies, although there
is evidence that many of those that live on or overlooking the river are a self-selected group
displaying a greater level of environmental concern than do those living further away.
The most important locational choice factors found by James were "convenience" factors (size
and floor plan of home, well-kept yard, good sewerage and drainage facilities), followed by
seclusion and attractiveness: least important was the "price and access" factor (low price,
proximity to school, work and shopping). His interpretation of this finding was that price and
access were viewed as a constraint in choice between areas in which to look for a home and
that the higher rated factors were more important for selecting a home within a certain area
(1974:70). The case studies suggest some support for this interpretation although the
attractiveness of the area, in particular the river location, proved to be a more important
choice factor for the Thames Valley and southern England case studies discussed above.
The quantitative analysis of the DWSC/89 data set showed social characteristics (as defined
by the model) to be related to perception of flood hazard but in a complex manner; many
characteristics are interrelated. Increasing age and decreasing levels of income and education
were related to a degree of acquiescence with statements and low flood hazard perception (as
measured by the statements). Those living closest to the river frequently exhibited a different
response pattern to those living further away and tended to have a lower perception of flood
hazard, as measured by the statements, despite having greater flood experience.
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The qualitative research aided interpretation of sometimes conflicting findings. For example,
two of the qualitative interviews showed age to be related to a reduced preparedness to live
with the flood risk and a more positive attitude to scheme proposals, primarily because of
feelings of inability to cope with the event. However, this relationship was not found with
other older informants nor with cases of tolerance of flooding by some older residents that
were reported by engineers. Thus, age cannot be regarded, on its own, as a reliable indicator
of flood hazard perception as presently defined. The definitions of flood hazard are largely
based on catastrophic events whereas most flood experience, following a decay function away
from the source, falls short of this degree of severity (see Chapter 3) and thus the criteria for
definition of the hazard and its perception are inadequate.
Analysis of the distance from the river variable warrants further, more detailed, research (see
also Montz, 1982 for a discussion of this variable). It was found, of course, to be closely
linked to flood experience (including recency, frequency and seriousness of event) and while
the data broadly support previous research which related recent, frequent and serious flooding
with higher levels of flood hazard perception, the qualitative research illustrated the
complexity behind the responses. It suggested that the threshold of perception of flooding as
a hazard requiring action (adjustment) is raised by environmental factors, particularly where
the informant/respondent overlooks the river. The perception of hazard is strongly
interconnected with the nature of available or proposed adjustments and the two cannot be
adequately examined or understood separately.
In view of the specific role of flood experience in this model it would be preferable to
separate this from other social characteristics. Secondary flood experience was not found to
be a useful factor in the quantitative studies although the Lower Stour interviews suggested
that contact with friends and neighbours with flood experience (in the same area) had had a
marginal effect in raising the perceived seriousness of flooding but did not seem to be
sufficient to shift attitudes to proposed or existing schemes from negative to positive.
None of the case studies addressed socio-economic status and political leanings in any detail:
this was partly because of the difficulty in gaining valid measurements without using a large
number of questions and partly because the main research sponsor (the NRA Thames Region)
believed asking 'political' questions of NRA 'customers' to be too sensitive. The subsequent
analysis of the data sets suggested that the measures used in the quantitative surveys, although
strongly suggestive of an explanatory role (particularly the environmental values and
optimistic utilitarianism scales), were not sufficiently wide-ranging or sensitive to cover the
factors which appeared to be important (i.e. those outlined in the dominant social paradigm
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and) and that a more detailed examination of underlying value systems is justified.
All the case studies (and the engineers' interviews) lent support to the view that attitudes to
local environmental factors were an important influence (though not necessarily or always an
overriding one) on attitudes to flooding and flood defence schemes. As might be expected,
attitudes to the local environment were related to more fundamental environmental values but,
as stated above, the measures for underlying values lack sufficient sensitivity as yet. The
Maidenhead data illustrated this problem: they (in addition to background information on the
area and its residents collected during an observer role) suggested that concern for the local
environment leaned more towards property values (associated with the dominant social
paradigm) rather than what might be termed tioethics' (associated with the alternative social
paradigm): more sensitive measures of underlying values should facilitate further
understanding of these relationships.
Those living nearest to the river tended generally to show less support for flood relief
schemes and those furthest from the river to show most support. The distance from the river
at which an individual lives is, of course, related to a range of other factors, including inter
alia the specific local characteristics which might or might not add a premium to riverside
property value, income level, preferences in leisure pursuits (e.g. angling, boating, etc.), and
personal environmental values. Thus, caution should be exercised in generalising from these
studies to elsewhere in England and Wales.
However, this research suggests that many riverside dwellers are likely to comprise a distinct
sub-group with greater river experience (of both floods and river management options), and
with more both to win and lose in any flood defence debate. In choosing (for those who have
chosen) to live by the river this group may have paid a premium on their property value, a
premium on their insurance rates and a premium on their exposure to risk. These factors -
depending on other socio-economic variables - could make them either vociferous opponents
or supporters of any flood defence proposal. However, riverside dwellers - as with floodplain
residents generally - are not a homogeneous social group and thus it is inappropriate to expect
a unified response.
For many floodplain residents (and other members of the community) the NRA remains a
shadowy organization which has yet to project an image. Very large numbers of respondents
gave 'don't know' or 'neither agree nor disagree' responses in the quantitative surveys, and
the qualitative interviews suggested that those residents who had had contact with the NRA's
predecessor organization were expecting the NRA to develop similarly - poorly or adequately
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as past experience dictated. Overall, attitudes varied between positive and negative and no
very clear picture emerged from the social data to suggest that particular groups had either
a positive or a negative attitude to the NRA.
It was hypothesized that attitudes to the NRA would influence attitudes to schemes but when
respondents have little experience of the NRA it is possible that the relationship can be
reversed, as appeared to be the case in some of the Lower Stour interviews. It seems likely
that the two variables are closely interlinked and subject to continual revision following the
accumulation of further experience or information.
The model of flood hazard perception and adjustment suggests that the public actively search
for, and freely choose between, an unspecified range of adjustments. This represents,
however, a static model which does not take account of the dynamic nature of flood hazard
adjustment. It is only realistic at a specific point on the scheme development continuum; that
is, at the post-flood (and, often, pre-adjustment) stage. This stage is not always present. It
is more often the case that possible adjustments are presented to the floodplain resident by
a flood defence agency (most usually the NRA) with specialist foreknowledge of flood risk,
and not, as the model suggests, actively searched for by the resident.
In the DWSC/89 survey only 15 percent of respondents had "taken any precautions against
flooding". Of this 15 percent of properties, the most common precautionary measure was for
the house to be built above the 1947 flood level (a common recommendation from the NRA
in response to planning proposal referrals from local authorities). Other precautions actively
taken ranged from raising the floor level of the house by raising the structure on piles or
putting in another, concrete, floor; placing electrical wiring above flood levels; carrying out
minor management works to the river and its banks; buying sandbags; and taking out
insurance. Many householders had inherited these adjustments when they bought their
property and had not personally carried out such an adjustment. Thus despite a large majority
of respondents in the case studies discussed being aware of a flood risk, only a minority had
made a form of individual adjustment search and carried out an adjustment.
Generally, in the face of difficult decisions and with no strong personal interest or apparent
cost to bear', there is an underlying tendency to accept the experts' views and proposals.
For any decision, however, there is invariably a minority that perceives it will have to bear
a cost and its attitudes are influenced accordingly. The perceived costs are a measurement of
" Cost, as it is used here, does not necessarily imply a financial cost. It is an aggregate
of all the disbenefits perceived to accrue from either a flood or a flood defence scheme.
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the perceived impact of a decision on the perceived existing benefits.
In the absence of any detailed proposals for the design or route of a flood defence scheme,
the general attitude is likely to be acquiescence. Arguably, this is because the respondents
have no 'image of damage' (Mileti, 1980; Hutton and Mileti, 1979; Marks, 1990) - either
of flooding or of a flood defence scheme - upon which to base their attitude response. This
was perhaps the case in the DWSC/89 Case Study where the prevailing attitude was one of
general acceptance (although not entirely uncritical) of the professional estimation of the flood
risk and a relatively neutral position regarding any hypothetical scheme. This did not preclude
a negative disposition to flood defence proposals by a minority.
When the proposals are more detailed, the image of damage becomes more focused. At this
stage opposition to scheme development can be more pronounced. The relative costs and
benefits of any proposed scheme are then likely to be influenced also by personal perception
of the flood risk. In the absence of recent flooding, perception of flood risk is likely to be
limited and the present costs of the scheme proposal can be seen as greater than the future
benefits. In this situation the risk-environment trade-off will be more strongly weighted
against the proposal (and for the environment). To balance this, however, there remains an
underlying attitude amongst the majority of the public of acceptance of, and acquiescence to,
the expert/public body promoting the scheme.
This was the situation reflected in Eton Wick (Tunstall et al, 1989). In Eton Wick, the flood
risk was seen to be relatively remote and the perceived impact of the proposed scheme was
more immediate. In addition, there was a conviction in the community that while the major
costs of the proposed scheme would fall on Eton Wick, the benefits would accrue to
Maidenhead - the area likely to bear the major costs of flooding but, for the majority, a lesser
impact from the scheme.
Equity and distributional issues such as these are typical of flood defence decision-making and
resource management generally. Such issues must be borne in mind when evaluating choices
in hazard mitigating adjustment. For example, while many of those in Maidenhead who
experienced flooding made what would seem to be an appropriate choice in accepting (or
perhaps just not opposing) the proposed scheme, the majority of them do not have to bear the
scheme costs; these must be born by others in closer proximity to the scheme who may or
may not have experienced, or be at risk from, flooding. This study also underlined that it is
important for decision makers not to be complacent about getting a positive response to
scheme proposals in the event of a flood. Even when, as in Maidenhead, recent flooding has
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occurred, this does not provide automatic support for flood defence proposals.
In the Lower Stour and West Bay Case Studies flood impact and scheme impact were not so
widely separated. In these two studies it could be said that the true cost of a scheme would
have been borne by those who also bore the major cost of flooding. Both case studies showed
that the experience (and thus bearing the cost) of flooding is not always sufficient to outweigh
the perceived costs of a scheme.
The comment from the West Bay study that "...you cannot damage the environment just for
the sake of property._ 'seriousness' means deaths, not amount of damage" reflects an extreme
of environmental concern and is thus a minority view. It is possible, however, that over time
it may come to reflect the views of a greater number and is at present in the vanguard of
environmental attitude change. The precedent for this interpretation is the increase that has
occurred in the level of environmental concern of the general public: a level of concern that
was, until comparatively recently, representative of only a minority.
This would appear to be a different sort of risk-environment trade-off to that made by some
of the Maidenhead respondents for whom the protection of their (valuable) property was
possibly a more significant element in their scheme attitude than a generalised concern to
avoid detrimental environmental impact. The environmental sensitivity of the Maidenhead,
Windsor and Eton scheme was also promoted vigorously whereas this part of the Bridport
scheme was not, which made it easier to support a scheme in Maidenhead and easier to reject
one in West Bay (on environmental grounds).
The case studies, focusing at the individual level, have suggested that the initial model of
flood hazard perception and mitigation is too simplistic although support was found for the
importance of environmental factors and the existence of a risk-environment trade-off. All
the case studies have shown, to some degree, a mismatch between the perceptions of the
floodplain residents and those of the NRA engineers whose role it is to provide flood defence.
The following section examines the input from the institutional level through a series of
interviews with NRA engineers.
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13. INTERVIEWS WITH (NRA) ENGINEERS
This chapter discusses the fmdings of a separate research module designed to examine the
role of institutional-level influences on the decision environment of the individual
floodplain resident. Although aimed at the institutional/organizational level, the research
was conducted through a study of the attitudes of individual engineers whose views, it is
suggested, are broadly typical of the (river) engineering culture (evidence for this
assumption comes from interaction with the engineering culture over the three year study
period).
13.1 Data collection techniques: engineers
13.1.1 Introduction
Observation of NRA engineers has been on-going since the inception of the research
project, albeit mostly on an informal and unstructured basis. Attendance at internal and
external NRA meetings and at conferences and seminars has presented numerous
opportunities to observe engineers in both their professional and private capacities. Notes
were taken after some of these meetings and some lengthy telephone conversations. From
these opportunities, it became clear that there existed, in the culture of the engineer, a
fruitful area for more in-depth study'.
An acknowledged problem in qualitative research is gaining entry to the field of study
(Hanunersley and Atkinson, 1989; Bryman, 1989); past work undertaken by FHRC
(much of it for the NRA and its precursor organizations) is known to many engineers in
river management and its reputation provided ease of entry into the engineering culture.
Cooperation was generally forthcoming from the participants, largely because sponsorship
for the study came from their own organization and was thus legitimated from within.
13.1.2 Pilot quantitative survey
As part of the examination of engineering culture and attitudes, a structured pilot
questionnaire was given to 17 engineers and 11 research and administration staff in
February 1990 to examine the hypothesis that the two groups would have different
attitudes towards a range of environmental and public participation issues with the
45 This was pursued only in so far as the engineers' attitudes and actions intervened
in the initial model of flood hazard perception and mitigating adjustment.
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engineers placing less value on the importance of environmental and public participation
issues and more value on technical expertise and the role of science.
The research and administration staff were hypothesized to be more representative of the
general public. The majority of the questionnaire was designed to test the usefulness of
a number of attitude statements, many of which had been used successfully before.
Although the sample was too small for any reliable statistical analysis and any results
must therefore be treated with caution, it was found that a number of statements
discriminated between the two groups and generally supported the initial hypotheses.
However, this form of structured questionnaire was deemed to be of limited value
because of the number of uncommitted responses it elicited from the engineers in
particular. Generally they appeared unwilling to accept the breadth of the concepts
covered by the statements and frequently rated their responses at the midpoint of the
available range: neither agreeing nor disagreeing.
The engineers who took part in the pilot questionnaire survey resisted the 'straightjacket'
of the categories and appeared unwilling to submit what was perceived to be an inexact
response. As a result, it was decided to adopt a qualitative approach which would allow
the engineers themselves more control over issue selection, terminology and expression.
13.1.3 Pilot qualitative interview (a 'brief ethnography')
A pilot qualitative interview was undertaken based on Spradley's 'brief ethnography'
approach (Spradley, 1979). This was deemed to be the appropriate method with which
to make an exploratory examination of engineering culture as a background to the more
specific areas of inquiry which had been somewhat unsuccessfully examined using the
more highly structured questionnaire.
In terms of achieving the original aim of the ethnography - to make an initial exploration
of the culture of the (NRA) engineer - the pilot interview was largely successful. It
showed that there are sub-cultures in engineering and brought out a useful distinction
between site-based, 'Resident Engineers' and office-based, 'Project Design Engineers'.
It suggested that site experience (over and above the minimum required for professional
qualification) might alter an engineer's attitudes and approach so as to make the "human
factors" (as the engineering informant termed them) of scheme development (that is,
landscape impact, loss of view, loss of privacy, effect on house values, general concern
about impacts on, and disturbance of, local environments etc.) a more major factor in
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scheme design. In the informant's own words these "human factors" were described as
"peripheral" and "subsidiary" to the engineering function. The distinction between the two
types of engineer was a new dimension and had not been expected.
An important finding for the research project that arose from the interview, was the
parallel identified by the informant when he compared and contrasted the conflict that
arises between flood defence and 'human factors', with the earlier conflict that had arisen
between land drainage and conservation. Nature conservation and ecology were once seen
to be peripheral to land drainage schemes. Arguably, they represented a threat to the
expert status of the engineer by compromising the primacy of the engineering design.
Although the conflicting value systems of the engineer and the nature conservationist still
cause some conflict, the engineering culture has adapted to some extent. By organising
into groups, conservation and ecology gained a more powerful voice with which to
bargain. This, allied with a general change in public attitudes to the environment, led to
environmental protection legislation, and such issues are now treated with a degree of
respect - although still regarded as subsidiary to the main problem focus. Formal
mechanisms and institutional structures have been developed to deal (to some extent) with
this conflict.
It may be that the less easily categorisable and measurable 'human factors' - which are
now still regarded as peripheral - may soon pass through a process of maturation and
emerge as significant factors to be accounted for in scheme design. The recognition of
this similarity provided a valuable insight into the research problem and a useful frame
of reference in which to examine further this highly subjective focus of public opposition
to flood defence schemes.
It is problematic in a single interview to explore meanings in any depth, nevertheless, a
substantial body of information was collected in the pilot interview. However, it was
decided that the classic ethnographic approach and Spradley's highly structured question
technique (Spradley, 1979) were potential barriers to the progression of the research
which did have specific questions to answer in a limited time and across a large
geographical range (see below). Thus, a looser style of interview was chosen for the
remainder of the research into engineers' attitudes.
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13.1.4 Qualitative interviews with engineers
Sampling design
It was decided to interview a minimum of ten engineers from across the NRA regions.
This was felt to be an adequate number to ascertain the validity and reliability of the
interviews and to achieve a national coverage. There was a concern to establish a degree
of `generalisability' of the findings of the quantitative surveys which, because they had
been concentrated within the Thames area, might be held to be a regional artifice and
solely a reflection of the affluent south east. This created an opportunity to expand (and
possibly make more acceptable) the original aim of a qualitative survey of engineers,
which was to examine, in a broadly philosophical and discursive mode, attitudes to a
range of environmental and decision-making issues. The administration of the pilot
questionnaire and subsequent discussions with engineers suggested that many NRA
engineers were likely to be too busy to agree to such a proposal but would agree to
something more concrete and more obviously connected with their work and the NRA
organization.
A revised plan was formulated to discuss specific schemes where there had been
significant opposition on environmental impact grounds (this was a part of the proposed
research plan for the Public Perception of Rivers and Flood Defence Research Project for
the following year). It was hoped that, while speaking of the details of individual
schemes, attitudes would be revealed towards the issues of research interest and that a
more discursive mode would be adopted when a degree of rapport had been established
between interviewer and interviewee.
An initial list of contacts for nine NRA Regions was obtained from an officer of Thames
Region. A letter was sent requesting information and creating an opportunity for further
follow-up. It was acknowledged in the letter that the addressee might not be the person
most suitable to respond and asking that the letter should then be forwarded. There then
followed some delay while some regions replied, others passed the letter on and others
failed to respond. Telephone follow-ups were made and after some months appointments
were made within eight NRA Regions. No interviews were arranged in the Thames
Region, where continuing contact was established and thus the circular letter was
inappropriate, or Wessex Region, where the original pilot interview had been undertaken.
Both of these regions are in the south/southeast of England where several research
projects had already been carried out, thus the need to pursue the question of
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generalisability here did not apply.
A total of eleven interviews was carried out with engineers at a senior level (see Table
13.1). This level was chosen to give a range of experience, including project design,
public consultation and substantive decision-making. One of those interviewed (Interview
10) was an engineer in a new NRA post that was significantly different to that of the
other ten interviewees. This interview produced mostly factual rather than attitudinal
responses and so is of less value than the other ten.
The interviews
It is preferable, in qualitative research, for a series of interviews to be undertaken in
order that rapport can be built up over a period of time. In this way more complex or
personal questions can be asked and an opportunity is given for the interviewer to return
to query and clarify earlier responses. In this series of interviews each engineer was seen
once only, which meant that rapport had to be developed very quickly and remained
fragile.
An outline list of questions (see Appendix G-13.1) was prepared but this was substantially
modified during the progress of the interviews. It was found that rapport could easily be
broken by introducing a question from a question sheet in what otherwise tended towards
an informal discussion. (This was found also during interviews with floodplain residents
in the Lower Stour Case Study). The outline interview structure was used flexibly and
the interviewee given a large measure of control over the choice and depth of topics
covered. This resulted in a smaller number of questions being covered in some detail
while others were not asked at all (Cornwell, 1986). Many question topics were
covered by the interviewee spontaneously without the question being asked. Other
questions were found to be inappropriate in their formulation or content and were either
reformulated or dropped entirely. Others were of a largely factual nature which only
needed to be raised in one interview.
It was clear, in some interviews, that engineers were responding as they felt the NRA
would wish them to respond: that is, they were giving an institutional, rather than a
personal, response. This was particularly the case for Interview 2. Some engineers were
initially quite suspicious of the motives for the interviews, suspecting that they were
This approach is similar to that used by Cornwell (1986) in her 'non-sanitised'
account of a research project.
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Table 13.1: Status of engineering interviewees and details of interviews
INTERVIEW PERIOD:
Pilot interview:	 25th June 1990
First interview:	 28th November 1990
Last interview:	 7th February 1991
INTERVIEW JOB TITLES OF	 YEARS IN
NUMBER ENGINEERS INTERVIEWED	 PROFESSION
1	 Principal Engineer
	 30+
2	 Chief Engineer (above Principal)
	 30+
3	 Principal
	 23
4	 Area Flood Defence Manager
	 15+
5	 Regional Planning Engineer
	 17
6	 Area Manager
	 19
7	 Engineering Manager (above Principal)
	
37
8	 Principal Engineer
	 23
9	 Area Manager	 30
10	 Senior Engineer
	 11
11	 Principal Engineer 	 27
Mean number of years in profession = 24
LENGTH OF INTERVIEW
INTERVIEW PAGES OF	 HOURS/MINS.
NUMBER TRANSCRIPT
1	 24	 3 hours
2	 14	 1 hour
3	 13	 1 hour
4	 19	 1 hour 30 mins
5	 30	 2 hours 50 znins
6	 16	 1 hour 50 mins
7	 22	 1 hour 45 mins
8	 18	 1 hour 15 mins
9	 16	 1 hour 15 mins
10	 10	 1 hour
11	 19	 1 hour 45 mins
201 pages
	 18 hours 10 mins
Average length of interview = just over 1 hour 30 mins.
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perhaps a method of professional evaluation.
A minority of those interviewed expressed concern initially over confidentiality and what
was to happen to the transcripts. They were given assurances that no comments would
be attributable to individuals and that after making an initial complete transcript for the
interviewer's eyes only, a second transcript would be produced with the informants'
names and, where necessary, place and region names, changed to initials or symbols.
They were told that non-sensitive details of schemes were to be forwarded to NRA
Thames Region as part of the research project requirements.
All interviews were tape recorded and transcripts were made by the interviewer (as
recommended by Whyte, 1977). Most engineers accepted the need for the tape recorder
and for the majority of the interview period it did not appear to be unnecessarily
intrusive. However, some interviewees were considerably more free in their comments
once the interview was completed and the tape recorder was switched off. Others
punctuated the interview with expressions such as "perhaps you'd better not quote this"
or "perhaps I shouldn't be saying this but...".
Some of the longer interviews included a break for lunch during which time the engineers
were again more free with their responses. This was particularly the case where another
engineer was present when they would talk to each other as if an outsider were not
present. On one such occasion the tape recorder was switched on again briefly but had
a strongly inhibiting effect.
The untaped responses did not reveal any themes or topics which were not recorded
elsewhere on tape, however, they were expressed much more bluntly. These points were
noted subsequent to the interviews and served to reinforce the later interpretation of the
transcripts but no verbatim comments are available.
The interviews took place in regional NRA offices, many of which had only been
occupied since the formation of the NRA in 1989 (or just prior, when formation was
more or less certain). Thus NRA engineers (amongst other staff) had had to undergo
considerable physical disruption as well as disruption to their working practices, since the
decision to split from the water and sewerage supply functions and these factors
contributed to the feelings of some that they were under pressure.
Nine of the eleven engineers interviewed made references to how busy they were. Most
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made explicit reference by saying they were very busy and would spare a stated amount
of time for the interview, others made more covert references by taking occasional
glances at their watch or getting physically restless after fifty or sixty minutes and
fidgeting in their seats or showing slight signs of relief when it was indicated that the
interview was coming to an end. Two of the eleven interviewees however, made no overt
reference to being busy or to time but were anxious that the long journey undertaken
should not be wasted and therefore gave freely of their time.
Two of the interviews were with two engineers simultaneously for part of the time. In the
first of these the second informant is identified in the transcripts by a lower case letter
as well as the interview number (lb). In the second joint interview, the contributions
divided fairly evenly between the two, with one engineer speaking for the majority of the
first half and the other for the majority of the second half. This was transcribed as two
separate interviews'.
13.2 What was expected prior to the interviews
As a result of the above-mentioned long-term interaction with engineers and the surveys
of, and interviews with, floodplain residents, it was expected that the interviews would
reveal a range of attitudes, relating to environmental and public participation issues, to
indicate where NRA engineers influenced, constrained or controlled the choices of
floodplain residents. Further, that engineers, in their role as experts, would show some
degree of ambivalence to the need or preference of the public for an input from them to
floodplain decision-making.
It was expected also that there would be some sensitivity about the role of engineers in
the guardianship of the water environment". When a former water authority landscape
architect made a very public denunciation, on television and in print, of the destruction
of watercourses by engineers (Purseglove, 1988) he was criticised by many engineers as
having 'bitten the hand that fed him' (personal observation at a FI-1RC Seminar on
Environmental Assessment, 1988). The destruction of wetlands by engineering projects
has received a considerable degree of attention in recent years and continued contact with
engineers has revealed that they are not immune to this criticism. It was expected
47 Brief details of the interviewees and the interview lengths are outlined in Table 13.
" Soon after the NRA was formed its publicity material began to describe it as
the 'guardian of the water environment'.
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therefore that the interviewees might adopt a defensive position to protect both their
profession and their organization.
It was also expected, after many informal discussions with engineers, that they would
express the belief that opposition to flood defence schemes that was based primarily on
environmental factors, came from people with no flood experience and would disappear
in the wake of a flood.
13.2.1 Hypotheses
Following from the above discussion and based on readings of the literature (White,
1966a, 1966b; Craik, 1970; Sewell, 1971; Sewell and Little, 1973; Cotgrove, 1982;
Penning-Rowsell et al, 1986; Wengert, 1971; Otway and Wynne, 1989; Simmie, 1974)
several hypotheses were developed that underpinned the interviews. These were as
follows:
Engineers would be likely to:
(i) prioritize technical above environmental factors in scheme design and
implementation;
(ii) place greater emphasis on nature conservation impacts rather than
aesthetics in scheme design;
(iii) believe that public consultation is something of an obstruction to the
smooth implementation of a scheme;
(iv) prefer to control the dissemination of information to the public;
(v) have a simplified conceptual model of the floodplain resident's decision-
making process.
These hypotheses provided the base for the 'Outline Interview Structure' (see Appendix
G-13.1) but were not adhered to rigidly during the interview process.
13.3 Discussion of interview findings
The interviews broadly confirmed the above hypotheses but also served to illustrate the
complexity of these issues. It soon became apparent that the 'Outline Interview Structure'
had been formulated with a simplified conceptual model of the engineer's decision-making
process. It was found that engineers, like environmentalists and floodplain residents, were
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not a homogeneous group although most did share a common core of values related to
the role of the expert and the importance of objectivity rather than subjectivity.
A range of themes was identified from the interview transcripts. Some of these themes
were articulated spontaneously by one or more interviewees; others arose from the
questions and topics in the 'Outline Interview Structure' (a list and examples of themes
that were examined in the analysis can be found in Appendix G-13.2 and G-13.3). It is
proposed to use the above hypotheses as headings under which the interview fmdings will
be discussed. These will be preceded by a discussion of the environmental attitudes of
NRA engineers and will conclude with a discussion of the risk-environment trade-off
from the perspective of the NRA engineer, standards of flood protection, and flood
causation. Verbatim quotes are identified by the number of the interview in square
brackets.
13.3.1 Environmental attitudes of NRA engineers
It was stated above that the term 'environment' encompassed a number of dimensions and
this was apparent in the interviews. The simplest division comes between nature
conservation and aesthetic considerations. Most engineers tended to focus initially on the
former dimension although on occasion they merged the two, while the comments of the
floodplain residents most frequently related to the latter. Nature conservation has a
scientific, and therefore objective, base that engineers could respect while visual aspects
were seen to be purely subjective and less easily legitimated.
Certain areas of land or communities are deemed by engineers to be 'sensitive' because
they are particularly valued environments and this determines both the initial and the
subsequent treatment they receive in the design and promotion of flood defence schemes:
[6] "In a place like the centre of 'X', which is a nationally renowned sort of
tourist area, the thought of us building walls and floodbanks and the like would
have just been out of the question."
[8] "...a very.. .extremely environmentally sensitive area and we recognised this
right at the beginning of the design stage and we embarked upon trying to design
engineering works with environmental sensitivity."
[6] "There are sites that we identify fairly quickly...a scheme near 'X' Abbey and
right from stage one we're saying we've got to be very careful here in the way
we approach this scheme, its a tourist area, its high quality fishing in the river,
all these things are picked out in stage one."
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The need to avoid damage to such 'objectively' assessed sites of ecological, landscape or
cultural value is now accepted. This does have, however, a knock-on effect in that any
areas not so designated are inevitably regarded as of lesser value and perhaps deserving
less concern. Thus, the purely local (subjective) value conferred on an area by those who
live there may not be deemed sufficient to justify costly damage-avoidance works. This
attitude can be shared by both engineers and nature conservationists, who adopt, on
technical grounds, specific criteria of value for the purposes of 'objective' site evaluation
and, in the process, devalue some sites of purely local interest.
Although an area may have no designated ecological, historical or other value, it may
nevertheless have significant value to the local inhabitants (Fordham, 1991a; Fordham et
al, 1991). An assessment of environmental value in purely technical terms (by
professional ecologists and conservationists) can overlook the more commonplace value
of local environments to the general public.
Some engineers attempted to appropriate the term 'environment' for themselves (as, for
example, commercial organizations dealing with waste management have done also); the
following extract gives an indication of one way in which this was done:
[5] "Now, environmentally, there's two ways of looking at it. Obviously.. .a flood
relief scheme that stops or very much reduces the frequency with which
people... get flooded, is in itself an enormous environmental enhancement."
Thus, because engineers work in and with 'the environment' they can claim a professional
(and therefore more legitimate) understanding of both the environment itself and the term;
the suggestion is almost that NRA engineers are the true environmentalists, certainly more
so than the average floodplain resident. Related to this, many engineers regard themselves
as longstanding environmentalists and refer to their membership of the professional
organization the Institute of Water and Environmental Management (MEM) as evidence
of this. Good engineering practice, in terms of design and use of resources, was seen by
one engineer to be equated with good conservation:
[3] "My own personal view of conservation matters is that the best engineered
solution will frequently be the best conservation perspective. If you look at
conservation from an overall perspective."
Several engineers expressed a familiarity with nature conservation and ecological
principles and stated that there was little mystique involved ([4] "there isn't that much
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mystique about nature conservation. We tend to know what is wanted and what is
unacceptable ourselves."). However, in the majority of cases, this familiarity is based on
the use of several manuals and guidelines that have been produced in recent years (Water
Space Amenity Commission, 1980, 1983; NCC and Countryside Commission, 1983;
Newbold, Purseglove and Holmes, 1983; Lewis and Williams, 1984; Dearsley, 1984;
Ash and Woodcock, 1988; Purseglove, 1988). The familiarity is also based on attendance
at conferences and seminars, and interaction with NRA conservation staff, consultants and
consultees. These instructional sources cover certain practical matters but little basic
theory and can lead to misunderstanding and mistrust of conservationists' . motives for
their decisions.
The following extract illustrates the complexity of the environmental dimension in river
works. Although the engineer claimed an awareness of the consequences to the
environment of land drainage works, what preceded it showed how nature conservation
and amenity or leisure values have been treated as interchangeable: the suggestion was
that saltmarsh and "natural wading birds" can be replaced by the "leisure value" of
"linear park works":
[8] "The Rivers Authority at that time, had close liaison with the NCC to
develop.. .well they couldn't avoid losing the saltmarsh but they did some linear
park works and this sort of thing to try and reduce the impact on the local people
to provide them with some other sort of leisure value, if you like, as a
replacement for that which they'd be losing by the loss of natural wading birds
etc. Yes, I think we certainly have learned to recognize the value of the
environment and to perhaps be more aware of the consequences of what we're
doing in land drainage..."
Nature conservation was seen here in terms of its ieisure (use) value to people., rather
than having its own intrinsic value and rights of protection. The breadth of the term
'environment', which encompasses a range of environmental concepts, can lead to
confusion in the prioritisation of impacts and decisions. A range of, possibly competing,
interest groups are likely to be involved in any environmental decision: the competing
interests of nature conservation and more generalised leisure pursuits can lead to conflict
when both are subsumed under the umbrella term 'environment'.
Interviewees (and other engineers met during the research period) expressed a degree of
sensitivity to the idea that engineers have been forced to incorporate environmental factors
in their work, and often claimed to have done so willingly. Some interviewees
characterised NRA engineers as being particularly interested in the countryside and the
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environment and denied that there was much conflict between themselves and
conservationists:
[4] "Most of us tend to be drawn towards countryside and nature and that sort of
thing. So I don't really think there is a great conflict. Nowadays I think people
tend to want conservation, things that look nice, and that is what they're given but
I think that the general attitude of engineers is that that is what we should be
providing anyway or certainly the general attitude of engineers within the NRA
and the river type environment because this is why most of us tend to come
towards this sort of job."
[9] "Where we can do things to enhance, we do. You know, we're not forced into
it, we do it quite happily."
While the importance of environmental issues has been acknowledged for some time by
engineers, the interviews suggested that their acceptance of the need to change work
practices has been forced to some degree by legislation and NRA mission statements. The
values expressed by the engineers pointed to the placing of environmental factors behind
technical and cost issues whereas, generally, the reverse is the case for floodplain
residents (see above case studies).
Antipathy to 'environmentalists' or 'conservationists' and their viewpoints was implicit
in parts of some interviews but could also be explicit. One engineer was prepared to put
forward a personal view that reflected related values that other engineers only hinted at:
[lb] "Well I don't know what the NRA thinks but I think people are much more
important than any other species personally."
This view was noticeable in other interviews when the NRA and NCC could not achieve
a satisfactory compromise on the nature or timing of works. When this situation arose the
NCC was suspected of going beyond the bounds of purely scientific justification for its
decision:
[5] "It's a partly scientific argument [from NCC] but I think that politics and
influence come into it as well."
While the engineers who were interviewed displayed a degree of environmental awareness
and concern it was apparent that environmental factors had been imposed on traditional
engineering 'custom and practice' and have yet to be fully integrated and accepted within
professional thinking. It is possible, however, that the engineers' value system (which,
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arguably, encompasses a utilitarian view of nature and values its control) will remain
antipathetic to the values underlying a deeper sense of environmental concern.
13.3.2 Prioritization of technical above environmental factors in scheme design and
implementation
The interviews supported the hypothesis that engineers prioritized technical aspects of
scheme design although, it could be argued that this is as it should be because engineers
are primarily technicians. However, as public servants, with an expressed commitment
to 'giving the public what it wants', the consistent devaluation of (broad) environmental
factors is notable. The interviews suggested that engineers still regard modifications of
scheme design to take account of aesthetic (and nature conservation) factors as 'bolt-on
extras' and therefore of a subsidiary nature to the primary technical function. The
following two excerpts illustrate the way engineers viewed the non-technical or aesthetic
aspects as compromises to technical or economic viability:
[4] "I don't think we should compromise engineering principles for other reasons.
If you're going to design something, the first element of design - it's got to
work."
[1] "We're not in the business of providing totally uneconomic schemes just
because people don't like the look of it."
An interesting adjunct to this discussion is the engineers' own aesthetic sense which
derives pleasure from the clean lines and simplicity of certain uncompromisingly
engineered structures:
[5] "An engineer in the past might have derived satisfaction from seeing a well
designed, neatly constructed, well constructed concrete channel, doing a good
flood relief job and not realize that, to the people whose gardens it backs onto,
it's an eyesore."
This point was taken up by several engineers and suggested a comparison between
engineers and farmers, many of whom have a similar attitude to a vast, ploughed field
or field of wheat, uncluttered by hedges, trees and wild flowers ('weeds'). In this
comparison a parallel relationship can be seen between farmers and conservationists and
engineers and conservationists:
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[5] "I think there's been almost a parallel change of heart and mind on the part
of farmers.. .we have a close relationship with farmers in many aspects of our
land drainage responsibilities and I detect that they too are tending.. .1 mean
they're being pushed in that direction anyway. But its a combination of being
pushed and becoming aware, I think, on the part of both sections of the
population. Who would have thought that farmers and engineers had anything in
common..."
This seems partly to acknowledge the 'push' that was necessary for the development of
a degree of environmental sensitivity by these two professions which have significant
effects on the environment.
13.3.3 Placing of greater emphasis on nature conservation impacts rather than
aesthetics in scheme design
The technical bias discussed above extended to nature conservation issues which were
generally held to have greater validity than the purely aesthetic although this was often
implicit rather than explicit in the transcripts. A number of reasons could account for this.
Firstly, that it is the result of the exigencies of legislation (1976 Land Drainage Act, 1981
Wildlife and Countryside Act, 1989 Water Act; EC Directive No. EEC/851337, 1988
Statutory Instrument No. 1217) which have made the conservation of flora and fauna a
statutory obligation (albeit, in the 1989 Water Act, only as far as is consistent with other
NRA duties). Similar obligations apply to the conservation and enhancement of 'natural
beauty' but this acknowledgement of subjective values tends to be confined to areas with
obvious and widely recognized value, such as designated Areas of Outstanding Natural
Beauty etc., rather than, for instance, the more parochial value of local views from
houses.
Secondly, as discussed above, nature conservation has a strong technical component and
thus can be seen to be open to objective evaluation. This 'fellowship of technical
expertise' (Lowe, 1983) can provide a bridge between engineers and conservationists (see
below (13.3.5 (iv)) for further discussion of this point).
Thirdly, nature conservationists have become organised and powerful and many of their
arguments have now become widely accepted. This is not the case in many, seemingly
minor, instances of conflict over aesthetics where no organized body may exist or be
accepted. Local authority planning departments can, and on occasion do, perform this
role although their record on aesthetic aspects of design is notoriously poor (evidence for
this assertion an be found in numerous town shopping areas, for example). The single
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resident or small group of residents who wish to preserve some aspect of their immediate
environment, or state a preference for an alternative design feature or finish, have little
or no negotiating power and are often over-ruled primarily on cost grounds. However,
on large schemes with substantial budgets, it was recognized by some interviewees that
it can be cost effective to agree to some of these more minor alterations in design in order
to smooth the implementation of a scheme and avoid costly delays with contractors.
Several engineers expressed opposition to the idea of decorative detailing of structures if
the details were not functional: function should dictate form. This was taken further by
one engineer who believed it to be wasteful of natural resources and therefore ultimately
damaging to the environment:
[3] "If you have a concrete structure, why not let it be concrete? Its just.. .purely
subjective. To go quarrying out stone... spoiling the countryside to quarrying stone
to make your engineering structure apparently more conservation.. .more
sympathetic to the conservation viewpoint. I find it utterly ludicrous really."
This provides a further example of the appropriation of the conservation ethic.
13.3.4 Belief that public consultation is something of an obstruction to the smooth
implementation of a scheme
Although the engineers publicly professed a commitment to the appropriateness of
consulting the public as part of scheme promotion, certain of their comments (particularly
some of those expressed outside the formal, taped interview) betrayed the frustration that
they felt ("...if we didn't have to consult anybody it would be much easier to.. .promote
schemes." [2]).
The general position implicitly adopted by engineers was that they were expertly qualified
to manage problems of flood defence and that early and wide inclusion of the public into
the decision-making arena served only to complicate and extend the design and
implementation periods of schemes.
Engineers' descriptions of consultation included the following adjectives:
'stormy'; `rowdy'; 'delicate'; 'hairy'; `tortuous'; `hard'; `foot-slogging';
'extensive'.
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These are indicative of the perceived difficulty of many consultation initiatives.
Frequently engineers appeared to adopt, or were placed in, a combative/adversarial
position in relation to the public. The nature of existing forms of public consultation tends
to perpetuate this relationship by placing the engineer in the role of expert 'promoter'
with a scheme to defend against an opposing group. This relationship was acknowledged
by some engineers and it can be seen in the following extract how the process has
become, to some degree, institutionalised:
[7] "...project manager, he looks after it, its his own project, he's done the
investigation, he's decided or recommended the preferred solution, he's got the
necessary approvals, he's intent on carrying that scheme right through to
completion.. .And its that commitment to a scheme really which enables the
project manager to take on all sorts of... sort of, hairy situations and... dealing
with difficult people, its something you've got to do to overcome the problems
to.. .get the work carried out. I suppose we're salesmen.. .we are salesman in
some ways because we've probably spent a lot of time in looking at the various
alternatives but we have to persuade other people that the proposals which we
have are the best ones and if you believe in what you've done, as a project
manager will..."
The above shows how, in that region at least, the adversarial position had been
incorporated into the design and implementation process, influencing the project staffmg
structure. For the project manager the scheme then becomes very much a personal
enterprise and while 'difficult people' can obstruct its progress, it was acknowledged
nevertheless that this was an accepted part of the process.
13.3.5 Preference for control of the dissemination of information to the public
Engineers expressed similar views concerning the need to control the nature and the
release of information to the public. Information release in the promotion of a proposed
scheme is controlled by the NRA with the intention of ensuring the most favourable
response. The public does not have free access to available information, much of which
is regarded as highly confidential. The timing of the release of information concerning
proposed schemes is carefully controlled to avoid jeopardising the development with too
much public opposition.
At a meeting of Taplow Parish Council, where members of the NRA Thames Region
were giving a promotional talk and video screening for the Maidenhead, Windsor and
Eton Flood Alleviation Scheme, a request from the audience to see the evidence on which
option selection had been based (a preferred option had been selected from ten possible
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options (Thames Water, 1986)) was met with some dissembling and agreement was not
immediate': the meeting was told that the request would have to be referred to a higher
level in the NRA management hierarchy. Thus, although the NRA is a public body and
its flood defence engineers believe themselves to be performing a public duty,
nevertheless in scheme promotion an adversarial relationship can develop and project
engineers are unwilling to divulge details of project decision-making to members of the
public who may oppose them at a public inquiry.
Accepted protocol within the NRA provides the following sequence for flood defence
scheme consultation: from Regional Flood Defence Committee approval to formal
consultation with local authorities, then Parish Councils, local societies and finally the
general public (Gardiner, 1991). There are many internal justifications for this sequence.
The need to gain and maintain local authority support for a proposal necessitates the
release of information to elected members, ahead of the general public, for them to
acquaint themselves with the details of a proposal to 'safeguard their credibility with their
constituents'; similarly with community group leaders (Gardiner, 1991).
Individual landowners who would be impacted directly by a scheme are felt likely to be
the most sensitive to proposals and so project engineers prefer to contact them personally
before any information is released to the wider public. As Regional Flood Defence
Committee Meetings are open to the public and any matters discussed are likely to be
reported in the local press, it was said to be necessary on occasion to fix the timing of
the release of information to these committees to prevent directly affected landowners
hearing about proposals via the impersonal medium of the press.
The NRA maps the occurrence of flooding and produces flood envelopes for floods of
different magnitudes. Within any flood envelope there will be some properties that do not
flood because they are on higher ground or are otherwise protected or simply because the
flood envelope is inaccurate at that point. When the NRA releases flood maps as public
information and publicity material it runs the risk therefore of alarming some residents
unnecessarily and possibly leaving itself open to legal liability problems. Thus, there can
be a hesitancy to release such maps and related information to the general public often
on the grounds of their possible effect on property values. There is a concern that
proposed flood defence developments should not create a form of 'planning blight'
" The Project Manager, who was an outside consultant, was in favour of releasing
the information but an NRA officer at a higher level in the institutional hierarchy was
not.
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(Gardiner, 1991) and thus the timing of the release of information to the general public
is seen by some as sensitive: as a result, information regarding a local flood risk may not
be disseminated (engineers are unlikely to widely publicise a flood risk without
simultaneously having some form of flood defence proposals to offer the public). Further
discussion of the control of information will be dealt with under separate headings below.
(i) Consultation: general issues
Engineers are not trained in methods of public consultation or conflict resolution
techniques and yet they now find that they spend an increasing amount of time dealing
with the public under the broad heading of 'consultation'. Engineers stated that between
20 and 75 percent of their time was spent on consultation (see Table 13.2). Generally,
engineers learned the techniques of public consultation through engaging in the process
itself and by building on the accumulated skills of colleagues within their department.
Procedures for consultation were seen by some engineers to be progressing in an
evolutionary rather than a revolutionary manner; a method of progression recognized (and
supported by some) in the literature (Fagence, 1977; Banovetz, 1972; O'Riordan, 1983a).
Many engineers felt that dealing with the public was integral to their work in the NRA
and because of this the job attracted a certain kind of engineer:
[4] "[Consultationys a fundamental part of the job...if you don't get adept at
doing it you fall by the wayside. I think its something we've got to do and if you
can't, particularly in this job, if you can't deal with the public then all sorts of
problems arise.. .Were I not able to deal with the public then I wouldn't be in this
job because I wouldn't really be able to do it.. .people that naturally take to that
sort of side of things come into jobs a bit like mine. Whereas if I didn't like the
public at all or wasn't able to deal with the public, I'd go to a consultants or
something like that where I was dealing with the pure engineering aspect rather
than some public consultation."
Engineers perceived an increasing pressure on them to consult. Changing social values
now mean that people no longer accepted unquestioningly the authority of public servants.
Engineers identified pressures coming particularly from the middle/professional classes
who were more active and better resourced in their campaigning.
[5] "I think the people are much more conscious nowadays of their power to get
things changed than in the past...There's obviously much more awareness of the
environnient.., and the realization that you don't have to put up with what is done
in their name."
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Table 13.2: Responses to the question: "how much time do you spend on public
consultation?" (Engineers)
INTERVIEW
NUMBER
1	 75 percent;
2 'Its the vast bulk of the time spent on the scheme. It outweighs the
amount of time spent on design by a great amount. Design is a relatively
insignificant part of scheme promotion nowadays'
3	 'A fifth';
4	 'Getting on for a half';
5	 Not asked;
6	 'A third';
7	 Not asked;
8	 Not asked;
9	 Not asked;
10	 Not asked;
11	 'About a quarter'.
Approximate average percentage of time spent on consultation = 40%
The wider socio-political environment exerts an influence in terms of a social consensus:
"what everyone wants". According to several engineers interviewed, in the 1960s "what
everyone wanted" was cost-effectiveness, and the environment "had no value". Now
however, the environment is "fashionable" and extensive public consultation is demanded
and so engineers have adapted their designs and work practices to meet these new
requirements. This suggests there has been some shifting in the values of the dominant
social paradigm.
A factor that emerged from the interviews was that NRA engineers perceived much of
their work to be 'in the public interest'. They tended not to recognize or admit that any
personal/institutional need drives scheme development. Schemes were believed to be
developed in a spirit of altruism based on the following scenario: because engineers do
not live in floodplains, they have nothing to gain from scheme development and thus, a
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flood defence scheme is purely for the benefit of floodplain residents. This partly explains
why engineers can be genuinely surprised when floodplain residents oppose and refuse
the schemes which have been developed "purely for their benefit". The engineers also
made a distinction between the role and behaviour of NRA engineers and private
consulting engineers. The latter were believed to care less about public preferences and
sensibilities and to concentrate more on 'getting the job done': the former were believed
to perform a public service and to be more concerned to accommodate or placate the
public.
Engineers expressed a preference for retaining control of consultation processes including
the methods, the timing and the choice of those to be consulted. Clearly there are
organizational/operational justifications for the engineers' position but these may conflict
with broader notions of the public interest. These will be discussed below.
(ii)	 Consultation: how?
A range of methods for consultation (see Table 13.3) are adopted by NRA engineers
depending on the perceived sensitivity of the proposed scheme. A public meeting was the
preferred method for consultation with the general public . This allows the NRA to set
the agenda and retain a degree of control of the proceedings. Sometimes the NRA attend
public meetings which are nominally called by Parish Councils. These meetings are
chaired by the Parish Council and NRA officers attend as guests although they have
largely initiated the meeting. The basic structure of the meetings remains the same: NRA
officers outline the flood history of the area, make a presentation of the scheme proposals
using slides, videos and other display materials, and answer questions from the floor. As
discussed above public meetings invariably disadvantage the inarticulate and advantage
organised interest groups and individuals. Thus, they are not a representative reflection
of public opinion.
The interviews brought to light a secondary use of public meetings, as a means of placing
the (often minority) scheme opposers in close proximity to those in favour of scheme
proposals. The rationale given for this is that the former are likely to have no flood
experience but are likely to be personally disadvantaged by a scheme and they will have
to face, and justify their position to, flood victims who will be pressing for a solution.
Because flood defence is seen to be 'in the public interest' scheme opposers are placed
in the position of acting against the public interest and merely in their own self interest.
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Table 13.3: A range of methods for consultation adopted by engineers
Main methods:
- public meetings
- public exhibitions (drawings, plans, photographs etc.)
put contact names/numbers on public displays
produce an artist's impression of scheme
- slide presentation
- via Statutory Instrument 1217
- advertise in local press (SI 1217)
- break scheme into a number of small parts and apply for planning permission for
each part
- press handouts
With representatives:
- meetings with local councillors/local authority officers
- meetings with Parish Councils
- meetings with environmental and amenity groups
- meetings with prospective floodplain developers
With the general public:
- write to everyone in local community
- giving details
with questionnaire
- personal letters of invitation (to public meetings) to residents
take residents to see physical models
- personally visit individual affected landowners
put notices up in local community
site meetings with affected individuals
- use the National Farmers' Union to convene a meeting of local
- consult with ratepayers
- put up profiles on site to indicate height of proposed defences
set up a 'hotline' between residents and Resident Engineer
landowners
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[7] "when there are problems like that I always feel that the best way of dealing
with them is to meet them head on and to have a public meeting.. .you can't really
beat a good public meeting where everyone...or as many people as possible, turn
up and get their feelings about the scheme off their chest and their neighbours get
a chance of hearing them and hearing the answers which we provide and often
that results in some sort of agreement being reached."
[4] "...In fact this is one of the reasons we hold these public consultations, in as
much as if someone doesn't want a scheme, the neighbours can discuss it and get
onto them and say, you know, 'don't be so silly' and they tend to work it out
amongst themselves."
The interviews in Christchurch (see Lower Stour Case Study) supported this interpretation
of the secondary use of public meetings. Some interviewees who were opposed to the (at
the time) proposed scheme because of the major impact they perceived it would have on
their amenity and property value claimed they had been shouted down by others at
meetings. Other documentation (NRA file of correspondence) related to this scheme
showed that the scheme opposers were characterised by certain other local people as
selfish, even though some of those in opposition had personally experienced flooding, or
whose houses were at risk of flooding, and were thus putting themselves at risk from
future flooding.
However, it was also pointed out in the engineers' interviews, in situations where there
is considerable opposition to a scheme this secondary use of the public meeting can work
against the scheme promoters because a minority voice, in support of a scheme, will also
be inhibited from speaking out against the majority view.
As outlined above (see Chapter 3, section 3.2) the NRA is now obliged, when developing
a flood defence scheme (or carrying out other land drainage/river works) likely to have
significant effects on the environment, to carry out an Environmental Assessment (EA)
or prepare a written justification for not doing so. Statutory Instrument 1217 not only
acknowledges that flood defence schemes can have significant environmental effects but
also that the public has a right to be consulted, and make representations, about them.
The regulations came into force in July 1988 and seem not to have caused the problems
that many engineers at first envisaged. Few EAs have attracted written comment from the
general public but where they have they have caused considerable delay. This, it was
suggested by some engineers, was particularly the case when the regulations were first
introduced and MAFF was obliged to make a decision on a scheme:
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[6] "We produced an environmental statement.., and we satisfied everybody apart
from one person 	 He wouldn't withdraw his objection... It then went through
to MAFF and had to go to the Minister for a decision. And I think this really put
MAFF on the spot and it took a long time for MAFF to actually bite on the bullet
and come down on our side. They were very reluctant."
Individual members of the public who raised objections had been a problem for more than
one region. The suggestion behind some of the comments made by the engineers was that
because no insurmountable objections had been raised by conservation bodies, this pointed
to there being no legitimate environmental objections:
[3] "You're obliged to advertise, even when you've reached agreement with all
the conservation bodies about what the scheme should be, you're then obliged to
advertise the fact in two local papers and anybody can send in some spurious
objection. Not based on any proper understanding of the environment, it can be
a totally subjective objection. And if that is brought to the Minister's attention
then there are difficulties promoting the scheme."
The problem of the single objector has led some regions to opt for the planning
permission route for scheme development even though many flood defence schemes are
deemed to be permitted development and do not require this permission. This route was
regarded as 'more secure' because it resulted in the approval of the local planning
authority for the scheme and placed the onus for dealing with objections with the local
authority rather than MAFF:
[3] "If we'd followed that route and got planning permission for it, then the
gentleman [objector] concerned would have had to object to the planning
authority, they would have realised from the local knowledge that his objection
was not to be taken seriously and the scheme would have had planning permission
and we would have been building it by now if we'd taken the planning permission
route rather than the SI1217 route."
(iii) Consultation: when?
Most engineers accepted that the public had a right to know what was being done by a
public authority although they adhered somewhat rigidly to the belief that there was a
right time for this knowledge to be imparted.
[2] "You obviously can't do it at a very early stage because, until you've got
some clear idea of what you're going to do, there's nothing to consult on."
The engineers' position on the timing of consultation was that the public prefer the NRA
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to consult when they have a reasonably clear idea of what the preferred option, and
sometimes options, would be and that if engineers went to consultation before that stage,
the public were likely to send them away until they had more firm proposals to present:
[1] "If you start talking to people about 'well now, what are we going to do about
the flood defences around here?'. They're quite likely to turn around and say
'well that's your business, for goodness sake, go away and get some ideas
together and we'll have another chat when you know'."
[4] "If we go too early we find we've got airy-fairy ideas and we can't give them
anything definite. And they more or less say 'well come back when you've got
something a little bit more definite'."
[11] "I can imagine them coming back and saying 'well, when you've got
some.. .better ideas, talk to us then; when you've got something we can see, talk
to us then and then we'll maybe be able to make some comments to that'."
This position conflicts with the findings of the surveys of floodplain residents' attitudes
discussed above which showed that only a small minority preferred to be consulted at the
stage of a preferred option; most preferred to be consulted at the stage where there were
several options to choose between or at an even earlier stage. However, as no cases of
consultation by the NRA at a very early stage have been discovered the engineers'
assertion remains untested.
The following quote is representative of how most engineers felt about the timing of
public consultation and the point at which it is actually carried out:
[6] "Stage 1 is problem identification, we sort of say 'well we've got a flooding
problem here, it could cost something like two hundred thousand to solve this
problem and there looks like being round about three hundred thousand pounds
worth of benefits and its worth going farther with it'. Stage 2 is you actually look
at the various options and try and evaluate.. .1 suppose it isn't until we've got
Stage 2 established and we've got a preferred scheme that we tend to.. .or going
into Stage 3, the detailed design stage.. .Stage 2, the evaluation of alternatives,
while we may talk to the environmental groups, the fisheries and the like, we
don't normally talk to the public. [Q: Why is that?] I think it's more convenience
more than anything else, you know, to get yourself in a position.., at the end of
Stage 2, then you know you've got a scheme which is acceptable from an
engineering point of view, you can cost it... it'll work, it'll cost about the right
amount of money, the conservation, recreation side of things is all agreeable, you
can actually go and say 'well this is a scheme which we could build', rather than
perhaps.. .offering alternatives which for other reasons we couldn't build either
because they're too expensive or there're problems from the conservation point
of view."
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While from the engineers' perspective this seems a rational way to proceed, it does not
allow for a 'no scheme option'. By this stage money has been spent, individual engineers
have a strong sense of ownership of the scheme and to have the basic premise challenged
by the public would entail considerable professional loss of face. It is an example of a
common situation that has been identified in the literature (HMSO, 1969; Krimsky, 1984;
Kasperson, 1986), that is, once decisions have been made, the decision-making body
tends to exhibit considerable inertia in addressing more fundamental issues such as
whether a scheme should go ahead at all.
One engineer acknowledged this dilemma but did not speculate further:
[11] "People have said to me.. .that really it's too late once you've started the
design, you've got to get in earlier than that. Because things have.. .decisions have
been taken by that stage; you're already pointing in one direction and its too
late..."
(iv)	 Consultation: who?
Statutory requirements for consultation are limited and voluntary procedures are necessary
if the public is to make an input to decision-making (Penning-Rowsell et al, 1986:171).
For many reasons it is more convenient for NRA engineers to deal with representatives
of the public (whether local authority members and officers, officers of environmental
organizations, parish council members etc.) than with the public themselves. However,
the surveys discussed above found that the public preferred consultation to be with both
representatives and the general public.
Nature conservation supporters have become organised into groups with a recognized
authority and identifiable personnel with whom engineers can consult. Such groups
represent "relatively fixed, identifiable points, with some permanence and continuity, in
a shifting sea of attitudes, values and interests" (Lowe, 1983:94). Many organizations
have permanent staff whom engineers are prepared to respect as fellow professionals.
Nevertheless, one engineer stated (outside the formal interview situation) that their region
had co-opted a representative of a conservation body onto one of their committees and
thus he was seen to be, to some extent, within the NRA's control.
One aspect of the engineers' attitude to the general public and who should and should not
be consulted is reflected in the following extract. It refers to officers from a borough
council rather than the NRA. However, the remarks and tone of the engineer who related
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the anecdote revealed his agreement with the underlying message:
[1B] "Down in 'X' they've got all sorts of societies and the Borough Engineer's
department they had a sort of list of all these and they were all capable of
producing you an impressive letter on impressive headed notepaper but the
Borough Engineer's Department had got notes on all of them, you know, 'big
society, lots of influential people, we'll listen to them' and... 'this is a load of
cranks, you don't need to take any notice of them'; they'd got them all graded."
It is not surprising that engineers generally give members of the public a low priority in
the sequence of consultation when their attitudes to the abilities or knowledge of the
public is known. When asked how useful members of the public were as sources of
information or suggestions most engineers considered them to have a very limited value:
[4] "Well they're extremely useful on historic flood levels. What has happened,
we find that they are very, very good; they will know that a flood in 1947 came
up to the fourth brick below their window or something...Quite often their views
on the causes of these things and the answer to how to solve these things isn't
very good. Basically they haven't got the training."
Some engineers gave examples where members of the public had offered useful pieces
of historic evidence of past floods but others hesitated to accept even this role for the
public input of information. Information offered by the public was often seen as partial
and, when compared to the level of technical information available to engineers, very
imprecise.
(v) Consensus and conflict
Where, as a part of the consultation process, a scheme is presented to a relatively
homogeneous community, it can result in little or no opposition; this situation tends to
be regarded as the norm by many NRA engineers. However, in conditions of diversity,
scheme proposals can heighten existing situations of conflict and the consultation process
itself can increase confrontation and polarization (Wengert, 1976; O'Riordan, 1983a:230).
The NRA is not set up to deal with conflict situations but relies largely on achieving
consensus. Implicit in many of the beliefs and working practices of NRA engineers is a
consensus, rather than conflict, model of society: beliefs that there is very little conflict
over flood defence scheme promotion and that the consultation process, with its emphasis
on public education, will achieve consensus. Sometimes it is acknowledged that conflicts
do not get resolved:
224
[1] "The conflict was never actually resolved.. .there were still a lot of objections
left over at the end but the Parish Councils eventually decided that something
needed to be done about it and the preference which most people had chosen, the
scheme which most people preferred on our consultation.. .they said 'Oh we'd
better do that'."
[10] "It's this cooperation that we're trying to establish always; cooperation not
confrontation."
During interviews some engineers claimed that scheme opposers were merely
representatives of a specific interest group and not representative of the general public.
Thus (possibly legitimate) claims by minorities were regarded as unacceptable if they
were in serious conflict with the goal of scheme adoption'.
13.3.6 Simplified conceptual model of the floodplain resident's decision-making
process
This hypothesis relates to the standard picture presented by engineers of the floodplain
resident and his/her attitudes to flood risk and flood defence schemes which tends towards
over-simplification. A common position was discernible. Firstly, those who opposed flood
defence schemes were not themselves at risk of flooding. They were characterised as
people who walk their dogs in the area; visitors from outside who like the view;
newcomers to the area; and those being 'whipped up' by a minority:
[4] "You'll often find that people who complain about views of the river and
aesthetics I suppose are probably people that don't get flooded, they live
somewhere else and they go down there during the day or walk past it to do the
shopping . "
[9] "I think there was some very, very, active stirring by some people who
weren't necessarily involved in the flooding."
[11] "There are a handful.. .less than a handful of people, who are really doing
the driving. But they know their way around the system and they claim to be
speaking on the behalf of about 150 other people; they've got a petition to prove
it."
The latter extract also refers to the type of people who "know their way around the
system". These people, and also those who are "well-resourced" and able to back their
Interest groups were not examined in any detail during the research and analysis
proved to be inconclusive (see Figure 7.2) but it seems probable that the differing value
systems of interest groups would be likely to result in variations in scheme response.
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opposition with lawyers, were singled out by several engineers as problematical. They
were often described as newcomers and professionals and were contrasted with those
(non-professionals) who had been resident longer and were generally more acquiescent.
Secondly, that the 'silent majority' in the community was in support of a scheme and only
the opposing minority was vocal:
[4] "The opposition to the scheme, was quite vocal. People that were in
opposition would write to the press and they'd write to us and they'd write to the
Chairman, they'd write to MPs, they'd say they didn't want a scheme. Whereas
the people who did want it were far more sort of happy and sort of thankful the
scheme was going ahead and they didn't make a lot of noise. Its easier to sort of
say no to something and get yourself heard than sort of to say yes."
It has been noted in the literature that silence on, or lack of involvement in, an issue is
often construed as consent when in fact it may just reflect a sense of powerlessness
(Otway and Wynne, 1989) or may not have reached the threshold of action (Kasperson,
1986).
A third common characterisation was that when flooding occurred, people were happy
to have any scheme, and that a flood was almost a pre-requisite for scheme acceptance:
[8] "You can usually promote flood alleviation works on the back of past flood
events."
[6] "I think the only thing that would have got the scheme off the ground would
have been a flood during the course of the preparations."
The surveys of floodplain residents' attitudes discussed above showed that while flood
events did heighten expectations of future flooding and generally predisposed communities
towards acceptance of a scheme, they were not sufficient to ensure acceptance of a flood
defence scheme that was perceived to have an unacceptable environmental impact. Further
examples of such tolerance of flooding were advanced by the engineers from all regions
during interviews.
[4] "an interesting point that we find, generally when we're doing these schemes,
is that the people who've experienced.. .lived in a place for a long time and have
experienced flooding for a long time, tend to accept it. They, well they just accept
it.. .they're people that have always known it floods and it doesn't come as any
shock to them or any surprise to them."
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It can be difficult for engineers to accept this accommodation of the flood risk as it
undermines their professional raison d'etre. While engineers, when pressed, could
recognise this to be the case, it appeared to require them to step outside their professional
role and empathise (not merely sympathise) with floodplain residents regarding matters
which were not primarily flood-related. This requirement is outside their professional
(technical/design) brief and thus tends to remain dormant.
13.3.7 The risk-environment trade-off from the perspective of the NRA engineer
Many of the engineers interviewed rejected initially the idea of a risk-environment trade-
off. However, as the individual interviews progressed, that position appeared increasingly
untenable. Table 13.4 juxtaposes illustrative extracts and shows how, within the same
interview, some engineers made contradictory statements regarding this concept.
Tolerance of the flood risk (and flooding) by the public was often either denied or
regarded as 'peculiar':
[1] "So I don't know.. .my own experience of talking to people, what sort of
floods they'll tolerate. I reckon after they've been flooded they won't tolerate any
sort of flooding even if it was quite a small flood."
[4] "The people who've...lived in a place for a long time and have experienced
flooding for a long time, tend to accept it. They, well they just accept it. Their
buildings have always smelt musty and they tend to think that is the norm. It's
quite peculiar."
Nevertheless, many engineers had experienced personally situations where residents had
refused flood defence on environmental grounds although more often the engineers
information was indirect, through hearsay:
[3] "There are a couple of residents at 'X' who are not that bothered about being
protected from flooding and I've heard of another location, Upton-on-Severn, has
been a fairly famous example of a village that floods regularly where the people
positively don't want to be protected from flooding because of what would be
entailed."
[2] "But there are the odd schemes where, for particular reasons, the only
solutions that are available to us may have adverse effects. And people then have
to choose between having the scheme done and not having a scheme done. And
there have been situations where we've suggested a scheme to a local community
and they've said 'no thanks, we'd rather carry on and put up with the flooding'.
And we haven't then done anything."
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[5] "Now, the people who lived there suffered quite badly last winter, got very
badly flooded, they've had a very strong interest in something being done. But
once they learned that access to the beach was going to be cut off by these ["huge
lumps of rock" to be used as breakwaters] they threw up their arms in horror and
said "we're not having that any way"."
The interviews showed that engineers themselves made a risk-environment trade-off. They
recognized that there was a point in scheme design beyond which they could not go
because of the unacceptability of the environmental impact:
[2] "I wouldn't attempt to even produce details of the sort of schemes [1960s-type
concrete channels] nowadays to a public meeting because you wouldn't get out
alive [laughs]."
[4] "There are certain things we don't consider now because they will be
environmentally unacceptable."
They also made a risk-environment trade-off when they balanced the standard of
protection against the environmental impact of a scheme (independent of cost factors):
[1] "There was a great debate at the time.. .how high it should be and it was
actually put lower than we would have intended, because of objections."
[3] "Obviously the height of the seawall is more or less a compromise between
effectiveness and visual impact."
Such schemes are no longer considered even though their benefit-cost ratio would have
allowed a higher standard of protection. This might have meant reducing the standard of
protection from a 1 in 100 year level to a 1 in 50 for example, which could require the
lowering of the height of a wall or bank so that a view was maintained or a section of
scheme removed altogether for species or habitat protection.
The environmental impact from land drainage schemes has been recognized for longer
than that for urban flood defence and many of the former schemes are no longer viable
in environmental terms even though they might (marginally) satisfy benefit-cost criteria:
[lb] "The arable farmers were pressing for a channel improvement to reduce the
incidence of flooding and.. .you could only realise enough benefits to justify the
scheme by completely devastating the whole valley and turning it over to intensive
arable...So there was a scheme that certainly would have had some benefits.. .but
it had this big environmental minus that killed it."
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Table 13.4: Risk-environment trade-offs: illustrative extracts showing how, within
the same interview, some engineers made contradictory statements regarding this
concept
TRADE-OFF DENIED
[1] "My own experience of talking to
people, what sort of floods they'll tolerate.
I reckon after they've been flooded they
won't tolerate any sort of flooding, even if
it was quite a small flood."
[2] "We've never been in a situation where
we've promoted a scheme in opposition to
public opinion."
[3] "Problems are more about.. .the
basically conservative thing about not
wanting change. At least, those people not
affected by flooding, not wanting change."
[4] "I don't think [people who buy flood-
prone properties] realize [what flooding is
like]...they wouldn't trade-off that against
the environment in the middle of summer
on a nice day."
[5] "People who suffer the environmental
detriment as a result of your scheme...are
unfortunately not usually the same people
who derive benefit from flood relief."
TRADE-OFF SHOWN
[1] "On practically every scheme we've
done recently.. .not only recently...some
that go back a long time, we've had quite
significant objections.. .on the grounds that
it was going to spoil the view or obstruct
access"
[2] "There have been situations where
we've suggested a scheme to a local
community and they've said 'no thanks,
we'd rather carry on and put up with the
flooding'.
[3] "The seawall would have had to be six
feet high along the edge of the existing
promenade. That was obviously totally
unacceptable I would have thought."
[4] "The people who've lived in a place
for a long time and have experienced
flooding for a long time, tend to accept
it."
[5] "Now the people who lived there
suffered quite badly last winter, got very
badly flooded, they've had a very strong
interest in something being done...but once
they learned that access to the beach was
going to be cut off.. .they threw up their
arms in horror and said 'we're not having
that any way!"
[7] "I can't recall that [trade-off]
happening quite honestly. Generally, you
know, people.. .we've always managed to
persuade them at the end of the day."
[7] "Even people who've maybe been
affected by flooding don't necessarily want
to welcome you onto their land if you
want to construct works."
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Table 13.4 continued
TRADE-OFF DENIED
[8] "I've not.. .never found a lot of interest
or requests from people asking us to leave
out works, they're usually quite happy to
hear that flood defence works are being
carried out and usually are quite prepared
to accept the type of works that we're
proposing."
[9] "And the ones who were affected, they
knew darn well they had flooded badly and
they were very pleased to see the scheme
thank you!"
TRADE-OFF SHOWN
[8] "When things are calm and quiet the
production of scheme works can prove
somewhat difficult but if you can carry
them forward on the backs of recent
events, people's acceptance and
understanding of what we're doing is a lot
higher."
[9] "The older property had been lived in
by people who accepted the flooding and
their property flooded and they didn't
expect anyone to do anything about it."
[II] "People who object to flood defence
schemes.. .have never been flooded."
The trade-off engineers make, however, is a professional one and not the personal one
made by floodplain residents (Fordham and Tunstall, 1990). Engineers invariably do not
live in floodplains and thus are not themselves at risk of flooding. The trade-off they
make could be regarded as 'easier' than that made by the residents. However, if a scheme
is overtopped then the professional repercussions can be considerable:
[4] "If you undertake a scheme, say a 30 year scheme, and it's overtopped, the
consequences are far worse than they would have been had there been no scheme
at all. And the political fallout from doing a scheme, and then it actually
overtopping, is quite horrendous."
This is the reasoning behind the engineering practice of `overdesigning' schemes to allow
for the (inevitable) greater than design standard flood. The choice of standard of
protection is an important factor that will be discussed next under its own heading.
13.3.8 Standards of protection
The Case Studies discussed above pointed to differences in the attitudes of engineers and
floodplain residents to standards of flood protection. In many cases, residents did not
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object to flood defence in principle but to the scale of the scheme (i.e. the level of
protection) chosen by the engineers. The choice of standard relates to the different kinds
of risk-environment trade-off made by the two groups but, more importantly, to
traditional engineering practice which, as discussed above, errs on the side of caution.
Despite public expressions of relative certainty regarding the justification for chosen
standards, privately some engineers are prepared to acknowledge that `overdesign' takes
place:
[1B] "I mean as far as I can see there are a lot of uncertainties in all engineering
projects, you know, and maybe there are some economic inefficiencies as a result.
I mean, most structures are over designed because no structural designer wants
to be the fellow who took it too far and had his whatever it was fall down
[laughs]... so basically a lot of civil engineering is over designed to a greater or
lesser extent. So the works are going to be over designed and there's no doubt if
they were under designed someone somewhere is in serious trouble [laughs]."
[4] "I'd say in the general case, I would go for a high standard of protection
rather than look for a lower standard simply because its more cost-beneficial or
for other reasons, people can't see the river or that sort of thing."
The high capital cost of structural flood defence measures has led, perhaps inevitably in
the political and financial climate of recent years, to a rethinking of old methods. The
dogmatic adherence ("custom and practice") to fixed 100-year standards of protection in
urban areas is being challenged to some extent and specific flood problems are beginning
to be assessed on an individual basis. However, there is not yet universal acceptance of
this view:
[4] "We've had a policy of designing schemes to a hundred year standard with
adequate freeboard. Now I think that it has been quite often voiced that what you
should actually do is look at the most viable financial. .. financially so if you get
a better cost-benefit on a say a thirty year scheme or a fifty year scheme then you
should go for that. And I think that is a view holding a lot of.. .you know, is
taking root. I don't agree with that myself."
Many engineers still believe they must provide, in the public interest, protection "for the
foreseeable future". However, that there is room for flexibility in scheme design was
touched upon by some engineers. One engineer contrasted river and sea flood protection;
the former being more of an exact science than the latter which involved too many
variables interacting independently in various ways:
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[3] "The design of seawalls is not very precise...I think the compromise element
comes there; that it's misleading of an engineer to say "it has to be precisely 3
feet nine high, because I worked that out to be 3 feet nine high", because I think
that would be really dishonest. You can say that the wall can be, you know, 2
feet high or 4 feet high... if its only 2 feet high you'll get a bit more seawater
coming over when there's a bad storm than if we make it 4 feet high."
This quote suggests that there could have been some discussion and negotiation of
standards of protection and height of defences in the West Bay Case Study and conflicts
with the reported experiences of the residents who were faced with an 'all or nothing'
situation.
13.3.9 Flood causation
Beliefs about the causes of flooding are important influences on attitudes to mitigation.
The Case Studies touched, in varying degrees, on the perceptions of flood causation of
the floodplain residents who believed the NRA to be culpable to some extent. This was
a common finding and was recognised as such by the engineers. The engineers, however,
emphasised the natural causation of flooding; flooding was seen as a largely natural event,
albeit sometimes exacerbated by human factors.
[4] "I think that anyone that floods, always feels that it's a human-induced event.
As soon as there's a flood, people look around for someone to blame. It can't be
a natural event; it's got to be someone's fault. It's obviously a bureaucrat that
hasn't done what he should have done or.. .we tend to be blamed, people tend to
blame us for the flooding. We have somehow caused it. Simply because its a
natural reaction; its got to be someone's fault."
[7] "It was a simple explanation that you are being flooded more frequently
simply because it's raining harder, more often. I mean, people would never have
considered that as one of the reasons because they were looking for someone
being responsible."
If flooding were to be regarded as predominantly human-induced, for example by
overdevelopment of floodplains, operational failures by NRA operatives, or as a result
of previous engineering land drainage works (all of which were suggested by floodplain
residents in the case studies discussed above), this would call for different solutions.
Respectively: greater land use planning/development control, better supervised/more
highly trained operational staff, or acknowledgement of professional failure and
responsibility. All of these suggest a lesser role for the specific skills of the engineer.
To some extent engineers have colluded (albeit unconsciously) in the development of
232
floodplains which ultimately has put people and property at risk and has inevitably
encouraged the introduction of (structural) flood defence schemes. Although this
proposition (stated in such an uncompromising form) would be publicly denied by most
engineers, the transcripts from the interviews provide some evidence for this view:
[7] "...quite a longstanding problem. Initially arising as a result of development
by the 'X' New Town Development Corporation.. .our predecessor authority
enjoyed quite a good relationship with 'X' New Town Development
Corporation.. .they were always ready to make contributions to scheme works
which would allow future developments to take place."
[5] "Planning liaison.. .wasn't done as effectively or as comprehensively in the
past as it is now and in any case, with the best will in the world, if you've got a
rapidly developing outer suburban area.. .you can't pick up everything."
This latter situation was acknowledged by Thames NRA who have for some time been
unable, through lack of staff resources, to respond to all planning proposals sent to them
and thus must operate a priority system'. A large number of these proposals are for
small scale property extensions which individually may have a minor impact but
incrementally may have a major effect on the hydrological regime of the catchment
(Hollis, 1975).
The system in which NRA engineers operate is undoubtedly unsatisfactory in terms of
their abilities to influence (in the interests of mitigation) the wider land use planning
issues of floodplain management:
[4] "Most of the problems nowadays are in the urban areas, and a lot of these
problems we aren't empowered to solve and yes I think land drainage legislation
was designed for a different sort of period in our history.. .yes I think it does need
rationalising."
However, this situation has been recognized for some years and, arguably, could have
been addressed more strenuously during the restructuring that led to the privatisation of
the water authorities and the creation of the NRA. While the stated position of the
engineer might generally be opposition to building in the floodplain, there is nevertheless
an element of fatalism in their attitude towards the inevitability of development:
51 This observation is based on notes taken at a meeting at Maidenhead Town Hall
between officers and members of Maidenhead and Windsor... and officers and consultants
of the NRA Thames Region regarding the proposed Maidenhead, Windsor and Eton
Flood Alleviation Scheme and a possible extension of flood relief downstream.
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[5] "It's an uphill struggle and success is always less than a hundred percent. We
can only try to mitigate the effects of floodplain development."
A less formal liaison procedure exists between the NRA and interested developers where
the NRA believe it will gain significant flood defence benefits or offset costs. An example
of this process is the initiation of the DWSC/89 Flood Study which was partially funded
by development property interests (Thames Water, 1987b). In 1987 the NRA (then
Thames Water) objected to a planning application for a large scale retail and leisure
development on the grounds that it would encroach onto the Thames and Colne Brook (a
tributary of the Thames) floodplains. The development company returned to the NRA
requesting them to investigate ways in which the NRA's objections could be resolved;
they subsequently financed (£60,000) a study of flooding problems and the collection of
hydraulic data between Datchet and Chertsey (Thames Water, 1988) and, had their
application succeeded on appeal, would have contributed £6.8 million to the future flood
defence scheme (Gardiner, 1991).
Whereas this could be described as a mutually beneficial partnership approach (Gardiner,
1991), whereby development interests part-fund 'socially desirable' flood defence, an
alternative interpretation would see it as an inappropriate liaison between a powerful
private development organization and a supposedly disinterested public body. If the
NRA's own development role is acknowledged, then this represents a conflict of interest
between organizational and public goals.
13.3.10 Rationality
A view commonly held by engineers, but not consistently borne out in this research, is
that attitudes to flood defence will be positive in the immediate aftermath of a flood and
negative after a period of time has elapsed.
Thus, people do not always appear to consistently express rationality when their attitudes
or behaviours are viewed over time. However, their behaviour (or expressed attitude) is
likely to be rational when viewed in temporal or situational context. For example, the
apparently rational response - positive attitude to flood defence - can be an emotional
(therefore non-rational), 'knee-jerk' reaction focused on a single, uncommon stimulus:
this may be modified (in some situations) to a truly rational response - negative attitude
to flood defence - once the stimulus has passed and a range of other factors are evaluated
simultaneouily.
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Ascertaining the rational individual response in the situation most commonly experienced
in Britain (infrequently occurring floods, rarely of a serious, life-threatening nature and
possible mitigating adjustments limited to a structural flood defence proposal with an
inherent element of environmental impact) is more complex than the simplistic view,
expressed above, of the floodplain resident's decision-making process.
The Lower Stour and West Bay interviews illustrated this process. In one of the Lower
Stour interviews the informants (a couple), who were vehemently against the existing
flood defence scheme, were pressed to follow through a series of questions that resulted
in them confronting - uncomfortably - an inconsistent response pattern. Appendix G-13.4
contains a lengthy extract from this interview which illustrates two issues.
Firstly, from an `interactionise perspective, it indicates the very 'social' nature of this
kind of research interview, which is more closely allied to 'normal', everyday social
exchanges, and - perhaps because of this - more likely to elicit valid and reliable
responses than is the formal, (unnatural) interview procedure of the questionnaire survey
which aims to gather valid and reliable responses by strict adherence to a standardised
interview protocol.
Secondly, it appears to support the engineers' view of the typical floodplain resident's
simple decision-making process by showing that the informants ultimately agreed that,
given a flood, the scheme would be worthwhile. However, on another level, it shows the
extreme reluctance of some residents to accept what they feel to be an unsuitable
adjustment but the only one they have been offered. Nobody wants to be flooded and
while many may be prepared to risk being (hypothetically) flooded, few are prepared to
agree to make that sacrifice when actually confronted with the choice. Thus, when
pressed, most respondents/informants will agree to the worthwhileness of a flood defence
scheme: particularly one already in existence which must, to some extent, be
accommodated.
In West Bay, however, even a relatively serious flood event was not sufficient cause for
one informant to express a positive attitude to the flood defence proposal. This informant
was able to evaluate the consequences of the proposed adjustment in concert with other,
environmental, factors that, in the emotional, 'knee-jerk' - apparently rational - response,
appear to be either not evaluated or discounted. This informant was one of the few who
are prepared to make a personal sacrifice for environmental reasons ("you cannot damage
the environment just for the sake of property").
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Engineers make what they believe to be a rational decision, based upon accurate
information concerning the 'objective' level Of flood hazard. However, this estimate
nevertheless contains a subjective element. Past flood events provide the evidence from
which the present level of flood risk is estimated but accurate measurements of past
events are not commonly available and this is particularly the case with rare events which
require many years of record to adequately gauge their estimated return period. Invariably
much investigative work is necessary to unearth newspaper reports, photographs showing
previous flood levels and other documentation. The presence of conveniently situated
gauging stations can provide more reliable measurements and while computer modelling
now provides more accuracy it still relies on secondary, historic data for calibration:
[I] "If you want to know what the flood level was, you're never absolutely sure
unless you had a recorder there. Even when you've got a recorder there, they
need to be very carefully run to make sure that they're reliable. Even visual
gauge boards.. .you'd think would be cared for and responsible, you can get funny
answers. You just can't account for differences.. .you know they are due to human
error."
Nevertheless, engineers promote, with apparent certainty, schemes designed to protect
against very rare events, on the basis of uncertain information that sometimes conflicts
with the reported experiences of the public. During interviews, engineers reported
instances where they were certain that residents were denying (because it was allegedly
in their interest to deny them) the existence of past floods which engineers were certain
had occurred. Thus, a polarity of views can develop between engineers and public which
can be almost impossible to reconcile.
In tidal flooding and sea defences the problems of estimation are compounded by the
complexity and interaction of the determining factors (see above discussion of standards
of protection, Section 13.3.8).
It is frequently the case that flood defence schemes are imposed on one population to
protect another population on another reach of the river:
[1] "Of course 'X' itself isn't the major beneficiary from the scheme; the benefits
are upstream in the 'Y' industrial areas."
[3] "So the dam is to be at a location where there isn't flooding, in order to
protect people who live downstream at the location where there is flooding."
[4] "And sometimes we get the fact that people have defences through their
grounds when in fact they don't flood themselves."
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Thus, as the latter extract illustrates, there may be no objective level of flood hazard -
no flood hazard at all in fact - for particular populations who yet are asked to accept flood
defence. This is particularly problematic where increased levels of flood risk in one area
are perceived to have been caused by injudicious floodplain development and yet the
impact of a proposed flood defence scheme is to fall on another area - with little or no
flood risk itself - which has practised greater floodplain development control. This is
believed by some (see discussion in Chapter 9, Maidenhead Case Study) to have been the
case in Maidenhead to the detriment of other communities such as Taplow and Eton
Wick.
13.3.11 Summary and conclusions
This series of interviews and related background observations and contacts indicated the
complexity of the institutional influences on floodplain management decisions by pointing
to where NRA engineers influenced, constrained or controlled the choices of floodplain
residents.
The initial hypotheses were substantiated by the findings. The engineers did tend to
prioritize technical above environmental factors in scheme design and implementation and
yet showed some sensitivity about their role as guardians of the water environment
(defensive positions were adopted at times to protect both their individual professional
position and their organization).
There was evidence that they place greater emphasis on nature conservation impacts
rather than aesthetics in scheme design. This was seen to be related to the scientific, and
therefore objective, base of nature conservation (via professional ecologists) with which
engineers could - to some extent - identify. Visual aspects, however, were seen to be
more purely subjective and less easily legitimated. However, a degree of tension could
arise between environmental professionals and engineers when scheme implementation
was hindered. Furthermore, the technical assessments of environmental value made by
professional ecologists and conservationists can themselves under-rate the more
commonplace value of local environments to the general public.
While environmental factors have assumed a greater prominence in flood defence during
the last five to ten years, the interviews suggested that they have been imposed on
traditional engineering 'custom and practice' and have yet to be fully integrated and
accepted within professional thinking. Flood defence remains the primary consideration
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and environmental factors are secondary to this. Many engineers regarded themselves as
'environmentalists' but this term encompassed for them dimensions of control and utility
that could conflict with the aesthetic or tioethicar concerns of some of floodplain
residents.
The interviews suggested that the attitudes of engineers to both the environment and flood
risk mitigation differed from those of many floodplain residents and that there was a lack
of understanding, by each group, of how they reached their respective decisions.
Although both engineers and residents made risk-environment trade-offs these were
substantively different - the former making them on professional grounds and the latter
making them on personal grounds. It is often the case that residents do not object to flood
defence in principle but to the scale of the scheme chosen for them by the engineers.
The research highlighted a degree of ambivalence on the part of the engineers to the need
or preference of the public for an input from them to floodplain decision-making. Levels
of public consultation have also increased in recent years but they too have yet to reach
a standard which might satisfy those members of the public with serious objections or
whose timing conforms to the preference of the majority of floodplain residents
interviewed in the case studies. Engineers can be said to 'set the agendas' in the decision-
making environment and tend towards manipulation in the promotion of schemes. There
appears to be no satisfactory system for dealing with minorities with legitimate
grievances.
The wider socio-political system in which NRA engineers operate is undoubtedly
unsatisfactory in terms of their abilities to influence (in the interests of mitigation) the
wider land use planning issues of floodplain management: there is nevertheless an element
of fatalism in their attitude towards the inevitability of development. The part-funding of
flood defence schemes by development interests may represent a potential conflict of
interest between organizational and public goals.
In terms of the individual components of the initial model of flood hazard perception and
mitigating adjustment, the research fmdings suggest that the engineers intervene, to some
degree, at every point. In view of the degree of involvement of the NRA in the flood
defence decision-making process it is suggested that a concentration at the level of the
individual floodplain resident is an inappropriate focus for the understanding of flood
hazard mitigating adjustment and, in light of their different goals and objectives, it is
unrealistic to subsume both engineers and residents under the same umbrella term:
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'manager' (Kates, 1962).
The next chapter presents a revision to the conceptual model which guided the research
and which represents a more realistic starting point for future research within the
dominant paradigm.
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14. THE INITIAL AND REVISED MODELS OF FLOOD HAZARD PERCEPTION
AND MITIGATING ADJUSTMENT
14.1 The strengths and limitations of the initial model
The case studies of floodplain residents supported, to varying degrees, the hypothesized
relationships of the initial research model, reiterating the importance of flood experience in
influencing flood hazard perception - recent experience of an event increasing the expectancy
of another - but also underlining the complexity of its relationship to choice (or acceptance)
of mitigating adjustments.
Environmental factors were seen to be an important influence on attitudes to mitigation and
analysis identified the particular usefulness of examining underlying value systems as
explanatory aids to understanding aspects of floodplain decision-making. However,
sufficiently wide-ranging and sensitive tools for measuring these factors have yet to be
developed.
What was hypothesized initially to be a (linear) chain of action leading to mitigation, would
seem to be more appropriately described as a web of interaction between individual and
external factors. The qualitative research in particular suggested that the 'external influences'
(especially 'institutional factors' and 'government policy') hypothesized in the initial model
to connect with adjustment attitudes and choices, represent a much wider influence on the
individual decision-making environment than had previously been understood: by, for
example, pre-empting individual flood hazard perception, by eliminating the apparent need
for adjustment search, by determining the 'objective' level of hazard and by constraining the
available degrees and forms of adjustment.
The 'external influences' cell also incorporates a range of forces which act upon the engineer,
constraining his/her choices. The study of the engineers illustrates how the sole focus on the
individual unit of analysis (e.g. the floodplain resident) is inadequate for understanding
decision-making processes in floodplain management. The findings indicate the institutional
level to be the main initiator and agent of action in the choice of flood hazard adjustment in
England and Wales.
While environmental factors may be important to individual residents (as the above findings
suggest), the latter are relatively powerless in the floodplain management arena; their
'choices' are constrained, not only by the preferences of individual engineers and particular
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organizational structures (in this case of the NRA), but also by the wider, land use planning
context which itself comprises (as analytical categories) individual, organizational and societal
levels.
The initial model, while functioning on a simple level, is severely limited by its focus on the
individual unit of analysis and by its obscuration of the complexity of the decision-making
process. The following section provides a development of the initial model - and thus a more
appropriate starting point for any future research in this field - yet acknowledges the inherent
complexity of any decision sequence' which, ultimately, makes its reduction to a few pre-
determined and determining steps an inadequate summation.
14.2 A revision of the model of flood hazard perception and mitigating adjustment
The following revised conceptual model, showing factors of choice and constraint in flood
defence, is tentative and purposely limited. It aims to highlight certain recently observed
aspects of the flood defence decision-making environment that have been overlooked or
misunderstood in the past. While retaining, for comparative purposes, a similar structure and
cells, it shifts the main focus for the decision process from the individual to the institutional
level as being more appropriate to Britain (and possibly elsewhere).
However, the range of possible initial conditions and the complexity of the interactions
between the individual, institutional and societal levels are such that to attempt to model the
whole decision structure would defeat the primary object of simplified explication. Thus, the
following serves to draw together the research findings but is not to be regarded as
comprehensive in either its descriptive or explanatory power.
The model is directed primarily at examining choice of adjustment, not flood hazard
perception, and thus the precursors to the latter are, in this problem formulation, less
important than the precursors to the former. While individual perception of flood hazard may
be necessary for an individual to instigate a flood hazard mitigating adjustment, it is not a
necessary condition of acceptance of adjustment (the more frequent endpoint to the decision-
making process in England and Wales). Furthermore, acquiescence to authority (as
represented by the NRA for example) can sometimes over-rule or replace the role of
individual perception in this decision-making process.
52 As the law of requisite variety states, if you are to cope with the behaviour of a system
you must have at least as much variety available to you as in the system (Ashby, 1964).
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While the main determinant of action is posited to be at the institutional level, the discussion
moves between the individual, institutional and societal levels because of the degree of
interaction between them. The structure of the model (see Figure 14.1) divides into three
levels - which are suggestive of a power hierarchy (individual; institutional; and societal) -
and four sections (the focused environment system; the social and personal characteristics of
the individual; values, beliefs and attitudes; and the decision-making process). The
subsections are discussed individually below and comprise an initial, simplified description
of the dominant paradigm view ('a') followed by the complexity found during fieldwork ('b').
14.2.1 Level 1: the individual level
a) the simplified, dominant paradigm model: "It is [the] process of individual choice that
is at the base of much of the action of people in dealing with extreme events" (Burton et al,
1978:81). There is no fundamental difference between individual and collective behavior: the
latter is an aggregation of individual decisions nominally constrained by government (Kates,
1971).
b) the complex model: People rarely act as individuals; they are most often members of a
social group. An individual may be a member of several social groups - at different times and
simultaneously: a family group, an environmental group, a residents group, a property owner,
a professional, a past flood 'victim', etc. For each of these socio-cultural identities there is
likely to be an appropriate underlying value system and a reference group of significant
others. The individual's value system can be seen more as a continuum than a discrete
construct, with minor variations along it to accommodate the individual's range of social
identities. Each of the socio-cultural identities produces its own focus point on the continuum
and provides the (normative) framework for decision-making.
It is possible that some of these social roles may produce conflict in the personal value system
when it is in conflict with the dominant societal value system. When this occurs, the presence
of significant others (perhaps within an interest group) may be the culminating influence on
the decision.
In this model the individual level is conceptualised as more reactive than pro-active; pro-
activity, it is suggested, occurs more commonly at the institutional level. This is not a fixed
condition however; a flood event or new information may shift the individual towards initial
pro-activity in an adjustment search, to which the institutional level subsequently reacts.
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Figure 14.1: Outline structure of a revised model of flood hazard mitigating adjustment.
Nevertheless, the development of the modelled sequence (see Figure 14.2) from initial
`decision-making stress' to the resulting 'degree and form of adjustment' is likely to return
to a reactive mode simply through the long lead times necessary for the full implementation
of many structurally orientated flood defence projects - the original initiators of action may
no longer be resident in the latter stages of implementation.
Discussion of the individual role does not imply endorsement of a model of free individual
choice but rather it addresses one aspect of social structure: the power nexus, it is suggested,
is located elsewhere in the model.
14.2.2 Level 2: the institutional level
a) The simplified, dominant paradigm model: "...collective or corporate enterprises
["public, quasi-public, corporate, or commercial bodies"] differ little in their resource-using
and hazard-related activities from their counterparts under individual management" (Burton
et al, 1978:115).
b) The complex model: Beyond the individual and influencing her/his decision-making
environment is the institutional level - in this case, the NRA flood defence division - which,
it is argued here, is the main initiator of action in the decision-making process leading to
(structural) adjustment. This level has its own dominant (engineering) culture, objectives, and
appropriate value system. Within the 'corporate' engineering value system, there are sub-
cultures related to different departmental groups and their objectives, and within that,
individual engineers have a personal modification of the sub-cultural value system which will
be related to the other social roles that they perform.
The institution is motivated by a degree of self-interest and self-perpetuation which may
conflict with the public (or even individual) interest. The need to maintain institutional
structures, to continue to support departments and individual employees by designing and
implementing projects similar to those of the past, could lead, ultimately, to a concentration
on projects of lower (relative) priority, such as those relating to protection against very rare
events.
The institution is socially legitimated by the dominant political economic structure and its
value system and thus, proposals emanating from an alternative social paradigm, for changes
to, or in, the institutional structure, must overcome the considerable inertial forces which
maintain the status quo.
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Figure 14.2: A model of selected factors of choice and constraint in flood defence.
Intuitively one would expect there to be differences between a personal (e.g. floodplain
resident) and a professional (e.g. NRA flood defence section) interest in flood hazard
management. This was borne out to some extent in the interviews with engineers, some of
whom expressed a personal divergence of opinion on particular flood defence schemes
depending on whether they were to respond professionally or hypothetically as floodplain
residents. As engineers they were committed to providing flood defence to a high (e.g. 100
year) standard: when assuming the role of floodplain resident, however, they could appreciate
the difficulty inherent in the risk-environment trade-off - flood defence versus loss of
landscape, conservation or amenity value.
The institutional level is closely related to the wider political economy structures that operate
in society.
14.2.3 Level 3: the societal level
a) The simplified, dominant paradigm model: "...smaller managerial units would consist
of households in most societies, but include as well all sorts of commercial, industrial, and
governmental units, and on the highest level constitute an aggregate based on the nation-state"
(Kates, 1971:444).
b) The complex model: In fairness to Kates, the above quote is followed by the following
sentence: "Unfortunately, one cannot simply aggregate the smaller units to arrive at the
higher levels of hierarchy". However, there is a strong sense within the work of the dominant
paradigm that that is precisely what they do and this is the justification for the omission of
the last qualifying sentence which more closely approximates the sense of the dominant view.
When the societal level is addressed it is equated (as in the influential but much criticised
1978 volume of Burton et al) with a national/government policy focus rather than
incorporating a more truly sociological perspective.
Cotgrove's (1982:27) model of the dominant social paradigm (reproduced in Table 2.1) has
been selected in this study as appropriate for the socio-political framework as applied to
Britain and with a particular focus on environmental factors. It is the paradigm, created and
maintained by dominant power groups, which provides legitimation for the institutions and
processes of a market economy and provides the framework to interpret and give meaning
to experience.
Flood defence is widely accepted as a social welfare product but it is the dominant social
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paradigm and its value system that defines social welfare and thus the flood defence function
and its parent institution are related strongly to questions of political economy at the societal
level. Flood defence professionals aim to maintain their economic position in society and tend
to continue to operate into the future in a similar manner to the past. While the rhetoric
claims flood defence to be in the public interest, the latter is never fully defined and may
require (for low probability events) 'deals' with property developers and other commercial
enterprises to achieve.
It must be emphasised here that this does not imply that flood defence is never in the public
interest but rather that there can be multiple other dimensions operating in the decision-
making process which must be identified and addressed if the widest possible public interest
is to be served.
14.2.4 Section 1: the focused environment system
a) The simplified, dominant paradigm model: "The natural events system - the array of
wind, water, and earth processes - functions largely independently of human
activities... Conversely, for practical purposes, large parts of the social system may also be
regarded as operating independently of natural events" (Burton et al, 1978:19).
b) The complex model: The particular background focus of the revised model is the
interactions between the physical system and the human use system which determine an
'objective' level of environmental value and an 'objective' level of flood hazard. These
represent the parameters which are the initial social and physical conditions of the model:
they are not to be regarded as static but to be in a state of flux derived from changes in each
other and in other components of the model.
As modelled, however, they are prone to the criticism made earlier (Chapter 2) and expressed
in the above quotation, that environment is treated as an independent, exogenous factor
influencing the socio-cultural system but not actually a part of it. This is not the intended
representation but is due in large part' to the exigencies of the conceptual modelling process
which preclude the diagramatic representation of the sum of human-social-environmental
interactions.
' See also Watts (1983:231-262) for a discussion of the disjuncture between humans and
their physical environment.
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14.2.5 Section 2: the social and personal characteristics of the individual
a) the simplified, dominant paradigm model: Empirical research has shown conflicting
fmdings related to the importance of social characteristics but hazard experience is regarded
as of singular importance in influencing choice of adjustment.
b) the complex model: Variations in individual social and personal characteristics are liable
to influence the form of the personal value system and attitudinal responses but in a complex
manner due to the considerable interaction between the characteristics. As discussed above,
the role of individual characteristics in descriptive or explanatory models of flood hazard
management must be viewed in the context of the constraining mechanisms of societal
structures. Furthermore, they should not be regarded as static elements but as subject to
change through time and resulting from change elsewhere in the model.
While intuitively it appears logical that flood experience must affect subsequent attitudes and
behaviour to mitigation to some degree, the research findings discussed above suggest that
it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient cause when viewed in isolation: other factors can
have a positive reinforcing effect or a negative, over-riding effect.
14.2.6 Section 3: values, beliefs and attitudes as influences on decision-making
a) The simplified, dominant paradigm model: Individual perceptions, attitudes and beliefs
are of paramount importance in understanding and explaining actions or proposed behaviours.
"At the heart of managing a natural resource is the manager's perception of the resource and
of the choices open to him in dealing with it" (White, 1966a:105).
b) The complex model: In this section are contained those values, beliefs and attitudes
pertinent to the focused environment. They can be subdivided into those of the individual
floodplain resident and those of the institution (the engineering culture and shared, corporate
value system). The beliefs and attitudes (also social and personal characteristics) of individual
engineers are hypothesized to influence decision-making but to an untested degree and thus
are subsumed under the corporate value system and not described further in the model.
Straddling the institutional and societal levels in the revised model is 'government level
policy', which can take the form of, for example, MAFF restraints on institutional choice,
DoE Environmental Assessment requirements, or other legislative restrictions or rulings
which may influence all stages of the decision-making sequence. For example, cost is the
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primary limiting factor for scheme development: if the benefit-cost ratio is poor or below
unity then a scheme has very little chance of development, even though there may be
significant flooding for some residential properties TM. Project engineers, from their
familiarity with the site and the preferences of some residents, may believe a scheme should
be carried out but are limited by MAFF requirements to satisfy national economic efficiency
criteria.
Thus engineers appear constrained in their available options by codes of practice decided at
higher levels of organizationss (pointing to the need for further investigation at the
organizational level and above and exemplifying one of the limitations of investigation at the
individual level).
Crossing the boundary between the individual and societal levels are 'interest group goals',
which may or may not be in conflict with the dominant social paradigm and with the
individual's personal value system. Interest group goals can influence the decision-making
sequence at both an individual and institutional level.
Whatever the nature and extent of the role of individual values, beliefs and attitudes (and
some considerable degree of importance is ascribed to them) it is argued here that their role
is fundamentally constrained by social structures and ideology. As has been stated above (see
Chapter 2), a major criticism of behavioural geography has been its reduction of social and
historic complexity to individual psychological processes (Baran, 1969; Rieser, 1973).
14.2.7 Section 4: the decision-making process
a) The simplified, dominant paradigm model: this is based on Simon's (1957) model of a
boundedly rational, individual decision-maker, seeking, not to maximize her/his utility, but
for a solution which is 'good enough'; the individual `satisficer' is limited by time and energy
to collect information, and by cognitive limitations. Furthermore, "a behavioral model of
choice for public decision making...has similar features to the sequential model for
individuals" (Kunreuther and Slovic, 1986:178).
In many schemes the benefits accrue from the industrial and commercial sectors rather
than the residential; if these sectors are limited or absent then the benefits may not be
sufficient to support a scheme.
55 It could be argued that if engineers had found themselves seriously in conflict with this
situation, they could have made more strenuous representations to higher organizational levels
to change it.
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b) The complex model: The lack of any real differentiation in the dominant paradigm
between individual, institutional and societal goals and power relations constitutes a
fundamental underestimation of complex reality.
The full complexity of the decision-making process is not expressed in the revised model
(which is based on the reserach study fmdings) but the main decision sequence is shifted to
the institutional level, acknowledging interactions from both the individual and societal levels.
An outline of the process is discussed below.
Decision-making stress and perception of flood hazard
The decision-making stress (see Figure 14.2) which initiates the decision-making sequence
is linked closely to flood hazard perception at the institutional level. This is based on the
assumption that the initiation of an active search for a flood hazard adjustment would not
occur without first perceiving there to be some risk from flooding. Arguably, the existence
of the flood defence function is indicative of a continual state of flood hazard perception,
albeit subject to constant revision. The Section 24 surveys (see Chapter 3) carried out by the
precursors to the NRA (indicative of a pro-active search for flood hazard) have identified
most flood problems, although areas of flood risk, unknown to the NRA, still come to light,
where flooding has occurred in the past but had been accepted by residents and no adjustment
search initiated''.
At the level of individual residents, they may or may not perceive there to be a hazard, yet
may be expected to evaluate the consequences of adjustments promoted from elsewhere. The
long lead times necessary for large scale, structural schemes can lead to the scenario whereby
a scheme proposal, which may have been triggered by an earlier flood event, is eventually
presented to a set of floodplain residents (independent of any adjustment search by them), the
majority of whom may never have experienced flooding (those who originally experienced
the flood event being no longer resident in the floodplain). Thus the adjustment proposal may
be presented independent of any perception by the floodplain resident of a flood hazard. In
this scenario the threshold of perception is induced by the NRA engineer.
At the individual level a complex process may occur as a result of a decision-making stress
(Kasperson, 1969b; O'Riordan, 1983a; Penning-Rowsell et al, 1986). When an individual is
56 That is, no adjustment search involving the NRA: small scale individual adjustments
and coping mechanisms (such as buying insurance, getting sandbags, moving furniture, etc.)
may have been initiated.
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faced with a decision-making stress they must select the appropriate socio-cultural role for
dealing with it and evaluate the decision against the appropriate variant of the value
system57. There may be an immediate conflict: for example, in the case of a flood defence
proposal as the decision-making stressor, they may have to choose the salient role from being
a family group member (as a parent they may tend towards securing flood defence safety for
their children); an environmentalist group member (as such they may be concerned about the
environmental impact of a flood defence scheme); a householder (they may be concerned to
protect their property from flood damage but may also be concerned that a large structural
defence may have a negative affect on property value).
Each of these social roles could suggest a different response. There might then be a referral
to significant others connected with the adopted social role(s); their influence will be
dependent on their current salience (vis-a-vis their numbers, status, power, emotional
attachment, etc.) and may sway the decision one way or another. There may also be a
referral to the dominant societal value system in which the individual may find support or
conflict.
Specific locational characteristics can influence the degree of salience of the decision-making
stressor. If an individual is close to a river they may be either particularly concerned to avoid
flooding or more concerned to protect the familiar river environment. If the individual is a
prior flood 'victim' their previous experience may have been either distressing or benign and
thus could influence their decision either way.
In this decision-making environment the interaction of the individual resident with the
institutional level comes with the public exposure of a flood defence proposal'. The
individual resident may or may not have had prior experience with the institutional level. The
response of the individual to the institution and its proposal is likely to be influenced to some
degree by the degree of congruity between the individual's value system and the dominant
social value system. There is a bias in favour of the institution as a socially legitimated
structure which will tend to induce a degree of acquiescence with institutional decisions.
57 Although this should not suggest a simple, mechanistic or deterministic process.
58 In the recent past it was possible for flood defence works to be implemented with
minimal interaction with the individual floodplain resident: this is less likely to happen now
because of the need, for example, to produce and publicise environmental statements and
because of current institutional concerns with 'public image' and 'the customer'.
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Adjustment search
Further action (adjustment search) can be initiated in a number of possible ways at the
institutional level. For example: as identified problem areas rise to the top of the priority list
in the region's capital programme; when a flood occurs and pressure comes from outside
(often from higher levels than the individual such as from local authorities or M.P. ․); or
when developers offer to make a contribution to scheme costs to facilitate acceptance of their
development proposal.
The adjustment search by engineers can occur at some temporal distance from a flood event
because their flood hazard perception is generalised, and not locationally discrete: it does not
rely on personal experience of a flood event but on professional extrapolation from technical
data. It is a lengthy process albeit within a range of options that are limited, ultimately, by
economic factors.
The engineers' adjustment search may be triggered by an individual event or as a result of
Section 24 surveys (these surveys can be seen as a generalised, not locationally specific,
adjustment search). The Section 24 surveys allow a prioritisation of flood defence needs
based on rateable value of the properties involved, the frequency of flooding and the
estimated cost of a scheme. A possible scheme may come to the top of the priority list and
be put into the capital programme but proposals may be rejected by the public who prefer to
tolerate the flood risk rather than accept the proposed scheme. A flood event may exert
political pressure on the NRA engineer to provide flood defence for a site lower down on the
priority list:
[2] "Most of the capital programme that we've built up has been built up due to
political pressure following catastrophic events."
For the individual (resident), 'perception of hnard' and 'adjustment search' may both be
circumvented and they may enter the decision-making sequence at the point of 'evaluation of
consequences of adjustment'. While individual perception of flood hazard may lead to almost
immediate adjustment search (e.g. they may pressurise the NRA to act), because of long lead
times for structural works, the following stage - 'evaluation of consequences of adjustment' -
may be 10 years or more distant in time.
Whether or not the floodplain resident makes an independent adjustment search will depend
largely on their access to flood hazard information, whether there has been a recent flood to
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trigger action, and/or whether s/he considers some (further) mitigating adjustment to be
necessary. Some floodplain residents will not make a search for any mitigating adjustment
even though they are aware of the flood hazard and have experienced flooding.
Access to information is likely to be a key influence on individual perception of hazard and
adjustment decisions. In urban floodplain management, where populations may be highly
mobile, information relating to past flood events, the existing flood risk and the availability
of mitigation adjustment, may be almost solely at the institutional level (although significant
others in the community may also be influential). Control of access to this information is also
at the institutional level.
Evaluation of consequences of adjustment - the risk-environment trade-off
Engineers evaluate the consequences of adjustment on a professional basis: they are not
themselves at risk of flooding or dwelling in the floodplain and thus will suffer no personal
detriment. How far engineers empathise - as opposed to sympathise - with floodplain
residents is likely to be a key factor in the degree to which their evaluation will be
commensurate with that of the floodplain resident. Certain interviews with engineers indicated
that in some (relatively clearcut) cases, engineers did empathise with residents and perceived
the difficulty of making a decision to accept a flood defence scheme which would have a
major environmental impact. However, institutional imperatives can over-rule such individual
factors.
The result of the engineers' evaluation of the consequences of any adjustment is the selection
of what they believe to be an appropriate adjustment (or sometimes more than one) to present
to the public. Thus, this selection process should be linked to the previous model cell, the
adjustment search, because it limits the availability, to the public, of adjustment options.
The engineer is concerned primarily to evaluate the impact a scheme would have on
hydrology and hydraulics, and on the local community in terms of interference with
communication links such as major roads and railways, for instance. The environmental
(nature conservation, landscape, archaeological, etc.) consequences of adjustment are
evaluated in consultation with possibly a range of environmental organizations and with in-
house conservation staff, depending upon the scale of the adjustment. Consequences to
individuals are dealt with sympathetically if this can be done without jeopardising the overall
scheme, but generally there exists a belief that the adjustment is in the wider public interest
and a minority should not put their preferences before the greater good of the majority. The
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engineer thus becomes the arbiter of what is (or should be) in the public interest:
[3] "in many ways I think it's part of an engineer's responsibility to the community
to come up with the best solution."
Evaluation of consequences of adjustment is likely to be a much longer process at the
institutional than at the individual level. After carrying out a range of cost-benefit procedures
(see Chapter 3), the flood defence engineers are likely to select a single option to promote
to the public. Thus the contribution of the individual resident to this decision-making process
will have been curtailed by the limited choice and information offered by the institutional
level.
As a result of public consultation, interest group goals may influence the evaluation process
and subsequent revisions may be made. As discussed above, there appears to be an inverse
relationship between the timing of public consultation and the degree of possible subsequent
revision: the earlier the public input, the greater the likelihood that revision can or will occur
and vice versa.
Degree and form of adjustment
The degree (standard) and form of adjustment is almost wholly in the hands of the engineer.
Possibilities for individual adjustments by residents are few and rarely feasible without having
a detrimental effect on other floodplain residents (excluding minor adjustments (see below)
which are designed to mitigate the effects of a flood but not to remove the risk up to a given
design level). Flood defence has long been regarded as a national or community level activity
and, as such, requiring management at an institutional level: because of this, floodplain
residents are rarely exposed to possible, individual floodproofmg measures. However, some
floodplain properties (in, mostly, riparian locations) have had their floor levels raised, have
replaced wooden floors with concrete, and/or have raised the electrical circuitry above a
known flood level, for example. Where a form of floodplain development control is in
operation, new property developments may have to satisfy certain criteria in order to gain
planning permission: this may take the form of raised floor and threshold levels with several
steps up to the entrance, properties may be built on 'stilts', or the ground floor use may be
limited to garage or utility space with the lowest habitable rooms at first floor level.
Thus the degree of protection offered by, and the final form of, the adjustment will be the
result of a number of stages of evaluation but most of these will have occurred at the
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institutional level with minimal input from the individual member of the public. There is, of
course, an argument that, in a representative democracy, this is how it should be: the NRA
is the institution with executive powers in the public interest. However, while the NRA's
overseeing body (MAFF) may have an elected member at its head, the NRA engineers who
make the majority of the decisions (including conducting the justifying cost-benefit analysis)
are not elected representatives and their motivation in maintaining their positions must be
acknowledged as constituting a possible conflict of interest. The NRA, in performing its flood
defence function, is both 'poacher and gamekeeper': a potential floodplain developer policing
itself.
14.2.8 Conclusions
The revised model described above represents a conventional modification of initial
hypotheses as a result of research findings. However, a major conclusion of the research
study is that the systems approach that was adopted cannot adequately deal with the
complexity found during fieldwork. The suggested interactions between levels and cells
represent a compromise between reality and clarity: to model all interactions (supposing it
were possible to discover these) would obscure the point of the exercise. It is a conclusion
of this research that the a priori model form itself can serve to blinker the researcher to other
- non-modelled - possibilities and exclude that which lies beyond the expected and the status
quo.
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15. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This study set out to investigate a number of specific areas within set boundaries. The
research aimed to examine the importance of environmental factors in flood hazard
management and the role of NRA engineers in influencing, the choices of floodplain
residents. The theoretical focus was the appropriateness of the dominant (North American)
hazards research paradigm as an explanatory model in the British context. It further aimed
to extend the previous, primarily quantitative, research design model to investigate the
usefulness of a qualitative approach.
The concluding discussion is structured on these substantive areas of study. It summarises the
key findings and, where appropriate, makes certain recommendations arising from these.
15.1 The importance of environmental factors in flood hazard management
Infrequent flood events lie in the area of greatest decision-making uncertainty (Kates, 1962);
for this reason it is not surprising that some hazards research findings have been
contradictory. While experience of flooding has been found to be an important factor in flood
defence decision-making it is not a sufficient cause to determine response to scheme
proposals. From a policy position it is problematical to rely on 'objective' measures of flood
severity as an indication of likely response when it is the individual's subjective measure of
severity (among other factors) which will determine their response and this response may not
always be commensurate with the 'objective' measure.
Furthermore, while the environmental benefits of a particular location may be of considerable
importance, neither are these a sufficient determinant of scheme attitude. This research study
has found that underlying (environmental) value orientations, linked to specific locational and
experiential factors, interact in a complex manner to affect attitudes and behaviours with
regard to flood defence.
Flood defence, like flooding itself, entails both costs and benefits. For those living closest
to the river, their environment represents both asset and hazard. They gain (potentially) the
greatest environmental benefit but also, because they are likely to be flooded more frequently
and to greater depths than those further away, tend to bear the greatest cost. Because flood
schemes normally provide a defence between river and population, those living nearest to the
river are also likely to live nearest to the scheme. Thus, they have more to gain from the
scheme but potentially more to lose if they perceive the scheme to have a detrimental
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environmental impact. The striking of a balance between these conditions represents a risk-
environment trade-off that this research has demonstrated to exist.
The degree of centrality of environmental beliefs and attitudes remains uncertain, however.
Similarly, the proximity of the engineers' value system to the (majority) social world view
was not fully tested. If environmental beliefs and attitudes are but a part of a web of
interconnected beliefs within the individual's value system (which the study findings tend to
support), and if decision-making is dominated ultimately by the choices of the majority, then
it is likely that there will continue to be a mismatch between the engineering response and
the preferences of the more environmentally concerned (minority?) of the public with regard
to structural flood defence.
It is also likely that the engineering culture will (continue to) set the agenda and make the
final flood defence decisions within the bounds of national economic efficiency and within
their socially legitimated institutional role. This will tend to marginalise issues of more
fundamental environmental concern if they threaten these overriding imperatives.
15.2 The role of NRA engineers in influencing, constraining or controlling the choices
of floodplain residents
Viewing a range of floodplain management issues through the eyes of two different floodplain
managers - residents and engineers - has illuminated not only the relative importance of
environmental factors but also, more generally, the problems of focusing solely at the
individual level. This is not to argue, however, that an examination of the individual is
valueless or inappropriate but rather that there is a need to mediate between individuals and
their social context and that individually-focused studies must therefore give due consideration
to the degree of constraint imposed by social structures.
While, as individuals, engineers may be more or less environmentally concerned, they do not
act solely as individuals; they act in an institutional role and it is that which governs
ultimately their environmental attitudes and behaviours within flood defence. It has been
suggested above that the underlying value system of engineers is closely associated with the
dominant social paradigm which privileges material wealth and the control of nature. Yet
there remains, however, a degree of tension between the individual and organizational needs
and imperatives of the engineer. The relationship between the individual engineer, the
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organization within which s/he" is located and the government departments that ultimately
control their actions, is an under-researched area that would benefit from further study.
15.2.1 Institutional and policy issues
Flooding is not a wholly natural event and flood defence is not a wholly technical issue.
Thus, the dominant role of engineers in flood defence decision-making presupposes the
adoption of a structural (engineering) solution. In the existing institutional system the wider
socio-political factors are relegated to the margins of the decision-making environment
because no unified system exists for incorporating them despite the centrality of land use
planning issues in flood causation, exacerbation and control. There is some indication that
problems resulting from a lack of liaison between NRA flood defence departments and local
authority planning bodies are beginning to be addressed (Gardiner, 1991) and it is possible
that, in the long-term, non-engineering professionals will take a more prominent role in
decision-making.
The financial requirements of the (flood defence) 'capital programme' - a system devised
ostensibly to protect the public purse - can, ironically, result in money being spent for its own
sake. Engineers must bid for funds to carry out defence works; once gained, they are
constrained to spend them. This process can exert pressure on project engineers to implement
schemes that may have aroused public opposition. Conversely, without the ability to 'carry
over' funds from one financial year to the next and with the lack of reserves, engineers may
have to search for work (inevitably of low priority) on which to spend remaining funds. This
system is particularly inappropriate for flood defence which to some extent is tied to long
term perspectives and/or climatological conditions. There is a degree of periodicity in flood
events: many years can pass with little flooding (as has been the case in the Thames Valley
in recent years) and then notable flood years can occur (such as 1947 or 1968, for example)
resulting in major flooding which may require immediate attention. The present funding
system is not an efficient one for dealing with this situation.
Related to this, is the question of the appropriateness of cost-benefit analysis (at least in its
present form) as the framework for the selection of factors deemed important. The cost-
benefit methodology has serious flaws which are underestimated by its exponents. Perhaps
the most important of these is its spurious assumption of decision-maker disinterest and
independence. This research has shown that those (engineers) in positions of decision-making
" Gender issues were not examined in the engineers' research module but the almost
exclusively male engineering culture suggests itself as a fruitful area of further research.
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power are not disinterested but have their own criteria for judging the relevance and
importance of factors which can differ from those of the public, particularly with respect to
issues of aesthetics.
If the public are not involved in decision-making until a late stage there is little chance of
them influencing decisions that are already considerably advanced and less chance of
returning the debate to more fundamental issues that may have been overlooked by
professional decision-makers.
This research has illustrated the limitations of the public consultation exercises carried out
by the NRA and suggested the need for greater (and earlier) availability and provision of
information to the public if they are usefully to contribute to floodplain management
decisions. Many members of the public are not aware of any flood risk and, even when they
are, they are not aware of its meaning. Thus, the educational aspect of public consultation
is important but it should be separate from scheme promotion.
15.2.2 Policy implications/recommendations
The present structures for consultation are inadequate; greater opportunities for public
participation are needed to provide a sense of ownership in the scheme or, preferably, the
solution - ideally participation should occur before a scheme is chosen. This can only be
generated if the public are involved early, and, if possible, before views become polarised.
NRA personnel need training to equip them for the public consultation work they are now
required to do and for a future extension of this role (perhaps to include also training in
conflict resolution). This should take account of theory as well as practice; that is, its purpose
should not be merely to raise the level of efficiency of present (essentially, scheme
promotion) practices but to examine the wider issues raised by public consultation and
participation. There is, however, a potential drawback to this process which was noted by one
engineer during interview: he suggested that the public tended to distrust more those who
demonstrated a 'slickness' of approach which they viewed as closely associated with a public
relations (and thus not disinterested) position.
This research showed that some interviewees'/informants' attitudes to the flood risk had been
influenced by their insurance companies and their solicitors when they bought the property.
If such professionals are acting as 'gatekeepers' (Pahl, 1975) they should be included
specifically in any flood hazard information dissemination that the NRA might carry out in
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the future.
While this research did not set out to specifically examine coping strategies, nevertheless,
informants and respondents provided examples of where these had been adopted. More
detailed research could usefully be carried out to estimate the degree of individual adjustment
already adopted: for example, where foundations have been built above flood levels, where
concrete floors have been laid, where electrical circuitry has been raised above known flood
levels, etc. This knowledge would contribute to an understanding of how people do - and
could - cope with floods rather than control them.
15.3 The appropriateness of the dominant (North American) hazards research paradigm
as an explanatory model in the British context.
In its lengthy history the dominant paradigm in hazards research has contributed much of
value - particularly its role in mapping out an initial framework for research - but its products
have been more limited than the claims of some of its supporters might suggest: it can be
criticised for a tendency towards self-aggrandizement, perhaps dating to the promise that
quantitative methods appeared to hold in the 1960s and 1970s, through aims° to develop
general laws and theories of human behaviour.
The theoretical base and original conception of the dominant hazards paradigm can be seen
(albeit, largely with the benefit of hindsight) to be limited. Researchers within a
positivist/empiricist framework sought to measure observable reality and ignored or
underestimated values. The original, essentially static, model did not take account of, for
example, historical factors related to coping with flood risks and attitudes to flood defence.
The model's individual focus could not deal with structural or institutional levels of
involvement in the decision-making environment. Neither was it an adequate explanatory aid
within its own terms: floodplain residents are not a homogeneous group therefore any theory
of their decision-making is fundamentally flawed if it concentrates solely on flood hazard
management.
The focus on how to achieve mitigation through heightened flood hazard perception (although
a straightforward link between the two conditions was not proven) failed fully to recognize
the potentially unacceptable impacts on environment that ill-considered mitigation might
60 See Calef s introduction to White's Human Adjustment to Floods (White, 1945) which
claims "nothing less than a comprehensive theory of the geographic approach to the problem
of dealing with floods" (chapter 8, vii. Quoted in Kates and Burton, 1986:10).
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involve'. While the concept of `man's (iis) relationship with nature' was acknowledged as
important (i.e. control versus stewardship) this again focused at an individual level and did
not address the role of competing value systems and powerful economic and political interests
in society. The concentration on choice rather than constraint is built on a particular view of
society which ignores the extent of social conflict and the self-interest of actors in the
decision-making environment.
It seems that most researchers in the field of hazards must begin working within the
'dominant view' of the White/Kates/Burton school (Hewitt, 1983). Some appear to remain
bound by this theoretical framework (Smith and Tobin, 1979); some move incrementally
away from it (Penning-Rowsell et al, 1986); others revolt more completely (Hewitt, 1986).
The pervasiveness of the 'dominant view' can be traced to one of its noted failings: a lack
of attention to theory (Torry, 1979c). Workers within this paradigm - particularly
geographers - have tended not to engage in theoretical debate, perhaps because the very
dominance of the paradigm has led to the perception that no valid challenge to it exists.
The research discussed here has followed a similar progression to that just outlined: beginning
with a traditional natural hazards research paradigm (studying the individual's perception of,
and attitude to, flood hazard); advancing incrementally (contributing an examination of the
environmental and institutional components via the study of individual residents' and
engineers' perceptions and attitudes); and ending where perhaps it should rightfully have
begun (with a less individually-based, empirical approach and a more socio-political
examination of those factors modelled, somewhat naively, as 'external').
This analysis has been based on a conflict model of society: of conflicting power groups and
value systems. Philosophically it has mediated between a humanist and a structuralist
perspective: wherein the individual is viewed as not wholly determining but neither wholly
determined. There is no suggestion that this is, or should be, the only framework for
analysis: hazards research is open to disciplinary plurality. The eclecticism of social
geography (as the parent discipline here) is at once limiting and liberating; the former because
it can cause a crisis of identity and a lack of analytical focus; the latter because it allows the
cross-fertilization of ideas and the complementary division of labour that is vital for such a
multidimensional study area.
While acknowledging and supporting many of the criticisms of the dominant paradigm in
61 Although James et al (1971) included environmental concern as a potentially important
factor in choice of mitigation, measurement is based on responses to one attitude statement.
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hazards research, the research discussed above has found much common ground but would
suggest a change of emphasis in future work.
Earlier hazards research has focused on the perception of flood hazard: it has operated on the
assumption that this should lead to adoption/acceptance of mitigating adjustment and has then
examined why often it does not. The research discussed here has started at the end point of
the dominant paradigm's model: the adjustment itself. This has highlighted the
interconnectedness of these two points - hazard perception and mitigating adjustment - and
shown that the former cannot be understood without understanding the nature of the latter:
the contribution to the model of the environmental factor exemplifies this relationship.
It is a central contention of this thesis that variation in responses to proposals occasioning
environmental change (such as flood defence schemes) are related, fundamentally, to differing
value systems which are the result of socially constructed systems of meaning and are not to
be understood fully by a primarily psychological, behavioural approach, focusing at the
individual level: however, neither should this focus be omitted. As a result of an almost
exclusive concentration on the individual, much hazards research (within the dominant
hazards research paradigm) has been prone to the "fallacy of the wrong level of analysis"
(Galtung, 1967:45), whereby inferences are made to another theoretical unit than that
observed.
This work has bridged the early hazards research paradigm and the later, more policy-
orientated, approach of Penning-Rowsell et al (1986). It has adapted these to a form of
research design more appropriate to the urban British situation by bringing together the
environmental, individual and institutional strands within the single issue of floodplain
management and even within a single case study. There is a need however to advance this
study area by similarly examining other institutional and societal levels and their role in
floodplain (or catchment) management.
Future hazards research could benefit from a change of disciplinary emphasis: incorporating
a greater contribution to its traditional geographical base from sociological, political, and
anthropological perspectives. This would provide a wider theoretical base.
15.4 Methodological issues: quantitative and qualitative research designs
This research project has usefully combined quantitative and qualitative methods in various
ways: using different data sources (written documents, personal interviews and newspaper
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articles); making comparisons across quantitative studies; using both an observer and a
participant observer's role to gain understanding of the internal operation of the NRA as a
public institution.
Kates (1964) used the concept of "interpretation" to describe "the process whereby
information is referred to an individual's underlying perception of the state of nature, and is
assimilated in a unique personal way" (1964:49): this concept is closely allied to the pursuit
of the "unique personal culture" of qualitative investigation. It can best be examined
qualitatively, most particularly because of its extreme individualist focus: it is not possible
to aggregate unique personal cultures.
The qualitative studies have suggested that the adoption of a more anthropological approach
would be fruitful: to re-examine - at all analytical levels - the floodplain management milieu
as a strange culture: to avoid the constraints on the development of research direction which
can come from the imposition of a detailed prior model of research design.
15.4.1 'Underdog' research
The research discussed here has sometimes seemed to polarise the views of two groups:
floodplain residents and engineers, and has adopted, at times, an adversarial and polemical
stance in favour of the former. This is akin to a study of - in Silverman's (1985) terminology
- 'underdogs' and 'top dogs' respectively. Silverman raises the issue of studies of the
powerless sections of society ('underdogs') and calls for an element of balance through the
study of 'top dogs' of which, he claims, too little is known (1985:19). This fails to
acknowledge, however, a major purpose of such studies which aim, not only to describe a
relatively unknown sector of the community but also, by giving expression to its views, to
partly redress a social power imbalance. The latter purpose (and its inherent partisanship)
must, in a small way, be acknowledged for this research.
While of a different scale to the major studies of the Chicago School of sociologists, this
study has aimed to illustrate (if not redress) a power imbalance in floodplain management
where, despite recent moves towards greater public consultation and 'giving the public what
it wants', it is the organizational goals and aspirations that are dominant. Public institutions
should be open to public scrutiny in order to control self-serving and self-perpetuating
tendencies. However, to counterbalance the possibility of an underlying partiality, this
research has attempted, in Popperian terms, to identify those cases or issues which undermine
('falsify') the stated hypotheses and has presented them where found.
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15.5 Future research directions
It was stated above that the revised conceptual model (Figure 14.2: Factors of choice and
constraint in flood defence), while comprising a development of earlier research, simply
provides a more appropriate starting point for future research in this field but not a
concluding statement. Furthermore, it was suggested that this research has ended where it
should rightly have begun. This suggests that hazards research, despite many years of
investigation, remains open for new contributions.
The study focus used above could be adapted and enlarged to include aspects of floodplain
management in countries other than England and Wales. It would be of both academic and
applied interest to examine North American floodplain management from the (ethnographic)
perspective of a non-native and with the benefit of the revised model and the main study
fmdings. In other words, to take the revised hazards research model back to its country and
culture of origin to investigate, inter alia, how far the extension of the individual focus, to
incorporate the institutional and societal, is appropriate outside the national bounds of the
present study; and to incorporate social and cultural anthropological methods to examine the
engineering culture of the U.S.A. C.E. and other institutions active in floodplain management.
It is perhaps more important, however, to approach the flood problems of other developed
and developing countries from the suggested, alternative starting point if they too, in their
often desperate need to manage catastrophic flooding, are not to implement inappropriate
structural controls - with all their inherent potential for adverse environmental (and social)
impact - when it is social, cultural and political solutions that may be required.
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APPENDIX A
Appendix A: 1
Appendix A-2.1: Influential factors in hazards research findings (after McKay, 1984)
ATTRIBUTES
	
INFLUENTIAL
	
NOT INFLUENTIAL
SEX Men more likely to
determine family
response to flood hazard
(James, 1974).
Sex not related to
awareness of flood risk
(Kates, 1971; Mileti et
al, 1975; McPherson,
1977).
Sex not related to flood
hazard perception
(Parker, 1976).
LENGTH OF
RESIDENCE
TENURE
EDUCATION
Longer residence, more
aware (Waterstone,
1978).
People living in same
house longer than 5
years, less likely to
evacuate than those
resident less than 5 years
(Baker, 1979),
Home owners more
likely to mitigate
(Waterstone, 1978).
Urban homeowners more
sensitive to hazard
charcteristics; rural =
opposite (Burton et al,
1978).
The more educated the
respondent, the higher
the tendency to feel that
the flood problem should
be solved (McPherson,
1977).
Hazard awareness
increases with higher
education but college
graduates are less
prepared than those with
some college education
(Turner, 1979).
Length of residence not
related to awareness of
flood problem or
inclination to act
(McPherson, 1977).
Tenure not related to
flood hazard perception
(Parker, 1976).
Education not influential
in respondents'
inclination to act
(McPherson, 1977).
Education not significant
in future flood
expectation (Kates,
1962).
Appendix A: 2
ATTRIBUTES
AGE
NOT INFLUENTIAL
Socio-economic
indicators not associated
with attitudes to future
flooding (Burton, 1961).
Appendix A-2.1 continued.
FAMILY/
HOUSEHOLD
STRUCTURE
GROUP
MEMBERSHIP
SOCIO-ECONOMIC
INDICATORS
DISTANCE FROM
THE RIVER
INFLUENTIAL
Age associated with
perception of importance
of flood and knowledge
of local flood problem:
younger respondents
more aware (Handmer,
1979).
Age associated with
hazard awareness:
younger respondents
more aware (Waterstone,
1978).
Single family structure
more likely to take
action; however, homes
with school age children
are less aware of
earthquake hazard than
those without children
(Turner, 1979).
Families with children
under 16 less aware of a
flood problem (Parker,
1976).
Group membership has a
positive association with
attitude to structural
solutions (James, 1974).
Socio-economic class
associated with greater
knowledge of flood
protection structures
(Roder, 1961).
Nearer to the river,
more aware of flood
hazard (Waterstone,
1978).
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Appendix A-4.1: Conceptual propositions underlying the research design (DWSC/89)
1.	 That the more highly valued (objective assessment) an environment, the less
environmental change (e.g. a structural flood defence scheme) will be tolerated;
2.	 That those people who, generally, value the environment highly (subjective assessment),
will be less likely to tolerate environmental change (and vice versa);
3.	 That those most concerned/worried about the flood risk, are likely to tolerate higher levels
of environmental change arising from structural flood defence schemes (and vice versa);
4.	 That there exists a scale of (flood) risk matched to a scale of willingness to tolerate
environmental change;
5.	 That those people who live in areas subject to recent high levels of environmental change
will be more likely to accept further environmental change (e.g. in the form of a structural
flood defence scheme) (and vice versa);
6.	 That those people who have experienced flooding will:
a) be more aware of future flood risk;
b) be better informed about flood alleviation proposals;
c) be more favourably disposed to proposed flood defence works (and vice versa);
7.	 That those people who live nearest to the river will be most aware of the flood risk (and
vice versa);
8.	 That those people who live nearest to the river will be more likely to accept structural
flood alleviation measures (and vice versa);
9.	 That those people belonging to organizations/community groups etc will be more likely to:
a) be aware of scheme proposals (should any exist)
b) take a critical stance re scheme proposals (and vice versa);
10.	 That those people who often use local open spaces/recreational areas will be less tolerant
of proposed environmental change (and vice versa).
OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS REQUIRED (numbers relate to previous section)
1.1	 environmental value - objective
1.2	 environmental change
1.3	 toleration of environmental change
2	 environmental value - subjective
3.1	 flood hazard (objective)
3.2	 flood hazard perception
3.3	 worry about flooding
4	 scale of risk
6	 flood experience (personal/subjective)
6a	 awareness of future flood risk
6b	 knowledge about flooding/personal information level
6c	 attitude to flood alleviation schemes/proposals
7	 nearness to river
9	 group/organization membership
9a	 awareness/knowledgeability of scheme proposals
9b	 critical attitude to scheme proposals
10.1	 open space/recreational areas
10.2 measure of use of local open space/recreational areas
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Appendix A-4.1 contd: Operational definitions (Question numbers from DWSC/89)
1.1	 environmental value - objective:
landscape/amenity/recreation/nature conservation, designated areas: local/borough plans;
reports from environmental and other organizations.
1.2	 environmental change:
attitude statements (Question 6) and BSAS questions (Questions 7, 8).
1.3	 toleration of environmental change
measurement of (1.2) above
2	 environmental value - subjective:
attitude statements (Question 6), Questions 2, 3.
3.1	 flood hazard (objective):
technical data/models etc.
3.2	 flood hazard perception:
attitude statements (Questions 13, 14, 15, 17, 19).
3.3	 worry about flooding:
attitude statements (Questions 14, 15), Question 16.
4	 scale of risk tolerance:
high/medium/low? assessed from previous answers and Question 18
6	 flood experience (personal/subjective):
Questions 10, 11.
6a	 awareness/expectation of present/future flood risk:
attitude statements (Questions 14, 15), Questions 13, 17, 19.
6b	 knowledge about flooding/personal information level?:
Questions 10, 19.
6c	 attitude to flood alleviation schemes/proposals:
attitude statements (Question 24).
7	 nearness to river:
map data.
9	 group/organization membership:
Question 41.
9a	 awareness/knowledgeability of scheme proposals:
Not applicable for this survey.
9b	 critical attitude to scheme proposals:
assessed from Question 24 above
10.1	 open space/recreational areas:
map data + local/borough plans
10.2 measure of use of local open space/recreational areas:
Questions 4, 5.
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Appendix A-4.1 contd: Conceptual propositions (appropriate question numbers from
DWSC/89)
1	 That:
the more highly valued (objective assessment) an environment,
the less environmental change will be tolerated;
2	 That:
those people who, generally, value the environment highly (subjective assessment)
(Q2 9 3, 6),
will be less likely to tolerate environmental change; and vice versa (Q7, 8)
3	 That:
those most concerned/worried about the flood risk (Q12, 16), are likely to tolerate
higher levels of environmental change; and vice versa (Q7, 8)
4	 That:
there exists a scale of risk
matched to a scale of willingness to tolerate environmental change;
6	 That:
those people who have experienced flooding (Q10) will:
a) be more aware of future flood risk (Q19) ;
b) be better informed about flood alleviation proposals (n/a);
c) be more favourably disposed to proposed flood alleviation works (Q24);
7	 That:
those people who live nearest to the river (Distance from the river
measurement) will be most aware of the flood risk (Q19) ;
[be most aware of past flooding (Q13)];
be more likely to accept structural flood alleviation measures (Q24, 28);
9	 That:
those people belonging to organizations/community groups etc (Q41) will be more
likely to:
a) be aware of scheme proposals (should any exist) (n/a);
b) take a critical stance re scheme proposals (Q24);
10	 That:
those people who often use local open spaces/recreational areas (Q5)
will be less tolerant of proposed environmental change (Q24);
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Appendix B-1: Thames Perception and Attitude Survey (1989) Questionnaire
MIDDLESEX POLYTECHNIC
FLOOD HAZARD RESEARCH CENTRE
CONFIDENTIAL
THAMES ATTITUDE SURVEY
BASELINE QUESTIONNAIRE: DATCHET - WALTON BRIDGE
FOR OFFICE USE ONLY
Questionnaire number 	
Location 	
Grid Reference'
	
Distance from river
Within x metres.... ..1 	
Beyond x metres.	 2 	
Interviewer Name 	
Interview No 	
Date 	 1989 	
Time interview started 	
Time interview finished 	
Length of interview (minutes) 	
Does the dwelling where the interview was carried out
have a ground floor?
[CIRCLE CODE THAT APPLIES]
Yes.... ..1 ........
No..2 ........
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2We are carrying out a survey for the Flood Hazard Research
Centre at Middlesex Polytechnic. The aim of the survey is
to find out peoples' views on, and use of, local amenities
and recreational areas; and how people feel about river
management and environmental and planning issues.
The Flood Hazard Research Centre is responsible for
designing the survey and for analysing and reporting the
results. The survey is supported by, but is independent of,
the National Rivers Authority Unit of Thames Water. The
survey is completely confidential. The names and views of
individuals participating will not be revealed to anyone
outside the Centre and results will be published in
statistical and unidentifiable form only.
1. How long have you lived in...
Datchet/Wraysbury/Hythe End/Egham/Staines/Thorpe/
Laleham/Chertsey/Shepperton/Weybridge/Walton?
[INTERVIEWER TO SELECT AND CIRCLE APPROPRIATE NAME]
la. And how long have you lived at this address?
[ROUND UP TO NEAREST YEAR]
•
2. What are the advantages or disadvantages of
living locally?
[SHOW CARD A]
Please rate each of the following on a scale of
-5, major disadvantage to +5, major advantage.
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
	
major	 neither	 major
	
disadvantage	 one	 advantage
nor the other
[RECORD CODE IN CODING COLUMN	 CODE
FOR EACH ITEM]
a) Access to work.
	
b) Rates 	
	
c) Being near the river 	
	
d) Housing 	
	
e) Availability of wildlife habitats 	
	
f) Countryside nearby 	
g) Shopping facilities 	
h) Neat and clean town 	
i) Risk of river flooding 	
j) Attractive environment 	
k) Transport facilities 	
	
1) Open spaces for outdoor recreation 	
	
m) Other local leisure and recreational facilities 	
	
n) Any other...please specify 	
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other(s):
a	 b	 c
3
3. So, generally, how do you rate this local area
as a place to live, on a scale of
-5, very bad to +5, very good
[SHOW CARD B] [RECORD CODE IN CODING COLUMN]
CODE
	
-5	 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 	
	
very	 neither	 very
	
bad	 good nor bad	 good
4. Have you visited the River Thames or other rivers
near here for recreation in the last 12 months?
[CIRCLE CODE THAT APPLIES]
Yes, Thames.... ..1 ........
Yes, other(s)...please specify.... ..2 ........
None.... ..0 ........
[IF NONE, GO TO 5]
[IF YES]
4a. About how often do you make these visits?
[READ OUT]
[CIRCLE CODE THAT APPLIES] R. Thames
	
Daily 	 1 
	
Weekly 	 2
	Fortnightly 	 3 
	M nthly 	 4
	At least 4 times a year 	 5 
	2 or 3 times a year 	 6
	Annuall  	 7 
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45. Have you visited for recreation any of the following parks,
recreation grounds, local areas of open space or countryside,
including footpaths, in the last 12 months?
[SHOW CARD C (MAP A)]
[IF YES, CIRCLE ALL CODES THAT APPLY]
[IF NONE (CODE 41), GO TO 5b] how rank
ften top 3
DATCHET
	
Datchet Reservoir ..... 1..
	 ....
	
'Thames Water' Lakes ..... 2..
	
....
	
Windsor Home Park ..... 3..
	
......
	
Ham Fields ..... 4..
	 ......
WRAYSBURY
	
Kingsmead..... 5..	 ......
	
Sunnymeads..... 6..	 ......
	
Wraysbury No. 1 and No. 2 ..... 7..
	 ......
	
Ankerwycke Priory ..... 8..
	 ......
	
Heron Lake ..... 9..
	 ......
	
Windsor Great Park....10..
	
......
EGHAM
Englefield Green... .11..
Coopers Hill Slope... .12.
Runnymede....13..
Langham Pond SSSI....14..
Whitehall Lane/Great Fosters/Muckhatch Farm area... .15..
Callow Hill Woodland... .16..
Virginia Water... .17..
Pooley Green/Egham Hythe Recreation Ground....18..
STAINES
Staines Moor.. ..19..
Staines Reserynirs....20..
Shortwood Common... .21..
Queensmead Lake... .22..
Lammas Park... .23..
THORPE
Royal Hythe Farm/Norlands Lane... .24..
Fields Ten Acre Lane area....25..
Thorpe Park... .26..
St Anne's Hill... .27..
Penton Hook Island and area....28..
CHERTSEY
Laleham Park, Thames-side/Laleham Campsite and Abbey... .29..
Abbey Chase, Abbey Field... .30..
Abbey Mead....31..
Dockett Eddy Lane... .32..
Dumsey Eyot....33..
Chertsey Meads....34..
Addlestonemoor....35 	
SHEPPERTON/WEYBRIDGE/WALTON
Footpath routes - Wey navigation... .36
Shepperton Ranges....37
Desborough Island....38
Walton Bridge.	 39
Anywhere else? please specify....40
None of these....41
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5[IF YES, HAVE VISITED SITES]
5a. About how often do you make visits
to each of the areas?
[READ OUT]
[RECORD APPROPRIATE CODE IN 'HOW OFTEN'
COLUMN PREVIOUS PAGE]
Daily 	 1 
Weekly 	 2
Fortnightly 	 3
Monthly 	 4
At least 4 times a year 	 5
2 or 3 times a year 	 6
Annually 	 7
5b.Which of these parks, recreation grounds, local areas
of open space or countryside, including footpaths,
if any, is most valuable to you and why?
Please could you rank up to 3 areas in terms of
their value to you?
[WRITE IN NAME OF AREA AND PROBE WHY]
[RANK 3 MOST IMPORTANT AREAS IN 'RANK 3'
COLUMN PREVIOUS PAGE]
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66. Here are some general statements that people have made
about the environment and today's society.
They are not questions and there are no right or wrong
answers, we would just like your opinions on the
statements and whether you agree or disagree with them
and how strongly?
Please rate them on a scale of 1, strongly agree to
5, strongly disagree.
.1
	
2	 3	 4	 5
strongly agree	 neither disagree strongly
agree	 agree nor	 disagree
disagree
[SHOW CARD D]
[RECORD CODE 1-5 IN CODING COLUMN FOR EACH STATEMENT]
CODE
a) People are more important than the environment
b) Most insects are pests and wouldn't be missed
C) Industry should keep prices down even if this
causes damage to the environment 	
d) It's wrong to use animals to test the safety of
cosmetics 	
e) We should live in harmony with Nature even if it
means some sacrifices on our part 	
f) I like to be in the open air of the countryside 	
g) We have to be prepared to accept a lower standard
of living in order to protect the environment 	
h) It's right to use animals for medical research 	
i) We have no choice: we have to protect the environment
or we will destroy the human race 	
j) The main reason for protecting the countryside is its
importance for recreation 	
k) The Earth and Nature are fragile and we can easily
cause irreversible damage 	
1) I would love to see a kingfisher
m) The most important problems to-day are economic
problems, like inflation or unemployment 	
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71	 2	 3	 4	 5
strongly agree
	 neither disagree strongly
agree
	 agree nor	 disagree
disagree
n) The main reason for protecting plants is that we can
never know when a plant might turn out to have
important medical or other uses
	
o) I love seeing butterflies and dragonflies
	
p) New jobs must be created, even if this sometimes causes
damage to the environment
	
q) Today's society is too materialistic
	
r) These days, morality and trying to do what's right
don't seem to matter
s) We owe a duty to animals and nature, they don't exist
just for our enjoyment and use
	
t) Without economic growth, our country will not be able
to afford to do the things we want
	
u) I want my children and grandchildren to see and enjoy
those things I enjoyed as a child
	
v) If we kept on worrying about the future, nothing
would ever get done
	
w) The most important problems to-day are the threats
to the environment
x) Scientists will always be able to find the solution
to a problem 	
y) We seem to know the price of everything and the
value of nothing
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87. I would like to ask you whether you think the local
countryside and open spaces have changed in the
last 20 years?
Do you think: [READ OUT]
[CIRCLE CODE THAT APPLIES]
	
They are much the same.... ..1 	
	
They have changed a bit.... ..2 	
	
They have changed a lot.... ..3 	
don't know .
	
-9 	
[IF CHANGED]
7a. Do you think the local countryside and open spaces
have changed for the better or worse?
[CIRCLE CODE THAT APPLIES]
	
better.... ..1 	
	
worse.... ..2 	
	
better in some ways/worse in others.... ..3 	
don't know	 -9 	
8. I would like to ask you whether you are concerned
about things that may happen to the local countryside
and open spaces.
[CIRCLE CODE THAT APPLIES]
Are you: [READ OUT]
Veryconcerned.... ..1
Quite concerned.... ..2
A bit concerned.... ..3
Not particularly concerned.... ..4
Not at all concerned.... ..5
9. Have you ever done any of the following
[SHOW CARD El [CIRCLE ALL CODES THAT APPLY]
Yes No
a) Contacted MP or Local Councillor....
b) Contacted Government or Local Council Department....
c) Contacted radio, T.V. or newspaper....
d) Signed a petition....
e) Joined an action/protest group....
f) Given money to a campaign....
g ) Volunteered to work for a campaign....
h) Attended a public meeting....
i) None of these....
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9FLOOD RISK AND FLOOD PROTECTION
Now I would like to ask you some questions about
flood risk and flood protection.
10. Have you ever experienced flooding from a river in your
house or garden?
[CIRCLE CODE THAT APPLIES]
Yes....
No....
[IF NO GO TO 11]
[IF YES]
10a. Was that at this address, elsewhere or both?
[CIRCLE CODE THAT APPLIES]
This address....
Elsewhere....
Both....
[IF THIS ADDRESS OR BOTH GO TO 10b]
[IF ELSEWHERE OR BOTH GO TO 10c]
10b. When you were flooded at this address,
was that in the house and garden or the
garden only, and how many times?
[WRITE IN NUMBER OF TIMES]
[NEVER = 0]
House and garden
Garden only
[IF ELSEWHERE OR BOTH]
10c. When you were flooded elsewhere,
was that in the house and garden or the
garden only, and how many times?
[WRITE IN NUMBER OF TIMES]
[NEVER = 0]
House and garden
Garden only
10d. And where was that?
[RECORD ADDRESS IF WITHIN STUDY AREA;
IF NOT, JUST RECORD NAME OF GENERAL AREA]
..1 ........
..2 ........
..1 ........
..2 ........
..3 ........
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CODE
10
10e. Thinking of the worst flood you've experienced,
how serious were the effects of the flood upon
the household's life?
Please rate the effects on a scale from
0, not at all serious to 10, extremely serious
[SHOW CARD F]
[RECORD CODE IN CODING COLUMN]
CODE
	
0	 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 	
	
not at all	 extremely
	
serious	 serious
10f. Was that at this address or elsewhere?
[CIRCLE CODE THAT APPLIES]
This address....
Elsewhere.. .please specify....
..1 ........
..2 ........
10g. What year was that?
[WRITE YEAR IN CODING COLUMN]
11. Have you known personally anyone who has
experienced flooding in their house or garden?
[CIRCLE CODE THAT APPLIES] Yes....
No
. .1 ........
2 
12. If your house were to be flooded from the Thames
or other rivers, how serious do you think the
effects would be on the life of your household?
Please rate this event on the following scale:
{SHOW CARD F AGAIN]
[RECORD CODE IN CODING COLUMN] CODE
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
not at all
serious
8 9 10 	
extremely
serious
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13. Are you aware of...
Datchet/Wraysbury/Hythe End/Egham/Staines/Thorpe/
Laleham/Chertsey/Shepperton/Weybridge/Walton
	
[CIRCLE APPROPRIATE NAME]
...having been flooded in the last 50 years?
[CIRCLE CODE THAT APPLIES]
Yes.... ..1 ........
No.... ..2 ........
Don't know	 -9 	
[IF NO GO TO 14]
[IF YES]
13a. When was that?
[WRITE DATE(S) ON DOTTED LINES,
LEAVE CODING COLUMN FREE]
13b. Was this house or garden affected by the
flooding that occurred then?
[CIRCLE ALL CODES THAT APPLY]
House....
Garden....
Yes No dk
.1...2..-9
.1...2..-9
[IF YES]
13c. What was the depth of flooding here?
[DON'T KNOW = -9]
[WRITE IN FEET/INCHES/METRES - PLEASE SPECIFY]
[LEAVE CODING COLUMN FREE]
DATE*
	
DATE°
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13f. Do you have any photographs of the flood(s)?
Yes.... ..
No.... ..2
13g. Do you have any
of the flooding?
other recollections
Yes... .1
No... ..2
........
........
........
........
12
13d. Do you know if the flooding was caused by
river flooding or by some other cause such as
blocked drains etc?
Don't know.... .	 -9 	
River flooding.... ..1 ........
Other cause, please specify. 2 
DATE.	
DATE•	
[IF RIVER FLOODING]
13e. Do you know which river caused the flooding?
Yes (please name).... 1 ........
RIVER 	
No.... . .2 ........
[IF YES TO (f) or (g)]
13h. Would you be willing to lend the photographs
or agree to this information being released to
the National Rivers Authority Unit of Thames
Water, as they are trying to build up a picture
..
131.
of past flooding?	 •
Would you mind possibly being
about your recollections?
Yes....
No....
re-interviewed
Yes....
No....
..1 .....
..2 ........
..1 ........
..2 ........
:
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13
CODE
14. Here are some statements about flooding and what
it is like. I would like to ask you whether you
agree with them or not and how strongly.
Please rate them on a scale of 1, strongly agree to
5, strongly disagree.
[SHOW CARD G]
1
	
2	 3	 4	 5
strongly agree
	 neither disagree strongly
agree	 agree nor	 disagree
disagree
[RECORD CODE 1-5 IN CODING COLUMN
FOR EACH STATEMENT]
a) There are problems getting insurance in this local
area because of the flood risk 	
b) You can get some fun out of every situation - even
flooding 	
C) It takes months rather than weeks to get the house
back to normal after a flood 	
d) Nobody wants to buy your house if it gets flooded 	
e) If you live in flood prone areas, flooding is at
the back of your mind all the time 	
f) If you live in areas liable to flooding, you can't
get any insurance 	
g) We don't have real floods here 	
h) The worst thing about floods is not the monetary
costs but the loss of personal possessions like
letters and photographs 	
i) Flooding brings out the best in people 	
j) A flood affects people's mental and physical
health long after the event 	
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14
CODE
15. Here are some opinions that have been expressed about
the flood risk in this area.
Do you agree or disagree with them, and how strongly?
Please rate them on a scale of 1, strongly agree to
5, strongly disagree.
[SHOW CARD H]
1
	
2	 3	 4	 5
strongly agree	 neither disagree strongly
agree
	
agree nor	 disagree
disagree
[RECORD CODE 1-5 IN CODING COLUMN
FOR EACH STATEMENT]
(a) The Thames Barrier at Woolwich has removed the risk of
flooding in this area 	
(b) Flooding is only likely in the area if rivers, streams,
	
locks and weirs are not properly maintained or operated
(c) Past flooding was a freak event, unlikely to happen again
(d) The likelihood of flooding in the area is increasing all
	
the time because of changes in climate and other things 	
(e) A flood could happen again any year 	
(f) A flood won't happen again because the Water Authority
can now control flooding through river management 	
(g) We are now due for another flood 	
(h) Building roads and houses in the flood plain makes
flooding worse
	
16. How worried are you about the possibility of
flooding in the future in your local area?
Please indicate on a scale of 0, not at all
worried to 6, very worried
[SHOW CARD I] [RECORD CODE IN CODING COLUMN]
	
0	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6 	
	
not at all	 very
worried	 worried
CODE
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15
CODE
17. How likely do you think it is that this
house/flat will be flooded in the following
time periods?
Please rate each of the following on a scale of
0, no chance of flooding to 10, certain to be flooded
[SHOW CARD J]
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
No chance	 Almost certain
[RECORD CODE IN CODING COLUMN FOR EACH ITEM]
(a) In the next 5years .
(b) In the next 10 years 
	
(c) In the next 50 years 	
(d) In the next 100 years
(e) In the next 200 years
	
18. Would you be prepared to live in this same area if the
risk of flooding were as follows:
[SHOW CARD K]
[CIRCLE ALL CODES THAT APPLY]
Yes No
a) a 1 in 200 risk, each and every year,
that your house would be flooded 	 1 2
b) a 1 in 100 risk, each and every year,
that your house would be flooded
	 1 2
c) a 1 in 50 risk, each and every year,
that your house would be flooded 	 1 2
d) a 1 in 25 risk, each and every year,
that your house would be flooded
	 1 2
e) a 1 in 10 risk, each and every year,
that your house would be flooded 	 1 2
f) a 1 in 5 risk, each and every year,
that your house would be flooded 	 1 2
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19b. Were you aware of this possibility when you
moved here?
[CIRCLE CODE THAT APPLIES]
Yes.
No.... ..2
Don't know/can't remember -9
[IF NO]
19c. Would you still have moved here if you had
known of the possibility of flooding?
Yes.... ..1
No.... ..2
Don't know -9
........
........
........
16
19. Flooding has occurred in the past in this study area
- between Datchet and Walton Bridge - and
there is no reason to believe that it will not
happen again. Are you aware that there is this
possibility of flooding?
[CIRCLE THAT WHICH APPLIES]
Yes....
No....
[IF NO GO TO 20]
[IF YES]
19a. Where did you hear this?
[CIRCLE ALL CODES THAT APPLY]
Newspaper....
Television....
Neighbour(s)....
Personal observation/experience....
Other...please specify....
..1 ........
..2 ........
Yes No
[IF YES]
19d. Could you tell me your reasons for moving here
even though you knew about the possibility of
flooding?
[RECORD ANSWER VERBATIM: PROBE]
Appendix B: 23
17
20. The Local Authority is responsible for granting planning
permission to build in the flood plain. The Water
Authority advises it on the flood risk.
Here are some statements about planning and planning
decisions in flood prone areas.
Do you agree or disagree, and how strongly, with the
following statements?
[SHOW CARD L]
Please rate them on a scale of 1, strongly agree to
5, strongly disagree.
1
	
2	 3	 4	 5
strongly agree	 neither disagree strongly
agree	 agree nor	 disagree
disagree
[RECORD CODE 1-5 IN CODING COLUMN
FOR EACH STATEMENT]
CODE
a) Local Authorities shouldn't allow houses to be built
in areas where there is a 1 in 50 risk of flooding 	
b) Local Authorities shouldn't alloy houses to be built
in the wider area where there is a 1 in 100 risk of
flooding 	
c) The Local Authority should ensure that houses are
built with thresholds above the flood level in
flood prone areas 	
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1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
...........
...........
18
21. What restrictions, if any, should the Local Authority
place on new developments and redevelopment in this
study area - between Datchet and Walton Bridge -
because of the flood risk?
[SHOW CARD M] [CIRCLE ALL CODES THAT APPLY]
Should it...	 YES NO
a) allow no new developments in this
area because of the flood risk
b) allow only a percentage of new developments
to be built because of the flood risk
c) allow new developments up to a limited ground cover
size because of the flood risk
d) allow applications for house extensions as long as
they do not exceed 100 square metres because of the
flood risk
e) place no planning restrictions on new developments
or redevelopment because of the flood risk ...............
or do you think there is no flood risk in this area
and therefore no planning restrictions are
necessary
g) other...please specify
.............................................................
.............................................................
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19
URBAN RURAL
1	 1 
2	 2
3	 3
4	 4
Now I would like to ask you some questions about
flood protection.
Water authorities and local authorities can
provide varying degrees of protection from
flooding by structural means such as widening,
dredging and embanking the river and by digging
flood relief channels to carry away flood waters.
They can also provide flood warning systems and
other assistance to reduce the effects of flooding.
22. Could you tell me which of the following alternative
methods of flood protection you would prefer in both
urban and rural areas.
[SHOW CARD N]
For URBAN areas would you prefer:
[CIRCLE CODES 1 or 2, and 3 or 4 IN URBAN CODING COLUMN]
1. floodwalls, of up to a metre in height,
made of concrete or brick
OR
2. embankments, of up to a metre in height,
made of grassed over earth mounds
Would you prefer:
3. a landscaped, concrete-lined flood relief channel to
carry away excess flood waters
OR
4. a landscaped river channel with natural earth banks
to carry away excess flood waters
22a. And for RURAL areas? which would you prefer:
[REPEAT 0.22]
[CIRCLE CODES 1 or 2, and 3 or 4
IN RURAL CODING COLUMN ABOVE]
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23. Here are some factors which people have said should
be taken into account when carrying out river
management and flood relief schemes.
Would you indicate how much weight you think should
be given to each of the following factors.
Please rate them on the following scale
[SHOW CARD 0]
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
	
No	 Very
	
importance	 important
[RECORD CODE 0-10 IN RATING COLUMN
FOR EACH STATEMENT]
RATE
(a) The effect on the landscape 	
(b) The effect on value of houses 	
(c) The effect on wildlife habitats 	
(d) The effect on recreational opportunities for
walking, fishing etc 	
(e) The effect on access to the Thames 	
(f) The effect on historical or archaeological sites
in the area 	
(g) The cost of the works 	
(h) Safety considerations 	
(i) Disturbance to everyday life caused by
construction works
	
(j) Any other factors. Please specify
	
RANK
23a. Now please can you rank the 5 most important from:
1, the most important factor to 5, the least important
[RECORD CODES 1-5 IN RANKING COLUMN ABOVE]
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24. Here are some statements that have been made about
flood protection in this area.
Do you agree or disagree with them and how strongly?
Please rate them on a scale of 1, strongly agree to
5, strongly disagree.
[SHOW CARD P]
1
	
2	 3	 4	 5
strongly agree
	 neither disagree strongly
agree	 agree nor	 disagree
disagree
[RECORD CODE 1-5 IN CODING COLUMN
FOR EACH STATEMENT]
a) Anything designed to reduce flooding is desirable
	
b) There are many more important things which need to be
done than flood relief schemes
	
c) Metre high flood protection embankments spoil the view
	
d) A flood relief scheme should be carried out in this
area regardless of cost
	
e) It is a waste of money to spend it on flood
relief channels: nature will always win in the end
	
f) A flood relief channel could offer new opportunities
for recreation
	
g) I would rather put up with flooding than spoil
the open space here with flood relief channels
	
h) I would rather the Thames were widened and dredged than
a new flood relief channel were dug in this area
	
i) Flood relief schemes will only bring more
development into the area
	
j) A flood relief scheme can enhance the environment
	
k) I would rather have any scheme than be flooded
	
1) I would rather rely on flood warnings and risk being
flooded than have any flood relief scheme in this area.
m) A flood relief channel would be preferable to raised
flood embankments in this area 	
n) A flood relief channel the size of the Thames
would have a terrible impact on the environment
	
o) There is no need for a flood relief scheme in this area
because the flood risk is too low
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Choosing a level of flood protection involves a choice
between the risk and severity of flooding which must be
accepted AND the size of the works required for
protection. The scale of the works depends on the
quantity of floodwater in a given flood.
Works can consist of (amongst other things) one or more
of the following:
a) dredging and widening the river;
b) building floodwalls or embankments;
c) digging new flood channels.
The bigger the flood that you are providing protection
against, the less choice there is in the method of
protection.
25. Can you estimate how much extra flood water there
would be in the Thames in a repeat of the 1947 flood
which was the last major Thames flood? Would it be:
[READ OUT] [CIRCLE CODE THAT APPLIES]
a) half as much again as the Thames can carry to the
top of its banks without flooding
b) the same amount again as the Thames can carry to
the top of its banks without flooding
C) twice as much again as the Thames can carry to the
top of its banks without flooding
d) don't know 	
1 
2 
3 
-9 	
26. Can you estimate how many households between Datchet
and Walton Bridge would be flooded above floor level
in a repeat of the 1947 flood? Would it be:
[SHOW CARD Q]
[CIRCLE CODE THAT APPLIES 	 under 100....
100....
500....
1,000....
5000....
10,000....
20,000....
30,000....
more than 30,000....
don't know....
27. Can you estimate for how long, on average, households
could be flooded in a repeat of the 1947 flood?
Would it be: [READ OUT]
[SHOW CARD R] [CIRCLE CODE THAT APPLIES]
a few hours....
1 day....
3 days....
1 week....
2 weeks....
3 weeks....
longer than 3 weeks....
don't know....
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28. The following are generalised accounts of the kind of
flooding that might occur as a result of floods of
different magnitudes.
Based on these accounts, what level of flood protection do
you think the Water Authority should provide in this study
area - between Datchet and Walton Bridge?
Should it carry out flood protection schemes to help protect
against flooding...
[CIRCLE CODE THAT APPLIES]
1) that has a 1 in 10 chance of happening every year:
which would mean, within a limited area and for a
limited number of people;
a flood that would last for about 1 to 3 days;
involving garden flooding and possibly some flooding
of riverside properties; having to drive through
floodwater; particularly inconvenient for children,
elderly and disabled;
and which would require a fairly low level of
protection;
that would not protect people or property
from rarer floods (with a 1 in 25, 1 in 50, or 1 in 100
chance of happening every year, for instance) that cause
greater damage;
involving limited works to the river and possibly
embanking or building flood walls
	
2) that has a 1 in 25 chance of happening every year:
which would mean, within a larger area and for a
larger number of people;
a flood that would last for about 5 to 6 days;
involving all of the above plus some riverside
houses flooded, work journeys severely disrupted;
foul drainage overflowing and contaminating floodwaters;
severe annoyance;
and which would require a medium level of protection;
that would not protect people or property from rarer
floods (with a 1 in 50, or 1 in 100 chance of happening
every year, for instance);
involving dredging, widening and embanking of the
River Thames and possibly building flood walls
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3) that has a 1 in 50 chance of happening every year:
which would mean, over a much larger area and for a
much greater number of people,
a flood that would last for about a week to 10 days;
involving all of the above plus work journeys impossible;
water entering many outhouses and house foundations;
some house flooding with water above floor level;
severe annoyance and financial loss and worry;
localised loss of services (gas, electricity,
telephone etc);
and which would require a high level of protection;
that would not protect people or property from rarer
floods (with a 1 in 100 chance of happening every year,
for instance);
possibly involving a flood relief channel
4) that has a 1 in 100 chance of happening every year:
which would mean, over a considerable area and for a
communities of people;
flooding that would last for about a fortnight or more;
involving all of the above plus house flooding with
water above floor level; widespread disruption;
general loss of services (gas, electricity, telephone etc)
substantial financial losses and worry;
and which would require a very high level of protection;
probably involving a flood relief channel and
other works
e) No flood protection scheme
28a. What was the most important factor in making
your choice?
Could you rank the following factors
from 1 most important to 4 least important factor.
[WRITE CODES IN RANKING COLUMN]
[IF ALL EQUALLY IMPORTANT RECORD 1 AGAINST f.]
RANK
	
a) the frequency of flooding 	
	
b) the area and number of people to be affected 	
c) the nature of the flooding in terms of the likely
	
distress and disruption 	
d) the nature of the flood protection works.... 	
	
e) other.. .please specify 	
	
f) all equally important
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29. Do you think that the Water Authority should provide the
same level of flood protection throughout the study area
between Datchet and Walton Bridge - or should it provide
different levels of flood protection depending on local
conditions and the wishes of local communities?
[CIRCLE CODE THAT APPLIES]
Same level of protection throughout the study area 	 ..1 ........
Different levels of protection depending on local
conditions and the wishes of local communities.... ..2 ........
[IF 2, GO TO 29a.]
29a. Would you choose a different level of protection,
and if so what, for your local area?
Yes, different.... ..1 ........
No, the same.... ..2 ........
[IF YES, DIFFERENT, REFER BACK TO
GENERALISED ACCOUNTS IN 28. ABOVE]
[CIRCLE CODE THAT APPLIES]
1 IN 10.... ..1 ........
1 IN 25.... ..2 ........
1 IN 50.... ..3 ........
1 IN 100.... ..4 ........
NONE.... ..5 ........
OTHER.. .PLEASE SPECIFY.... ..6 ........
30. DO you feel you have enough information with which
to decide the level of flood protection you would
like for the study area - between Datchet and
Walton Bridge?
[CIRCLE CODE THAT APPLIES]	 Yes.... ..1 ........
No..2 ........
[IF YES, GO TO 30b.]
[IF NO]
30a. What kind of information do you think would
be helpful?
[RECORD VERBATIM AND PROBE]
30b. Do you have any other comments to make on
flood protection?
[RECORD VERBATIM AND PROBE]
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31. The NRA Unit of Thames Water Authority is currently the main
body responsible for designing and implementing schemes
to protect against river flooding in this area.
Here are some statements that have been made about
the way the Water Authority carries out this
responsibility.
Do you agree or disagree with the following statements
and how strongly?
[SHOW CARD U]
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 -9
strongly agree	 neither disagree strongly don't
agree	 agree nor	 disagree know
disagree
[RECORD CODE 1 TO -9 IN CODING COLUMN
FOR EACH STATEMENT]
CODE
(a) The Water Authority knows best what kind of flood
relief scheme is needed: I trust their experts' opinion..
(b) The Water Authority only proposes flood relief
schemes when they are really needed to reduce the
flood risk 	
(c) The Water Authority can now control flooding through
river management so that flood relief schemes are not
necessary 	
(d) The Water Authority cannot be relied upon to
design an environmentally sensitive flood relief
scheme 	
(e) The Water Authority doesn't take the public's views
into account when deciding on a flood relief scheme 	
(f) The Water Authority consults the people affected
fully when developing plans for a flood relief scheme
(g) Some people affected by a flood relief scheme have
more influence on the decisions of the Water Authority
than others 	
(h) The Water Authority spends too much money on
flood relief schemes
	
(i) The Water Authority designs flood relief schemes
that enhance the local environment
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32. If the National Rivers Authority Unit of Thames Water
were to propose a flood relief scheme for this area,
how soon do you think it should consult the public?
Should it consult them...
[SHOW CARD V]
[CIRCLE CODE THAT APPLIES]
a) Before it selects any options for the design or
route'	 1 
b) When it has selected a number of possible options
for the design and route so that the public can
choose between them'	 2 
c) When it has chosen a preferred option for the
design and route for people to comment upon'	 3 
d) Or do you think it shouldn't consult at all but
should go ahead with whatever it thinks best 	 4 
e) Other.. .please specify	 5 
33. In your view, should the NRA Unit of Thames Water...
[SHOW CARD W]
[CIRCLE CODE THAT APPLIES]
a) only consult the general public directly 	 1 
b) only consult through representatives such as
parish councils, residents' committees,
wildlife and amenity groups etc	 2 
C) consult both the public directly and through
representatives	 3 
d) shouldn't consult	 4 
e) other.. .please specify 	 5 
34. How would you prefer to be consulted about any
flood risk or flood relief proposals for this area?
[CIRCLE ALL CODES THAT APPLY]
[SHOW CARD X]
a) Public meetings....
b) Walk-round exhibitions....
c) Video presentations....
d) Regular newsletters....
e) Other...please specify....
Yes No
............................................................. ...........
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GENERAL.
These questions are standard for questionnaires and are
only for our own classification purposes. Your answers
are entirely confidential.
28
35. Respondents sex
[CIRCLE CODE THAT APPLIES]
Female 	 0
Male 	 1
36. To which of the following age groups do you belong?
Under 18 	 1
18 - 34 	 2
35 - 54 	 3
55+ 	 4
37. How many people are there in your household in each
of the following groups?
[RECORD NUMBER IN EACH GROUP ON DOTTED
LINE BUT LEAVE CODING COLUMN FREE]
Children 10 and under 	
Children 11 - 16 	
Adults aged 65 and over 	
Other adults 	
38. Can you tell me at what age you completed
full-time education 	
Still in full-time education 	 1
39.	 Do you own your own home?
Yes 	 1
No 	 2
40. Which of the letters on this card represents
the gross annual income, from all sources, of
your household?
[SHOW CARD Y] [CIRCLE THAT WHICH APPLIES]
g	 under	 5,000 	 1
d	 5,001 -	 10,000 	 2
s	 10,001 -	 15,000 	 3
b	 15,001	 -	 20,000 	 4
e	 20,001 -	 25,000 	 5
m25,000 and over.... ..6 ........
[CODE BUT DON'T READ OUT]
Refused
	
7
Don't know -9 	
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Yes No
1
2
41. Would you please tell me whether you are a member
of, or regularly give money to, any of the following
organisations?
[SHOW CARD Z]
National Trust.
World Wide Fund for Nature
(used to be the World Wildlife Fund) ....
A Political Party ....
Local or County Naturalists' Trust ..
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds.
A Sports Club.
A Civic or Community Association....
Any other environmental group
(e.g. Greenpeace/Friends of the Earth) ....
41a. Is there anyone else in your household who is a
member of, or regularly gives money to, any of
these organizations?
Yes....
No....
Don't know.
... 1...2....
... 1...2....
... 1...2....
... 1...2....
... 1...2....
... 1...2....
.. 1...2....
..1 ........
..2 ........
-9 	
42. Does your insurance policy/policies cover the
risk of flooding?
[CIRCLE CODE THAT APPLIES]
Yes.
No. .
Don't know.
Don't have any insurance....
	
1	
	
2	
	
-9 	
	
..3 	
43. Have you taken any precautions against flooding?
Yes 	
No
[IF YES]
43a. What precautions have you taken?
[RECORD VERBATIM]
..............................................
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That is the end of the questionnaire and I would like to thank you for
giving so much of your time.
It would be helpful if you could give me your name, address and telephone
number as the Flood Hazard Research Centre makes random checks to ensure
that interviews have been carried out satisfactorily. These details will
be on a detachable sheet and the confidentiality of your answers is
assured. Please do not feel you have to give these details if you do not
wish to.
RESPONDENT'S NAME 	
RESPONDENT'S ADDRESS 	
RESPONDENT'S TELEPHONE NUMBER 	
INTERVIEW NUMBER 	
INTERVIEWER'S NAME 	
INTERVIEWER'S SIGNATURE 	
ADDITIONAL NOTES 	
FOR OFFICE USE ONLY:
QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER-
[MAINBASE SUMMER 1989]
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Appendix B-2: 'The River Environment and You' Postai Survey (1990)
The River Environment
and You
Middlesex Polytechnic
*Flood Hazard Research Centre
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CONFIDENTIAL
For your assurance:
(1) the names and views of individuals participating
in this survey will not be revealed to anyone
outside the Flood Hazard Research Centre; and
(2) the results will be published in an
unidentifiable statistical form only.
MIDDLESEX POLYTECHNIC
FLOOD HAZARD RESEARCH CENTRE
11:: THE RIVER ENVIRONMENT AND YOU
Please write any extra comments you would like to make on the blank
areas of the questionnaire, but leave the right hand margin free.
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[0 . 1]	 How long have you lived in this area?
	 Years	 	 Months
[0 .2 ]	 What are the advantages or disadvantages of living
locally?
PLEASE RATE EACH OF THE FOLLOWING ON A SCALE OF:
1 • Major disadvantage, to 5 = Major advantage
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Major Disadvantage Neither Advantage	 Major
Disadvantage	 advantage	 advantage
nor
disadvantage
PLEASE WRITE EACH RATING NUMBER IN THE BOX PROVIDED
(a) Ease of access to work 	
(b) New building developments 	
(c) Being near the river 	
(d) Aircraft noise 	
(e) Attractive countryside 	
(i) Risk of river flooding 	
(g) Any other? 	
[0. 3 ]	 So, how do you rate this local area generally as a
place to live?
On a scale of: 0 = Very bad, to 10 = Very good
PLEASE TICK BOX
•
Very
	
Very
bad
	
good
012
	
5 6 7 8 9	 10
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(O.4]	 Do you visit the river(s) nearby for recreation?
PLEASE TICK BOX
Yes 	 0 No 	 1-1
[0.4a]	 IF YES, Which river(s) do you visit and how often?
NAME OF RIVER 	
PLEASE TICK BOX	 daily 	
weekly 	
monthly  -
twice a year
	
once a year
NAME OF SECOND RIVER 	
PLEASE TICK BOX	 daily 	
weekly 	
monthly 	
twice a year 	
once a year 	
[0.4b)	 What is it that you like about visiting the river?
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[0.5]	 Here are some general statements that people have made
about the environment and today's society. They are not
questions and there are no right or wrong answers -
we would just like your opinions on the statements.
PLEASE RATE THEM ON A SCALE OF:
1 • Strongly agree, to 5 = Strongly disagree
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Strongly	 Agree	 Neither	 Disagree Strongly
agree	 agree nor	 disagree
disagree
PLEASE WRITE EACH NUMBER IN THE BOX PROVIDED
(a) People are more important than the environment .
(b) We should live in harmony with Nature even if it
means some sacrifices on our part 	
[--]
(c) The most important problems today are the
threats to the environment 	
(d) It's right to use animals for medical research. 	 .1n1.
(e) Scientists will always be able to find the
solution to a problem 	
(f) These days, morality and trying to do what's
right don't seem to matter 	  r--]
LI(g) The most important problems today are economicproblems, like unemployment or inflation 	
(h) It's wrong to use animals to test the safety of
cosmetics 	
(i) I like to be in the open air of the countryside
(j) We seem to know the price of everything and the
value of nothing 	
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Now we would like to ask you some questions about flood risk and
flood protection.
[0.6]	 Have you ever experienced flooding from a river in
your house or garden?
PLEASE. TICK BOX:	 Yes 	 	 No 	
IF 'YES', GO ON TO ANSWER QUESTION [Q.6a]
IF 'NO', GO ON TO [Q.7]
[Q.6a1	 When did you experience flooding from a river in
your house or garden? (Month/Year)
House 	
Garden
[Q.6b]	 When you experienced flooding, was that at this address
or elsewhere?
PLEASE TICK BOX
This address 	 	 elsewhere
[Q.6c]	 Do you know which river caused the flooding?
No, I don't know (please tick) 	
Yes, the name of the river is
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Thinking of the worst flood you've experienced, how
serious were the effects of the flood upon the
household's life?
PLEASE RATE THE EFFECTS ON A SCALE FROM:
0 = Not at all serious, to 10 = Extremely serious
PLEASE TICK BOX
	
Not at all	 Extremely
	
serious
	
serious
0	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10
Please use the space below for any additional comments
about the flood you experienced
..........................................................
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[0.7]	 Are you aware of the flooding that occurred in
February 1990?
PLEASE TICK BIM
In this area?
	 Yes....	 No
In other areas?
	 Yes.... El No	 n
(Q.7a1	 If 'yes', which other areas?
	
(Q.8]	 If your house were to be flooded from the Thames or
other rivers, how serious do you think the effects
would be on the life of your household?
PLEASE RATE THE LIKELY EFFECTS ON A SCALE FROM:
0 = Not at all serious, to 10 = Extremely serious
PLEASE TICK BOX
	
• Not at all	 Extremely
serious	 serious
0	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10
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(0 .9 1 Here are some statements that people have made about
floods and the flood risk in this area. I would like
to ask you whether you agree with them or not.
PLEASE RATE ON A SCALE OF:
1 = Strongly agree, to 5 = Strongly disagree
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Strongly	 Agree	 Neither	 Disagree Strongly
agree	 agree nor	 disagree
disagree
PLEASE WRITE EACH RATING NUMBER IN THE BOX PROVIDED
(a) A flood could happen again any year
(b) A flood affects people's mental and physical
health long after the event 	
(c) The Thames Barrier at Woolwich has removed the
risk of flooding in this area 	
(d) There are problems getting insurance in this
local area because of the flood risk 	
(e) A flood won't happen again because the National
Rivers Authority can control flooding through
river management 	
(f) The likelihood of flooding is increasing all
the time because of changes in climate and the
global environment 	
(4) We don't have real floods here
(h) Flooding is only likely in the area if rivers,
streams, locks and wiers are not properly
maintained or operated 	
(i) Past flooding was a freak event and is unlikely
to happen again 	
7
7
7
Appendix B: 47
(Q.10]	 How worried are you about the possibility of flooding
in the future in this area?
PLEASE INDICATE ON A SCALE OF:
0 = Not at all worried, to 6 = Very worried
PLEASE TICK BOX
	
Not at all	 Very
	
worried	 worried
0	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6
(0.11]	 How likely do you think it is that this house/flat
will be flooded in the following time periods?
PLEASE RATE ON A SCALE OF:
0 = No chance, to 10 = Almost certain
0	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10
No	 Almost
Chance	 certain
PLEASE WRITE EACH RATING NUMBER IN THE BOX PROVIDED
In the next 5 years
In the next 10 years 	
In the next 50 years 	
In the next 100 years
In the next 200 years
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[Q.12]	 Would you be prepared to live in this same area if
the risk of flooding were as follows:
PLEASE TICK EITHER YES OR NO FOR EACH QUESTION
(a) a 1 in 200 risk, each and every year,
that your house would be flooded?
	
Yes 	 No 	
(b) a 1 in 100 risk, each and ever year,
that your house would be flooded?
	
Yes 	 No 	
(c) a 1 in 50 risk, each and every year,
that your house would be flooded?
	
Yes 	 No 	
(d) a 1 in 25 risk, each and every year,
that your house would be flooded?
	
Yes 	 No 	
(e) a 1 in 10 risk, each and every year,
that your house would be flooded?
	
Yes 	 No 	
(f) a 1 in 5 risk, each and every year,
that your house would be flooded?
	
Yes 	 No 	
For any additional comment(s)
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[Q.13]	 Flooding has occurred in the past in this area and there
is no reason to believe that it will not happen again.
Were you aware before receiving this questionnaire that
there is this possibility of flooding?
PLEASE TICK BOX	 Yes 	
	
No
IF YOU ANSWERED 'YES' PLEASE GO ON TO ANSWER Q.13a AND
FOLLOWING QUESTIONS.
IF YOU ANSWERED 'NO' PLEASE GO ON TO ANSWER 0.13e.
M.13a1 Were you aware of the possibility of flooding when
you moved here?
PLEASE TICK BOX
	 Yes
	
No 	
IF 'YES', ANSWER [0.13b]. IF 'NO', GO ONTO (Q.13e)
[Q.13b] Where did you hear this?
PLEASE TICK BOX
Newspaper 	
Television 	
NRA/Thames Water leaflet 	
Solicitor (when buying house) 	
Insurance company 	
Neighbour(s) 	
Personal observation/experience 	
Other 	
(0.13c] Did this influence your decision to move here and,
PLEASE TICK BOX:
	 Yes 	
	
if so how/	 ,•nnnnn 
No fl
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[Q.136] Could you tell me your reasons for moving here even
though you were aware of the possibility of flooding?
(PROCEED TO [0.14])
[Q.13e] Would you still have moved here if you had known
about the possibility of flooding?
PLEASE TICK BOX
	
Yes 	 F--] No
	
IF 'YES', ANSWER [Q.13f]. IF 'NO', GO ON TO [0.14]
[0.13f1 Could you tell me the reasons why you would still
have moved here if you had known about the
possibility of flooding?
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N.141	 The local authority is responsible for granting
permission to build in the flood plain. The National
Rivers Authority (N.R.A.) advises the local authority
on the flood risk.
Here are some statements about planning and planning
decisions in this area. Do you agree or disagree with
them?
Please rate them on a scale of:
1 = Strongly agree, to 5 = Strongly disagree
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Strongly	 Agree	 Neither	 Disagree Strongly
agree	 agree nor	 disagree
disagree
PLEASE WRITE EACH RATING NUMBER IN THE BOX PROVIDED
(a) The local authority should not allow houses
to be built in areas where there is a 1 in 50
chance of flooding each year 	
(b) The local authority should not allow houses
to be built in areas where there is a 1 in 100
chance of flooding each year 	
(c) The local authority should ensure that houses
are built with thresholds above the flood
level in flood prone areas 	
(d) The local authority should not allow any new
developments because of the flood risk 	
(e) The local authority should only allow
applications for house extensions in this area
if they do not exceed 10 square metres 	
(f) If the alternative sites for development
involve damage to areas of landscape or
environmental value, the local authority
should allow development in the flood plain
7
7
7
For any additional comments 	
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[Q.15]	 Sere are some statements that have been made about
flood defence in this area. Do you agree or disagree
with them?
PLEASE RATE THEM ON A SCALE OF:
1 x Strongly agree, to 5 = Strongly disagree
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Strongly	 Agree	 Neither	 Disagree Strongly
agree	 agree nor	 disagree
disagree
PLEASE WRITE EACH RATING NUMBER IN THE BOX PROVIDED
(a) A flood relief scheme should be carried out in
this area regardless of cost 	
(b) I would rather put up with flooding than spoil
the open space here with a flood relief channel
(c) I would rather have any scheme than be flooded 	 7
(0 There is no need for a flood relief scheme in
this area because the flood risk is too low 	
(e) A flood relief scheme should be carried out in
this area regardless of impact on the
environment 	
(f) I would rather the Thames were widened to twice
its existing width than a new flood relief
channel were dug in this area 	
(g) I would rather rely on flood warnings' and risk
being flooded than have any flood relief scheme
in this area 	
(h) Anything designed to reduce flooding is
desirable 	
(i) Flood relief schemes will only bring more
development into the area 	
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[0.16]	 The National Rivers Authority (N.R.A.) Thames Region is
the main body responsible for designing and implementing
flood defence schemes in this area.
Here are some statements that have been made about the
way the N.R.A. carries out this responsibility - do you
agree or disagree?
Please rate them on a scale of:
1 = Strongly agree, to 5 = Strongly disagree
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Strongly	 Agree	 Neither	 Disagree Strongly
agree	 agree nor	 disagree
disagree
PLEASE WRITE EACH RATING NUMBER IN THE BOX PROVIDED
(a) The National Rivers Authority knows best what
kind of flood relief scheme is needed: I trust
their experts' opinion 	
(b) The National Rivers Authority cannot be relied
upon to design an environmentally sensitive
flood relief scheme
	
(c) The National Rivers Authority doesn't take the
public's views into account when deciding a
flood relief scheme
	
(d) The National Rivers Authority spends too much
money on flood relief schemes 	
(e) Some people affected by a flood relief scheme
have more influence on the decisions of the
National Rivers Authority than others
	
(f) The National Rivers Authority should inform people
who live in flood-prone areas of the risk 	
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N.17]	 Are you aware of the flood defence scheme -which
includes a major flood defence channel- that has been
proposed by the National Rivers Authority for the
Maidenhead, Windsor and Eton area?
PLEASE TICK BOX	 Yes
	 	 No 	 1---]
[0.18)	 Do you think a similar flood defence channel would
be the best option for flood defence . in this area?
PLEASE TICK ONE BOX
(a) Yes, this would be the best option 	 [--]
(b) No, there is a better alternative 	
(please specify below)
(c) No, for other reasons
	
(please specify below)
(d) Don't know 	
(e) Don't have enough information to decide 	
[0.19]	 If the National Rivers Authority Thames Region were to
propose a flood defence scheme for this area, how soon do
you think it should consult the public? - Should it
consult them...
PLEASE TICK ONE BOX ONLY
(a) Before it starts any studies of a flood
problem? 	
(b) Before it selects any options for the design
or route? 	
(c) When it has selected a number of possible
options for the design or route so that the
public can chose between them? 	
(d) When it has chosen a prefered option for the
r--]design or route for people to comment upon')
(e) Or, do you think it shouldn't consult at all
but should go ahead with whatever it thinks
r--]best?
	
(f) Other? (Please specify) 	   
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(0.20]	 Has the River Thames flooding in February 1990 changed
your attitude to the flood risk in this area?
PLEASE TICK ONE BOX
(a) No, it hasn't - . I am still unconcerned 	
(b)No, it hasn't - I am still concerned
	
(c)Yes, it has - I am more concerned'
	
(d)Yes, it has - I am less concerned
	
(e) No, I didn't know about the flooding 	
(0.211	 How near is your home to a river or stream
(approximately)?
(a)Overlooking 	
(b)Within 250 metres/yards 	
(c)Between 250 and 500 metres/yards 	
(d)Over 500 metres/yards 	
(c) Don't know 	
(0.22]	 Which river or stream is your bone near?
(C0.23 .1 	 Were you interviewed by one of our interviewers
last year (1989)7
PLEASE TICK BOX	 Yes
	
No
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[0.24]	 Does your insurance policy/policies cover
the risk of flooding?
PLEASE TICK BOX
YES 	
NO 	
DON'T KNOW 	
DON'T HAVE ANY INSURANCE 	
[0.25]	 Have you taken any precautions against flooding?
PLEASE TICK BOX
	 Yes
	
No 	
IF YES
[0.25a] What precautions have you taken?
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The following questions are standard for questionnaires and
are only for our own classification purposes. Your answers
are entirely confidential.
[0.26]	 Please tick whether you are: Female
	
Male 	
(0.271	 What is the year of your birth?
	
[0.28]	 At what age did you complete full-time
education?
(0.29]	 Do you own or are you buying your own
home?
PLEASE TICK BOX
	 Yes 	
No 	
(0.30]	 How old is the flat/house in which you
live?
(0.31]	 As head/joint head of household, what is your present
occupation or, if unemployed or retired, what was your
last occupation?
Never had a job (please tick)
	
(0.31a] In your work, do you (or did you) supervise any workers?
PLEASE TICK BOX:
	 Yes 	 El No
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7
7
Questionnaire number... Date returned
(0.3 2 ]	 Would you please tick any of the following organisations
of which you are a member, or to which you regularly
give money:
National Trust 	
World Wide Fund for Nature
(formerly World Wildlife Fund)
A Political Party 	
Local or County Naturalists' Trust
	
Royal Society for the Protection
of Birds
	
A Sports Club 	
A Civic or Community Association 	
Any other environmental group
	
(eg. Greenpeace/Friends of the Earth)
That is the end of the questionnaire and we would like to thank you for
giving so much of your time. Please return the questionnaire in the
envelope provided as soon as possible.
FOR OFFICE USE ONLY
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Residential
/1 
Interviewer name
Interviewer number E/Di
Age of
CIRCLE CODE
Dwelling Type:
Detached house = 1
Semi-detached house = 2
Terraced house = 3
Bungalow = 4
Flat = 5
dwelling.
Pre 1918 = 1
1919 - 1938 = 2
1939 - 1965 = 3
1966 - 1977 n 4
Post 1977 n 5
Does the dwelling occupied by this household have
a ground floor?
Yes
No 	 2
	 1
Appendix B-3: 'The River Thames, Maidenhead Flooding Survey' (1990). Relevant
sections of the questionnaire.
MIDDLESEX POLYTECHNIC
FLOOD HAZARD RESEARCH
CENTRE
CONFIDENTIAL
RIVER THAMES, MAIDENHEAD FLOODING SURVEY
TRANSFER FRCM CORM= SHEET
LOCATION
ADDRESS NUMBER
Interview Number
Interview type
Date of interview
Time interview started 	
Time interview finished 	
Duration of interview (minutes)
- 1 -
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1. Bow long have you lived in this house/flat?
	
years 	
	
since February 1990 	 CLOSE
2. Do you own your house/flat?	 Yes 	
	
No 	
3 a) What are the advantages and disadvantages of living
in this area? Please rate each of the following aspects
from -5, major disadvantage to +5, major advantage.
SEM CARD 1 READ air AND CODE EACH
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
	
major	 major
	
disadvantage	 advantage
	
Access to work
	
	
Being near the river
	
	
New developments
	
	
Aircraft noise
	
	
Shopping facilities
	
	
Attractive enviromment
	
	
Quali ty of the housing
	
	
Risk of river flooding
	
	
Transport facilities 	
3 bo) So generally, how do you rate this local area as a place to
live on a scale of -5, very bad to, +5 very good?
SHOW CARD 2
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
	
very bad	 neither
	 very good
good nor bad
.2
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4. How near is this property to a river or stream?
READ OUT	 overlooking 	 1
	
within 250 metres(270 yards or 820 feet)
	 2
over 250 but within 500 metres(270 to 550 yards or 820 to 1640 feet)... 
	 3
	
over 500 metres(over 550 yards or 1640 feet)
	 4
5. Were you aware of the possibility of flooding in this area
when you moved here? 	 Yes 	 1
	No 	 2
	
Don't know
	 -9
IF YES ASK Q5a AHD GM THEN iG01 TO Q6. OTHERS GO TO Q5c
(a) Where did you hear or read of this possibility?
READOUT AND CIRCLE CODE FOR EACH
	 Yes No
	Newspaper 
	 1 	2
	
Television 	 1 	 2
	
Thames Water Authority leaflet 
	 1 	 2
	
National Rivers Authority leaflet 
	 1 	 2
	
Neighbours 
	 1 	2
	
Solicitor (when buying house) 
	 1 	 2
	
Personal observation/experience 
	 1 	2
	
other, please specify 	 1 	2
(b) Could you tell me your reasons for moving here
although you were aware of the possibility of flooding.
PROBE:FULLY, RECORD ANSWER VERBATIM
- 3 -
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IF NO
(c) Would you have moved here if you had known of
the possibility of flooding?
	
Yes 	 1
	
No 	 2
IF YES ASK Od. OTHERS GO TO (16
(d) Could you tell me the reasons why you would
have moved here if you had known about the
possibility of flooding?
PROBE FULLY, RECORD ANSWER VERBAID4
6. Have you ever been warned about possible flooding by
any of the following while living at this address?
WAD =AND CIRCLE CODE FOR EACH
	
Yes No
Police
Water or Rivers Authority
Flood warden
Local Authority
Media (r.V./radio)
don't know
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
	 -9
IF-YES
Hour many warnings have you received in the last five
years or since you have been living here? (IF LESS THAN
1, in YEARS)
	
4
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7. How many times altogether in the last 5 years or since you
have been living here (IF LESS THAN FIVE YEARS) have you
been flooded in your:
READ OUT WRITE IN MEER OF IMES
a) House, garden and land 	
I) Garden, outbuildings and land only
c) Total number of times (a+b)
	
8. How did you first become aware of the possibility of a
flood in February this year?
CIRCLE CtiLY =ANSWER DO NOT PROMPT
1. water entered property 	 1
2. own judgement 	 2
3. message from neighbour 	 3
4. message from relative 	 4
5. warning from National Rivers Authority 	 5
6. warning from police 	 6
7.warning from flood warden 	 7
8. warning from local authority 	 8
9. media (T.V./radio) 	 9
10.other (please specify) 	 0
9.	 What further warnings did you receive? 	 Please answer
YES or NO for each statement.
READ OUT AND CIRCLE CODE REFACE
1. water entered property 	
Yes No
1	 0
2. own judgement 	 1	 0
3. message from neighbour 	 1	 0
4. message from relative 	 1	 0
5. warning from National Rivers Authority ..... 1....0
6. warning from police 	 1	 0
7. warning from flood warden 	 1	 0
8. warning from local authority 	 1	 0
9. media (T.V./radio) 	 1	 0
10. other (please specify) 	 1	 0
- 5 -
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18. Had you taken any actions to reduce the effects of flooding
	
before you knew of the risk of flooding in February 1990? Yes 	 1
	
No 	 2
IF YES What sort of things had you done?
MEE RIMY, RECORD VERBAT/M
19 a) Did you do any of the following when you first became aware
of the flood risk in February 1990?
SEEM CARD 6 RUC COCE FOR EACH AMON
	
19a.	 19b
Yes No
	Tried to find out more information 
	
1  2
	
Went to check river water level 
	
1  2
	
Warned others on site/at home 	 1  2
	
Warned others elsewhere: neighbours, relatives 	 1  2
	
Tried to prevent water entering premises 	 1  2
	
Moved vehicles 	 1  2
	
Moved property: furniture, equipment 
	
1  2
	
Moved animals, pets 	 1  2
	
'Awned off electricity supplies 	 1  2
	
Household member(s) moved upstairs for safety
	 	
1  2
	
Household menber(s) left premises for safety 	 1  2
	
Other actions please specify
	 	
1  2
19 b) Please tell me the order that you did these things? which
did you do first 	 ?	 IN 1 - 5 AT 19b
- 9 -
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ASK ALL
20. As a result of any prior warning(s) about the floods in
February 1990, either oficial or unofficial, did you take
any actions to reduce the potential damages of a flood?
	
Yes 	
	No 	 2
IF YES Can you estimate the value of the damages avoided?
21 a) In February of this year floods occurred along the
River Thames. Were you flooded in any of the following
and to what depth ? BEAD OUT 1 - 5. CODE EACH AN!) WRTIE
IN ESTIMATED MAXIMUM IEPTH FOR EACH.
PLEASE SPECIFY m/cm or ft/ins Ft:REAM
	
YES NO N/A DFC	 DEPTH
(1)House ground floor 	 1 2  -8..-9 	
(2)House underfloor/basement/ cellar ........ 1...2...-8. -9 	
(3)Garage/outbuildings	 1 2  -8..-9 	
(4)Garden	 1 2  -8. -9 	
(5)Road/pavement outside property ........... 1...2. -8 -9 	
IF MOOED (1 to 5) Ass:(alt6 CHEERS GO TO O22
21 to) On what date and at what time did the flooding start and
how long did the floodwater stay in?
SPECIFY HOURS/DAYS FOR EACH
	Date	 Time	 Duration
	
flooding	 24hr	 days/hrs
started
(1)House ground floor 	
(2)House underfloor/basement/pplIRT. 	
(3)Garage/outbuildings 	
(4)Garden 	
(5)Road/pavement outside property 	
- 10-
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ASK ALL
24. At the time of the floods in February 1990, did you
have an insurance policy for the structure of your
house/flat and outbuildings that covers flooding?
	
Yes 	
	N 	 2
	
Don't know 	 3
	
No: Others/landlord responsible 	 4
25. Did you have a 'new for old' contents insurance policy
at the time of the flood?
	
Yes, 'new for old' 	 1
	
No, other policy 	 2
	
No contents insurance	 3
26. In your experience has the risk of flooding led to any
problems getting insurance cover?
	 Yes 	 1
No 	 2
IF YES What sort of problems?
REMO VERI3ATIM
BE FOR Snarl= AND CCtiTEMS
a) structural insurance
b) contents insurance
- 12 -
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56. We would like you to try to summarise all these different
affects of the flooding upon your household's life. Overall
how serious were the effects of the flood upon your household?
SHOW CARD 10
0	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10 	
no effect	 still have
not recovered
57. Please rate the following consequences of the flood upon
your household's life on the following scale:
SEM CARD 11 READ cur 1 - 12 AND MOE FOR EACH anrr
-8	 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
not	 no
	
most
applicable effect	 serious
1. Effect upon your health/ your family's health	
2. Having to leave home 	
3. Damage to replaceable items eg.furniture, contents 	
4. Worry about flooding in the future 	
5. Loss or damage of irreplaceable objects (photos etc.) 	
6. All the problems and discomfort whilst trying to get the
house back to normal afterwards 	
7. Damage to the house itself 	
8. Stress of the flood itself 	
9. Effect on gardens, land and outbuildings 	
10.Foul smell of the flood water 	
U. Inconvenience caused by road and bridge flooding 	
12. Other (please specify) 	
58. If your house and/or property were to be flooded (again) from
the Thames or other rivers, how serious overall do you think the
effects would be on the life of your household?
SHOW CARD 12
	
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
	
not at all	 extremely
serious	 serious
23 -
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61. How worried are you about the possibility of flooding here
in the future? SHOW CARD 15
0	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6
no thing	 very
to worry about	 worried 	
62. Now I would like to ask your views on the flood problem.
How likely do you think it is that this house/flat will
be flooded in the following time periods?
SHOW CARD 16 READ =AND CODE EACH STATEMENT
0	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6
very	 very
unlikely	 likely
(1) In the next 5 years 	
(2) In the next 10 years 	
(3) In the next 50 years 	
(4) In the next 100 years
(5) In the next 200 years
63. Would you be prepared to live in this same area if the risk
of flooding were as follows:
READ =AND CODE EACH STATEMENT	 Yes No
(1) a 1 in 200 risk, each and every year,
that your house would be flooded
(2) a 1 in 100 risk, each and every year
that your house would be flooded
(3) a 1 in 50 risk, each and every year
that your house would, be flooded
(4) a 1 in 25 risk, each and every year
that your house would be flooded
(5) a 1 in 10 risk, each and every year
that your house would be flooded
(6) a 1 in 5 risk, each and every year
that your house would be flooded
- 25 -
1 2
•
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
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64. Here are some statements that have been made about the
environment and environmental decision making. There are no
'right' answers, we are just interested in your opinions
about these statements and how strongly you feel about them.
SEW CARD 17 READ =AND CODE EACH STATEMENT
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 -9
strongly agree neither disagree strongly don't
agree	 agree nor	 disagree know
disagree
(1) People are more important than the environment 	
(2) We should live in harmony with nature even if it means
some sacrifices on our part 	
(3) The most important problems today are the threats to
the envisorment 	
(4) Scientists will always be able to find the solution
to a problem	
(5) It's wrong to use animals to test the safety of cosmetics 	
(6) These days, morality and trying to do what's right don't
seem to matter 	
(7) The most important problems today are economic problems
like inflation and unemployment 	
(8) It's right to use animals for medical research 	
(9) I like to be in the open air of the countryside 	
(10)We seem to know the price of everything and the value
of nothing 	
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65. Here are some statements that people have made after a flood.
Do you agree or disagree with them?
SHOW CARD 18 BEAD (WAND CODE EACH STATEMENT
	 Agree = 1
Disagree = 2
Not Applicable = -8
(1) We hardly worry about the possibility of flooding 	
(2) When we go away on holiday, we arrange with neighbours
to contact us in case of a flood 	
(3) We are so worried that we do not go on holiday or long
visits 	
(4) When we go away on holiday we move important things
above the possible flood level 	
(5) We are afraid to go out when it rains heavily 	
(6)* When it rains heavily we move our car(s) to a safe place 	
(7) We worry every time it rains heavily 	
(8) We are afraid to go out when a storm is forecast 	
(9) We stay up all night when it rains heavily 	
(10)We would move to another house if we could 	
(11)When it rains we check the level of water in the stream 	
(12)We have stopped using the cellar in case of flooding 	
(13)We have spent money trying to stop floodwater getting
into the house 	
(14)When it rains heavily at night, we are too worried to
sleep 	
(15) We keep a stock of candles, matches and supplies in case
we are surrounded by a flood 	
(16)We feel there is nothing we can do about flooding 	
-27-
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66. Here are some statements that have been made about the flood
risk. Do you agree or disagree with than and how strongly?
SHNCARD 17 READ =AND CODE EACH STATEMENT
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 -9
strongly agree neither disagree strongly don't
agree	 agree nor
	 disagree know
disagree
(1)The Thames Barrier at Woolwich has removed the risk
of flooding in this area 	
(2)Flooding is only likely in the area if rivers, streams
locks, and weirs are not properly maintained or operated
	
(3)Past flooding WS a freak event, unlikely to happen again
	
(4)A flood could happen again any year
	
(5)A flood won't happen again because the Rivers Authority can
now control flooding through river management
	
(6)The likelihood of flooding in the area is increasing all
the time because of changes in climate and other things
	
(7)We don't have real floods here 	
67. Have you any comments you would like to make about the flood
problem here and what should be done about it?
PROBE FUELY, RECORD VERBATIM
-28-
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68. The local authority is responsible for granting permission
to build in the flood plain. The National Rivers Authority (NRA)
advises the local authority on the flood risk.
Here are some statements about planning and planning decisions
in Maidenhead. Do you agree or disagree, and how strongly?
SHOW CARD 17	 RFAD OUT RECORD CODE FOR EACH STATEMENT
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 -9
strongly agree neither disagree strongly don't
agree	 agree nor	 disagree know
disagree
(1)The local authority should not allow houses to be built
in areas where there is a 1 in 60 chance of flooding each year
	
(2)The local authority should not allow houses to be built
where there is a 1 in 100 chance of flooding each year
	
(3)The local authority should ensure that houses are built with
thresholds above the flood level in flood prone areas
	
(4)The local authority should allow no new developments of any kind
because of the flood risk 	
(5)The local authority should not allow any developments which
would increase the flood risk to existing properties
	
(6)The local authority Should only allow small housing
extensions (i.e. not exceeding 10 square metres 	
(6) If the alternative sites for development involve damage to
areas of landscape or environmental value, the local
authority should allow development in the flood plain
	
69. What, if any, other comments would you like to make about
planning controls and developments in the flood plain?
PROVE FULLY, RECORD VERBATIM
- 29 -
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70. Here are some statements that have been made about flood
defence for Maidenhead, Windsor and Eton. Do you agree
or disagree with them and how strongly?
SHOW CARD 17 MD our 	 CODE FOR EACH STATEMENT
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 -9
strongly agree neither disagree strongly don't
agree	 agree nor	 disagree know
disagree
(1) Anything designed to reduce flooding is desirable 	
(2) A flood relief scheme should be carried out in this
area regardless of cost 	
(3) A flood relief scheme should be carried out in this
area regardless of envirorrnental impact 	
(4) I would rather put up with flooding than spoil the open
space with flood relief channels 	
(5) Flood relief schemes will only bring more development
into the area 	
(6) I would rather have any scheme than be flooded
	
(7) I would rather rely on flood warnings and risk being
flooded than have any flood relief scheme in this area 	
(8) There is no need for a flood relief scheme in this area
because the flood risk is too law
	
(9) I would rather the Thames were widened to twice its existing
width than a new flood relief channel were dug 	
30-
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71. The National Rivers Authority for the Thames Region is
responsible for designing and implementing flood defence
schemes in this area.
Here are some statements that have been made
about the way it caries out this responsibility.
Do you agree or disagree and how strongly?
SHOW CARD 17 READ our AND CODE FOR EACH SIPMEMENT
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 -9
strongly agree neither disagree strongly don't
agree	 agree nor	 disagree know
disagree
(1) The NRA knows best what kind of flood relief scheme
is needed: I trust their experts' opinion 	
(2) The NRA cannot be relied upon to design an
environmentally sensitive flood relief scheme 	
(3) The NRA doesn't take the public's views into account when
deciding on a flood relief scheme 	
(4) Some people affected by a flood relief scheme have more
influence on the decisions of the River Authority than
others 	
(5) The NRA spends too much money on flood relief schemes 	
72. When proposing flood relief schemes, how soon do you think the
NRA should consult the public? Should it consult them...
SHOW CARD 19 CODE aNE:
(a) as it starts studying the flood problem 	 1
(b) before it selects any options for the design or route 	 2
(c) when it has selected a number of possible options for the
design and route so that the public can choose between than 	 3
(d) when it has chosen a preferred option for the design
and route for people to comment on 	 4
(e) or do you think it shouldn't consult at all but should
go ahead with whatever the experts advise 	 5
(f) other...please specify
	
	 6
-31-
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73. In your view, should the NRA...
HOARD 20 READ =AND CODE ONLY=
(a) only consult the general public directly 	 1
(b) only consult the general public through representatives such
as local authorities parish councils, residents' committees,
wildlife and amenity groups etc 	 2
(c) consult the public both directly and through representatives 	 3
(d) shouldn't consult the public 	 4
(e) other...please specify 	 5
74. How would you prefer to be consulted about any flood risk or
flood relief proposals for this area?
SHOWCARD 21 CAN MULTICODE IF WIRE THAN ONE STATED
a) public meetings 	 1
b) walk-around exhibitions 	 2
c) video presentations
	
3
d) regular newsletters 	 4
e) other...please specify 	 5
75. Are you aware of the flood alleviation scheme (which includes
a major flood relief channel) that has been proposed by the
National Rivers Authority for the Maidenhead, Windsor
and Eton area?
	
Yes
	
No 	
IF YES ASK (a) AND (t). OTHERS GO TO C79
1
2
(a) Where did you hear this?	 •	 (a) (b)
READ OUT AND CODE ALL APPLICABLE	 Newspaper...1 ..... 1
Television... 2 ..... 2
Public meeting...3 ..... 3
National Rivers Authority leaflet...4 ..... 4
National Rivers Authority video...5 .....5
Neighbours...6 ..... 6
other, please specify...7 .....
(b) Which was the best source of information? 	
7
CNE CODE ONLY
-32-
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76. You say that you have heard about the proposed scheme. I'd like
to know What you have heard about or read about any details of
the proposed scheme? For example, do you know:
a) Whether the proposed route for the channel is to be on the
Maidenhead side or the Taplow, Dorney and Eton side
of the River Thanes? 	 Maidenhead side 	 1
	
Taplow, Dorney and Eton side
	 2
	
Don't know	 -9
b) Whether the proposed channel will have mainly natural
	
banks or mainly concrete lined banks? Mainly natural banks 	 1
	
Mainly concrete banks 	 2
	
Don't know 	 -9
c) Whether the size of the proposed channel is to be half
as wide as the River Thanes, twice as wide as the Thames
or the same width as the Thames? 	 Half as wide 	 1
	
TWiee as wide 	 2
	
The same width 	 3
	
Don't know	 -9
d) Do you think that the proposed scheme is the best option for
alleviating flooding in this area?
	
Yes, this is the best option 	 1
	
No, there is a better alternative.. .please specify
	 2
	
No, for other reasons...please specify
	 3
	
Don't have enough information to decide
	 4
	
Don't know
	 -9
- 33 -
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77. Has the recent (February 1990) flooding changed your
attitudes to the flood alleviation scheme proposals?
	
Yes 	 1
	
No 	 2
IF YES In what way?
PROBE FULLY, RECORD VERBATIM
78. What, if any, other comments do you have on the Maidenhead, Windsor and
Eton Flood Alleviation Scheme?
PROBE MIX, RECORD VERBATIM
ASK ALL
79. Has the recent (February 1990) flooding changed your
attitudes to the flood risk in the area?
Yes 	 1
No 	 2
IF YES In what way?
PRCEE FULLY, RECCED VERBATIM
- 34 -
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These remaining questions are standard for most questionnaires and are only used
for our own classification purposes.Your answers are entirely confidential.
79. Sex of respondent	 Male 	 1
	
Female 	 2
80. TO which of the following age groups do you belong? 	 Under 18 	 1
	
18-34 	 2
	
35-49 	 3
	
50-64 	 4
	
65 and over 	 5
81. Please tell me at what age you completed your full time
education?
	 Still in full-time education
	
1
At age 	
82. How many people are there in your household in each
	
of the following groups including yourself? Children 10 and under
	
	
Children 11 - 16 	
	
Adults aged 65 and over 	
	
Other adults 	
83. Do you know when your house/flat was built?
	
date 	 1
	
don't know
	
2
84. Which of these do you have?
	
'0' level/CS/GCSE	 1
	
'A,' level 	 2
	
professional qualifications. .please specify 	 	 3
	
Degree 	 4
	
Higher degree 	 5
	
other...please specify
	 6
85. Which of the letters on this card represents the gross annual income
from all sources of your household?
SHOW CARD 22	 Don't know
	
 9
	
Refused 	 -7
(N.B. That is before tax or national insurance contributions)
-35-
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APPENDIX C
Appendix C: 80
Appendix C-7.1: Community activism scale (DWSC/89)
Question 9• "Have you ever done any of the following:
% frequency
Contacted MP or Local Councillor 48% (237)
Contacted Government or Local Council Department 60% (298)
Contacted radio, T.V. or newspaper 27% (135)
Signed a petition 75% (370)
Joined an action/protest group 25% (124)
Given money to a campaign 62% (305)
Volunteered to work for a campaign 28% (139)
Attended a public meeting 52% (257)
None of these" 9% (42)
Scale characteristics:
Number of items 8
alpha for scale .76
Range 0-8
Mean score 3.8
Std.dev. 2.3
Skewness 0.1
Kurtosis -.98
Valid cases 489
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Appendix C-7.2: Environmental values scale (DWSC/89)
Statements taken from Question 6: 1, strongly agree to 5, strongly disagree.
mean stddev
Q6d	 It's wrong to use animals to test	 2.0
	 1.2
the safety of cosmetics.
Q6e	 We should live in harmony with Nature 	 1.9	 0.7
even if it means some sacrifices
on our part.
Q6f	 I like to be in the open air of	 1.6	 0.7
the countryside.
Q6g	 We have to be prepared to accept a 	 2,7	 1.0
lower standard of living in order to
protect the environment.
Q6i	 We have no choice: we have to protect 	 2.0	 0.9
the environment or we will destroy
the human race.
Q6k	 The Earth and Nature are fragile and 	 1.9	 0.7
we can easily cause irreversible damage.
Q61	 I would love to see a kingfisher.
Q6o
	 I love seeing butterflies and
dragonflies.
Q6q	 Today's society is too materialistic.
Q6s	 We owe a duty to AniinalS and nature,
they don't exist just for our
enjoyment and use.
Q6u	 I want my children and grandchildren to
see and enjoy those things I enjoyed
as a child.
Q6w The most important problems to-day are
the threats to the environment.
Q6Y We seem to know the price of everything
and the value of nothing.
Scale characteristics:
Number of items 13
alpha for scale .72
Min-max 29-60
Mean score 47.4
Std.dev. 4.6
Skewness -.165
Kurtosis .618
Valid cases 472
	
1.9
	 0.7
	
1.9
	 0.7
	
2.1	 0.8
	
1.8	 0.5
1.8	 0.6
	
2.6	 1.0
	
2.5	 0.9
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Appendix C-7.3: Optimistic utilitarianism scale (DWSC/89)
Statements taken from Question 6: 1, strongly agree to 5, strongly disagree.
mean stddev
Q6i	 The main reason for protecting the 	 3.3	 0.9
countryside is its importance for
recreation.
Q6m The most important problems to-day are
	 3.0	 1.0
economic.
Q6n	 The main reason for protecting plants is that 	 2.7	 1.0
we can never know when a plant might turn out
to have important medical or other uses.
Q6p	 New jobs must be created, even if this	 3.2	 0.9
sometimes causes damage to the environment.
Q6t	 Without economic growth, our country will not	 2.4	 0.8
be able to afford to do the things we want.
Q6v	 If we kept on worrying about the future, 	 3.0	 1.0
nothing would ever get done.
Q6x	 Scientists will always be able to find the
	 3.5	 0.9
solution to a problem.
Scale characteristics:
Number of items 7
alpha for scale .65
Min-max 10-32
Mean score 20.7
Std. dev. 3.8
Skewness .17
Kurtosis -.22
Valid cases 477
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ENV
Sex %
female 58
male 42
Age %
18-34 21
35-55 34
55+ 45
Age at completion of education
up to 15	 36	 27
16-17	 33	 49
18 and over	 31	 23
Home owner %	 %
yes	 83	 86
no	 15	 17
Income	 %	 %
<10k	 26	 15
10-25k	 36	 27
>25k	 17	 26
Refused	 13	 23
Distance from river
riverside	 13	 10
<250m	 26	 37
250-500m	 34	 34
>500m	 27	 19
ENV
%
41
59
%
32
39
30
Appendix C-7.4: High and low scores: environmental values and optimistic utilitarianism
scales (DWSC/89)
HIGH	 LOW	 HIGH	 LOW ALL
OPT OPT SAMPLE
% % %
47 55 50
53 45 50
% % %
12 29 21
30 53 39
57 18 40
% %
47 18 31
36 35 40
15 48 29
% %
84 90 86
16 10 14
% % %
33 8 19
29 34 33
7 34 21
20 14 16
% %
8 11 11
39 27 32
32 30 31
22 31 26
Advantages/disadvantages of the area
Being near the river
mean 3.1 2.6 2.8 2.7 2.9
median 4 3 3 3 3
Risk of flooding
mean -0.3 0.3 -0.1 0.2 0.1
median 0 0 0 0 0
Attractive environment
mean 2.7 2.4 2.6 2.6 2.6
median 3 3 3 3 3
General rating of area
mean 3.2 3.0 3.3 2.9 3.2
median 4 3 4 3 3
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Appendix C-7.4 continued.
HIGH
ENV
LOW
ENV
HIGH
OPT
LOW
OPT
ALL
SAMPLE
Preparedness to live with flood risks:
1:200
	 risk	 % % % %
yes	 74 85 79 82 80
no	 25 15 22 18 20
1:100 risk
yes	 69 79 71 72 73
no	 31 21 29 27 27
1:50 risk
Yes	 53 58 50 54 55
no	 46 42 50 45 45
1:25 risk
Yes	 37 32 37 33 36
no	 63 68 63 66 64
1:10 risk
Yes	 27 25 31 22 25
no	 72 75 69 77 75
1:5 risk
yes	 24 21 30 18 22
no	 76 80 70 81 77
Organization membership/support:
National Trust
	 % % % %
yes	 22 24 19 26 23
World Wide Fund for Nature
% % % % %
Yes	 31 13 20 23 20
Political party
%
Yes	 10 8 9 9 11
Local/county Naturalists' Trust
% % % % %
Yes	 7 4 6 3 4
RSPB	 % %
Yes	 27 10 18 22 19
Sports Club	 % % % %
yes	 22 38 23 32 28
Civic/community Association
% % % % %
Yes	 20 10 17 22 19
Other environmental group
%
Yes	 23 8 10 19 16
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Appendix C-7.4 continued.
HIGH
ENV
LOW
ENV
HIGH
OPT
LOW
OPT
ALL
SAMPLE
Scheme statements: Question 24
Q24a	 mean	 2.4 2.5 2.1 2.9 2.5
median 2 2 2 3 2
stddev	 1.08 0.92 0.76 1.05 0.99
Q24b
	
mean	 2.9 2.6 2.8 2.6 2.7
median 3 2 3 2 3
stddev	 0.97 0.79 0.94 0.84 0.88
Q24c	 mean	 2.8 2.9 2.9 3.1 2.9
median 3 3 3 3 3
stddev	 1.03 0.98 0.96 0.92 0.96
Q24d	 mean	 2.9 3.3 2.9 3.1 3.1
median 3 4 3 3 3
stddev	 0.96 0.96 0.98 0.96 0.94
Q24e	 mean	 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.7 3.6
median 4 4 4 4 4
stddev
	 0.84 0.73 0.82 0.76 0.78
Q24f	 mean	 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.6
median 2 2 2 2 2
stddev	 0.89 0.82 0.79 0.86 0.82
Q24g	 mean	 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.6 3.6
median 4 4 4 4 4
stddev
	 0.92 0.87 0.86 0.84 0.86
Q24h
	 mean	 2.6 2.9 2.7 2.9 2.7
median 2 3 2 3 3
stddev
	 1.07 0.98 0.98 0.99 1.00
Q24i	 mean	 2.9 3.0 2.8 3.3 3.0
median 3 3 3 3 3
stddev
	 0.87 0.88 0.86 0.82 0.87
Q24j
	
mean	 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.7
median 2 3 3 3 3
stddev
	 0.80 0.81 0.82 0.84 0.80
Q24k
	 mean	 2.7 2.7 2.3 3.2 2.7
median 2 2 2 3.5 2
stddev
	 1.11 1.06 0.92 1.04 1.05
Q24I	 mean	 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.5
median 4 4 4 4 4
stddev
	 0.96 0.88 0.93 0.93 0.91
Q24m mean
	 2.6 2.7 2.5 2.7 2.6
median 2 3 2 3 2
stddev
	 0.95 0.81 0.89 0.87 0.86
Q24n	 mean	 2.4 2.5 2.3 2.5 2.4
median 2 2 2 2 2
stddev	 1.02 0.90 0.94 1.06 0.93
Q24o
	 mean	 3.1 2.9 2.8 3.2 3.0
median 3 3 3 3 3
stddev
	 0.92 0.86 0.90 0.94 0.94
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Appendix C-7.5: Perceptions of change in the local countryside and open spaces (DWSC/89)
BSAS*: "Do you think the countryside generally is much the same as it was twenty years ago, or do you
think it has changed? [IF CHANGED] Has it changed a bit or a lot?"
DWSC/89: "I would like to ask you whether you think the local countryside and open spaces have changed
in the last 20 years. Do you think.. .they are much the same; they have changed a bit; they have changed
a lot?"
BSAS 1985
%
BSAS 1986
%
BSAS 1987
%
DWSC 1989
%
Much the same 20 22 20 11
Changed a bit 23 25 21 25
Changed a lot 49 48 55 60
Don't know
/not answered 7 5 3 4
BSAS: "Do you think the countryside generally has changed for the better or worse?"
DWSC/89: "Do you think the local countryside and open spaces have changed for the better or worse?"
BSAS 1985
%
BSAS 1986 BSAS 1987 DWSC 1989
Has not changed 27 22 20 11
Better 11 13 12 7
Worse 49 51 56 38
Better in some ways
/worse in others 11 8 8 42
Don't know/not answered 1 6 3 2
Appendix C-7.6: Concern about the local countryside and open spaces (DWSC/89)
BSAS: "Are you personally concerned about things that may happen to the countryside, or does it not
concern you particularly?
[IF CONCERNED] Are you very concerned, or just a bit concerned?"
DWSC/89: "I would like to ask you whether you are concerned about things that may happen to the local
countryside and open spaces."
BSAS 1985 BSAS 1986 BSAS 1987 DWSC 1989
Very concerned 31 40 44 3'7
Quite concerned* N/A N/A N/A 42
A bit concerned 37 40 33 16
Does not concern me
particularly/not
particularly concerned 32 25 22 4
Not at all concerned** N/A N/A N/A 0
Don't know/not answered 0 0 1 0
* BSAS = British Social Attitudes Survey
** These categories DWSC 1989 only.
Approximate numbers of correspondents (percentages may vary due to rounding and the calculation of sub-
groups):
BSAS 1885 1805
BSAS 1986 1548
BSAS 1987 1410
DWSC 1989 494
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Appendix C-7.7: Reasons for moving to the area (DWSC/89)
Question 19d. "Could you tell me your reasons for moving here even though you knew about the
possibility of flooding?"
Reasons for moving
	 Number of	 % of those
to the area	 times	 interviewed
mentioned	 mentioning
spontaneously	 spontaneously
Like the area 109 22%
Convenient for travel/work 83 17%
No/low flood risk 76 15%
Better house/garden 72 15%
Wanted to live by river 62 13%
Other social/family/non-
environmental reasons 57 12%
No choice over housing 28 6%
Accept flood risk 27 6%
Countryside nearby 13 3 %
Cases: 494
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There are problems getting insurance
in this local area because of the
flood risk
You can get some fun out of every
situation - even flooding
It takes months rather than weeks to
get the house back to normal after
a flood
Nobody wants to buy your house if
it gets flooded
If you live in flood prone areas,
flooding is at the back of your mind
all the time
If you live in areas liable to
flooding, you can't get any insurance
The worst thing about floods is not
the monetary costs but the loss of
personal possessions like letters
and photographs
Flooding brings out the best in people
Appendix C-7.8: The nature of flooding and its effects (DWSC/89)
Question 14: "Here are some statements about flooding and what it is like. I would like to ask you
whether you agree with them or not and how strongly."
We don't have real floods here
A flood affects people's mental and
physical health long after the event
Cases:
All	 468-493
Flooded	 115-118
Not flooded	 352-374
(Mean, median and standard deviation)
ALL	 FLOODED	 NOT
FLOODED
3.8 3.7 3.8 mean
4 4 4 med.
0.8 0.8 0.7 S.D.
3.1 2.7 3.3 mean
3 2 4 med.
1.2 1.0 1.2 S.D.
1.9 1.9 1.8 mean
2 2 2 med.
0.7 0.8 0.6 S.D.
2.6 2.7 2.5 mean
2 2 2 med.
1.0 1.0 1.0 S.D.
3.1 3.1 3.1 mean
3 4 3 med.
1.1 1.0 1.1 S.D.
3.7 3.7 3.6 mean
4 4 4 med.
0.7 0.6 0.8 S.D.
2.6 2.6 2.6 mean
2 2 2 med.
0.9 0.9 0.9 S.D.
2.6 2.7 2.5 mean
2 3 2 med.
1.0 1.0 1.0 S.D.
2.8 2.6 2.8 mean
3 2 3 med.
0.9 0.9 0.9 S.D.
2.4 2.6 2.4 mean
2 2 2 med.
0.8 0.9 0.9 S.D.
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The Thames Barrier at Woolwich has
removed the risk of flooding in this
area
Flooding is only likely in the area if
rivers, streams, locks and weirs are
not properly maintained or operated
Past flooding was a freak event,
unlikely to happen again
The likelihood of flooding in the area
is increasing all the time because of
changes in climate and other things
A flood could happen again any year
A flood won't happen again because
the Water Authority can now control
flooding through river management
We are now due for another flood
Appendix C-7.9: Causation and likelihood of flooding in the area (DWSC/89)
Question 15: "Here are some opinions that have been expressed about the flood risk in this area. Do
you agree or disagree with them, and how strongly?"
Building roads and houses in the
flood plain makes flooding worse.
Cases:
All 453-488
Flooded 112-117
Not flooded 337-370
(Mean, median and standard deviation)
ALL	 FLOODED	 NOT
FLOODED
3.2 3.3 3.1 mean
3 4 3 med.
0.9 0.9 0.9 S.D.
2.7 2.6 2.7 mean
2 2 2 med.
1.0 1.0 1.0 S.D.
3.3 3.2 3.3 mean
4 4 4 med.
0.9 1.0 0.9 S.D.
2.9 3.0 2.9 mean
3 3 3 med.
0.9 0.9 0.9 S.D.
2.4 2.4 2.4 mean
2 2 2 med.
0.8 0.8 0.8 S.D.
3.4 3.4 3.4 mean
4 4 4 med.
0.9 1.0 0.9 S.D.
3.5 3.4 3.5 mean
3 3 3 med.
0.7 0.8 0.7 S.D.
2.8 2.6 2.8 mean
3 2 3 med.
1.0 1.0 0.9 S.D.
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Appendix C-7.10: Perceived seriousness of experienced flood, worry about future
flooding and awareness of flood risk, across -3 datasets
Thames Attitude Survey (1989) 	 (DWSC/89)
'The River Environment and You', Postal Survey (1990) 	 (DWSC/90)
Maidenhead Flooding Survey (1990) 	 (M'head)
DWSC/89	 DWSC/90	 M'HEAD
SERIOUSNESS OF EXPERIENCED FLOOD
%	 mean	 4.4	 3.9	 4.0
median	 3.5	 3	 3
stddev	 3.8	 3.5	 2.9
cases	 (116)	 (144)	 (196)
Scale: 0, not at all serious to 10, extremely serious.
M'head and Severn Scale: 0, no affect (on household) to 10, still have not recovered.
WORRY ABOUT FUTURE FLOODING
mean	 1.6	 2.7	 3.0
median	 1	 3	 3
stddev	 1.6	 1.7	 2.1
cases
	 (493)	 (599)	 (198)
Scale: 0, not at all worried to 6, very worried
AWARE OF PAST FLOODING
%	 Yes	 80	 62	 N/A
cases	 (492)	 (565)	 N/A
* DWSC/90 Survey question wording: "Are you aware of the flooding that occurred in February 1990.. .in
this area?"
DWSC/89 Survey question wording: "Are you aware of [this local area] having been flooded in the last
50 years?"
AWARE OF POSSIBILITY OF FUTURE FLOODING
%	 Yes
	 75	 81	 N/A
cases
	 (494)	 (599)	 N/A
AWARE OF FLOOD RISK WHEN MOVED
%	 Yes	 52	 58	 77
cases
	 (384)	 (616)	 (195)
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Appendix C-7.11: Attitudes to flood protection - scheme response scale (DWSC/89)
Statements taken from Question 24: scale: 1, strongly agree to 5, strongly disagree
Q24a Anything designed to reduce flooding is
desirable.
Q24b There are many more important things which
need to be done flood relief schemes.
Q24c Metre high flood protection embankments
spoil the view.
Q24d A flood relief scheme should be carried out
in this area regardless of cost.
Q24e It is a waste of money to spend it on flood
relief channels: nature will always
win in the end.
Q24f A flood relief channel could offer new
opportunities for recreation.
Q24g I would rather put up with flooding than spoil
the open space here with flood relief channels.
Q24j A flood relief scheme can enhance the
environment.
Q24k I would rather have any scheme than be flooded.
Q241 I would rather rely on flood warnings and
risk being flooded than have any flood
relief scheme in this area.
Q24o There is no need for a flood relief scheme
in this area because the flood risk is too low.
Scale characteristics:
Number of items 11
alpha for scale .69
Min-max 21-49
Mean score 35.7
Std.dev. 4.9
Skewness
-.385
Kurtosis
-.208
Valid cases 463
mean stddev
2.5 1.0
2.7 0.9
2.9 1.0
3.1 0.9
3.6 0.8
2.6 0.8
3.6 0.9
2.7 0.8
2.7 1.0
3.5 0.9
3.0 0.9
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Appendix C-7.12: Responses to selected scheme statements according to distance from the river and
flood experience (DWSC/89)
Question 24k "I would rather have any scheme than be flooded."
Distance
from river
Flood
experience
agree
Attitude to scheme
neither	 disagree
Nearest to flooded 38% 0% 63%
river not fld. 22% 11% 67%
Up to 250m flooded 61% 9% 30%
from river not fld. 60% 10% 31%
250-500m flooded 50% 13% 37%
from river not fld. 50% 21% 29%
Over 500m flooded 63% 17% 21%
from river not fld. 58% 21% 21%
ALL flooded 53% 10% 37%
ALL not fld. 53% 17% 30%
Question 24d" A flood relief scheme should be carried out in this area regardless of cost."
Distance
from river
Flood
experience
agree
Attitude to scheme
neither
	 disagree
Nearest to flooded 25% 13% 63%
river not fld. 33% 11% 56%
Up to 250m flooded 33% 24% 42%
from river not fld. 35% 19% 46%
250-500m flooded 27% 37% 37%
from river not fld. 30% 32% 38%
Over 500m flooded 33% 21% 46%
from river not fld. 37% 22% 41%
ALL flooded 30% 24% 46%
ALL not fld. 34% 23% 43%
Question 24g "I would rather put up with flooding than spoil the open space around here with flood
relief channels."
Distance
from river
Flood
experience
Attitude to scheme
agree neither disagree
Nearest to flooded 46% 17% 38%
river not fld. 19% 0% 82%
Up to 250ra flooded 24% 9% 67%
from river not fld. 11% 21% 68%
50-500m flooded 17% 7% 77%
from river not fld. 18% 12% 71%
Over 500m flooded 9% 22% 70%
from river not fld. 14% 8% 78%
ALL flooded 24% 13% 64%
ALL not fld. 14% 13% 73%
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Appendix C-7.I2 continued:
Question 241 "I would rather rely on flood warnings and risk flooding than have any flood relief
scheme in this area."
Distance
from river
Flood
experience
agree
Attitude to scheme
neither	 disagree
Nearest to flooded 38% 8% 54%
river not fld. 22% 7% 70%
Up to 250m flooded 31% 9% 59%
from river not fld. 16% 17% 67%
250-500m flooded 27% 13% 60%
from river not fld. 14% 18% 68%
Over 500m flooded 21% 8% 71%
from river not fld. 18% 8% 74%
ALL flooded 29% 10% 61%
ALL not fld. 16% 14% 70%
Question 24o "There is no need for a flood relief scheme because the risk is too low."
Distance
from river
Flood
experience
Attitude to scheme
agree neither disagree
Nearest to flooded 57% 30% 13%
river not fld. 50% 8% 42%
Up to 250m flooded 52% 12% 36%
from river not fld. 40% 24% 36%
250-500m flooded 23% 33% 43%
from river not fld. 36% 36% 28%
Over 500m flooded 21% 29% 50%
from river not fld. 26% 31% 44%
ALL flooded 38% 26% 36%
ALL not fld. 35% 29% 36%
Question 24a "Anything to reduce flooding is desirable."
Distance
from river
flood
experience
Attitude to scheme
agree neither disagree
Nearest to flooded 71% 4% 25%
river not fld. 56% 15% 30%
Up to 250m flooded 66% 6% 28%
from river not fld. 67% 10% 24%
250-500m flooded 73% 17% 10%
from river not fld. 68% 12% 20%
Over 500m flooded 71% 8% 21%
from river not fld. 64% 8% 27%
ALL flooded 70% 9% 21%
ALL not fld. 66% 11% 24%
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Appendix C-7.12 continued:
Question 2b "There are many more important things which need to be done than flood relief
schemes."
Distance
from river
Flood
experience
agree
Attitude to scheme
neither	 disagree
Nearest to flooded 48% 22% 30%
river not fld. 56% 22% 22%
Up to 250m flooded 69% 6% 25%
from river not fld. 45% 33% 22%
250-500m flooded 30% 30% 40%
from river not fld. 49% 30% 21%
Over 500m flooded 58% 21% 21%
from river not fld. 44% 30% 26%
ALL flooded 51% 19% 29%
ALL not fld. 47% 30% 23%
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Appendix C-7.13: Responses to scheme statements (Questions 24 a, d, e, g, k and o)
according to flood experience, distance from the river, environmental values scale score
and optimistic utilitarianism scale score.
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'Anything-to reduce flooding
(DWSC/89).Is desirable
'Anything-.to reduce flooding
Is desirable' (DWSC/89).
100
30
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40
20
Agree Neither Disagree
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>500=	 MI 65 8 27
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<250m	 EEO 67 9 25
Riverside ED 63 10 28
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80
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Appendix C-7.13a: "Anything to reduce flooding is desirable"
% frequency
'AnTthint -to reduce flooding
Is desirable (DWSC/89).
Environmental Values Scale
100
80
60
II
40
20
0
Low score 67 12 21
High score /=1 65 14 21
% frequency
High score	 upper quartile
Low score lower quartile
% frequency
'Anything-A° reduce flooding
Li desirable' (DWSC/89).
Optimistic Utilitarianism Scale
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Low score w lower quartile
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100
80
1
 I 	 	  ,
20
Agree Nei ther Disagree
>500m 13 11 76
250-500m 17 10 72
<250m	 EZ2 14 18 68
Riverside g=1 31 61
60
40
Appendix C-7.13b: "I would rather put up with flooding than spoil the open space here
with flood relief channels"
"I would rather put up with
flooding than spoil the open spate
here with flood relief channels'.
% frequency
'I would rather put up with
flooding than spoil the open space
here with flood relief channels'.
rue
80
60
40
20
___
. 	
- ------
	 --a---
....
.....
DisagreeNeitherAgree
Low score	 1,	 X 18
18
10
12
70
70High score L.—)
% frequency
High score upper quartile
Low score w lower quartile
Environmental Value* Scale.
'I would rather put up with
flooding than spoil the open space
here with flood relief channels'.
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Appendix C-7.13c: "It is a waste of money to spend it on flood relief channels: nature
will always win in the end"
'It h a waste of money to spend it
on flood relief channels: nature
will always win In the end'.
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Appendix C-7.13d: "A flood relief channel should be carried out in this are regardless
of cost"
'A flood relief scheme should be
carried out In this area
regardleu of cost'.
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carried out in this area
regardless of cut'.
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Appendix C-7.13e: "There is no need for a flood relief scheme in this area because the
flood risk is too low"
'Them is no need for a flood relief
scheme in this area because the
flood risk is too low'.
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'There is no need for a flood
relief scheme in this area
because the flood risk is too low'.
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% frequency % frequency
'I would rather have any
scheme than be flooded'.
'I would rather have any
scheme than be flooded'.
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Appendix C-7.13f: "I would rather have any scheme than be flooded"
'I would rather hers any scheme	 'I would rather have any scheme
than be flooded',	 than be flooded'.
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Appendix C-7.14: Attitudes to consultation and the NRA (DWSC/89)
neither
agree	 disagree
	
agree nor
disagree
Question 31g
"Some people affected by a flood relief	 64%	 16%	 21%
scheme have more influence on the
decisions of the Water Authority/NRA
than others."
Question 31e
"The Water Authority/NRA doesn't take	 41%	 31%	 27%
the public's views into account when
deciding on a flood relief scheme."
Question 31f
"The Water Authority/NRA consults the 	 17%	 55%	 28%
people affected fully when developing
plans for a flood relief scheme"
Cases: 377-415
YES	 NO
Question 30
"Do you feel you have enough information	 17%	 83%
with which to decide the level of flood
protection you would like for the
study area?"
Cases: 489
Appendix C: 103
Appendix C-7.15: Testing the Model. Discussion of hypothesized relationships:
DWSC/89.
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Testing the Model. Discussion of hypothesized relationships: DWSC/89.
Associations between dependent and independent variables significant at or above the 95% confidence level.
Analysis showed some significant associations for all the major hypothesized relationships: with so many
significant associations it is highly probable that some will be statistical artifacts and not substantive.
Discussion has been limited to those relationships which were deemed to be of interest or importance and
also subject to logical interpretation.
Social characteristics with perception of flood hazard.
(Social characteristics were
measured by questions 1, 10,
10e, 11, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39,
40,41 and distance from the
river. Perception of flood
hazard was measured by
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distressing) while females were more cautious.
risk in the area when they moved there.
mitigating adjustment
Males were also more likely
elicited significant
associations with
respondents's sex but those
that did suggested that males
tended to take a more
optimistic view of the
likelihood and nature of
flooding (i.e. they believed it
to be less likely and less
to have been aware of the flood
There was agreement from the older age group (55 years +) with many of the statements (both positive and
negative with regard to hazard perception), except where the statements suggested that the flood risk was
either increasing or imminent, where they showed greater disagreement. Overall the older age group
displayed a relatively low level of flood hazard perception as measured by the statements. The youngest
age group (18-34) displayed more uncertainty and a tendency to disagree with many of the statements which
resulted in their having a higher flood hazard perception than the oldest age group. The middle age group
(35-54) showed the highest flood hazard perception overall but in many cases their responses were split
between agreement and disagreement.
The older age group were more aware of past flooding in the area and did not underestimate the seriousness
of a possible future flood but rated it higher than did the younger age groups. They were less worried about
flooding, perhaps because they also believed it to be less likely. The older age group were more prepared
to live with the more remote risks (possibly because they felt they would be less likely to experience them)
and less prepared to live with the more frequent risks.
When preparedness to live with varying levels of risk was scaled to give a broad indication of behavioural
intent', the oldest group were split between those not prepared to live with any level of risk (scoring 0 on
the scale) and those prepared to live with most or all levels of risk (scoring 5 or 6 on the scale). The
younger age groups were clustered more in the middle ranges (prepared to live with between 1 and 4 of
the risk levels but less prepared to live with all or none).
Those who completed their education at the age of 15 displayed a tendency towards an acquiescent response
See Question 18a to 18f: the scale was constructed by scoring the number of levels of risk
respondents were prepared to live with, giving scores from 0 to 6.
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except, again, where the statements suggested an increased likelihood of flooding. It is probable that this
is related to the age variable as the older age group also tended to have the least education. Those with
higher levels of education tended to show a higher degree of flood hazard perception but also expressed
higher levels of uncertainty.
A similar pattern was found with the income variable as had been found with age and education, that is,
higher levels of agreement from those with the lowest income levels (up to £10,000) and, from those with
the highest (2S,000+) income level, disagreement with statements suggesting that past flooding was a
freak event and unlikely to recur. Questions and scales measuring the likelihood of flooding in varying time
periods showed the lower income group to believe flooding to be less likely than the higher income groups.
This was particularly the case for the longer time periods.
Distance from the river elicited some variability in response where significant associations were found but
generally those living closest to the river displayed a different response from the majority; they tended to
have lower flood hazard perception, as measured by the statements, but were also uncertain. Those living
furthest from the river (over 500 metres away) were closer to the majority view and generally had higher
flood kazArd perception. Those in between were often uncertain or split in their responses but the nearer
of the two (up to 250 metres from the river) had a generally lower degree of flood hazard perception while
those a little further from the river (between 250 and 500 metres away) showed a generally higher level.
Those living closest to the river also had more flood experience and the unexpected direction of their flood
hazArd perception must be viewed in relation to this factor.
Those living nearer to the river believed flooding to be less likely in the short term and were generally less
worried than those living further away.
Organization membership or support did not give a clearly interpretable pattern. Responses varied
depending on both the statement and the organization It seems likely that membership or regular support
of any organization is closely related to other social variables and little can be explained in this case by the
membership variable alone. A contributory factor in the variability of response is likely to be the low
frequencies for members/supporters, giving too few numbers in the cells for reliable analysis.
The household structure variable showed that generally those with children took a more cautious view of
the likelihood of flooding, having a greater expectancy of its return, compared to those without children.
The households with older members (particularly those comprising exclusively older members) presented
a similar pattern to the age variable discussed above; the older households having a lower flood hazard
perception.
Length of residence also appeared age-related (those residing in the area longer, being older people) and
showed a similar response to the age variable: those in residence longest showing a generally lower level
of flood hazard perception, as measured by the statements, and expectancy, as measured by the scale of
likelihood.
Greater numbers than expected of those with flood experience were, as might be expected, aware of past
flooding in the area and aware of the possibility of future flooding but they were also prepared to live with
the more frequent flood risks. Responses tended, paradoxically, towards a lower level of flood hazard
perception than for those without experience (see discussion of statements elsewhere for a suggested
explanation of this finding).
House tenure showed a significant association with one variable only and this was the scaled preparedness
to live with varying flood risks. Higher numbers than expected of those who did not own their property
were prepared to live with a larger range of risks compared to property owners.
In summary, social characteristics (as defined by the model) were related to perception of flood hazard but
in a complex manner; many being interrelated. Increasing age and decreasing levels of income and
education were associated with acquiescence and low flood hazard perception (as measured by the
statements). Those living closest to the river generally exhibited a different response to those living further
away and tended to have a lower perception of flood hazard despite having greater flood experience. Flood
experience itself was associated with low flood hazard perception.
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Model of flood hazard perception and mitigating adjustment
Social characteristics with environmental value.
which showed a much greater number of significant associations.
(Environmental value was
measured by Question 3 and
by the Environmental Values
Scale and the Optimistic
Utilitarianism Scale.)
There were few significant
associations between social
characteristics and the
variables chosen to measure
subjective assessment of
environmental value.
However, the next section
(attitude to/use of local
environmental/attitude to
environmental change)
contains a number of
variables which related
closely to this section and
On the environmental values scale the higher scorers were females, who also rated the area generally more
highly, and older people, although the latter were slightly split between a high and a lower score.
Members/supporters of the WWFN, the RSPB and other environmental groups scored more highly on this
scale while members/supporters of sports clubs scored lower.
High scorers on the optimistic utilitarianism scale also tended to be older; they were longer resident, with
lower levels of income and education. Members/supporters of 'other environmental groups' had a lower
score.
Social characteristics with attitude to/use of local environmental/attitude to environmental change.
(Attitude to/use of local
environmental/attitude to
environmental change was
measured by questions 2, 4,
4a, 5, 7, 7a and 8.)
Females regarded the
countryside nearby and
shopping facilities as more of
an advantage, and the risk of
river flooding and transport
facilities as more of a
disadvantage, than did males.
The attractive environment
and being near the river were
rated as more of an
advantage to older
respondents although they
were also seen to be an advantage to the younger age groups. As might be expected, access to work was
not as important to older respondents, more of whom rated it as neither an advantage nor a disadvantage;
the middle age group rated it as a major advantage of the area. Open spaces for outdoor recreation were
an advantage to all age groups but a major advantage to the oldest, many of whom also made daily visits
to the river. Greater numbers than expected of the oldest age group thought that the local area had changed
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a lot while the middle group thought it was the same and the youngest did not know. Increasing levels of
perceived environmental change were linked to both increasing age and length of residence categories.
Household structure echoed the age pattern above. Households with older members rated transport facilities
and the risk of flooding as a greater disadvantage. Those households without older members rated access
to work as a major advantage. Households with children believed flooding a greater disadvantage. They
were likely to visit more recreational areas and were more concerned about things that happen to their local
environment.
The attractive environment was rated more advantageous by those with higher levels of education; who
were also more concerned about their local environment and more of whom visited the river.
Homeowners tended to rate as more of an advantage housing, rates, nearby countryside and the river than
did non-homeowners. Those with a higher income also tended to rate local attributes as more of an
advantage, visited more recreational areas and visited the river more frequently. They also tended to
acknowledge both positive and negative aspects of environmental change.
Those nearest to the river rated as more advantageous a number of local environmental attributes including
the risk of river flooding which was rated as a greater disadvantage by those living furthest from the river.
As might be expected, those living nearest the river visited it more frequently but they also visited more
recreational areas and were more concerned about things that might happen to the local area.
Higher numbers than expected of members of organizations showed greater levels of concern about the local
environment. These included members of sports clubs and civic/community groups as well as the more
environmentally oriented groups. Other responses were variable but in general members of several
organizations visited the river and recreational areas more often, and rated the environmental attributes as
more of an advantage.
Social characteristics with scheme attitudes.
flooding. This can make their reponses somewhat volatile.
(Scheme attitudes were
measured by Question 24.)
Those nearest to the river
tended generally to show less
support for flood relief
schemes and those furthest
from the river to show most
support. Those living up to
250 metres from the river
generally showed support but
were sometimes split. These
respondents are in a problem
zone as they are not close
enough to the river to enjoy
the highest environmental
benefit it can offer but are
close enough to suffer its
disbenefits in terms of
Length of residence, age and household structure were closely related variables, with the older residents
(including households with older members and the longest residence periods) showing a generally
acquiescent response which could be inconsistent (that is, showing both agreement and disagreement with
the positive scheme statements). In the Datchet to Walton Bridge study area there was a high level of
ignorance about both the need for and the nature of flood defence schemes and in the face of this
uncertainty it is possible that some respondents, who had an unfounded belief that what the statements said
was 'true', gave an acquiescent response rather than display this ignorance to the interviewer.
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(Attitude to the NRA was
measured by Question 31.)
Very large numbers of
respondents gave 'don't
know' or 'neither agree nor
disagree' responses to the set
of statements designed to test
people's attitude to the NRA.
For many respondents the
NRA is a shadowy
organization with whom they
have had little or no contact
and of whose responsibilities
and past actions little is
known.
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Only two statements (Q24c and Q24j) produced significant associations between sex and scheme response.
Higher numbers of males than expected felt more positively that schemes could enhance the environment
and that embankments do not spoil the view. This was reversed for females who also showed more
uncertainty. Males tended to be more prepared to commit themselves to an opinion on scheme statements
and females tended towards greater uncertainty.
Households with children tended to have a slightly more positive attitude to schemes although they also
showed greater uncertainty. Greater levels of education were associated with anti-scheme attitudes. The less
educated tended to support scheme statements and this may again be a tendency towards an acquiescent
response related to the age variable (older age groups tending to have less education). Those with higher
incomes tended to show less support for scheme statements and vice versa.
Members and supporters of groups showed a varied response. Higher numbers than expected of
members/supporters of civic/community associations showed both positive and negative attitudes to
schemes. Members/supporters of the World Wide Fund for Nature, the RSPB and political parties had a
generally more positive attitude to schemes while members/supporters of sports clubs and naturalists trusts
had a generally more negative attitude to schemes.
Perhaps surprisingly there were only two significant associations with flood experience and scheme
attitudes. Although the majority disagreed with the statement "I would rather rely on flood warnings and
risk being flooded than have any flood relief scheme in this area", higher numbers than expected of those
with flood experience preferred to rely on flood warnings. Those with flood experience showed a bimodal
distribution on the scheme response scale. Thus, flood experience per se does not appear to be a strong
explanatory factor in attitude to potential schemes.
Social characteristics with attitude to the NRA.
Once again there was
considerable acquiescence
with many of the statements from the older, less educated and lower income respondents where other
respondents tended towards uncertainty.
Greater numbers than expected of those with flood experience believed that the NRA cannot be relied upon
to design an environmentally sensitive scheme and only in the group living up to 250 metres from the river
did more believe that the NRA takes the public's views into account when deciding on a scheme.
Overall, attitudes varied between positive and negative and no very clear picture emerged from the social
data to suggest that particular groups had either a positive or a negative attitude to the NRA.
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Significant associations
between the two sets of
statements measuring
perception of flood hozArd
and attitude to schemes
Perception of flood hazard with attitude to scheme.
tended to show a logical
relationship and were
indicative of the internal
validity of the statements.
Those who had a higher
expectation of flooding were
more likely to show support
for schemes while those who
were more prepared to live
with the flood risk tended to
show less support. However,
awareness of past flooding
did not lead to unconditional
support for schemes. Those
aware were less likely to support a scheme regardless of cost, more likely to agree that it is a waste of
money to spend it on flood relief schemes because "nature will always win in the end", and more likely
to agree that there is no need for a scheme in the area because the flood risk is too low. Those who were
aware of the flood risk when they moved to the area were less likely to want any scheme rather than be
flooded.
Agreement with the statement: "you can get some fun out of every situation - even flooding" points to an
optimistic and positive attitude to flooding. Although, when cross-tabulated with scheme attitude statements,
the majority of floodplain residents responded in what might be assumed to be a logical manner (i.e. the
majority who disagreed that you can get fun out of flooding, also scored highly on the scheme response
scale) nevertheless agreement with the statement was also often associated with an optimistic attitude
towards both the necessity for, and the nature of, flood relief.
Higher than expected numbers of those agreeing that you can get fun out of flooding also agreed that there
are more important things than flood relief; that they would rather put up with flooding than spoil the open
space with flood relief channels; would not rather have any scheme than be flooded; and agreed that there
is no need for a flood relief scheme in the area because the flood risk is too low. However, they also
agreed, more positively, that a flood relief channel could offer new opportunities for recreation.
The influence of personality factors on beliefs about, and attitudes to, flooding and the environment, were
not examined empirically in any of the case studies discussed here, partly because they are difficult to
operationalise but also, related to this, because there was a need to keep the length of the survey instrument
to a minimum. However, the crosstabulations did suggest an underlying optimism in some floodplain
residents influenced their beliefs and attitudes. The variation in the responses was sufficient, however, to
dismiss the notion of a response set; acquiescence was not habitual.
Some statements that expressed support for flood relief were associated with statements expressing
ignorance of flood causation and a low flood hazard expectancy. However, the scheme response statements
that were used were both specific to the area and more general and it is possible that some residents can
have a positive attitude to flood relief in general while believing that there is no flood risk in their area.
For example, higher than expected numbers of those who agreed with the statements "we don't have real
floods here" and "past flooding was a freak event, unlikely to happen again" also agreed that anything
designed to reduce flooding is desirable (general); and would rather have any scheme than be flooded
(general).
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Higher than expected numbers of those who agreed with the statement that "the Thames Barrier at
Woolwich has removed the risk of flooding in this area", agreed with the same general statements and also
with the more specific: "a flood relief scheme should be carried out in this area regardless of cost". So,
even if a respondent believed the flood risk to have been removed or non-existent they could still argue in
favour of a scheme.
The two general statements: "anything designed to reduce flooding is desirable" and "I would rather have
any scheme than be flooded", in particular, commanded majority support (67% and 53 % respectively). The
former statement was the first to be asked of respondents in the DWSC/89 survey and the reduction in the
percentage agreeing between it and the latter statement may be due to an increasing awareness by
respondents of the more negative aspects of flood relief as suggested by subsequent statements. (This
interpretation was supported by the findings of the DWSC 1990 survey. See the Lower Stour Case Study
for a discussion of the qualifying process used in response to these statements).
Thus it would appear that even among certain respondents with a negative flood experience this statement
("anything designed to reduce flooding is desirable") can draw an initial acquiescent response. This may
be associated with the respondents' lack of any 'image of damage' for flood defence whereas they might
have a stereotypical image of (perhaps catastrophic) flood damage which they cannot relate to their
particular local environment. The vagueness of the word 'anything' contrasts with the second statement
which more specifically uses the word 'scheme' and follows statements which present an alternative view
of flood relief.
Attitude to scheme with attitude to NRA/Attitude to NRA with attitude to scheme.
It was hypothesized that
attitude to the NRA would
influence attitudes to schemes
but when respondents have
little experience of the NRA
it is possible that the
relationship can be reversed,
as appeared to be the case in
some of the Lower Stour
interviews. It seems likely
that the two variables are
closely interlinked and
subject to continual revision
following the accumulation of
further experience or
information.
A consistent relationship was
not found between attitude to
the NRA and attitude to schemes. Positive attitudes to the NRA were not a necessary condition of positive
attitudes to schemes (and vice versa) although generally this was the case.
Examples of exceptions to the expected pattern were those who agreed that there should be a scheme
regardless of cost also agreed that the Water Authority/NRA cannot be relied upon to design an
environmentally sensitive scheme and do not take the public's views into account when deciding on a
scheme. Whether or not people would rather have any scheme than be flooded was not necessarily
associated with whether they believed the NRA could be relied upon to design environmentally sensitive
schemes.
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SYSTEM
Environmental value with attitude to/use of local environment/attitude to environmental change.
Those with the highest scores
on the environmental values
scale also rated the
availability of wildlife
habitats and nearby
countryside as more of an
advantage and were more
concerned about things that
may happen to the local
countryside and open spaces.
Conversely, those with the
highest scores on the
optimistic utilitarianism scale
were less concerned, visit
less recreational areas and
more of them do not visit the
river.
Multiple regression analysis indicated that the factors contributing most to the overall rating of the local
area are the environmental factors (being near the river, availability of wildlife habitats, countryside nearby
and the attractive environment). The risk of river flooding contributes very little to the rating of the area
generally.
Attitude to/use of local environment/attitude to environmental change with attitude to scheme.
Those most concerned about
things that might happen to
their local environment and
who visited the river more
often had the most negative
attitude to scheme statements.
They were not prepared to
accept anything to reduce
flooding. Those who believed
the local area to have
changed little, disagreed that
a scheme should be carried
out regardless of cost, while
those who believed the area
to have changed a lot tended
to agree (although there was
more uncertainty also). It
was stated earlier that many
of those who believed the
area to have changed a lot were in the older age group who showed a tendency toward agreement with
many attitude statements and thus it cannot be assumed from this association alone (between a belief that
the area has greatly changed and a positive attitude to a scheme) that those areas that have seen a lot of
environmental change will accept more.
Those that rated the flood risk as a disadvantage were more positive towards flood relief schemes and had
a higher score on the scheme response scale.
Those that rated the area most highly agreed that embankments spoil the view but also that a flood relief
channel could offer new opportunities for recreation and a scheme could enhance the environment.
However, they both agreed and were uncertain about whether they would rather put up with flooding than
Appendix C: 112
ATTITUDE TO/
E OF LOCAL
ENVIRONMENT
ATTITUDE TO
ENVIRONMENTAL
CHANGE
Model of flood hazard perception and mitigating adjustment
/14VBICA*
:SVEZEICif
spoil the open space with channels, more preferring to rely on warnings. They were split over the flood
risk and the need for any scheme.
Generally, those that rated the area most highly showed a positive tendency towards flood relief schemes
but needed to be convinced that any scheme would not damage the environment.
Attitude to/use of local environment/attitude to environmental change with attitude to NRA.
Greater numbers than
expected of those who rated
highly being near the river,
disagreed that the Water
Authority/NRA only
proposes flood relief schemes
when they are really
necessary. However on other
statements they were more
positively disposed, agreeing
that the WA/NRA consults
people affected, and designs
schemes that enhance the
environment for example.
Negative attitudes to the
NRA were associated to
beliefs that the environment
has changed a lot and for the
worse. Other attitudes to environmental change showed that those who were very concerned did not believe
the NRA consults people fully.
A scale of attitude to the NRA showed that those who believed the local countryside and open spaces have
changed for the better had a more positive attitude to the NRA and vice versa. It is possible that this and
similar responses could be explained by a personality variable (not used here) which would be a general
indicator of optimistic and pessimistic dispositions.
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Appendix C-7.16: Testing the aodel: Associations between dependent and independent
variables significant at, or above, the 95 percent confidence level. DHSC/89
[NS	 Not significant	 0.n	 Significance
	 level?
- INDEPENDENT VARIABLES -
DEPEND
-ENT SEX AGE LENGTH FLOOD 2NDARY DISTANCE INCOME
VARS. RESIDE EXP. FL.EXP. FROM RIV
Perception o flood hazard
014a NS NS NS 1	 NS NS NS
014b .02 NS NS .00 NS .02
014c .03 NS NS NS NS .00
014d NS .04 NS NS NS .01
014e NS .00 NS NS NS NS
Ql4f NS .05 NS .02 NS NS
014g NS .00 .00 NS NS NS
Ql4h .00 NS .00 .01 NS .01
Q14i NS .00 NS .01 NS NS
014j NS .02 NS .03 NS .03
015a NS .02 NS NS NS NS
015b NS .00 .00 NS NS NS
015c NS .00 .00 NS NS NS
015d .05 .00 NS NS NS .00
015e NS .00 NS NS NS .01
015f NS .00 .00 .01 NS NS
015g NS NS NS NS NS NS
Ql5h	 NS .00 NS	 .04 NS NS
012 .04 .00 .02	 NS NS NS
013 NS .00 NS	 .00 .00 NS
016	 NS .01 NS	 NS NS .03
Q17a	 NS NS NS	 NS NS .01
017b	 NS .02 NS	 .01 NS .01
Q17c	 NS NS NS	 NS NS NS
017d NS .02 NS NS NS NS
017e NS .00 NS NS NS NS
018a NS .04 NS NS NS .04
0188 .04 NS NS NS NS NS
018c NS NS NS NS NS NS
018d NS NS NS NS NS NS
018e NS .01 NS .00 NS NS
Q181 NS .00 NS .00 NS NS
019 NS .00 NS .00 .01 NS
019b NS NS NS NS NS NS
V3523 .00 .00 NS
V3534 .00 .02 .02
Environaenta valu
03	 .04 NS NS N/A N/A NS
V350 5	.03 .01 NS N/A I N/A	 I NS
V351 6	NS .00 .00 N/A 1	 NS
'
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
.04
.01
.04
NS
NS
.04
.03
NS
, .03
1 .00
' NS
NS
NS
NS
.01
NS
.03
NS
11
,01
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
.01
EDUC MEMBER-
SHIP
HOLD
STRUCT
-ORE 2
TENURE
NS	 1
NS
NS	 1
SIG
NS	 1
NS
Nq
'
NS
NS SIG NS NS
.04 SIG SIG NS
.00 NS SIG NS
NS SIG SIG NS
.01 NS SIG NS
.00 NS NS NS
.00 SIG SIG MS
NS NS NS NS
NS SIG NS NS
.00 SIG SIC NS
.01 SIG SIG NS
NS SIG SIG NS
.00 SIG SIG NS
.00 SIG SIC NS
NS NS NS NS
NS SIG SIG NS
NS SIG NS NS
NS NS SIG NS
NS SIG SIG NS
NS NS SIG NS
NS NS SIG NS
NS NS SIG NS
NS NS SIG NS
NS SIG SIG NS
NS NS SIG NS
NS NS NS NS
NS NS NS NS
NS SIG NS NS
NS NS SIG .04
NS NS SIG .02
NS SIG SIG NS
NS NS SIG NS
.00 NS SIG .03
NS SIG SIG NS
.00 NS NS	 NS .00
NS NS 1	 SIG NS 1 NS
.00 .00 SIC NS 1	 NS
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- INDEPENDENT VARIABLES -
DEPEND
-ENT SEX AGE LENGTH FLOOD 2NURY DISTANCE INCOME EDUC MEMBER- R'HOLD TENURE
VARS. RESIDE EXP. FL.EXP. FROM RIV SHIP	 1 STRUCT
-ORE 2
Attitl to/ se of local e vironae t, attitude to enviromen al change
1
Q2a NS .00 NS N/A N/A NS
Q2b NS NS NS N/A N/A NS
Q2c NS .04 NS N/A N/A .00
Q2d NS NS NS N/A N/A .05
Oe NS NS NS N/A NIA NS
Of .01 NS NS N/A N/A NS
Q2a .02 NS NS NA N/A NS
Q2h NS NS NS N/A N/A NS
02i .01 NS NS N/A N/A .02
Q2j NS .01 .00 NA N/A .00
02k .05 NS NS N/A N/A NS
021 NS .05 NS NA N/A NS
Q2a NS NS .03 NA N/A NS
Q2n	 NS NS NS MA N/A NS
04	 .03 NS .00 N/A N/A NS
04a7	 NS .02 NS N/A N/A .00
0 8 	NS NS NS NA N/A .05
0 7 	NS .01 .00 NA N/A NS
Q7a	 NS NS NS NA NA NS
08	 NS NS NS NA N/A .00
Attitude to scheie
024a	 NS NS NS	 NS NS NS
024b	 NS NS NS	 NS NS NS
024c	 .01	 .05 NS	 NS NS NS
024d	 NS	 NS NS NS NS .00
024e	 NS	 .04 .00 NS NS NS
0241	 NS	 NS NS NS NS NS
024g	 NS NS NS NS NS .02
024h	 NS .03 .00 NS NS NS
Q24i	 NS .04 NS NS NS .01
Q24j	 .01 NS NS NS NS .03
024k	 NS .00 .03 NS NS .00
0241	 NS NS NS .03 NS NS
024a	 NS NS NS NS NS NS
Q24n	 NS .05 .04 NS NS NS
Q24o	 NS .01 NS NS NS .00
V342 9
	NS NS NS .00 I NS I NS
Attitude to NRA
Ola NS .01 NS NS NS
Q31b NS NS NS NS NS
Q31c NS .00 NS NS .00
Old NS NS NS .04 NS
Ole NS .00 NS NS .03
0311 NS NS NS NS NS
031g .01 .04 NS NS NS
Q31h NS NS NS NS .00
NS .00 NS NS NS
.03 NS NS SIG NS
NS NS NS NS .01
NS NS SIG SIG .00
.00 NS SIG NS .02
NS NS SIG NS NS
NS NS NS NS .01
.00 NS SIG NS NS
.02 NS SIG NS NS
.01 NS SIG SIG NS
.01 .00 SIG NS NS
.02 NS NS SIG NS
NS NS NS NS NS
.01 NS NS NS NS
NS NS SIG NS NS
.00 .00 SIG SIG .00
.03 NS SIG SIG NS
.00 NS SIG SIG .00
NS NS NS NS NS
.01 NS NS SIG NS
NS .01 SIG SIG .00
.02 .00 SIG NS NS
NS NS SIG NS NS
SS NS SIG NS .04
.00 .03 SIG SIG NS
.01 NS SIG SIG NS
NS NS NS SIG NS
NS NS SIG NS NS
.02 NS SIG SIG .05
.04 .00 SIG NS NS
NS NS NS NS NS
.00 .00 SIG SIG NS
NS NS NS SIG NS
NS NS NS NS NS
NS NS NS SIG NS
.03 NS NS SIG NS
.05 I	 NS I SIG NS	 1 NS
.04 NS NS NS NS
NS NS NS NS .01
.02 .01 NS SIG NS
NS NS NS NS NS
NS .00 NS SIG NS
.04 .01 NS SIG NS
NS NS NS NS NS
NS .04 NS NS .04
NS .03 NS NS NS
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- INDEPENDENT VARIABLES -
DEPEND
-ENT
	
PERCEPTION OF FLOOD HAZARD
VARS.
Q14a 014b 014c 014d Q14e g14f Q14g Q14h g14i Q14j contd.
Attitu e to scheme
024a NS .00 .00 .00 .01 .00 .00 .00 .08 .01
Q24b NS .02 NS .02 NS NS .00 NS NS NS
024c NS .00 .03 .00 NS .04 NS .00 .00 NS
024d NS .02 NS .00 .01 NS .00 .00 .01 .01
024e .00 .01 .00 NS .03 .00 .01 .03 .00 .02
024f NS .00 .03 NS .00 .00 NS NS .02 .00
024g NS .00 .00 .00 .00 NS NS NS NS .00
Q24h NS .00 NS .00 NS .00 .00 .00 .01 NS
Q24i NS	 NS NS NS NS .00	 .00 NS NS NS
Q24j NS	 .00 NS NS .00 .00 .03 NS .00 NS
Q24k NS	 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
Q241 .05	 .00 .00 .00 .00 .03	 .00 .02 NS NS
024a .03 .00 NS .00 .03 NS	 .01 .05 .03 NS
Q24n .00 .01 .00 .00 NS .00	 .00 NS NS .04
Q24o NS .00 NS .01 NS .00	 .00 NS NS .02
v342 NS	 .00 NS	 NS NS NS	 NS NS NS .00
- INDEPENDENT VARIABLES -
DEPEND1
-ENT
	
PERCEPTION OF FLOOD HAZARD
VARS.
Q15a
I
015b
1
Q15c
1
Q15d 015e Q15f g15g 015h 016 g17a contd.
Attitude to scheme
Q24a	 .00 .00 .00 .00 NS .02	 NS	 I	 .00 NS NS
Q24b	 .00 NS NS .00 NS .00 NS	 NS .00 NS
024c	 .00 .00 NS .01 .02 .00 NS	 .02 NS NS
Q24d	 .00 .02 .01 .00 .00 .00 .00	 .00 .00 .02
Q24e	 NS NS NS .00 .00 .02 NS	 NS NS NS
Q24f .00	 NS .00 NS .00 NS .01	 .00 NS NS
Q24a NS NS NS NS NS NS .02	 .00 .05 NS
024h .00 NS .00 .00 .00 NS NS	 .00 NS NS
Q24i NS .00 .00 .00 NS .05 .01	 .00 NS NS
024j NS NS NS .00 NS NS NS	 .02 .01 .01
Q24k .00 .00 .01 .00 NS .00 NS	 NS NS NS
Q241 .02 NS .00 .05 NS .00 .00	 .01 .03 NS
Q242 NS .03 NS NS .01 NS .00	 .00 NS NS
Q24n NS .02 NS NS NS NS NS	 .00 NS NS
024o .00 .01 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00	 NS .00 .04
v342 .01 NS NS NS NS .04 .00	 NS .00 NS
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- INDEPENDENT VARIABLES -
DEPEND
-ENT
	
PERCEPTION OF FLOOD HAZARD
VARS.
017b 017c
I1
Q17d Q178 Q18a 018b 018c 018d 018e Q181 contd.
Attitu
024a
Q24b
Q24c
Q24d
024e
Q241
024g
02411
0241
024j
024k
0241
024a
024n
0240
V342
e to
NS
.00
NS
.00
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
.04
NS
NS
.00
.00
scheie
NS
.01
.04
.00
NS
NS
NS
.05
NS
NS
NS
.01
.01
.03
.00
.02
NS
.02
NS
.00
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
.01
NS
NS
.00
.00
.02
NS
NS
NS
.00
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
.01
.03
NS
.01
.00
NS
.00
.04
NS
.02
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
.01
NS
NS
NS
NS
.01
INDEPENDENT
NS
NS
NS
.02
.00
NS
.00
NS
NS
NS
.02
.01
NS
NS
.05
NS
VARABLES
NS
NS
NS
.02
NS
NS
.00
NS
NS
.05
.00
.00
NS
NS
NS
.01
-
NS
NS
NS
.00
.03
NS
.00
NS
.02
.00
.00
.00
NS
NS
NS
.00
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
.03
NS
.05
.01
NS
.00
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
.04
.03
NS
.01
NS
NS
NS
NS
DEPEND
-ENT
VARS.
Q19	 I	 019b 012 013
ERCEPTION
V352
OF FLOOD
V353
HAZARD
Attitude to scheae
024a	 NS	 NS NS NS .01 NS
Q24b	 NS	 NS .02 NS NS NS
Q24c	 NS	 NS NS NS NS NS
024d	 NS NS NS .01 .03	 .00
Q24e	 NS NS NS .01 .03 NS
Q241	 NS NS NS NS .04 NS
Q24g NS NS NS NS .00 NS
024h NS NS NS NS NS NS
Q241	 NS NS NS NS NS .04
Q24j	 NS NS NS NS .00 NS
024k	 NS .01 .05 NS .00 .05
0241 NS NS NS NS .00 .00
024a NS NS NS NS .05 NS
Q24n NS NS .02 NS NS NS
024o .02 NS NS .00 NS	 .00
V342 NS NS NS NS .01	 .02
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- INDEPENDENT VARIABLES -
DEPEND
	
ATTITUDE TO NRA
-ENT
VARS.
1
Q31a Q31b Q31c Q31d 031e 03 1f 4319 031h 031i
Attitude to scheme
Q24a NS NS NS NS NS .00 NS NS NS
Q24b NS NS .01 NS .00 NS NS NS .00
Q24c NS .00 .01 .04 NS .02 NS NS NS
024d NS .01 .00 .01 .00 NS .03 .00 NS
024e NS NS .00 .03 .01 NS NS NS NS
024f NS NS .00 .00 NS .00	 NS NS .00
024g NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS .01
024h NS	 NS .00 .03 .00 NS NS NS NS
0241 NS	 .00 .00	 .01 NS NS NS NS .00
0241 NS	 NS .00	 NS NS NS NS NS .00
D24k .00	 .00 .00	 .00 NS .00	 NS .01 NS
D241	 ,	 NS	 NS .00	 NS NS NS	 .00 NS NS
D24a	 1	 .05 .01 NS .01 NS NS	 I	 NS NS NS
024n	 1	 NS NS .00 .02 NS NS	 NS NS NS
D24o	 I	 NS NS .00 .00 NS NS	 I	 NS NS .00
V342	 NS	 NS .00 NS NS NS	 ,	 NS
I
NS NS
DEPEND
	
ATTITUDE TO/USE OF LOCAL ENVIRONMENT, ATTITUDE TO ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE
-ENT
VARS. Q2a Q2b
I
Q2c
1
Q2d Q2e Q21 Q2g Q2h Q2i Q2j contd.
Attitude
Q24a
024b
024c
Q24d
024e
024f
Q24g
D24h
D24i
D24j
D24k
D241
)24m
)24n
)24o
;342
to
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
.04
.01
NS
scheie
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
.04
NS
.01
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
.00
NS
NS
.03
.01
NS
NS
.00
.01
.04
.04
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
.00
NS
.00
.05
NS
NS
NS
NS
.04
NS
NS
.00
NS
NS
NS
.05
NS
NS
NS
.00
NS
NS
.00
NS
NS
NS
.00
NS
NS
NS
NS
.00
.02
NS
.00
NS	 I
NS
NS
.00
NS
.00	 I
NS
.00	 I
NS
NS
.00
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
.00
NS
NS
NS
.05
.02
.01
NS
NS
NS
NS
.02
NS
NS
NS
NS
.02
.00
NS
.01
NS
NS
.02
NS
NS
.04
NS
.01
NS
NS
.00
.00
NS
NS
.02
NS
NS
.04
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
.02
NS
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J 07
	 Oa	 81
NS	 NS	 .00
NS	 NS	 NS
NS	 NS	 NS
.00	 NS	 .04
NS	 NS	 NS
NS	 NS	 NS
NS	 NS	 .05
NS	 NS	 NS
.01	 NS	 NS
NS	 NS	 NS
NS	 NS	 .03
NS	 NS	 NS
.03	 NS	 NS
NS	 NS	 NS
NS	 NS	 NS
NS	 NS	 NS
Attitude to scheue
.00
NS
.05
.04
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
.05
NS
NS
NS
NS
.01
024a
Q24b
Q24c
Q24d
024e
024f
024g
Q24h
Q241
024j
Q24k
0241
024a
Q24n
024o
v342
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
.01
NS
NS
.03
NS
DEPEND
-ENT
VARS. I Q2k
	
021
- INDEPENDENT VARIABLES -
ATTITUDE 0/USE OF LOCAL ENVIRONMENT, ATTITUDE TO ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE
g2a 03 Q4 Q4a 05
NS NS .00 NS NS
NS NS .03 NS .03
NS .01 NS NS NS
NS NS NS NS NS
NS	 NS NS NS NS
NS .01 NS NS NS
NS .01 .02 NS NS
NS NS NS NS NS
NS NS NS NS NS
NS .00 NS NS NS
NS NS .00 NS NS
NS .04 NS NS NS
NS NS NS NS NS
NS .01 NS NS	 NS
NS .00 NS NS	 NS
NS NS NS NS	 NS
INDEPEN ENT VARABLES -
DEPEND
-ENT
ATTITUDE TOJUSE OF LOCAL ENVIRONMENT, ATTITUDE TO ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE
VARS. I	 Q2a 02b Q2c Q2d Q2e Q2f g2g Q2h 02i g2j contd.
Attitude to NRA
031a	 NS	 NS NS NS NS NS	 I	 .01 NS NS NS
031b	 NS	 NS .00 .00 .02	 NS	 NS NS NS .02
031c	 NS	 NS NS NS NS	 NS	 .05	 NS NS NS
NS	 NS NS NS NS	 NS	 NS	 NS NS NS
031e	 NS	 NS .00 NS .01 NS .01	 NS NS NS
NS	 .01 .05	 NS NS NS .00	 NS NS .00
031g	 NS	 NS .00	 .00 NS	 I NS NS	 1	 NS NS .01
Q31h	 NS	 .02 NS	 NS RS	 NS NS	 !	 NS NS NS
0311 NS	 .02 .00
	 .00 .00 .05 NS	 1	 NS NS .04
INDEPENbENT VARIiBLES -
DEPEND
-ENT
VARS.	 02k	 021 g2a 03	 04	 1 Q4a	 g5	 07	 Q7a	 81
ATTITUDE TOJUSE OF LOCAL ENVIRONMENT, ATTITUDE TO ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE
Attitude to NRA
Q31a	 NS	 NS	 NS	 NS	 NS	 NS	 NS	 NS	 NS	 NS
Q31b	 NS	 NS	 NS	 NS	 NS	 NS	 NS	 NS	 NS	 NS
031c	 NS	 NS	 NS	 NS	 RS	 NS	 NS	 NS	 NS	 NS
Q31d	 NS	 .01	 NS	 NS	 NS	 NS	
.03	 .00	 .01	 NS
Ole	 NS	 NS	 NS	 NS	 .01	 NS	 NS	 .02	 NS	 NS
Q31f	 NS	 NS	 NS	 NS	 NS	 NS	 NS	 NS	 NS	 .01
031g	 NS	 NS	 NS	 NS	 NS	 NS	 NS	 NS	 NS	 NS
Q31h	 NS	 NS	 NS	 NS	 NS	 NS	 .01	 NS	 NS	 NS
Q311	 NS	 NS	 NS	 .01	 NS	 NS	 NS	 NS	 .00	 .00
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DEPEND
-ENT
VARS. jQ3
	
V350 V351
- INDEPENDENT VARIABLES -
ENVIRONMENTAL VALUE [SUBJECTIVE)
Attitude to/use of local environment, attitude to environmen al change
Q2a NS NS NS
Q2b NS NS NS
Q2c .00 .05 NS
Q2d .00 NS NS
Q2e .00 .00 NS
Q2f .00 .00 NS
Q2g .00 NS .03
Q2h .00 NS NS
Q2i NS NS NS
Q2j .00 NS NS
Q2k .03 NS NS
021 .00 NS NS
Q2a .00 NS NS
04 .00 NS .00
Q4a NS NS NS
45 NS NS .02
07	 NS NS NS
NS NS NS
48	 NS .00	 03
' MEMBERSHIP: This table does not tabulate the individual organization membership/support
variables. Where significant relationships were found between a dependent variable and any
of the organisation membership support variables this is marked SIG. A detailed breakdown
can be found in Appendix C-7.15.
2 HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE: This table does not tabulate the individual household structure
variables. Where significant relationships were found between a dependent variable and
any of the household structure variables this is narked SIG. A detailed breakdown can
be found in Appendix C-7.15.
3 V352 is the variable number of the scale score of Question 18, preparedness to live
with flood risks.
4 V353 is the variable number of the scale score of Question 17, the likelihood of
flooding.
5 V350 is the variable number for the Environmental Values Scale score.
6 V351 is the variable number for the Optimistic Utilitarianism Scale score.
7 04a: how often visit River Thames.
8 Q5: score for number of sites visited.
9 V342 is the variable number for the Scheme Response Scale score.
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People are more important than the
environment
We should live in harmony with nature even
if it means some sacrifices on our part
The most important problems today are the
threats to the environment
It's right to use animals for medical
research
Scientists will always be able to find the
solution to a problem
These days, morality and trying to do
what's right don't seem to matter
The most important problems today are
economic problems, like unemployment or
inflation
It's wrong to use animals to test the
safety of cosmetics
I like to be in the open air of
the countryside
We seem to know the price of everything
and the value of nothing
Appendix D-8.1: Agreement with environmental attitude statements (DWSC/90 and
DWSC/89)_
'The River Environment and You' (DWSC/90: Question 5) and
'Thames Attitude Survey' (DWSC/89: Question 6).
% AGREEING
DWSC/90 DWSC/89
29 40
92 91
65 54
33 46
16 18
47 64
36 39
75 76
94 94
61 63
Cases: 582 - 592
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Appendix D-8.2: Agreement with selected statements about floods and flood risk
(DWSC/90 and DWSC/89)
'The River Environment and You' (DWSC/90: Question 9) and
'Thames Attitude Survey' (DWSC/89: Questions 14 and 15).
% AGREEING
DWSC/90	 DWSC/89
A flood could happen again any year	 87	 73
A flood affects people's mental and
	
70	 63
physical health long after the event
The Thames barrier at Woolwich has 	 9	 29
removed the risk of flooding in this area
There are problems getting insurance in 	 6	 8
this local area because of the flood risk
A flood won't happen again because the 	 8	 22
National Rivers Authority can control
flooding through river management*
The likelihood of flooding is increasing 	 57	 40
all the time because of changes in climate
and the global environment*
We don't have real floods here	 32	 62
Flooding is only likely in the area if	 32	 57
rivers, streams, locks and weirs are not
properly maintained or operated
8	 26Past flooding was a freak event and is
unlikely to happen again*
* Slight change in question wording between 1989 and 1990
Cases: DWSC/90: 585 - 597
DWSC/89: 475 - 491
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7.8	 7.9	 mean
9	 9	 median
Appendix D-8.3: Perceived seriousness of experienced and hypothetical future floods, and worry
about future flooding (DWSC/90 and DWSC/89)
DWSC/90: Questions 6e, 8 and 10; DWSC/89: Questions 10e, 12 and 16.
DWSC/90 DWSC/89
3.9	 4.4	 mean
3	 3.5	 median
"Thinking of the worst flood you've
experienced, how serious were the
effects of the flood upon the
household's life?"
"If your house were to be flooded
from the Thames or other rivers, how
serious do you think the effects would
be on the life of your household?"
"How worried are you about the 	 2.7	 1.6	 mean
possibility of flooding in the future	 3	 1	 median
in this area?"*
* Slight change in question wording between 1989 and 1990
CgsPs: DWSC/90: 144 - 599
DWSC/89: 116 - 493
Appendix D-8.4: Agreement with scheme statements:
DWSC/90: Question 15 and DWSC/89: Question 24.
% AGREE	 MEAN	 SURVEY
A flood relief scheme should be carried	 37	 2.9	 DWSC/90
out in this area regardless of cost	 33	 3.1	 DWSC/89
I would rather put up with flooding than	 18	 3.4	 DWSC/90
spoil the open space with flood relief	 16	 3.6	 DWSC/89
channels
I would rather have any scheme than be 	 ao	 2.9	 DWSC/90
flooded
	 53	 2.7	 DWSC/89
There is no need for a flood relief scheme	 27	 3.1	 DWSC/90
in this area because the flood risk is	 36	 3.0	 DWSC/89
too low
I would rather rely on flood warnings and	 20	 3.4	 DWSC/89
risk being flooded than have any flood 	 20	 3.5	 DWSC/90
relief scheme in this area
Anything designed to reduce flooding is 	 48	 2.8	 DWSC/89
desirable	 67	 2.5	 DWSC/90
Flood relief schemes will only bring more 	 32	 2.9
	
DWSC/89
development into the area	 34	 3.0
	
DWSC/90
Cases: DWSC/90: 569 - 580
DWSC/89: 479 - 493
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Appendix E-9.1: Environmental values scale (Maidenhead 1990)
mean stddev
4.0 0.7
3.4 1.2
4.0 1.2
3.2 1.1
4.5 1.0
3.6 1.1
Question 64.
2	 We should live in harmony with nature even
if it means some sacrifices on our part
3	 The most important problems today are the
threats to the environment
5	 It's wrong to use animals to test the safety
of cosmetics
6	 These days, morality and trying to do what's
right don't seem to matter
9	 I like to be in the open air of the
countryside
10	 We seem to know the price of everything and
the value of nothing
Scale characteristics:
Number of items 6
alpha for scale .55
Min-max 17-66
Mean score 34.9
Std. dev. 5.9
Skewness .32
Kurtosis 4.07
Valid cases 193
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Appendix E-9.2: Agreement with selected flooding statements (DWSC/89 and
Maidenhead 1990)
DWSC/89: Questions 14 and 15;
DWSC/90: Question 9;
Maidenhead 1990: Question 66.
% AGREE MEAN	 SURVEY
The Thames Barrier at Woolwich has 	 29	 3.2	 DWSC/89
removed the risk of flooding in 	 9	 3.5	 DWSC/90
this area	 4	 4.4	 M'HEAD
Flooding is only likely in the area if	 59	 2.7	 DWSC/89
rivers, streams, locks and weirs are	 32	 3.2	 DWSC/90
not properly maintained or operated	 27	 3.5	 M'BEAD
Past flooding was a freak event,	 26	 3.3	 DWSC/89
unlikely to happen again	 8	 3.9	 DWSC/90
8	 4.1	 M'HEAD
A flood could happen again any year	 73	 2.4	 DWSC/89
87	 2.0	 DWSC/90
91	 1.8	 M'BEAD
A flood won't happen again because the 21 	 3.4	 DWSC/89
Rivers Authority* can now control	 8	 3.6	 DWSC/90
flooding through river management	 5	 4.2	 M'BEAD
The likelihood of flooding in the area 	 40	 2.9	 DWSC/89
is increasing all the time because of	 57	 2.5	 DWSC/90
changes in climate and other things	 59	 2.6	 M'BEAD
We don't have real floods here 	 61	 2.6	 DWSC/89
32	 3.2	 DWSC/90
12	 4.0	 M'HEAD
* The wording was changed from "Water Authority" used in the DWSC/89 survey.
Cases: DWSC/89: 453 - 491
DWSC/90: 585 - 597
M'HEAD: 185 - 194
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6 -
1
10 10 10
Appendix E-9.3: Perceived likelihood of flooding according to distance from the river:
mean and median ratings (Maidenhead 1990)
Mean perceived likelihood of
flooding according to distance
from river (Maidenhead 1990).
in S years in 10 years in SO years In 100 yearzln 200 years
Likelihood of flooding, 5-200 years
1.1 Riverside property
	 ED <250m of river
C:Zi 250-500m of river
Scale: 0. no chance
to 10. almost certain
Median perceived likelihood of
flooding according to distance
from river: Maidenhead 1990.
12
median rating
10 —
o
in 5 years in 10 years in 50 years in 100 'wain 200 years
Likelihood of flooding, 5-200 years
MI Riverside property	 ESSEI <250m of river
1=1 250-500m of river
Seale: 0, no Amite
to 10, almost certain
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Appendix E-9.4: Agreement with scheme statements (DWSC/89 and Maidenhead
1990)
DWSC/89: Question 24;
Maidenhead 1990: Question 70.
% AGREE MEAN SURVEY
Anything designed to reduce flooding is 	 66	 2.3	 M'HEAD
desirable	 67	 2.5	 DWSC89
A flood relief scheme should be carried 	 58	 2.7	 M'BEAD
out in this area regardless of cost
	
33	 3.1	 DWSC89
I would rather put up with flooding than	 10	 3.9	 M'BEAD
spoil the open space with flood relief 	 16	 3.6	 DWSC89
channels
Flood relief schemes will only bring more	 32	 3.2	 M'HEAD
development into the area 	 34	 3.0	 DWSC89
I would rather have any scheme than be 	 ao	 3.2	 M'HEAD
flooded
	 53	 2.7	 DWSC89
I would rather rely on flood warnings and	 11	 3.9	 M'HEAD
risk being flooded than have any flood	 20	 3.5	 DWSC89
relief scheme in this area
There is no need for a flood relief scheme
in this area because the flood risk is
too low
Cases: DWSC/89: 479 - 493
M'head: 172 - 198
6	 4.3	 M'ElEAD
36	 3.0	 DWSC89
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Appendix F-10.1: Example pagesof the Lower Stour Flood Alleviation Scheme
consultation comments book
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Appendix F-10.2: Extended list of themes (with examples) from those reported in the
comments book for the Lower Stour Flood Alleviation Scheme consultation.
1.	 PROPERTY VALUE
- the scheme will result in the lowering of house values
2.	 IMPACT OF SCHEME ON AMENITIES
- the recreation ground will be rained.
3.	 AGAINST SCHEME BECAUSE OF AESTHETIC REASONS
- the scheme as shown will ruin an area of great beauty.
- We bought the bungalow for the view.
4. INFREQUENCY OF FLOOD RISK:
- Flooding as in 1979 only happens about once every 70 years.
5. DO SOMETHING ELSE INSTEAD:
- Fill the ditch in!
- why not put individual brick walls round the properties of those who want them
6. ACCESS TO REC GROUND:
- How does one get on [The Mead] with walls and ramps I wonder
7. 'THEY' ARE PLANNING SOMETHING ELSE OTHER THAN WHAT THEY HAVE
SAID:
- Its my opinion that you no longer wish the residents to use [The Mead] as a recreation ground and
intend to flood it.
8. 'THEY' CAN'T BE TRUSTED:
- I do not feel that you could be trusted not to fill all this [meadow] with water either soon or at a later
date.
9. DON'T LIKE SCHEME ELEMENTS:
- the open ditch as it is a health hazard
- object to the building of a 10' high embankment when one of 5' would be adequate.
10. SAFETY ASPECTS:
- [DITCH] very dangerous
- increase in break-ins and other anti-social behaviour associated with the construction of embankments
and walls,
11.	 PUBLIC REQUESTING CHANGE OF PLANS:
- hope you will alter these stupid plans
12. SENSE THAT OUTSIDERS HAVE MADE PLANS NOT SUITED TO RESIDENTS:
- give it much more thought and consideration for local residents
- it is a pity that the planers [sic] do not reside in the area
13. LEAVE THINGS AS THEY ARE:
- would prefer the open space on [The Mead] to be left as it is
14. SCHEME COSTS:
- perhaps a less expensive alternative to this undoubted "Rolls Royce" of flood protection should be
considered first.
- I think it is money ill spent
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15. ABUSE OF [NRA] POWER:
- I find it disgusting that Wessex Water should use their Statutory powers to overide the objections of
the people of Christchurch
16. SCHEME WON'T WORK/WON'T DO THE JOB:
- The flooding will obviously occur at some other point
17. SCHEME ASPECTS THAT SHOULD BE DONE:
- I am in favour of the dredging of the river which is much needed
18. REASON WHY BOUGHT PROPERTY:
- [beautiful view of golf course etc] why we bought it in the first place.
19. THE CURE IS WORSE THAN THE ILLNESS
- the cure is far worse than the illness
20. DOUBTS ABOUT THE VIABILITY OF THE SCHEME
- Whatever the Engineers and Water people say that particular area that I live in is going to become a
swamp !!! Because they do not know where the water is going
21. WOULD RATHER RISK FLOODING THAN HAVE SCHEME
- as a person whose house was flooded I think I would rather take the risk of flooding
22. ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE LIKELY FROM SCHEME
- I find the scheme in its present form totally unacceptable especially the environmental damage
23. IN FAVOUR OF FLOOD PROTECTION BUT AGAINST PRESENT PROPOSALS
- I agree with flood prevention but to put a 10 ft embankment at the bottom of our garden.. .is
horrendous
24. SCHEME WILL AFFECT PRIVACY
- would completely spoil our privacy
25. SCHEME WILL CREATE ANNOYANCE
-
[the scheme] would become an ideal playground for children with their BMX cycles etc
26. AGREEMENT WITH THE SCHEME
- I agree with the scheme as proposed
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Appendix F-10.3: Outline interview schedule (Lower Stour)
FLOODING:
EXPERIENCE:	 Were they there during 1979 flood
BELIEFS ABOUT:	 Causes
Consequences/seriousness [0 to 10 scale]
Likelihood of return
EFFECT ON ATTITUDE OF RECENT (FEBRUARY) FLOODING
Standard question from DWSC/89 survey:
"Would you be prepared to live in the same area if the risk of flooding were as follows:
- a 1 in 200 risk each and every year that your house would be flooded;
- a 1 in 100 risk
- a 1 in 50 risk
- a 1 in 25 risk
- a 1 in 10 risk
- a 1 in 5 risk"
LOCAL ENVIRONMENT:
PERCEIVED VALUE
CONCERN ABOUT
IMPORTANCE FOR landscape
nature conservation
recreation
house value
FLOOD DEFENCE SCHEME: 
What were original attitudes to scheme proposal
Have attitudes changed since comments made
How important are various factors in making decision:
landscape - views from/to houses
nature conservation
cost of scheme
house value
recreational possibilities
access
privacy
safety
Have there been problems during construction
were they resolved
What now are perceived as positive aspects of the scheme
What now are perceived as negative aspects of the scheme
How much of a priority is flood defence:
what other problems/issues are more urgent/important
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Standard questions from DWSC/89 survey:
"I would rather have any scheme than be flooded"
"Anything designed to reduce flooding is desirable"
[Scale: 1 strongly agree to 5 strongly disagree]
PUBLIC CONSULTATION: 
How successful as a means of finding out people's preferences
Suitability of timing
methods
Did they have enough information to make decision
How were public's concerns treated by nra engineers
Should public be involved in decisions about flood defence - are they qualified to participate
NRA:
Technical ability
'Customer care'
INSURANCE: 
Cover flooding yes/no
High premiums?
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Appendix F-10.4: Interview number and selected informant details (Lower Stour)
Interview	 Selected informant details
number	 (age, gender, single or couple)
INT1: 1 female informant:
60+ years old;
INT2: couple:
early 40s years old;
lNT3:	 couple:
late 40s/early 50s years old;
INT4: couple:
60+ years old;
INT5: couple:
60+ years old;
INT6: 1 male informant (wife entered later but contributed little):
early 60s years old;
INT7: 1 male informant:
70+ years old;
INT8: couple:
mid-70s years old;
INT9: couple:
60+ years old;
INT1UT:	 1 male informant:
60+ years old;
INT2UT:	 1 male informant:
50+ years old;
INT3UT:	 1 female informant:
40+ years old;
INT4UT:	 couple (but mostly the female):
50+ years old.
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Appendix F-10.5: Selection of themes, with examples, taken from the interview
transcripts (Lower Stour)
THE SCHEME
WHAT PEOPLE DO ON THE BANK/WALL:
[I] "And I planted all the flowers up there [on floodbank] and they came up and they're quite
nice"
[2] "now of course you get the children playing out there, all with their bikes, motorbikes up
and down it"
[8] "we frequently get people walking up and down, having a look in to see what's happening
because they've got a good view"
WHAT PEOPLE CALL/FEEL ABOUT SCHEME/SCHEME HEIGHT/IMPACT ON VIEW:
[3] "I was horrified at the height in some places. It was like walking along the Great China
Wall it was that high and wide"
[5] "we're trying to hide the monstrosity"
[6] "but when you.. .started to see these profiles going up, you thought, my god! they're not
putting that bank up as high as that, and, sure enough they were then!"
[7] "So, its spoilt our view; its invaded our privacy because of people walking on it and I
suppose its [...] a security risk because people can walk along it and drop over onto the back
gardens"
[8] "in fact, it's been a success"
GETTING USED TO IT:
[I] "I seemed to lose my privacy I thought but again I've got used to it"
[8] "...but we got over it you know you do eventually...and if it stops flooding well that's the
main thing"
THERE IS A FAULT IN THE SCHEME DESIGN/CRITICISM OF DESIGN:
[2] "And I don't ever think that that system they've got there where you see the layers is going
to grow, that is never ever going to grow that. That is grass in there you see and that is never
going to grow"
[3] "its too steep for a gang mower to mow it I would think"
[5] "Oh and then on top of that they put that hideous fence, can you see it? You know why
that's there? To stop the kids cycling!"
THINGS RESIDENTS WANT/DON'T WANT DONE NOW:
[1] don't [laughs] want one tree in my [laughs] in my vision. Oh I don't mind bushes"
[2] "why don't they have a few trees put there or something ...we'd rather have something to
cover it up"
[7] "I think there should be a notice up somewhere, at both ends, saying its prohibited to walk
on the walls from the council and that would er might help to some extent"
WHAT 'THEY' [NRA] SHOULD HAVE DONE:
[3] "whether the cladding could have been sort of less startling a sort of more old fashioned
type of brick or a stonework type finish rather than that.. .this harsh red brick"
[7] "I would have said an earth bank, which is more in keeping with nature, but er about half
the height of that wall, would have been sufficient to contain any flood around here and er and
up the golf course"
CONCERNS ABOUT FUTURE/LONG TERM MAINTENANCE OF SCHEME:
[3] "But that will be the major problem the up.. .keeping it looking nice"
[3] MR: "The culvert is their responsibility". .MRS: "Well they certainly don't maintain that"
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WHAT (NRA) SAID THEY'D DO BUT HAVEN'T:
[2] "they promised me it would be landscaped but it's not been landscaped so I'm not happy
about that"
SENSE OF LOSS NOW VIEW GONE:
[2] "The thing is its gone for ever. That view is never ever going to come back and its gone"
FEELING OF HELPLESSNESS/FATALISM:
[2] "Problem is it's never going to be altered now though is it"
SUSPICION OF ULTERIOR/ADDITIONAL MOTIVES FOR THE SCHEME:
[2] "I've got a funny feeling that it's connected with 2 other things, this bank..."
DIFFERENCE IN ATTITUDES FROM ONE SIDE OF STREET TO OILIER:
[2] "Well obviously they're all for it the other side and we're all against it this side which is
only natural isn't it... 'cos it only affects us; doesn't affect the other side"
APPROVAL FOR A SCHEME BUT DISCONTENT WITH PRESENT ONE:
[2] "We're all for the flood scheme but um we're disappointed at the height it had to be"
[5] "we also told them that we were not against a normal wall, but not a 12 foot wall, you see"
GOLF COURSE IS MONEYMAKER FOR COUNCIL/HAS HAD SPECIAL TREATMENT:
[2] "Course there's a lot of ground been lost by the golf course but that golf course there, its
about the only best paying profitable thing in Christchurch Council that is. About the only
thing that makes money um so I think that's why they were so concerned about making it so
pretty that side"
[5] "in my opinion, it looks much better on the golf course side, I think they're not bothered
about a handful of people here but there's a lot of people use the golf course, and they've
made it pretty for them, you know"
CONSTRUCTION PERIOD ATTITUDES:
[8] "they were doing their best but they were working against time and they were all behind
with their contract and er it seemed to me that there weren't enough people on it"
[9] "I've never seen such dust! It was just as if it was a permanent fog wasn't it? Awful"
THE FLOOD RISK
CAUSES OF FLOODING/WHAT NRA HAVE DONE HAS WORSENED FLOOD RISK:
[3] "one of the things that have been said, the reason we were flooded before was because that
Wessex Water or whatever, straightened out, although they say no, part of the river further up
which, when you talk to local people who've been living here for years um they say that is the
reason it happened because it.. .the flow of water.. .it quickened the flow of water urn whereas
the river meandered before urn you know that was why we were really flooded"
[6] "you see the other thing about this particular river, it hadn't been dredged for 20 something
years and so, I mean, everything was in favour of it actually flooding in matter of fact"
[3] "But I don't think there's any doubt that what they've done here is going to push the
flooding further down"
FLOOD RISK EXACERBATED BY DEVELOPMENT:
[4] "with all these huge housing estates they've built along Castle Lane as well as hospitals,
supermarkets, all the rain comes off very, very rapidly into the river. And all the way up the
Stour"
FLOOD RISK NOT REALLY RECOGNIZED:
[1] "I'd still have that attitude that it couldn't happen really"
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CONFUSION OVER STATISTICAL EXPRESSION OF FLOOD RISK:
[2] "We were told by the engineers of Wessex Rivers that it would never be flooded for
another hundred years"
CONSULTATION
ATTITUDES TO THE CONSULTATION PROGRAMME:
[2] "Allright, they had us up there and you write in a book but [...] they weren't really
interested in it at all"
[3] "I don't it was too bad, the actual consultation but there were, I think, alterations and
variations that came about afterwards that perhaps the public weren't made as aware of as they
should have been which caused some consternation and aggravation"
[3] "I think you should have had consultations yearly or.. .keep people more updated"
PEOPLE WERE NOT AWARE OF WHAT IT WOULD REALLY LOOK LIKE:
[2] "I don't think really everybody didn't think what that was going to look like"
[3] "even when we saw the markers that they put up that was supposed to indicate the height, I
didn't...it didn't signify"
THE CONSULTATION WOULD INEVITABLY FAVOUR THE MAJORITY:
[2] "they went a bit too far with their leaflets to get a lot of votes.. .those people weren't
concerned, see.. .they weren't concerned about it were they, they weren't worried 'oh yes, let's
go for the higher scheme'"
WHAT THE ENGINEER(S)PTHEY' SAID:
[2] "We were told by the engineers of Wessex Rivers that it would never be flooded for
another hundred years"
ATTITUDE TO ENGINEER ON SITE:
[2] "he's a very nice chap yeah. When I went and complained he came down here and it was
half past six at night"
MISCELLANEOUS
WHY WE/I MOVED HERE:
[5] "We bought this bungalow knowing about the floods. I mean my er daughter-in-law's
mother said, 'oh J they had a flood...'; I said 'well we don't care, we like the outlook, we like
this, we like that; it's a risk we've got to take"
INSURANCE COMPANY ATTITUDES:
[2] "The insurance company, they weren't concerned"
[3] "I mean before we bought the place, we went to the insurance company and said well, were
they prepared to insure the property and, b, would they ask for an additional premium and this
was what, 5 years after the event and they were quite happy, they they regard it as a freak
incident"
GREENHOUSE EFFECT:
[1] "seeing how [...] the water is rising, so I was quite happy, yes I was quite happy with it
[scheme]"
[4] "and of course, in the past 10 years you've had, you know, the greenhouse effect becoming
more and more prominent for example and the rising of the waters. That wasn't around when
that information was discussed"
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Appendix F-10.6: Photographs of parts of the Lower Stour Flood Alleviation Scheme
Appendix F-10.6a:
	 The Lower Stour Scheme (part): showing the gradient of the
floodbank, access path and temporary fencing
Appendix F-10.6b: The Lower Stour Scheme (part): showing the impact on views from
houses across the golf course to the river
Appendix F-10.6c:
	 The Lower Stour Scheme (part): showing the structure of the
floodbank and the repairs to damaged sections
Appendix F-10.6d
	 The Lower Stour Scheme (part): showing poor turf growth and
weed invasion
Appendix F-10.6e:
	 The Lower Stour Scheme (part): showing the proximity of the
floodbank to some properties
Appendix F-10.6f:
	 The Lower Stour Scheme (part): showing the proximity of the
floodwall to some properties
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Appendix F-10.6a
Appendix F-10.6b
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Appendix F-10.6e
Appendix F-10.6f
APPENDIX F: 143
Appendix F-10.7: Analysis of conditions, consequences, interactions, strategies/tactics,
applied to selected dimensions of scheme and flood risk (Lower Stour)
THE SCHEME and ATTITUDES TO IT
What are the CONDITIONS which govern attitudes (positive/negative, present/future) to the
scheme?
that it doesn't spoil the view;
a belief that when landscaping is complete it will look better;
a belief that it will work;
a belief that the level of protection [and scheme] is too high;
a belief that they [those overlooking the scheme] are not as important as the golf course [on
whose side there is better vegetation growth as a result of a less steep slope];
a belief that they were promised much which did not transpire;
human nature - getting used to it;
interactions in the community;
the comparison between what existed before the scheme (an uninterrupted view across the golf
course and down to the river) and what exists now;
that it will be well maintained;
a condition of present attitude to the scheme is an element of surprise that the scheme is so
high - consultation did not prepare them for this
a belief in the global warming hypothesis;
a belief that the problem is not an engineering problem but a social and political one and so a
structural scheme is not a suitable solution;
a belief that single solutions, such as barriers to the floodwaters, are inadequate, because there
are a number of possible causes of flooding in the area, including extensive agricultural land
drainage and floodplain development;
the scheme results in a loss of open space;
the construction was managed inefficiently;
that the past flood was caused by human error; thus, to build a structure is not a rational
solution for dealing with the true cause of the flooding- human error;
a belief that the river needed dredging and that this would be a better solution to the flood risk;
a belief that the scheme is a waste of money and overdesigned. a belief that a contributory
cause of the flooding was the earlier straightening of the river by the NRA, so the necessity for
the scheme is based in part upon the past mistakes of the NRA;
a preference for a bank rather than a wall (but it would have to have been about half the size);
a preference for a wall rather than a bank;
the meadow is a flood meadow [and therefore a flood control mechanism];
a condition of a more favourable attitude to the scheme would be the planting of some trees;
the control of thistles and other weeds; more aesthetically pleasing fencing and paths; the
control of walkers, bike riders and dogs
the steep angle of the bank;
What are the CONSEQUENCES of the scheme?
[during construction] the dust meant people were unable to open windows during the hot
summer months;
[during construction] the noise of the lorries;
[during construction] it affected the moles in the area by driving them away temporarily;
[during construction] trail bikers used the site;
[during construction] there were vibrations to the house;
[during construction] the contractors drove tractors along the top of the bank (close to the
informants' property) which caused the informants anxiety;
[during construction] an informant suffered severe asthma attacks during the construction
process which resulted in x-ray examination and medication;
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a number of shrubs were removed which "people" missed;
some people have acquired more land [a benefit];
some people have gained land they did not want [a disbenefit];
children play [on the bank];
bikes and motorbikes are ridden up and down it;
cars drive up it at night time;
police have had to patrol it;
people walk along the bank and look over into people's gardens;
there is a high risk of burglaries;
those nearest to the scheme have swapped a flood risk for a security risk;
there has been a loss of view;
it has reversed the value of the outlook from the house: what was once the best view is now
the worst view;
the damage that the NRA have caused;
friends of the informants now remarked upon the scheme: 'I s'pose you've lost your nice view
now then?': most of them come and say "what on earth's that?";
the grass on the bank would be prevented from growing (as a consequence of the children
playing);
the informants can no longer see the golfers on the golf course (which previously gave them
much amusement);
friends on the golf course can no longer wave to them;
the contractors began work at an unacceptably early hour on some occasions;
wildlife has suffered a loss of habitat from removal of areas of vegetation used for nesting etc;
our hedgehogs have disappeared due to this work;
"it [the environment] is not as natural as it was; it's more synthetic";
it is now impossible for the annual fair to be sited there as it had been previously [mixed
response likely to this];
the flood defences will push the floodwaters further downstream to the detriment of other
residents;
"we've noticed a change in the type of birds we get here" [less variety now];
wildlife have difficulty getting over these embankments and walls;
the scheme's negative impact on wildlife;
loss of privacy;
loss of peace and quiet;
loss of access to the meadow and the river;
a belief that [the floodplain residents] will have to pay for the scheme ("they'll slide it on our
bills gradually so we don't notice anything");
perceived loss of value of the property;
golfers walk up the bank and damage it;
people walk up the bank and create a nuisance by looking in through windows;
possibly as a consequence of the scheme, the golf club has changed the layout of the course
and the informants now get far fewer golfballs coming in to their garden [a positive benefit];
it is less 'pleasant' than before the work started;
the informants now feel safer;
the informants have more privacy;
it is necessary to stand up to see over the bank.
What INTERACTIONS (engineers/other residents) were made in connection with the scheme?
the NRA (about loss of privacy and they offerred to put up a trellis);
the NRA (described as 'the Water Board' and 'Wessex Water') (mentioned in terms of the
consultation process, a consequence of which was that "you knew what was going on");
the Site Engineer (who had disclosed some design changes and took the informant into his
confidence by giving technical information and treating her as an (technical) equal;
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"one of the people from the Council" (giving a talk on the 'greenhouse effect' and the threat
this posed through rising water levels);
neighbours who opposed the works (blamed for putting a stop on the work;
people in the community (bringing up the possibility of flooding);
the Residents Association; (tactic) to leave the argument to those who could better argue the
case for completion of the floodwall;
other residents (from whom information was received about the previous flood);
informant's priest (who "told her off' for bringing such matters into church where she was
discussing it with neighbours);
people who walk on the bank and invade privacy by looking through windows.
What STRATEGIES/TACTICS were/are used in connection with the scheme?
planted flowers on the floodbank to make it look nice;
making a public fuss to try to get the scheme changed;
contact the Mayor;
"we kicked up a bit of a.. .hell of a storm";
to discuss possible alternatives with the NRA (tactics of conciliation);
to collect and keep scheme related correspondence and newspaper cuttings and compare the
promises made therein with what had actually transpired;
preparedness to join with other residents and sue over the losses of view, privacy, security and
property value;
writing letters and attending meetings to try and get preferences accepted;
perceived tactics of the NRA: to extend the questionnaire coverage too far, to people whose
property had never flooded; not to have published the results in the local paper so that local
people could verify them;
perceived tactics of the NRA: the omission of detailed plans of the proposed scheme in the area
where the informants lived;
perceived tactics of the NRA: to tell the local residents that they could telephone with any
suggestions for improving the appearance of the scheme (tactics of conciliation);
perceived tactics of the NRA; it told lies as a tactic for getting the scheme accepted.
ATTITUDE TO RISK
(tolerable levels of flood risk)
What are/were the CONDITIONS for tolerating the risk?
could not move anywhere else;
would not want to uproot home;
the belief that the last flood was a 'freak' flood;
the insurance companies regarded the last flood as a freak flood and did not raise the
premiums;
it is something that cannot be anticipated and so must be tolerated;
there is insufficient evidence on which to base the statistical estimate of risk;
the outlook and the immediate environment is worth it;
the risk is a remote one;
the belief that the 1979 flood was a result of a number of factors coming together and it is
highly unlikely that this set of circumstances will recur;
the perception of the cause of flooding as a rare event exacerbated by a lack of river
maintenance (now rectified by dredging and clearing the flood arches) leads to toleration of
risk without floodbank/wall;
earlier experiences in Australia where severe flooding was witnessed: the levels of flooding in
Christchurch are 'nothing' by comparison;
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experiences of high rainfall in the past which had caused the river water to 'lap the banks' and
'waterlog' the pasture but not flood property;
having insurance;
being prepared to tolerate a flood if it occurred;
knowledge of the previous flood;
the belief that the informant will no longer be alive when a flood recurs;
the existence of a long view across open land.
CONDITIONS for not tolerating flood risk
advanced age;
ill health (mental and/or physical);
previous flood experience;
that global weather conditions have changed making the risk more likely and possibly more
serious.
What STRATEGIES/TACTICS are/were used to tolerate risk
get sandbags to manage the flood;
deny the risk;
make flood plans for evacuation;
get insurance.
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Appendix G-13.1: Outline interview structure (Engineers)
1.	 EXAMPLES OF REFUSALS OF FLOOD DEFENCE ON GROUNDS OF UNACCEPTABLE
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
	
1.1	 Are there examples of cases where:
a) the proposed design standard had to be lowered because the environmental impact (in its
broadest sense) was too great?
b) the proposed design standard was maintained in the face of public opposition?
	
1.2	 What were the main objections?
	
1.3	 Would NRA handle it differently if it were to happen again?
	
1.4	 Was anything learned from this case?
	
1.5	 How do engineers balance risk and environmental impact?
	
1.6	 Is there a point (eg 1:5 -> 1:200 risk) where scheme design
standard conflict with existing locational benefits?
	
1.7	 In what sorts of situation would you be prepared to impose a scheme? Has that happened?
	
1.8	 Do you think as much/less/more consideration should be given to impact of schemes on the view
from people's houses as is given to, eg, impact on nature conservation and ecology?
	
1.9	 Can you give me examples of an environmentally 'good' scheme (ie care for wildlife, natural
banks etc) and a 'bad' scheme (ie a concrete trapezoidal channel)?
2.	 LIAISON AND CONSULTATION
	2.1	 What are the statutory requirements regarding consultation?
	
2.2	 When are the general public involved?
	
2.3	 How much time is spent on consultation/liaison?
	
2.4	 How confident are you about the information on which you base your decisions? e.g. flood maps,
modelling etc.
	
2.5	 How important is it to liaise with landowners and developers?
	
2.6	 Do engineers have any training in carrying out public consultation?
	
2.7	 Do you think engineers are the right people to do public consultation work?
	
2.8	 Do you think involving the public much more directly in the planning/designing process is a good
idea?
3.	 THE PUBLIC
	
3.1	 Can the public contribute anything substantive to scheme design?
	
3.2	 Have they in past schemes? e.g. have members of the public provided information/suggestions that
have led to design alterations?
	
3.3	 How useful are the public as information sources? How reliable is the information that the public
has?
	3.4	 Do you think the public/lay person should have the right to challenge the decisions of
professional/technical experts?
	
3.5	 What sort of people oppose flood schemes?
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Appendix G-13.1 continued
4. ENGINEERS
	4.1	 Is an engineer a particular type of person?
	
4.2	 How would you characterise an engineer?
	
4.3	 How does this characterisation differ from the general public?
	
4.4	 Do different types of people do different types of engineering work? eg do Site Engineers have
to be a particular type of person?
	
4.5
	
Would you say flooding was a natural hazard?
	
4.6	 How much is it a physical problem and how much a social problem?
	
4.7	 Would you say " A fundamental goal of the engineering profession is the control of nature?
(Sewell)
	
4.8	 How do you think the 'greenhouse effect' or global warming will affect water engineers?
	
4.9
	
Have you noticed any changes in your profession over the years?
	
4.10	 Do you think the importance of environmental factors in engineering design is just a
'fad'/fashionable at the moment and will be less important in a few years time?
	
4.11	 Do you think it would be better if engineers were left to make decisions on their own, without
public involvement? Would this result in better, faster decisions?
4.12 What do you see as the key problems in scheme promotion?
5. PERSONAL DETAILS
	
5.1	 What is your job title?
	
5.2	 How long have you been an engineer?
	
5.3	 What kind of experience have you had:
a) with public consultation?
b) as a Site Engineer?
	
5.4	 Would you move onto a floodplain?
	
5.5	 Have you learned anything that you would like to pass on to other engineers?
	
5.6	 Are you a member of any organisations - professional/recreational/community etc. E.G. Iwem,
national trust, rotary club...
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Appendix G-13.2: List of themes taken from interview transcripts (Engineers)
Conflict situations/resolution:
Consultation, descriptions of:
Consultation, general issues:
Consultation: how:
Consultation: time spent on:
Consultation: when:
Consultation: who:
Costs and benefits:
Democracy and questions of representation:
Development comparisons:
Differences between river and tidal flooding
Distrust of/attitudes to public authorities:
Engineers: attitudes to the public:
Engineers: attitudes to schemes:
Engineers: environmental attitudes:
Engineers: experience:
Engineers: types of:
Engineers, attitudes to themselves/their profession:
Engineers: frustrations of the job:
Environmental attitudes: change over time:
Environmental sensitivity
Experts
Floodplain management issues:
Flood risk: perceptions of:
Floods: natural versus social causation
Form and function:
Institutional issues, e.g. As a result of reorganisation:
Levels/standards of protection:
Maff: general:
Maff: attitudes to grant aiding environmental 'extras':
Majority versus minority:
National characteristics:
NCC/conservationists/environmentalists: dealings with, conflicts with:
Perceptions of the cause of flooding:
for the Public good/in the public interest:
the Public as a source of information/suggestions:
Scheme development/promotion issues
Schemes: aesthetics (visual impact) issues:
Schemes: cost constraints
Schemes: general issues:
Schemes: getting used to it:
Schemes: prioritisation of:
Schemes: reactions to by different groups:
Schemes: responses to proposals
Schemes: spatial differentiation between (scheme/flood) costs and benefits:
Schemes: 'triggers' for development:
Subjectivity/objectivity
Tolerance of flooding:
Trade-offs
Type of people who oppose schemes:
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Appendix G-13.3: A list of themes with examples (Engineers)
CONFLICT SITUATIONS/RESOLUTION:
[5] "How do you get a consensus view? There are some who are going to say 'never mind the birds and
flowers, we demand flood protection' and others are going to say 'we are custodians of the environment
and no short term consideration of property values should interfere with that'."
CONSULTATION, DESCRIPTIONS OF:
[3] "It's taking us an awful lot of labour and trouble."
[11] "It's a bit hairy at times."
CONSULTATION, GENERAL ISSUES:
[1] "Although we had consulted everybody, the public didn't generally realize what was being done."
[2] "We've never been in a situation where we've promoted a scheme in opposition to public opinion. All
our schemes are done by agreement with.. .certainly the people directly affected."
[4] "[Consultation is] a fundamental part of the job I think its something, if you don't get adept at doing
it you fall by the wayside."
CONSULTATION, HOW:
[3] "We opted to take the planning permisision route as a way of getting a final answer."
[3] "One of the disadvantages of the SI1217 route for consultation is that anybody has a right to object, for
any reason, even if its an irrelevant reason, its very difficult for somebody in the Ministry to ignore it."
[7] "When you go to your public meetings, you will explain all the various options which are available."
[11] "We started it off with a public meeting and we chose a local school in the area of this estate and just
an open discussion to anyone to come along.. .we gave them a presentation with slides and overhead
projectors and mounted photographs of what we'd actually done on the scheme and how it was intended
to work."
CONSULTATION, TIME SPENT ON:
[1] "The main activity is public consultation. And promotion of the scheme."
[2] "[Consultation is] the vast bulk of the time spent on the scheme. It outweighs the amount of time spent
on design by a great amount. Design is a relatively insignificant part of scheme promotion these days."
[8] "The public relations exercise has grown and grown."
CONSULTATION, WHEN:
[2] "You can't consult until you know what you're consulting people on but we would say that was the
earliest stage. Once you've got outline proposals, that's the first point at which you can consult people.
There's no point consulting them before then."
[9] "It's no good putting forward options if you know they're going to be shot down in terms of benefit: cost
and the scheme is going to be stopped. I mean, that's giving people a false choice."
CONSULTATION: WHO:
[2] "When I say we approached the local residents, we tend to do that through the Parish Councils as the
lowest level of public involvement that you can actually consult as a statutory body rather than trying to
call a public meeting of people."
[3] "Well we consult.. .not only the statutory consultees, we go to the local wildlife trusts who are delegated
consultees, we go to the County Conservation Officer, the County Archaeologist, who are not the statutory
consultees but we consult them all the same, and the RSPB and we used to consult the Vincent Wildlife
Trust.. .so we've consulted everybody who has professional expertise about the environment."
[5] "...approaching all the people who might have had an interest in the land that was going to be flooded
and explaining to them what was going to happen - what we proposed to happen."
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COSTS AND BENEFITS:
[2] "Well... the problem is, things that you have to take account of in schemes now, like conservation
matters and visual amenities, are not very easy to put on the benefit side of the equation - well in fact, in
conservation terms they're impossible to put on the benefit side of the equation."
COSTS AND BENEITTS continued:
[7] "Of course the big question mark is if we can justify carrying out scheme works and in fact an initial
survey of properties at risk would suggests that the benefit-cost ratio would be rather below unity in which
case we may well do nothing at all."
DEMOCRACY AND QUESTIONS OF REPRESENTATION:
[3] "Well I suppose from a democratic perspective, the best way to solve that is to let the local planning
authority have its say because the councillors represent the local people and it seems to be appropriate that
they should have the say."
[4] "Where we do have problems are the sort of groups.. .1 won't mention any but they set themselves as
being the 'Thames Conservation Society', you know, a little group of people set themselves up and they're
sort of unelected and they're unrepresentative, pushing their own sort of little.., they might be a group of
fishermen or something like that."
DEVELOPMENT COMPARISONS:
[5] "I'm contrasting the efficiency and speed with which the TGV has been pushed through northern France
compared to what they're having to struggle with in Kent to try to get a railway to the channel tunnel
through Kent."
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN RIVER AND COASTAL FLOODING:
[1] "In river situations those low frequencies, like 1 in 10 years, maybe they're significant. In the case of
tidal flooding they are not."
DISTRUST OF/ATTITUDES TO, PUBLIC AUTHORITIES:
[4] "Yes well we're knocked, we're generally knocked, I mean its all in the paper, you know, the public
authority.. .we're sort of everybody's fall guys."
ENGINEERS, ATTITUDES TO THE PUBLIC:
[1] "But the public will generally not have enough experience of.. .knowledge of what is the problem.. .not
many people, except us, know a lot about it so you have to take the lead in explaining or formulating what
are the possibilities."
[4] "Well I think that people that buy properties that are liable to flood are foolish or iminformed."
[7] "We do in our business meet some very difficult people..."
[8] "I think we're more prepared now to discuss and to try and satisfy people's preferences as much as we
can.
[11] "I think people just don't want change, unless its their carpets which are actualy floating on the water
and where they very definitely do want change."
ENGINEERS, ATTITUDES TO SCHEMES:
[2] "We're not in the business of promoting schemes in opposition to people's views."
[3] "We didn't really want to let the scheme drop because we feel.. .you feel some responsibility, its part
of the NRA aims and objectives to protect people from flooding.. .So in line with our objectives, we can't
simply leave people there behind because its awkward."
[5] "The contract is well under way at the moment. Its an absolute dog's breakfast."
[6] "The sort of technology of flood defence has improved such that they look a lot better and you can sort
of blend them in."
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ENGINEERS, ENVIRONMENTAL ATTITUDES:
[1B] "Well I don't know what the NRA thinks but I think people are much more important than any other
species personally."
[4] "There isn't that much mystique about nature conservation. We tend to know what is wanted and what
is unacceptable ourselves."
[8] "We have adapted and learned by experience and we've developed a lot and we've got a new insight
into the value of the environment and the requirements, no doubt about that."
[9] "Where we can do things to enhance, we do. You know, we're not forced into it, we do it quite
happily."
ENGINEERS, EXPERIENCE:
[1] "Well happily, my experience of talking to people who've just been flooded is limited."
[5] "However good your theoretical knowledge, you will design things that are silly if you haven't had the
experience of trying to build them."
ENGINEERS, TYPES OF:
[1] "We paid for a Liaison Engineer, who was in addition to the normal Resident Engineer, whose job
was to calm the residents. Because it was a potentially an extremely disruptive job'
[2] "A Principal Engineer would deal with a scheme right from the initial identification of the problem
through to completion of the whole project."
[7] "If you're using consulting engineers on a scheme, they don't have the same feel for the situation that
our own people have."
[11] "My experience of consultants [engineers] is that if NRA engineers are not practised at presentation
work, consultants are a damned sight worse."
ENGINEERS, ATTITUDES TO THEMSELVEStitiLIR PROFESSION:
[1] "Engineers though have had a.. .they still have to a certain extent, a bad image. Which of course
concerns the whole profession very much."
[4] "You don't come into the NRA necessarily because you want high pay, you want to be a high flyer;
you come into the job because basically you like that sort of existence."
[8] "The science of river engineering and flood protection is growing and developing and will continue to
do so."
ENGINEERS, FRUSTRATIONS OF THE JOB:
[5] "There must have been an awful lot of frustration. There's nothing worse, if you're actually directly
involved in engineering design, to keep on churning out work which doesn't get built."
ENVIRONMENTAL ATTITUDES, CHANGE OVER TIME:
[6] "Nobody likes to feel that they're doing a job where they're actually.. .these days.. .causing
environmental damage. So you usually find that very few engineers that you come across these days are
actually actively wanting to cut a trapezoidal channel, dead straight, for three miles across the countryside."
[8] "Engineers have been criticised strongly for their rough approach and their insensitive approach but in
the '60s the environment was of no value."
ENVIRONMENTAL SENSITIVITY
[7] "And we were persuaded that it wasn't right to do it when we heard about the impact it would have
upon a lot of flora and fauna in the area. And we did take it out of the scheme although it reduced the
benefits.. .the cost ratio quite considerably."
[8] "A very...extremely environmentally sensitive area and we recognised this right at the beginning of the
design stage and we embarked upon trying to design engineering works with environmental sensitivity."
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EXPERTS
[lb] "I think it's actually a national characteristic. I don't know if it's any different on the continent.
Nobody believes experts in this country do they?"
[7] "And then you come across people who sort of measure the size of bridges and work out how much
water's escaped and check the size of storage reservoirs to make sure you've got your figures right. They
don't understand the sort of detail which we, as sort of specialists, go into."
FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT ISSUES:
[1] "In the case of flood defences, what you can do for yourself is very limited."
[3] "What you can do is take personal actions to mitigate what happens during a flood."
[4] "We basically are a body which is employed to look at these flood schemes.. .its our job to come up
with an option which we think is an engineering solution."
[5] "We have no control over floodplain development, we can only work by trying to influence planning
decisions by local authorities."
[7] "But we can't always count on the cooperation of the local authorities and the local authority, if we do
carry out some limited flood alleviation works, are only then quick to take advantage of it by allowing
further development to take place."
[7] "I think.. .we've not been very well prepared before to counter development proposals."
FLOOD RISK, PERCEFTIONS OF:
[3] "Well I think the way the engineer sees it may arise out of the analysis that you carry out because you
look at the situation in terms of statistical averages whereas the residents' view may well be coloured by
whether or not there's been a recent flood event."
FLOODS, NATURAL VERSUS SOCIAL CAUSATION:
[5] 'We regard flooding as a natural event, exacerbated in many cases by human activity."
FORM AND FUNCTION:
[5] "I suppose it goes against the grain really, that if you have designed a good job, to in effect conceal
it by sticking bricks on the face and planting shrubs and flowers all over it. If you've done a good job you
want people to see it."
[7] "Now some people might argue that you shouldn't attempt to disguise a pumping station or.. .to look
like something else. I mean you should make it look what it is, its a functional thing..."
INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES, e.g. AS A RESULT OF REORGANISATION:
[7] "We had perhaps a few reservations earlier on because it seemed to be that.. .a lot of red tape but its
not turned out quite as bad as we imagined and we now.. .we're beginning to enjoy things like the exchange
of information with the other regions and also of course, the power and authority of the NRA as a national
organization.. .so I think certainly those things greatly outweigh perhaps the loss of a little bit of local
control which we had enjoyed in previous organizations."
[8] "Five or ten years ago we didn't have ecologists, we didn't have river corridor surveys, biologists etc
etc so the structure within the organization has expanded to bring in these specialists."
LEVELS/STANDARDS OF PROTECTION:
[1] 'a 1000 year was the accepted thing for the local areas, ten years ago.. .all the urban areas though, the
1000 year - no questions.. .Q: What about now? A: Between 1 and 200'
[1B] "That was the old fashioned way of doing things. Before any benefit-cost analysis and had to put a
frequency on the figures; what used to happen was people used to wait for a flood and say 'oh gosh, that
mustn't happen again. We'll build. .takethat plus a foot or two of freeboard'."
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LEVELS/STANDARDS OF PROTECTION continued:
[4] "I'd say in the general case, I would go for a high standard of protection rather than look for a lower
standard simply because its more cost-beneficial or for other reasons, people can't see the river or that sort
of thing."
[10] "That's quite important, that there are regional standards, in other words we're not applying one
standard in one part of the region and another standard in another part of the region."
MAFF, GENERAL:
[1] "I think MAFF are only concerned.. .about spending money properly."
[6] "The scheme certainly was overtaken by a change in attitude of MAFF...MAFF were agreeing the
scheme because they were getting a lot of pressure from local farmers, but by the end they were
embarassed by it."
MAFF, ATTITUDES TO GRANT-AIDING ENVIRONMENTAL 'EXTRAS':
[6] "The atmosphere changed.. .a lot of it came back to MAFF...MAFF's line was they looked at
everything that you went and put into a scheme, and anything they felt wasn't essential to the flood
protection was knocked out."
[7] "This is perhaps one of the problems, not knowing precisely how much we can spend on the
environment. We... feel there are restraints on us because if we go a little bit overboard then we're not
likely to get the approval of MAFF for the works which we're proposing. Now obviously we can't be given
a blank cheque but I don't think there are any clear guidelines for us, you know, just how much we can
spend.
MAJORITY VERSUS MINORITY:
[lb "But, there's often somebody that really rather would not have it done. You say to them 'well, you
know, you're in a minority and we're sure we're right and hard luck."
[1] 'We were extremely careful to consult everybody and get a majority.. .you couldn't call it a consensus
but a majority anyway in favour of doing something about it."
MAJORITY VERSUS MINORITY continued:
[2] "You're into a very difficult value judgement as to whether you say 'well the majority are in favour,
so for the good of the majority we'll bash on with the scheme' or do you say 'well some people don't like
it so, you know, perhaps we'll forget it'. What we would try and do is satisfy the minority who are still
not happy, by a process of consultation."
NATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS:
[1] "I don't know if this is a particularly English characteristic; there is always a tendency to try and find
someone to blame if something nasty happens to you for whatever reason."
[3] "I think the French are far more practical about these things, they seem to spend far less money on
using stone facing on their engineering structures; they're basically more honest. If you have a concrete
structure, why not let it be concrete?"
[4] "A friend of mine he goes off to holidays in France and he says he comes back and they treat him over
there a bit like you would over here a doctor or something like that whereas in Britain, the engineer is the
chap with a spanner."
NCC/CONSERVATIONISTS/ENVIRONMENTALISTS: DEALINGS/CONFLICTS WITH:
[4] "I don't think nowadays that there is a particular conflict between, certainly the people in the NRA and
conservationists."
[5] "We did our conservation consultation, went to the NCC and they said 'oh no you don't. That is the
habitat for a rather unusual type . of...'And we had quite a lot of to-ing and fro-ing with them last year but
in the end we came really to a total impasse. We couldn't go any fluffier."
[5] "It's a partly scientific argument [from Ncq but I think that politics and influence all come into it as
well."
APPENDIX G: 156
Appendix G-13.3 continued
NCC/CONSERVATIONISTS/ENVIRONMENTALISTS: DEALINGS/CONFLICTS WITH continued:
[7] "That was.. .certainly my first, encounter with the conservationists and you know we've learnt a lot over
the years, initially it was very difficult to bring the views of the conservationists and engineers together,
I still think there's, you know, a gap there."
PERCEPTIONS OF THE CAUSE OF FLOODING:
[1] "We do have a lot of people who say 'oh, no wonder we had a flood, they closed the Thames Barrier
yesterday.' Of course the Thames Barrier has nothing to do with it whatever."
[7] "It was a simple explanation that you are being flooded more frequently simply because its raining
harder, more often. I mean, people would never have considered that as one of the reasons because they
were looking for someone being responsible."
[8] "I don't think they [the public] do think that it [flooding] has been a natural thing but it's been an
unnatural occurrence that's caused it."
for the PUBLIC GOOD/IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST:
[2] "So I think, I can only assume that people [engineers having problems with consultation] are adopting
a confrontational attitude and if you're doing something for people's benefit, what's the point?"
[7] "...because it's for the benefit of the community at large and the powers which we have are intended
to get around this problem of the isolated objector.. .denying other people a proper standard of flood
protection."
the PUBLIC AS A SOURCE OF INFORMATION/SUGGESTIONS:
[3] "One of the elements in the present scheme is the proposal to jack the properties up. And that actually
was a suggestion which came from the village at a public meeting."
[4] "Well they're extremely useful on historic flood levels: what has happened, we find that they are very
very good, they will know that a flood in 1947 came up to the fourth brick below their window or
something.. .Quite often their views on the causes of these things and the answer to how to solve these
things isn't very good."
SCHEMES, DEVELOPMENT/PROMOTION ISSUES:
[7] "There's a real need to persuade people that you're going to carry out works which are going to be an
improvement to the local amenities."
[8] "So I think if there is a threat and if they've had past experience
of flooding.. .my experience tells me, we don't find a lot of problems in promoting the works and they don't
get over-interested..."
SCHEMES, DEVELOPMENT/PROMOTION ISSUES continued:
[9] "So we used the same method [of scheme promotion] and it worked at one and it didn't work at the
other."
SCHEMES, AESTHETICS (VISUAL IMPACT) ISSUES:
[1] "...the flood defence committee, I mean, having already built two thirds of the scheme, were quite
certain that they were not going to build the rest of the scheme to a lower standard just because of some
objections to.. .it wasn't going to look so nice."
[6] "The standards we're producing for those schemes are far in excess of the standard that would have
been done on a similar scheme ten years ago. We're using these reinforced masonry walls for
floodwalls...there's planting schemes going in alongside the works and while they're still not
perhaps.. .going to win awards.. .they look very good."
[11] "Schemes benefitted no end in having the architects there...as the engineer was developing the
schemes, the architect was there saying 'well don't do it this way, do it this way; and instead of having that
shape there why don't you...'; you could see it...it was very good, it worked well."
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SCHEMES, COST CONSTRAINTS:
[1] "The people wanted us to put it somewhere else. Well, you know, where they couldn't see it, but [the]
further down river you go, the more expensive it gets."
[7] "Often it's the economic factors which are going to determine a scheme.. .a scheme has to be viable
otherwise there's no chance of getting it through."
[7] "I think if you get more money made available for that [environmental works], we could spend it but
we often have to limit what we do by the amount of money we're likely to get approved."
SCHEMES, GENERAL ISSUES:
[2] "Well, we put in the scheme whatever needs to be put in to avoid any.. .well, not quite the right way
of putting it.. .we [went] as far as we needed to go to satisfy people and to obtain their approval for the
scheme."
[4] "It's alright pointing nowadays to schemes that were done twenty or thirty years ago and saying 'that
was terrible' but it wasn't terrible then. That was when it was done. The schemes that are done nowadays
you know, reflect public, what the public want now."
SCHEMES, GETTING USED TO IT:
[4] "But when people tend to get used to it they tend to think its a good idea. It doesn't last beyond the
building of the scheme. Its quite peculiar. I think.. .people tend to resist change. .I think, at the end of the
day, you tend to accept anything.. .fait accomplis."
[11] "I think at the end of the day what people don't want is change. And what doesn't look nice initially
when it's built, and if you want to go along 25 years later and do something different, then the thing,
whatever it is, has kind of matured, it's become part of the landscape and people will try and protect it.
Whereas, 25 years ago they were screaming blue murder."
SCHEMES, PRIORITISATION OF:
[2] 'there are the two types, there's the small community that suffers frequent flooding which, because
there's only a small number of properties involved, is low down the priority list, or there's the larger
community which is at risk from less frequent flooding but obviously a far larger number of properties
involved.'
SCHEMES, REACTIONS TO BY Dik ERENT GROUPS:
[3] "Even when you've reached agreement with all the conservation bodies about what the scheme should
be, you're then obliged to advertise the fact in two local papers and anybody can send in some spurious
objection. Not based on any proper understanding of the environment, it can be a totally subjective
objection."
SCHEMES, RESPONSES TO PROPOSALS:
[1] "The whole place blew up."
[3] "In fact we met district councillors and parish councillors to talk about the scheme and they almost
pulled our arms off wanting the scheme to go ahead."
[6] "It had got very emotional by this stage and the people just didn't want any scheme, didn't want any
work, any disturbance, there at all."
SCHEMES, SPATIAL DIEEERENTIATION BETWEEN (SCHEME/FLOOD) COSTS AND
BENEFTTS:
[I] "Of course X itself isn't the major beneficiary from the scheme; the benefits are upstream in the X
industrial areas."
[5] "It's a hard thing to put over to say to people down river there 'you've got to have your delightful
stream turned into a concrete channel because the people up here.. .because there's been intensification of
development here."
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SCHEMES, 'TRIGGERS' FOR DEVELOPMENT:
[2] "Well you would never dare have a scheme before the catastrophic flood if you don't have to, you see.
That's the problem, you're always reacting to the situation."
[4] "Most of the push that comes for a new scheme tends to be people that move into the area; they haven't
quite realised what flooding is like, they then get a little flood and then realise and then they start making
sort of representations about getting a flood scheme."
[9] "And then we had the '81 [flood] which was the trigger for the reappraisal because some people got
a fright."
SUBJECTIVITY/OBJECTIVITY:
[5] "You would have to put in a value for perhaps a scheme that had a positive benefit in environmental
and conservation terms, against one that had a positive detriment or a trade-off between the two...I accept
that you can't.. .you're measuring in two different scales of value but nonetheless I think you can do that
even if its in rather subjective terms."
[6] "I did feel that was a number of factors which we didn't put in the report to the RFDC because they
were subjective, if you like."
TOLERANCE OF FLOODING:
[1] "I reckon after they've been flooded they won't tolerate any sort of flooding, even if it was quite a
small flood."
[4] "An interesting point that we find.. .is that the people who've...lived in a place for a long time and have
experienced flooding for a long time, tend to accept it. They, well they just accept it. Their buildings have
always smelt musty and they tend to think that is the norm. It's quite peculiar."
[9] "The older property had been lived in by people who accepted the flooding.. .and they didn't expect
anyone to do anything about it. Then it changed hands and suddenly somebody realized that the property
flooded and there was a problem."
TRADE-OFFS:
[2] "But there are the odd schemes where, for particular reasons, the only solutions that are available to
us may have adverse effects. And people then have to choose between having the scheme done and not
having a scheme done. And there have been situations where we've suggested a scheme to a local
community and they've said 'no thanks, we'd rather carry on and put up with the flooding'. And we
haven't then done anything."
TYPE OF PEOPLE WHO OPPOSE SCHEMES:
[1] "Most of the objections were from people who don't actually live on the front in the flood-prone area.
It came from people who were not liable to floods but liked the view as it was."
[11] "They're far more likely to complain if the work is actually going to affect them, if the work is
actually planned on their land, and then they'll complain probably longer and harder than if its on somebody
else's land."
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flood risk (Engineers)
The interview took place with a married couple (MR. and MRS.): questions denoted by
,Q,.
Q:	 "If I said 'I would rather have any scheme than be flooded', would you agree or disagree...?
MR:	 Oh, yeah, we would rather have the scheme than be flooded, yeah I would...
Q:	 Would you give that 1 strongly agree, 2 agree...?
MR: No, I would have a 1 on that. I would really strongly agree to have it, a flood scheme yeah I
would...
Q:	 'Any scheme' the wording is. 'I would rather have any scheme than be flooded.'
MR:	 [laughs] what a big moat dug out there? [laughter] Yeah. Yeah obviously people who've gone into
it and built it, must feel that there must be something wrong there but oh yeah I would go strongly
with it to say to have a scheme, any scheme, as long as it...it suits [said emphatically] the
environment really isn't it, don't you think? [asks wife]
MRS: Mmm...
Q:	 What about you [said to wife], would you agree with that?
MRS: Yes. I definitely wouldn't like to be flooded.
Q:	 What about the statement 'anything designed to reduce flooding is desirable'?
MRS: Oh dear, they're awkward questions aren't they?
MR:	 They are awkward. Especially for a Sunday evening [laughs]...
Q:	 'Anything designed to reduce flooding is desirable', strongly agree to strongly disagree?
MR:	 Yeah, I'd strongly agree with that, yeah I would.
Q:	 But I could argue that you've got anything designed to reduce flooding...
MR: Mmmm. Mmmm.
MRS: Yes, well they're awkward questions...
MR: Mmmm, they are...
MRS: We've just contradicted ourselves really [laughs]...
MR:	 Yeah.. .yeah [pensively]...
Q:	 If there were a flood, would that be worth having that out there?
MR:	 Yeah I think it would. Yes it would but as I said before we started we are all for...
MRS: Yes that's it, we're not against it...
MR:	 No we weren't against it. I don't think anybody here was against it...
MRS: No, everybody wanted it.. .but the whole thing is, that is grotesque isn't it. If it was a bit lower,
that's all we wanted wasn't it'?"
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